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Abstract 
Over the decades ago the challenge of the housing policies in the developing countries 
was to ensure that basic accommodation needs are met and at an affordable price to the 
majority of the citizens (Harris & Arku, 2007; Tibaijuka, 2009). However, at the same 
time, housing challenges in developing countries have arisen due to rapid population 
growth and urbanisation. As a result, governments of these countries face tremendous 
pressure to provide housing especially decent and affordable for the low-income group 
(LIG). Meanwhile, there are many especially among the LIG without adequate and 
affordable housing for now and in the future. Naturally, these dynamics require a policy 
framework and institutional mechanism that focus on addressing the housing supply to 
cope with the increasing demand on a sustainable basis. Due to the failure of the prior 
strategies in the developing countries, beginning in the 1980s, there has been a 
paradigm shift in low-income housing policies of these countries from state to market 
driven delivery. As a result, it is being debated on whether neo-liberal housing policy is 
capable of producing an inclusive and sustainable housing policy outcome.  
Against this background, a comparative study of low-income housing policy is used to 
explore how and why there are differences in housing trajectories in Malaysia and 
Nigeria. The study conceptual framework was based on institutional analysis using 
structure and agency models within the purview of new institutional economics. As 
premises of the thesis, these are basic to the understanding of the countries housing 
policy trajectories in convergence and divergence. Using the case study method, the 
study results are based on semi-structured and structured questionnaires administered to 
the public sector policy makers and private sector developers; and LIG households 
respectively. In addition to, the study data depends on secondary sources.  
The findings of the study show in spite of the similarities between Malaysia and 
Nigeria low-income housing policies implemented have produced markedly different 
and even divergent outcomes, with clear signs of differential impact and experience. 
Also, the findings indicate that with a more developmentalist state, has more effective 
implementable low-income housing policy that drives a broader outcome. Similarly, 
the main findings of this study, not to our surprise, are that national institutional 
structures and agency responses play an important role in the shaping and determining 
outcomes of the low-income housing policies. They also highlight the importance of 
situating housing in a broader institutional context which emphasises the state as an 
institution matters. These findings establish that the policy success differs according to 
the state advancing the fundamental institutional legal, fiscal and regulatory 
frameworks.  
From the Nigerian context, the case study findings suggest that low-income housing 
policy strategy has to be state-driven rather than state withdrawal, especially under the 
neoliberal agenda. On the other hand, from the Malaysian context informed the 
understanding that this policy requires state political commitment and will concern as 
the most explicit determinant of success. To this, both contexts emphasises the 
limitations of the prevailing policy focus on ‗roll-out‘ of state in low-income housing 
policy.  Hence, to reinvent an inclusive housing policy outcome, and avoid the possible 
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consequence this may have for housing delivery by market-led delivery, success 
presupposes state advancing the interest of its market and society. As a result, the 
overall ‗vicarious experiences‘ policy learning is that the study context point to the 
significance of policy autonomy, the institutional framework of implementation, 
political will and commitment, socio-economic fundamentals and having competent 
market as a partner. The cross-national comparisons undoubtedly miss the crucial 
aspects of change over time in LIG housing delivery. Hence, there is a need for 
longitudinal comparisons and thorough policy research as a basis for sound low-income 
housing policy. 
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Abstrak 
Kepentingan sektor perumahan dalam pembangunan ekonomi dan sosial negara tidak 
boleh lebih penekanan. Perumahan merupakan elemen utama dalam menjana 
pertumbuhan dan pembangunan ekonomi. Keadaan perumahan mempunyai kesan 
positif yang kukuh kepada pertumbuhan dan pembangunan masyarakat. Sejak beberapa 
dekad yang lalu, cabaran berkaitan dasar perumahan yang dihadapi negara-negara 
membangun adalah untuk memastikan bahawa keperluan penginapan asas dipenuhi dan 
disediakan pada harga yang berpatutan kepada majoriti rakyat (Harris & Arku, 2007; 
Tibaijuka, 2009). Walau bagaimanapun, pada masa yang sama, cabaran yang dihadapi 
negara-negara membangun ini semakin mencabar disebabkan oleh pertumbuhan 
populasi penduduk yang pesat dan urbanisasi. Oleh yang demikian, kerajaan di negara-
negara ini menghadapi tekanan yang besar dalam menyediakan perumahan terutama 
yang baik dan berpatutan untuk LIG. Sementara itu, terdapat ramai penduduk terutama 
di kalangan LIG yang tidak mempunyai perumahan yang cukup dan berpatutan pada 
masa sekarang dan masa hadapan. Sememangnya, dinamik ini memerlukan satu rangka 
kerja dasar dan mekanisme institusi yang memberi tumpuan dalam menangani 
permintaan bekalan perumahan yang semakin meningkat secara berterusan. Disebabkan 
kegagalan strategi yang digunakan sebelum ini di negara-negara membangun, bermula 
pada 1980-an, terdapat satu anjakan paradigma dalam dasar perumahan bagi golongan 
berpendapatan rendah di negara-negara ini daripada negeri kepada penghantaran yang 
didorong oleh pasaran. Hasilnya, persoalan sama ada dasar perumahan neo-liberal 
mampu menghasilkan hasil perumahan dasar yang inklusif dan mampan dibahaskan. 
Dengan latar belakang ini, satu kajian perbandingan dasar perumahan berpendapatan 
rendah dijalankan untuk meneroka bagaimana dan mengapa terdapat perbezaan dalam 
trajektori perumahan di Malaysia dan Nigeria. Rangka kerja konseptual kajian dibuat 
berdasarkan analisis institusi yang menggunakan struktur dan model agensi dalam 
bidang kuasa ekonomi institusi yang baru. Sebagai premis tesis, ini adalah asas kepada 
pemahaman tentang dasar trajektori perumahan negara di penumpuan dan perbezaan. 
Menggunakan kaedah kajian kes, hasil kajian adalah berdasarkan soal selidik separa 
berstruktur dan berstruktur yang diberikan kepada pembuat dasar sektor awam; pemaju 
sektor swasta, dan isi rumah LIG. Dan data kajian juga, bergantung kepada sumber-
sumber sekunder. 
Dapatan kajian menunjukkan walaupun terdapat persamaan antara Malaysia dan 
Nigeria dasar perumahan berpendapatan rendah yang dilaksanakan menghasilkan hasil 
yang sangat berbeza dan walaupun berbeza, dengan tanda-tanda jelas kesan pembezaan 
dan pengalaman. Seterusnya, dapatan kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa dengan 
keadaan lebih developmentalist, mempunyai pelaksanaan dasar perumahan 
berpendapatan rendah yang lebih berkesan dan mendorong kepada hasil yang lebih 
luas. Tambahan pula, penemuan utama kajian ini, tidak mengejutkan kami, adalah 
bahawa struktur institusi kebangsaan dan jawapan agensi memainkan peranan penting 
dalam membentuk dan menentukan dasar-dasar perumahan berpendapatan rendah. 
Mereka juga menekankan kepentingan menempatkan perumahan dalam konteks 
institusi yang lebih luas yang menekankan negeri sebagai perkara institusi. Penemuan 
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ini membuktikan bahawa kejayaan polisi berbeza mengikut asas rangka kerja undang-
undang, fiskal dan pengawalseliaan institusi yang dimajukan negeri. 
Dalam konteks Nigeria, penemuan kajian kes mencadangkan bahawa strategi dasar 
perumahan berpendapatan rendah perlu didorong dan bukannya pengeluaran negeri, 
terutama di bawah agenda neo-liberal. Sebaliknya, dalam konteks Malaysia 
dimaklumkan bahawa pemahaman dasar ini memerlukan komitmen politik negeri dan 
akan kebimbangan sebagai penentu kejayaan yang paling jelas. Untuk itu, kedua-dua 
konteks menekankan batasan fokus dasar semasa mengenai 'roll keluar' negeri dalam 
dasar perumahan berpendapatan rendah. Oleh itu, untuk mencipta semula hasil dasar 
perumahan yang inklusif, dan bagi mengelakkan kemungkinan kesan perkara ini 
terhadap penghantaran perumahan melalui penghantaran yang diterajui pasaran, 
kejayaan diandaikan sekiranya kerajaan memajukan kepentingan pasaran dan juga 
masyarakatnya. Hasilnya, keseluruhan dasar pembelajaran 'mewakili pengalaman' 
adalah bahawa konteks kajian menekankan kepentingan dasar autonomi, pelaksanaan 
rangka kerja institusi, kemahuan dan komitmen politik, keperluan asas sosioekonomi 
dan keperluan mempunyai pasaran yang kompeten sebagai rakan kongsi. Perbandingan 
rentas nasional sememangnya terlepas aspek penting dalam aspek perubahan 
penyampaian perumahan LIG dari semasa ke semasa. Oleh itu, terdapat keperluan 
dalam perbandingan membujur dan juga penyelidikan dasar yang menyeluruh sebagai 
asas dasar perumahan kos rendah yang berkesan. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction 
―He who knows only one country, knows none‖  
(Professor Seymour Martin Lipset (1922-2006) quoted in Diamond (2007) 
1.1Background of the study 
The paradigm shift in housing policies of developing countries have been widely reported 
in the literature (Jones & Datta, 2000; Pugh, 1994b; Tomlinson, 2002). The shift was 
informed for a number of reasons. The popularly promoted was the failure of the 
government direct provider approach. In the developing countries, it was argued in the past 
and in recent years that the governments have not performed to their citizen expectations in 
delivery housing to low-income group (LIG). As a result, like housing policy scholars 
(Angel, 2000; Drakakis-Smith, 2000; Ogu, 1999; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001; Pugh, 1994b; 
Sivam, Evans, King & Young, 2001) and international organisations (e.g., UNCHS, 1990; 
UNCHS, 1996; World Bank, 1993b, 2000, 2002) informed these countries were 
encouraged to shift the low-income housing policy (LIHP) paradigm from the 
government‘s  provider to market-led driven.  
Interestingly, the paradigm shift became a singular policy of multi-lateral and international 
financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, who is the leading advocate of housing 
sector reform in developing countries along the path of neo-liberal ideology (Pugh, 1994b). 
This change of governance mechanisms is envisioned to serve as the appropriate 
mechanisms that will bring about change in the LIHP goals of delivering housing to the 
LIG-efficiently, cheaply and qualitatively and quantitatively. The policy contexts for this 
are the efforts to bring housing supply and demand into greater balance. Accordingly, by 
1993 the governments in developing countries had succumbed to the adoption of this new 
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LIHP reform (World Bank, 1993b) and buttressed on the change of the paradigm from 
these countries was done by Sandhu & Aldrich (1998:209). Implicitly,  the policy makers 
in most of these countries have reconsidered the rules of the game in housing delivery in 
their countries, cutting across all the countries irrespective of ideologies to the domineering 
market-led delivery mechanism (Linneman & Megbolugbe, 1994).  
The pressing reform for the expansion of the private market in the ‗enabling strategy‘ is 
intended for the development of the housing sector as a whole rather than on relying on 
project based approaches (Pugh, 1994a). Policy recommendations arising from such stand 
point concentrate on adjustments (Pugh, 1992, 1995c). It is expected of the reform to 
refocus housing market supply and demand through the deregulation and institutional 
development of housing markets in developing countries (Pugh, 1992). This is in order to 
overcome largely external constraints to more efficiently market mechanisms (Choguill, 
2007; Keivani & Werna, 2001a).  
Accordingly, to keep pace with demand, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were sought as 
alternative delivery systems (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011; 
Sengupta, 2006b). The major issues that arise with the paradigm shift are the questions 
whether these countries are in possession of preconditions regarding the institutional and 
legal environment, state commitment, financial and market robustness to attain the desired 
objectives. Therefore, it is the argument of this study that for the paradigm shifts in LIHP 
to thrive there must be in existence capable institutional structure and robust agency. 
Accordingly, what appears to be a common policy shift needs to be better understood; its 
national nuances explored, and its implications for the LIG housing delivery considered. 
Evidences of the ongoing policies are gathered from the Kuala Lumpur and Abuja, 
representing the capital cities of Malaysia and Nigeria respectively. 
3 
 
Against this background, there has been a recent upsurge in researches on low-income 
housing in both developed and developing countries within the study of LIHP. This is 
mainly due to under the second wave of neo-liberalism (Argent, 2007). The market-led 
housing delivery is increasingly raising concern on its suitability as well as the competence 
of the policy. The reform that incorporates formal market as the new agent of focus and 
attention reaffirmed the researchers concern.  
However, in reality there was a bias towards enabling the formal private sector (Keivani & 
Werna, 2001b). The LIHP in practice is argued favours more of the formal private sector 
(Keivani & Werna, 2001b; Sengupta, 2006b). The private developers, the new agent is of 
delivery expected to be complex and constrained by the institutional environment similar 
to the preceding approach under a government led delivery. Thus, the market-led LIHP, 
with its emphasis on formal private developers has a real analytical value of how such 
policy paradigm shift has influenced the outcomes of developing countries' LIHP. This 
study argue that if more focus is needed on market rather state, then the critical dimension 
should place emphasis on the nature of the institutional relationships between state and 
market as well as the society. In particular, it raises a question as to how be the LIG 
interest could be guaranteed under the reform dispensation? How does the reform impact 
upon their housing outcome? What convergence and divergence does such reform provide 
in a comparative focus? 
Consequently, this study focuses on LIHP. The policy is driven by formal private sector 
participation in housing delivery for LIG within the broader World Bank enablement LIHP 
framework. Since its debut there has been appraised of its performance from the 
establishments that sold it to the developing countries (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006; 
Struyk, 1990; UN-Habitat, 2006; UNCHS, 1991b, 1996). However, the evaluations of 
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enablement by its sponsors, the reports were more of non-empirical generalisations than 
evidence, mostly based on  what Forbes (2011) called ‗a helicopter view‘. Such world 
view of the enablement researches in most cases remains an abstraction to the reality on 
the ground in the developing countries. This is why often the findings expressed in 
universalising and unidirectional outcomes became challenged against the realities in these 
countries. Hence, the focus adopted by the researchers has now moved to evaluation of the 
‗enablement‘ strategy practice at national contexts. In order to generate literature on what 
works and what does not (Ganapati, 2009; Jones & Datta, 2000; Keivani, et al., 2008; 
Mukhija, 2001; 2004; Yeboah, 2005).  
Overall, this study seeks to make a contribution to the knowledge gap by examining its 
practice in comparative terms in Malaysia and Nigeria. Accordingly, more need to be done, 
especially when the subject is not well understood from country contexts (Keung, 1985) 
and the need to understand the contradictions the policy strategies have generated 
(Mukhija, 2004) for possible solutions. Similarly, this study is contributing to the limited 
literature on formal private sector under the enablement LIHP in the form of synergy 
between public and private sector practice in developing countries along the pioneers. 
Finally, this study argues that having the right institution is crucial, in whatever form of 
strategy, pursued to address the LIG housing. This position interprets why some society‘s 
LIHP performance under the paradigm dwindles to further exclusion of LIG. While in 
some become much more successful in creating more inclusive outcome in performance. 
1.2 Statement of research problem 
Low-income housing policy (LIHP) is a public policy issue that during the past decades 
has been surrounded by policy developments (Arku & Harris, 2005). In developing 
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countries, the issue for the LIG housing has generated concern substantially in their 
development phases (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005; Rondinelli, 1990). These issues 
includes, the proliferation of squatter settlements (Lemanski, 2009), estimated at over one 
billion of people living in such settlements (Choguill, 2007). Also there was failure to 
generate sufficient financial resources to meet the housing demands and as such creates 
shortage which impacts systematically on the poor (Tomlinson, 2007).  
To this end, has led governments to the formulation of policies and strategies that are 
aimed at addressing the low-income group (LIG) housing challenge. This is the prevailing 
significance in developing countries, where the government is the sole or dominant actor in 
all spheres of economy and public service delivery (Njoh, 2006). Consequently, 
developing countries are in the lead in formulating and implementing low-income housing 
policies since in the second half of the 20
th
 century (Arku & Harris, 2005). However, most 
of these policies failed to satisfy the desired objectives (Hordijk & Baud, 2006). Some of 
these reasons being that existing formal public structure, proven too outdated and 
inappropriate to meet these challenges (Fekade, 2000; Jaycox, 1977).  
Over the years these countries transformation in terms of population and urbanisation 
increases have left to governments with many challenges to contain. For instance, in 
Nigeria,  UN-Habitat (2008) estimated that the unmet housing demand was over 16 million 
units and more than 75% of the population live in informal settlements. Over the past 
decades, the strategies pursued failed to significantly address the LIG housing deficits in 
most of these countries. The LIG suffer most of housing shortages and costs, and exclusion 
of LIHP strategy outcomes. The challenge has deepened on government housing policies 
to address.   
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Coincidentally, the theory and practice of LIHP have converged in the last century on two 
factors, namely, government retreat and market as the catalyst of housing delivery, most 
especially to the LIG in not only the developing (Pugh, 1994a), but also in the developed 
countries (Carr & Mulcahy, 2010). The shift has been on LIHP guided by market-led 
principles, structures and standards. Hence, the 21
st
 century will undoubtedly be dominated 
by the private sector delivery. The private sector delivery, most especially the LIG 
housing, is an attempt to reduce the role of the state by a corresponding expansion of the 
role of the private sector provision and financing (Linneman & Megbolugbe, 1994). In 
Malaysia the experience of the past three decades has been that the housing of the LIG is a 
major development agenda of the government (Agus, 1997). However, over the same 
decades the Nigeria experience, with the LIG housing worsened rapidly and has become a 
major challenge for government to address (Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). 
Accordingly, the developing countries have realigned their low-income housing policies 
overwhelmingly by adopting the enablement strategy which involved transferring the role 
of housing delivery to the private sector (Linneman & Megbolugbe, 1994). The impact of 
neo-liberalism is the emergence of deregulation, privatisation and PPPs. Therefore, the 
LIHP reform is generated and led mainly by the international institutions such as the IMF 
and World Bank. 
The specific operational implementation of the enablement paradigm of housing policies in 
developing countries is through the PPP participation framework. The current paradigm 
shift demand for empirical researches with a view of determining its viability and 
appropriateness in achieving inclusive housing provision in these countries. The impacts of 
the enablement and its associated strategy of partnerships  Mukhija (2004) opined were not 
yet adequately defined, researched and thus its effectiveness apparently appeared 
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doubtable. Most current research issues are identified to be an identification of 
comparative institutional governance competence of enablement (partnership) (Jerzy 
Henisz, 2006). Hence, the concern on how the institutional governance of the partnership 
is emerging constitutes a topical issue for further research (Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010). 
Similarly, the policy analysis needs to be acquainted with how the state re-conceived the 
LIHP and how this has impacted on the LIG. 
However, there has been relatively not much being done in the context of private sector 
driven in the provision of low income housing in Malaysia and Nigeria, though pioneer 
ones are emerging (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011; Adegun & Taiwo, 2011; Ibem, 
2011a, 2011b; Salleh, 2008).  Yet a high potential for new research findings remains. 
Since, the contentions issue in the literature is whether these new actors of housing 
delivery are capable of radically transforming and would produce a major impact on 
housing the LIG in developing countries (Keivani & Werna, 2001a; Mukhija, 2004). What 
is commonly available over the years were on the evaluation of the prior strategies 
employed and later justifications or wisdoms behind the intervention of the market. This 
thesis, therefore, intends to bridge this gap. It is intended to contribute in line with the call 
made by Koepel & Ramanath, (2001:448-449) 
―to develop a more rigorous conceptualization of partnerships… It is important to 
advance this effort before then… over promised partnerships make this another 
passing fad in our attempts to solve development problems.” 
The question being asked is the private developers capable of reversing the government 
provider past decades of shortage and inadequate supply of LIG housing in developing 
countries. 
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This research studied LIHP in comparative terms using two countries, namely, Malaysia 
and Nigeria, which has not been explored at doctoral level (Table 1.1). These previous 
researches have covered wide range of issues relevant to this study. However, they are not 
very specific to this study area of interest. Malaysia and Nigeria, both have adopted the 
enablement (private sector driven) policy framework in housing delivery for the LIG. The 
choice of Malaysia and Nigeria were on the basis that both countries had adopted of 
private-sector driven LIHP. In other words, the question is whether the current policy 
increases the economic performance of the housing delivery sector, adjusting with strong 
presence of the LIG from its outcome. Again, how does the change impacted on the role of 
the state and the market in these processes of LIHP changes, in a way to improve the 
housing delivery to the LIG. All these issues and concerns are subject of review and debate 
in the LIHP literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table 1.1: Partial list of Ph.D theses on low-income housing policy and related issues 
in Malaysia and Nigeria 
Name Ph.D thesis title/university Methods Findings 
1.Thalha, M. 
(1980) 
Policy formulation and institutions 
building for public housing in 
Peninsular Malaysia, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, USA 
Mixed method  Shows the discrepancy 
between the ideal and actual 
national housing policy and 
this informed the proposal of a 
model housing policy with an 
institutional model for 
implementation 
2. Dlakwa, H. D. 
(1984) 
Implementing federal development 
project at the state level in Nigeria: 
the case of federal low-cost housing 
scheme 1980-1983, University of 
Pittsburgh. 
Qualitative 
method 
The established the failure of 
the federal low-cost housing 
scheme of 1980-83 to provide 
housing to LIG. Responsible 
factors were identified as the 
constraints 
3. Endau, I (1984) Public housing policy in Peninsular 
Malaysia, Texas A & M University, 
USA 
Qualitative 
method 
Substantial progress has been 
made by Malaysian 
government in meeting the 
housing of its citizen, though 
dealt in an ad hoc manner.  
4. Agba, E.G. 
(1986) 
A study of problems in new urban 
development and construction: the 
case of Abuja the new federal 
capital of Nigeria, Massachusetts of 
Technology, USA 
Qualitative 
method 
The FCDA processes of urban 
land and housing allocation 
tended to be biased in favour 
of the upper-middle and high-
income segment of the urban 
population. 
5. Morah, E. U. 
(1990) 
The implementation of public 
policy in developing countries: a 
case study of housing in Nigeria‘s 
new capital city at Abuja, 
University of British Columbia 
Mixed 
methods 
The disposition of policy 
officials greatly influences 
implementation outcome 
regardless of planning 
intentions. 
6. Onyeacholem, 
H. U. (1991) 
An evaluation of government 
policies in the provision of low-
income housing in Benin city, 
Nigeria, University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne, UK 
Quantitative 
method 
It was found that the sites and 
services is the preferred policy 
option subject to the 
availability of mortgage 
financing 
7. Yousoff, N. 
(1994) 
A culturally appropriate and 
economically housing delivery 
system for Malay urban low-income 
households in Malaysia, Texas A & 
M University, USA 
Quantitative 
method 
The policy of constructing 
ready-built housing units was 
not effective for Malay urban 
LIG in Malaysia.  
8. Abdullah, A. 
M. (1995) 
State housing provision in Sarawak: 
an examination of accessibility, 
habitability, sustainability and 
affordability: the case of the 
Sarawak Housing and Development 
Commission, Malaysia, University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK 
Quantitative 
method/ 
regression 
analysis 
The causes of the poor 
performance lie mainly on the 
supply side of the housing 
market. Thus, the success or 
failure any approach depends 
heavily on the rules within 
which it has to operate 
9. Hamzah, M. 
(1997) 
Housing policy in Malaysia: 
conditions, perspectives and Islamic 
values, University of Leeds, UK 
Qualitative 
method 
Households receptive to 
modern values & interpreting 
Islamic values in the context of 
time and space. 
10. Salim, A. 
(1998) 
Owner-occupiers transformation of 
public low cost housing in 
Peninsular Malaysia, University of 
Quantitative 
method 
The policy in relation to 
planning provisions and 
designs in delivery of public 
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Newcastle upon Tyne, UK sector housing for the LIG will 
be subjected to transformation 
with or without government 
financial support in order to 
meet the households 
‗developing needs 
11. Zalanga, S. I. 
(2000) 
The postcolonial state and the 
development agenda: a comparative 
study of the role of ruling elites in 
the development policy formulation 
and implementation in Malaysia 
and Nigeria, University of 
Minnesota, USA 
Qualitative by 
comparative 
historical 
analysis 
method 
Development choices and 
implementation strategies are 
determined by multiple factors 
and type of ruling elite mediate 
these factors by shaping the 
development goals and 
implementation of strategies 
12. Abdul Aziz, 
W. N. A. (2007) 
Low-cost housing policy in 
Malaysia: the challenge of delivery, 
University of Dundee, UK 
Case study Low-cost housing has been 
successfully delivered and 
utilized by the state as a tool to 
achieve social integration and 
economic balance. 
13. Aluya, J. U. 
(2007) 
A phenomenological study of 
affordable housing for the middle-
income population in Abuja, 
Nigeria, University of Phoenix. 
Qualitative, 
phenomenolog
ical study 
The economic infrastructure 
affects housing for the middle-
income population 
Asek, B. M. 
(2007) 
The people's housing programme: a 
study on the implementation of 
Federal Government housing in 
Peninsular Malaysia,  University of 
Malaya 
Qualitative 
method/Case 
study 
The implementation of peoples 
housing programme has failed 
to achieve its objectives 
14. Adebowale, 
B. O. A (2009) 
Divergent development: technology 
and innovation in the oil palm 
sector in Malaysia and Nigeria, 
University of Malaya 
Mixed 
methods 
Divergent paths in the oil 
sector was observed and 
shaped by differences in 
institutional policy trajectories, 
among other factors 
15. Ndubueze, O. 
(2009) 
Urban housing affordability and the 
housing policy dilemmas in 
Nigeria, University of Birmingham. 
Quantitative 
method 
Shows very high levels of 
housing affordability problems 
in Nigeria with about 3 out of 
every 5 urban households 
experiencing such difficulties. 
16. Khalid, M. S. 
(2010) 
Abandoned housing development: 
the Malaysian experience, Heriot-
Watt University, Edinburg 
Quantitative 
method  
The cause of abandonment of 
housing projects relates to 
institutional factors and failure 
to respond to market signals. 
17. Said, R. 
(2010) 
Analysis of the inter-relationship 
between the housing market and 
housing finance system in 
Malaysia, University of Ulster 
Quantitative 
method 
 There is strong is a strong 
relationship between the 
housing market and the 
housing finance system, more 
specifically the primary 
mortgage market and the 
housing market. 
18. Hamzah, H. 
(2012) 
State intervention in housing the 
urban poor in the developing state 
of Terengganu in Malaysia: an 
institutional analysis of low-cost 
housing regulations and their 
impact on low-cost housing 
provision, Auckland University, 
New Zealand 
Qualitative 
method, time 
series 
regression 
It explicitly found the 
immense contribution of state 
authority in administering low-
cost housing policy. But the 
regulatory implementation to 
be weak.   
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1.3 Research aims and questions 
1.3.1 Research aims and questions  
The aim of this study is to examine the LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria context, under the 
paradigm of enablement. The study will provide answers to why there are trajectories 
differences in LIHP outcomes between the two countries 
The key research question is how policy implementation and institutional structure and 
agency contribute to facilitate a policy environment success in LIG housing delivery. 
Hence, the specific questions are as follows 
1. How does the institutional structure of the state enhance or constraint the extent of 
participation of the market and the LIG in Malaysia and Nigeria? 
2. What is the nature of LIHP framework in Malaysia and Nigeria under the 
enablement strategy?  
3. What are the roles played by the state and market as facilitators and enablers under 
the enablement LIHP strategy in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja? 
4. How does the LIHP practice change the housing outcome among the LIG in Kuala 
Lumpur and Abuja? In other words, how does it accommodate LIG in Kuala 
Lumpur and Abuja? 
1.3.2 Research objectives 
Hence, the specific objectives of the study are as follows:  
1. To identify and describe the nature of the countries institutional structure 
underlying the implementation of LIHP in meeting the LIG housing in Malaysia 
and Nigeria. 
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2. To describe the LIHP framework in Malaysia and Nigeria context. 
3. To describe how the institutional agents' strategies to accommodates LIG housing 
within the context of policy implementation in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. 
4. To examine how the strategy has impacted on LIG households in Kuala Lumpur 
and Abuja.  
These key research objectives are combined in the final Chapters to justify the definite 
position that would be taken concerning the above expressed aim of the study. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is presented in ten Chapters. The following are brief outlines of these 
compositions. 
Chapter One as introductory, introduces the major issues relating to the LIHP, raising key 
research questions to be answered in the subsequent Chapters.  
Chapter Two looks at the concept and context of enablement LIHP. It explores the 
evolution and meaning of enablement LIHP in order to develop a consistent interpretation. 
It includes a review of the relevant development changes in the LIHP environment in the 
developing countries. It also single out the persistence of the issues and outcomes in the 
developing country's LIHP environment. The unresponsive nature of government-led and 
project-based approaches to LIG housing informed the emergence of policy consensus in 
the 1980s in favour of market-led. It is against this general overview that this study 
recognised another round of strategy in the form of a major shift to market-led in LIHP in 
developing countries. 
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Chapter Three covers the institutional analysis as theoretical basis that underpin this study. 
This Chapter focuses particularly on institutional analysis and new institutional economics. 
It describes the nature of these frameworks and how it is used in housing studies.  
Chapter Four of the thesis is devoted to research methodology, looking at the research 
methods used in the course of data collection and analysis on LIHP in Malaysia and 
Nigeria. Specifically, the research methodology adopted is a case study under two pronged 
approaches, namely, qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative semi-structured interview 
question was addressed to the research stakeholders, which include the public sector 
agency officials and private developers. Conversely, quantitative data were collected using 
structured questionnaires from a total of 900 household respondents in eleven housing 
estates in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. The method of data analysis employed includes 
content and descriptive statistical analyses. 
Chapters Five describes the institutional structures of Malaysia and Nigeria. This Chapter 
focuses particularly on political, governance, economic and socio-demographic structures 
of each of the countries and their capital cities. It is this Chapter that shows parallels 
between the countries in developmental trajectories. The examination of these issues is to 
prove that context matters to any aspect of policy implementation and its outcome. 
Chapter Six describes housing policies in Malaysia and Nigeria within the institutional 
structure of the countries as well as local context respectively. Expectedly, Malaysia and 
Nigeria housing policies shows a commonality in objectives and focus being both 
prioritised on LIG. 
Chapter Seven answers the research question number three of the study. It does so by 
analysing the role of agents in relation to the LIHP strategy implementation. The policy 
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strategy considered is public-private partnership. This study presented the findings 
according to three modified key areas of housing delivery, namely, pre-implementation, 
implementation and post-implementation. From the implementations of the strategy in 
Kuala Lumpur and Abuja the similarities and differences are presented. The issue of 
institutional structure in responding to the agent‘s robustness in the implementation 
process are demonstrated.  
Chapter Eight of answers the research question number four of the study. This thesis 
assesses the outcomes of the LIHP strategy on the target beneficiaries, namely LIG 
households. Not surprisingly, the overall finding shows contrasting outcomes in Kuala 
Lumpur and Abuja. 
Chapter Nine contains the discussion of the findings of the study. The Chapter discussion 
informed on the findings of the study, reflecting on their significance in answering the 
research questions of the study as well as their distinctive contributions.  
Chapter Ten provides the summary of this study, by joining together the key questions of 
the study. The summary of the findings shows three broad findings emerged. First, LIHP 
has grown substantially and has penetrated deeply in the country's policy arenas. Secondly, 
the changes in the policy have led to the increasing role of the market. In this context, the 
complex state, market and society partnership emerging. Thirdly, however, the context 
shows divergence the role the state continues to play under the paradigm shift in the policy 
arena. Consequently, this role played by the state resulted in also similar divergent 
outcomes in terms of LIG housing delivery outcomes in the country‘s context. Thus, it is 
the conclusion of this study that the domestic institutions matter in the LIHP outcome. 
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Accordingly, this comparative study context on both accounts provides a critique of the 
market-led LIHP as practised by these countries.  
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Enablement low-income housing policy, strategy and low-
income group housing 
2.1 Introduction 
The first Chapter, the emerging synergy between state, market and society under the 
platform of enablement is highlighted as the new housing policy paradigm in developing 
countries. This Chapter, therefore, reviews the low-income housing policy (LIHP) in 
developing countries and the enablement strategy in their entirety. The review intends to 
situate the present study within the context of other empirical study‘s findings with regard 
to housing the low-income group (LIG) issues advancing and emerging. Furthermore, the 
review aims to establish how the current study fit into the existing literature.  The more 
pertinent concern usually being expressed, what are implications of housing opportunities 
and challenges of the LIG, and LIHP implementation under the new order? Naturally, the 
question of the distributional impact of the socio-economic dynamism in LIHP always 
arises. Similarly, the issue of the mechanics of interaction between states, markets and 
society reconfigured in the LIHP hierarchy remains a contentious issue. It is therefore, 
significant to consider the conceptual and empirical basis of the enablement and to assess 
its wider implications in LIHP, in particular housing the LIG, in developing countries.  
2.2 Low-income housing policy context prior to enablement 
A historical literature review of the LIHP prior to enablement constitutes the focus of this 
section. Firstly, it is important to recognise that there has been a lot of literature generated 
for the few decades prior to the formal emergence of the enablement policy in the 
developing countries. The literature adequately highlighted the nature, extent and intensity 
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of the housing problems confronting the LIG across developing countries. In part, because 
the implemented policies were equally not producing appropriate housing for the LIG, 
rapidly and economically and in consequence, the few units provided were not affordable 
to the majority, whether for renting or buying. Instead, the bulk of the few units were taken 
by the middle-and high-income groups. As the various strategies deployed to resolve these 
housing problems, have been studied and evaluated. However, it is actually difficult to 
summarise the voluminous literature, it is fair to give an overview of such according to the 
strands of themes emerging, namely: 
2.2.1 Government housing programme 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on public sector direct provision 
programme too numerous to mention but only a few (Ikejiofor, 1999a; Malpezzi & Sa-
Aadu, 1996; Mayo, Malpezzi, & Gross, 1986; Ogunshakin & Olayiwola, 1992; Okpala, 
1986). These cited literature were very particular in their findings that the government 
housing programmes have failed to provide affordable housing to the majority of citizens 
in developing countries (Drakakis-Smith, 2000). In particular, (Malpezzi & Sa-Aadu, 
1996:133) argued that “these policies have discouraged housing investment, and have 
been both inequitable and distortional.” While, the overall assessment of this approach by 
UNCHS (1991a:16) concluded that “public-sector intervention in the shelter-delivery 
process can be summed up as problem of insufficient coverage, affordability by 
beneficiaries, lack of replicability and, to a lesser degree, social acceptability”. Hence, 
there were movements to find alternative workable strategy. On this basis, the 
governments in these countries were implored to disengage from direct provision and 
deregulate the housing market and institute support with the right incentives to enable the 
private sector to realise an efficient housing market (World Bank, 1993b).  
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2.2.2 Land and informal housing market 
The development of informal housing market appears prominently in the LIHP discourse 
in the developing countries (Mistro & Hensher, 2009; Jamaluddin, 2005; Kombe & 
Kreibich, 2000; Gonzalo Lizarralde & Root, 2008b; Yeboah, 2005; 1987). The central 
theme emerging appears to be associated with the development, financing, and its 
challenges in the policy arena. Furthermore, its contributions in terms of positive and 
negatives in housing the bulk of the urban residents, and the issue of symptom of LIHP 
failure, among others.  
There are many issues associated with the emergence of the informality of housing supply. 
Firstly, the developing countries are recognised with the highest urbanisation rates (UN-
Habitat, 2010a). However, the housing supplies from government and formal private 
developers proven to be inelastic, means that the informal private market constitutes the 
major alternative source of housing supply (Malpezzi, 1990; Malpezzi & Sa-Aadu, 1996). 
The failure of formal sector market accentuates the emergence of informal housing 
(Lemanski, 2009). The administrative inefficiencies apparent in land matters have been 
duly reported (Egbu, Olomolaiye, & Gameson, 2007, 2008; Garba, 1997; Whitehead, 
2007) and land agencies do not enjoy the citizens' confidence (Akingbade, Navarra, 
Zevenbergen, & Georgiadou, 2012b). 
Conclusively, it is recognised in the alternative, there is a predominance of the informal 
land markets as the major source patronised by the LIG and for most of the new housing in 
developing countries (Lemanski, 2009; Swindell & Mamman, 1990). Furthermore, , the 
informal source of land enjoyed peculiarities of being affordable, immediate possession 
and associated with no bureaucracy (Ikejiofor, 1998a). These cited authors have imagined 
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what would be the housing situation in the absence of this source for the poor in 
developing countries and its implication under enablement LIHP.  
 2.2.3 Financing 
The persistence of the housing problem among the LIG in developing countries are being 
challenged with the problem of insufficient funding for the LIG housing, inadequate loan 
availability and poverty (UN-Habitat, 2002). Even where available was not tailored to LIG 
specific needs and corresponding affordability (Pillay & Naudé, 2006; Rahman, 1994) and 
where such are made available end up being trapped by the medium-and high-income 
groups (Angel, 2001).  
Additionally, commercial banks were not in aid of the housing financial system, by 
devoting a significant amounts of long-term financing, rather they tend to emphasise on 
short term credit (Pillay & Naudé, 2006; Rahman, 1994). Consequently, financing 
availability for housing has proven difficult in most of these countries (Haywood, 1986). 
More so when  the mortgage finance market remained basically undeveloped (Chiu, 1995; 
Pillay & Naudé, 2006). Notwithstanding, the mortgage institutions created did not 
significantly improve the affordability of individual home purchasers, as the system also 
did not create a robust mortgage financial market (Chiu, 1995). Thus, these are the 
prevailing conditions under which the LIG are expected to participate in a market-driven 
housing delivery system. 
Meanwhile, the over dominance of  the informal sector as the most popular source of 
housing among urban residents in developing countries is seen as a consequence absence 
of long–term financing and hence the informal and incremental housing dominates 
(Renaud, 1987). Consequently, under enablement the governments have emphasised on 
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particularly private housing finance system, as an important method for enabling 
households to build their effective demand for housing (Lea, 2005). This research will 
track the changes if any in the housing finance system of the countries under study. When 
it is the concern under the enablement to create “housing investment financed through the 
financial process and not through public expenditures” (Renaud, 1987:33). 
2.2.4 Planning, land use control and use of local building materials 
The adoption of western standards in planning and development of land use is contested in 
the literature (Alnsour & Meaton, 2009; Hadjri, 1993; Rukwaro, 2009; Watson, 2009b). 
Although, the buildings constructed with the imported are considered to be conferring a 
status of prestige on such owners and in addition also “offer higher standards of comfort 
and security as well as bringing in higher income from rents” (Wells, Sinda, & Haddar, 
1998:397). However, this literature recognises planning/formal standards to be biased in 
favour of imported building materials against the available local materials. It has been 
earlier forewarned on the developing countries against adopting such western standards in 
housing delivery for LIG that (Ha & Merrett, 1984). Therefore, a contest is set by the 
authorities between the minimum building and environmental standards and what can 
people afford (Njoh, 1995).  
In the subsequent years, the liberalisation implemented by developing countries resulted 
compounding the problem of housing, in rising steeply price of manufactured building 
materials (Wells et al., 1998). Consequently, high cost of development associated with the 
use of manufactured building materials contributed to make the modern housing to be 
outrageously unaffordable to the majority of LIG in developing countries. Even the 
enablement that supposes to adopt the use of local building materials, a recent study by 
21 
 
Arku (2009) shows that in Ghana there was no significant change to the use of such 
materials. 
The most unfortunate, with such concomitant there was a high rate of contravention of 
such development control in developing countries (Omuta, 1987; Rukwaro, 2009). The 
contraventions to an extent, have reversed the urban development concept of ‗planning-
servicing-building-occupation‘ in most the urban centres, with the proliferation of informal 
settlements. As a consequence, planning has become anti-poor and indeed “directly 
responsible for spatial and social marginalisation” of the poor in developing countries 
(Watson, 2009b:178). 
The above subsection summarises the LIHP context that was in existence before the advent 
of enablement, which constituted the obstacles of housing policy to strengthen all inclusive 
policies that benefit the LIG in developing countries. Similarly, such context constitutes 
the focus of the new paradigm of the housing policy to reform and address, to achieve a 
policy that could adequately provide shelter available to the LIG under the enablement 
strategy. The success of the strategy depends on the extent the strategy is able to contain 
such inadequacies, which were considered as the major impediments to scale up the LIG 
participation in housing delivery in most of developing countries. This section draws the 
relevance to our key research question on whether the paradigm shift favours the 
participation of LIG in housing delivery. The next section reviews the changes of the state 
as an agent to bring such reforms into effect to fall along the general principle of the 
structural reforms the new policy required to lay, as a springboard to achieve the capacity 
building of the institutional framework. 
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2.3 History of enablement strategy in housing policy discourse 
The concept of enablement can be considered simplify as a guide in housing policy reform 
emanating from an international interest. Technically, Angels defined the concept as an 
approach where “... houses are and should be constructed, financed, maintained, and 
exchanged by market (and sometimes civic) institutions and that government intervention 
in the housing market should be focused on enabling market to work” (Angel, 2001:179). 
The reform in this definition suggests that government is free from direct responsibility, 
but only the role of facilitating, co-ordinating and monitoring the development of the 
policy framework implementation.  
The idea of enablement is traceable though not really at the beginning at international 
housing policy discourse, it began from the 1970s and 1980s (Sengupta, 2006b). This was 
immediately after the blatant failure of direct housing provision by the government and its 
public agencies. The enablement was first nurtured under the self-help concept (Pugh, 
1994b). According to Yeboah (2005) argued the practice and debate on self-help housing is 
what nurtured the emergence of the concept of ‘enablement‘. Thus, the self-help and 
enabler concepts have long history prior to the present time when it is adopted and 
encouraged by the international institutions on governments of developing countries 
(Harris, 2003). Hence, enablement became more relevant when the World Bank and other 
international institutions started pursuing the neo-liberalism policies (Pugh, 1994a).  
The enablement as the next guiding principles appeared prominently in the United Nations 
Centre for Human settlements (UNCHS-Habitat) documents  and publications and from 
which the UNCHS (1990) Global Strategy for Shelter (GSS) developed and endorsed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations (Pugh, 1994a). The enablement as a paradigm 
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shift from the ‗provider‘ and self-help‘ phases, falls in the third phase of the period of mid-
1980s of LIHP evolution in the developing countries (Choguill, 2007) to adequately house 
the LIG as shown in Table 2.1. The strategy entails positioning of private sector and its 
market efficiency as the next vehicle for housing delivery, while the governments are to 
provide an enabling environment from its reformed institutions and regulations to ensure 
the sustainability of the market in the difficult task of bridging the polarise gap between 
demand and supply of housing and its related infrastructures in the developing countries 
(World Bank, 1993b). 
By the late 1980s the self-help thinking on LIHP of developing countries has transformed 
into a new concept of enablement (Table 2.1). The new paradigm of LIHP is recognised to 
have been first expressed in GSS (UNCHS, 1988). It was Habitat I conference that moved 
the motion of the paradigm shift in LIHP in developing countries from one of government 
dominance to enabling and participatory approach. The new paradigm as mentioned above 
intending to move LIHP from project based to become a strategy that goes in integrating 
the overall national economic planning framework with focus on decentralisation, demand 
driven development, privatisation and deregulation (Mukhija, 2004). At the time of Habitat 
II, all these documents were harmonised to become one as “adequate shelter for all” 
(UNCHS, 1997). The Habitat II resolves that the LIHP in developing countries required 
action beyond the governments, but to include the society as a whole, which comprises of 
the private sector, NGOs, and community organisations as well as international 
organisations and communities. The acknowledged sources that influence the adoption of 
the new policy are (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development., 1992; 
United Nations Development Programme., 1991; World Bank, 1993b; 1991). 
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Table 2.1: Evolution of World Bank housing policies 
Phase and approximate dates Focus of attention Major instruments 
Modernization and urban 
growth: 1960s and early 1970s 
Physical planning and 
production of shelter by public 
agencies 
Blueprint planning: direct 
construction of houses 
(apartment blocks, core houses); 
eradication of informal 
settlements 
Redistribution with growth/basic 
needs: 1970s-mid- 1980s 
State support to self-help 
ownership on a project-by-
project basis  
 
Recognition of informal sector; 
Squatter upgrading and sites and 
services; Subsidies to land and 
housing 
The enabling approach/urban 
management: late 1980s-
early1990s 
Securing an enabling framework 
for action by people, the private 
sector and markets  
Public/ private partnerships; 
Community participation; Land 
assembly and housing finance; 
Capacity building  
Sustainable urban development: 
mid-1990s onwards 
Holistic planning to balance 
efficiency, equity and 
sustainability  
As above with more emphasis on 
environmental management and 
poverty alleviation; Sustainable 
Cities Programme 
Habitat II: 1996 ‗Adequate shelter for all‘ and 
‗Sustainable human  settlements 
development‘ 
Culmination and integration of 
all previous policy 
improvements 
Millennium Summit: 2000 8 Millennium Development 
Goals and 18 Targets, including 
target on slums 
Millennium Development 
Project 
 
Istanbul +5: 2001 Review of the Habitat Agenda 
process 
Renew Habitat Agenda 
commitment and develops more 
strategies 
Source: UN-Habitat (2006:17) 
 
The seven broad features of the enablement according to World Bank (1993b) to serve as 
the guiding principles of creating private housing market that is efficient and constituting 
the inputs in the construction of the country's policy framework of the governments are 
shown in Table 2.2. These constitute at the core of the current paradigm shift in developing 
countries LIHP reform (Angel, 2001). The implementation priority of the reform features 
differs according to countries nature of economies. For instance the low-income countries, 
such as ours, the recommendation is to prioritise their reforms along the line of all the 
above seven features. 
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Table 2.2: The do’s and don’ts in enabling housing markets to work 
Instruments Do Don’t 
Developing property rights  Regularise land tenure 
 Expand land registration 
 Privatize public housing 
stock 
 Establish property taxation 
x Engage in mass evictions 
x Institute costly titling systems 
x Nationalise land 
x Discourage land transactions 
Developing mortgage 
finance 
 
 Allow private sector to 
lend 
 Lend at positive/market  
rates 
 Enforce foreclosure laws 
 Ensure prudential 
regulation 
 Introduce better loan 
instruments 
x Allow interest-rate subsidies 
 
x Discriminate against rental 
housing investment 
x Neglect resource mobilisation 
x Allow high default rates 
Rationalising subsidies 
 
 Make subsidies transparent 
 Target subsidies to the 
poor 
 Subsidise people, not 
houses 
 Subject subsidies to review 
x Build subsidised public 
housing 
x Allow for hidden subsidies 
x Let subsidies distort prices 
x Use rent control as a subsidy 
Providing infrastructure 
 
 Coordinate land 
development 
 Emphasise cost recovery 
 Base provision on demand 
 Improve slum 
infrastructure 
x Allow bias against 
infrastructure investments 
x Use environmental concerns as 
reason for slum clearance 
Regulating land and 
housing development 
 
 Reduce regulatory 
complexity 
 Assess costs of regulation 
 Remove prices distortions 
 Remove artificial shortages 
x Impose unaffordable standards 
x Maintain unenforceable rules 
x Design projects without link to 
regulatory/institutional reform 
Organising the building 
industry 
 
 Eliminate monopoly 
practices 
 Encourage small-firm entry 
 Reduce import controls 
 Support building research 
x Allow long permit delays 
x Maintain unenforceable rules 
x Institute regulations inhibiting 
competition 
x Continue public monopolies 
Developing a policy and 
institutional framework  
 Balance public/private 
sector roles 
 Create a forum for 
managing the housing 
sector as a whole 
 Developing enabling 
strategies 
 Monitor sector 
performance 
x Engage in direct public 
housing delivery 
x Neglect local government role 
x Retain financially 
unsustainable institutions 
Source: World Bank (1993b:46-47) 
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It is important to emphasise that the concept of enablement began with ambiguity. For 
instance UNCHS (1996) stated that the enablement would be pursued within the 
framework that addressed those areas where the private and unregulated markets do not 
work. The question is, in which areas that the private and unregulated markets do not 
work. The bulk of the housing needs of the poor are being met by these sources in most 
developing countries, especially in those countries where the formal supply is grossly 
inadequate. Of course researchers have these sorts of contradictions associated with the 
doctrine of enablement promoted by these international organisations (Mukhija, 2004). 
Then even the liberation of the market advocated in LIHP, the explicit details is not 
defined.  
2.4 Enablement and state reconfiguration 
The emergence of market as the driven focus of the public goods and services and the 
reconfiguration and changing role of the state has received substantial attention from the 
researchers. The researchers stated the dominant role and function of the state under the 
dispensation is changing (Jessop, 2001, 2002, 2009; Kumar, 2007; Kura, 2008; Jones 
Rhys, Godwin, Jones, & Pett, 2005;  2005). Such changes have been described using 
metaphors such ‗hollowing out‘; ‗filling in‘; ‗rolling out‘ or ‗rolling in‘; ‗retreat‘ of the 
state amongst others. Furthermore,  the changes are described as political modernisation 
which explain the new relationships between state, market and society in national, 
international and multi-level (Malpass & Rowlands, 2010; Steiner & Steiner, 2004).  In 
particular the contribution of Jessop (1998, 2001, 2002) is immense, using a metaphor of 
‗hollowing out‘ of the state. This is conceptualised as changes that reduced the pinnacle of 
the state roles and functions through the processes of destatisation of the political system, 
internationalisation of policy communities and networks and the denationalisation of state 
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capacities. While Harvey (1989) interpreted the change as a shift from managerial to 
entrepreneurial styles of governance. On the other hand (Jones Rhys et al., 2005) used the 
metaphor of ‗filling in‘ of the state to describe the reshaping of the state organisations, 
policies and strategies to contain the hollowing in within the state institutions and space. 
For instance, the example of ‗filling in‘ is given by Murie (2010) as de-municipalisation of 
housing provision. Common to all these authors, have succeeded to draw the attention on 
the changing position of the state from governed by government to governance at the 
different waves of the neo-liberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002). 
The governance concept appeared and popularised in the development discourse courtesy 
of the international institutions of the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s at the time 
when the economies of developing countries had degenerated under economism (Hewitt de 
Alcántara, 1998; Pagden, 1998). With the shift to governance, the state was expected to 
nurture the interdependence between public, private and voluntary sectors and as a 
reinvented form of government in the unfolding privatise and market–orientated societies 
(Stoker, 1998). Consistent with this understanding Stoker (1998:9) refers to governance as 
“complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government”. 
However,  Jessop (1998) ascribed two meanings to the concept. One, governance is 
associated to any mode of coordination of interdependent activities, comprises of ‗the 
anarchy of exchange, organisational hierarchy and heterarchy. Secondly, the heterarchy is 
defined to mean coordination through networks. According to these definitions, what is 
observable in enablement is more of quasi-hierarchy, where the public sector determines 
and provides the enablement incentives for the other stakeholders‘ participation by 
subordinating the other agents. The quasi hierarchy of governance and their associated 
policies are the result of “shifting the forms in which tendencies to „failure‟ are manifested 
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and creating room for manoeuvre” (Jessop, 1998:32). However, it is argued that there is 
tendency to further compound the problem as (Jones, 2001) using empirical study shows 
policy reform create a new set of social, political and geographical challenges. 
The advent of governance has wide implications on LIHP. It is part of multiple reforms 
been introduced that provide legitimacy for private and voluntary sector participation 
under enablement strategy. The fundamental challenge of governance is on how to respond 
to the housing delivery that affects LIG timely, transparently and equitably. In the 
developing countries, the reinvention of the state, such governance, is susceptible to the 
truncation of the political and economic elite and such constitute the bane of reforms by 
whatever name it is called. This is why Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, & Ostrom (2006) 
affirmed that accountable governance was required to be instituted to enable the citizens to 
demand and hold officials at any level of governance responsible for their actions. 
The changes implied that the reconfigured state is undergoing a transformation that equates 
it amongst many actors in the societal development and not as the main driver. As 
government transformation is released, what then the neoliberal ideology required is a 
legitimate function of the government only to guard the sanctity of the market (Harvey, 
1989; 2005). The enablement strategy as such is to function in dislodging the hierarchical 
steering by the state to a LIHP that is implemented in networks (Smith, 2003). The policy 
framework identified such networks to include private sector, community based 
organisations (CBOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOS) and of course the state 
agencies (UNCHS, 1990, 1997). Accordingly, Sengupta (2006b) and Booth (2005a) shows 
that the networks of non state actors appear in the policy implementation in the form of 
PPP, voluntary mechanisms, market instruments etc. The ultimate objective is to install 
improve performance and constitute a remedy to the various kinds of previous strategy 
29 
 
policy implementation problems which are caused by ‗traditional government‘ (Angel, 
2000). The government mechanism changed to governmentality whereby the non-state 
actors assuming a new position within the governance structure and processes (Dodson, 
2006). However, the state has been in the process of remaining (or regaining) its 
prominence through the process of ‗filling in‘ to the new structural trends.  
It is envisaged that the new opportunities offered for the non state actors, perhaps would 
strength the state capability in solving societal problems, the such as, housing accessibility 
and affordability. However, the said advantages offered by the dispersal of actors does not 
guarantee for solutions to such problems as we shall see below. Similarly, researches have 
brought to the fore the contradictions emerging in the changing role of the state (Harvey, 
1985; 1989; Mukhija, 2001; Murie, 2010; Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001). This point is explicit 
in relation to LIHP, in (Mukhija, 2001:792) claim that instead of the hollowing out and 
filling in of the state under enablement strategy 
“involves not only decentralisation but also some form of centralisation; not only 
privatisation but also new kinds of public investment; not only deregulation but 
also enforcement of new regulations; and not only demand-driven  development but 
also supply-driven initiatives...enabling housing provision through market 
mechanisms requires a different type of state involvement, not necessarily less state 
involvement”  
The New Political Economy (NPE) theory in housing requires a special mention as 
propounded by Pugh (1991, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b; 1997; 2001). The theory 
on ‗enablement‘ is identified to be part of neoliberal political economy expanded by 
multilateral and international institutions, especially the World Bank. Pugh (2001) states 
the new theory was not confined to economic neo-liberalism and the possible reduction of 
state rules. It is rather the configuration of state roles in policy-making and institutional 
reforms, to achieve bridging of individual and collective choice in the housing markets of 
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developing countries. According to Pugh (1994b) the evolution of World Bank policies 
developed with a focus upon special projects for LIG to a more comprehensive approach to 
securing whole sector housing development within a framework of market enablement. 
Although, the foundation of the NPE began excessively pro-market, expectedly did not set 
any role for the government. This development was associated with the public choice 
theory most prevalent in the US at that time (Pugh, 1992). The government machinery 
functioned not on the broad benefits of the citizens and the policy therefore, promoted 
setting in control in favour of the market alone (Pugh, 1992). However, post-1988 changes 
inclined in favour of government-market relationships. Within this premise, the state and 
its institutions, role in enablement includes creating new policies, institutional 
arrangements and legislation in property rights. Other institutional changes in the creation 
of the enabling environment include new ways of organising and managing government 
agencies, the development of new skills and wider cultural change in attitudes to connect 
people and firms to market type economic incentives (Pugh, 1991; 1994a, 1995a, 2001). 
Therefore, the researcher can argue the internationalisation of LIHP being dominated by 
the World Bank‘s enabling approach are based on the neo-liberal view, advocating markets 
and PPP as panacea for housing solutions in developing countries, inconsistent with such 
expression declared in  Pugh (1994a, b ), World Bank (1993b) and Angel (2000). 
Pugh (1994b, 1995a) identified the World Bank focus on the NPE was to find a lasting 
solution of the urban areas by developing and promoting LIG housing development 
through market-driven delivery. In particular, Pugh (1994b) mentioned that the World 
Bank financed sites and services across the developing countries and include slum 
upgrading. However,  while these projects produced mixed results the World Bank 
changed its policy from project based to whole sector housing development (Pugh, 1994a, 
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b; ; 1997). This means that the role of government under enablement was not only 
confined to institutional support but comprises all aspects of housing development 
programme (Pugh 1995c). Equally important, the policy has the focus of broadening the 
economic agents‘ opportunities to spur up their significant contribution to the national 
economy. Thus under the enablement, the desired objective was to raise the economic 
opportunities of both the firms and household (Pugh 1995c). The NPE constitute a kind of 
broader SAP policies, essentially to address those areas where the SAP failed to improve 
the welfare of the people. Pugh (1995c) did not deny the negative effects of SAP on the 
people. He argues NPE was the World Bank next paradigm to correct such distortions 
generated in the economy. 
The Pugh NPE has been subject of comments and criticism from scholars (Gaile, 1995; 
North, 1994; Strassmann, 1994; Yeung, 1995). Gaile, (1995) observed that the Pugh NPE 
is like the neoclassical economics, with a nod towards the institutional structure of the 
political system in favour of privatisation and market prices. He further criticised what 
Pugh called ‗homeorhesis‘ path-dependent institutionalism that would lead to further 
dysfunctional structures in developing countries. If it is path dependent, as North (1990:98-
99) puts it, NPE is then a process that might constraints future choice sets in developing 
countries' LIHP. 
“At every step along the way there are choices-political and economic-that 
provide... alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice 
set and link decision-making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which 
the past neatly predicts the future.” 
Furthermore, Yeung, (1995) position the NPE as ‗conditionality clause‘ to loan 
programmes of international financiers. Loans were made on the condition of ‗reform‘, on 
which he argues in most cases failed to produce sustainable improvements in the 
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developing countries. To prove this claim, he reviewed the glaring failures of these 
financiers SAP and further concludes that the NPE theory would not be an adequate 
panacea in the developing countries developments. Similarly, (Strassmann, 1994) 
emphasised that the neoliberal NPE which simplified housing analysis to state and market 
missed the starting point. The starting point is the one that should strengthen the state and 
that this is most needed in the course of developing countries' development. So he argued 
the simplifying the housing to the path dependent of NPE would result to omissions and 
distortion that would impede the progress of such countries. Fekade (2000:149) described 
the NPE reforms of land tenure to facilitate the market as a “double-edged sword” that 
would result in more densification of informal settlements, where typically 40% and in 
many cases 75% of urban low-income households in developing countries are housed.   
It is important to observe that the state roles and function dynamics are actually creating a 
new state of structure and the hemisphere of influence. However, the irony is that in the 
reconfiguration, there is over emphasis of sectional interest market structure above over 
others. Of course, the lopsidedness “may privilege some actors, some identities, some 
strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons over others” (Jessop, 2001:1223). Under 
enablement, what is the apparent market structure is being promoted against other broad 
base alternatives of housing delivery to the LIG. 
As states as state intervention are dispersed, the housing crisis that has engulfed the 
developing countries, the housing policies of such countries needs reconsideration. Indeed 
the government has a role to play (Abd Aziz, Hanif, & Ahmad, 2008; Quigley, 1999). The 
past experiences of both developing and developed countries has shown how government 
re-intervention have ameliorated the challenges of housing (Baharoglu, 1996; Bourassa & 
Peng, 2011; Memery, 2001; Meng, Wong, Man Hui, & Feng, 2004). Some of these 
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experiences arises, such as in Turkey, according to Baharoglu (1996) after the 
liberalisation of the economy, has  drastically affected the housing sector. The policy 
interventions both involved supply and demand of the housing market. However, to be 
successful before the intervention the state need to have a coherent policy framework to 
guide the implementation. The measures might consider a contravention of the paradigm of 
the current NPE ideology. Such intervention had registered significant improvement in 
ameliorating the housing affordability and accessibility for many households in the LIG 
category (Abd Aziz, 2007; Abd Aziz et al., 2008; Meng et al., 2004). 
Although, the ongoing reconfiguration of the state is questioned as explanation of state-
society dynamics (Jones Rhys et al., 2005). Undisputedly, the unfolding dynamics provide 
us an essential step forward, to the study, understand and subsequently guide to the 
identification of underlying current of such changes in the case study countries. This is 
referring to the transformation that shifts the LIHP in the developing countries to one of 
decentralisation and privatisation that reduces state provision and creates greater private 
sector participation in the LIG housing delivery. 
2.5 Enablement strategy practice in developing countries 
Over the years in developing countries, the government plays the sole or dominant role in 
all spheres of economy and public service delivery (Njoh, 2006). The governments set the 
regulations and institutional frameworks, to enable the fulfilment of its role, and formulate 
sectoral policies and programmes for economic, social and political development. 
However, most of these policies failed to satisfy the desired objectives (Hordijk & Baud, 
2006). Furthermore, existing formal public structure, have proven too outdated and 
inappropriate to meet these challenges (Fekade, 2000). The cost of major public housing 
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programmes continued to increase in the late-1960s, and critics began to argued that such 
policies were no longer fiscally or socially sustainable or necessary (Dodson, 2006). The 
housing deficit, both in terms of quality and quantity became so apparent, at a time when 
other developed countries, such as Japan are enjoying a housing surplus (Echeverry, 2007). 
The constraints explaining the failures are multi-faceted. Therefore, scholars have 
contributed with different reasoning‘s. For instance, Echeverry (2007) and Tomlinson 
(2007) attributed the failure to inability to generate sufficient financial resources to meet 
the infrastructural demands creates shortage which impact systematically on the poor. 
There are factors of unrealistic high standard in housing, zoning and public services (Ogu, 
1999; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001; Rukwaro, 2009) constrained housing delivery and this  
means that the scarce resources produce fewer units at costs beyond the means of the mass 
of people (Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). Administrative and conventional barriers stand in the 
way of the poor gaining access to secure land tenure and credit which are essential for 
housing (Arku, 2009; Fekade, 2000; 2009; Tomlinson, 2007).  
The debate in the literature and which has no conclusive position is whether informal or 
formal market should be vested with the responsibility and accorded to all the deserve 
policy support to work towards the attainment of the enablement objective on the platform 
of private sector driven housing delivery (Keivani & Werna, 2001a). The opponents of the 
enablement seem to strongly oppose the formal housing market to take charge of delivery 
of housing and enable by the state (Baken & van der Linder, 1993; Jones & Ward, 1995; 
Keivani & Werna, 2001b; Ortiz, 1996). The general position of these scholars is that the 
formal private market historically has never been on the vanguard of provision of housing 
to the LIG in developing countries and the objective of profit maximisation would deepen 
market failures and distortions. Specifically, Keivani & Werna (2001b) declared that the 
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formal private firms should not be the focus of the enablement to meet the LIG housing in 
the developing countries, because by doing so they attempt to develop new policies and 
further expansion of the existing policies would be stifled. 
On the other hand Shirley, (1988), World Bank (1993b) and Malpezzi (1994) placed much 
emphasis on the formal private market as the strongest element that should be enabled in 
developing countries, because of their economies of scale to fulfil the desire result of a 
lasting solution to the LIG housing problem. Not only that, it would be a platform to 
launch a new vision of economic development in the developing countries. An empirical 
study of Sengupta (2006a, 2007) in India and Salleh (2008) in Malaysia seems to support 
this postulation. For instance the study of Sengupta (2006a) shows that the formal private 
sector has impacted on housing in Kolkata with efficiency in production due to the firms‘ 
technical and marketing expertise.  
The accountability and righteousness of the public sector strongly complimented to the 
realisation of the accomplishment. Similarly, Abd Aziz (2007) and Salleh (2008) shows 
the significant contributions of the private developers in Malaysia and that the housing 
provision for LIG was subjected to a series of government regulations and controls which 
enabled the private developers to make a difference in the meeting LIG dream of home 
ownership. Given quality enabling environment coupled with the government consistent 
policies and incentives the formal private sector could be a reliable agent capable of 
meeting the housing of the LIG in developing countries, as the experience of Malaysia has 
shown. However, there is a need to correct the misinterpretation of enablement that means 
complete rolling back of the state from housing provision, when in reality the enablement 
requires more of state involvement in housing delivery (Mukhija, 2001; 2004; Sengupta, 
2006b). To emphasise on this Mukhija (2001:792) profess that  
36 
 
“enablement involves not only decentralisation but also some form of 
centralisation; not only privatisation but also new kinds of public investment; not 
only deregulation but also enforcement of new regulations; and not only demand-
driven  development but also supply-driven initiatives...enabling housing provision 
through market mechanisms requires a different type of state involvement, not 
necessarily less state involvement.‖  
However, debates on the efficacy of the enablement approach continued to generate 
refinements to enabling strategy in the literature. The insistence of the formal private 
market  as the primary mechanism for housing delivery, have generated the idea of 
pluralisation of sources to realise the ultimate objective of meeting the housing of LIG and 
more so the most vulnerable poor in the society (Drakakis-Smith, 2000; Keivani & Werna, 
2001a; Ogu, 1999; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001; Sivam, Evans, King, & Young, 2001; 
Yeboah, 2005).  
The pluralistic approach idea intends to make the enablement comprehensive and 
integrated policy, by incorporating other stakeholders in the housing sector. The criticism 
of this pluralistic approach in enablement is not enough to be in pluralistic; the question of 
sustainability of the policy arises. Consequently, the enablement idea received a boost 
from researchers such as Choguill (2007, 2008) that broadening the strategy with the ideas 
on how to attain sustainability in developing countries' housing policy. The housing policy 
need to be sustainable to be on the path of finding a lasting solution to the housing problem 
of the LIG. This is more so when the enablement housing policy aims at inculcating 
“efficiency, equity and sustainability of government intervention in housing” (Angel, 
2001:203) 
From the policy documents of the international institutions that sponsor enablement, 
suggested that the platform of PPP arrangement would be used as the vehicle of market led 
delivery of housing in the developing countries (Sengupta, 2006b; Struyk, 1990). This 
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perhaps explains the increasing emphasis in many countries on the use of PPP (Whitehead, 
2007) for housing development. The fundamental goal of PPP is to share responsibilities 
between the participating parties. Depending on the agreement, PPP in housing according 
to the enablement, the private sector is entrusted with the responsibilities of physical 
construction, funding, implementation and in some cases the management of the disposal. 
On the other hand the government contributes by setting the goals, supervision and 
monitoring, standardisation and provision of legal, institutional, economic policy 
frameworks (Sengupta, 2006b; Tecco, 2008). PPP as the leading strategy of the 
enablement determinant success factors are worth further elaboration, to serve guide in 
answering a key research question of the study, and as presented in the next subsection of 
the Chapter.  
2.6 Criterion of success in public-private partnership as enablement 
strategy 
The concept of PPP has received a variety of definitions specifically adopted the working 
definition of PPP in this study is the one given by Boxmeer & Beckhoven (2005:3) 
“as an institutionalized form of co-operation between government and one or more 
private partners in a project with common interests via a distribution of decision 
rights, costs and risks … characterized by common responsibility; the final result 
for every individual partner strongly depends on the action of the other partners 
involved in the project.” 
Researchers have made a series of findings on factors of consideration to guarantee the 
success of the partnership (Abdel Aziz, 2007; Zhang, 2005b). The private partner selection 
has received attention in the literature, as one of conditional success factors in PPPs 
(Zhang, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a). On this note, the proper partner selection was identified as 
one of the most critical elements for the long–term success of the PPP (Koppenjan, 2005). 
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Similarly, Kumaraswamy & Zhang (2001) and Zhang (2004a) consider partner selection 
that the selection should emphasise on entrepreneurship and leadership, right project 
identification, strength of the consortium, technical solution advantage, financial package 
differentiation and differentiation in guarantees. Subsequently, Zhang (2004b) 
recommends that the selection of private sector partner requires the establishment of 
suitable evaluation criteria and the determination of their relative significance. From the 
research conducted, Zhang (2004b) identified criteria that are classified into four 
evaluation packages for PPP projects in general, namely: financial; technical; safety, 
health, and environmental; and managerial. As a result, these studies suggest that the 
public sector is required to establish adequate grounded evaluation criteria, to guide in the 
selection of the private partner selection.  
On additional factors, Cartlidge (2006) emphasized on having a good communication 
system and consistent leadership in place. Zhang (2005b) considers that the public sector 
role in creating a favourable social, political, legal, economic environment and an effective 
institutional framework for PPP is equally paramount. Mullin (2002) contributed that the 
partnership itself should have well defined objectives, clearly stated roles and 
responsibilities for each partner, and openness with the public sector. Keivani & Werna 
(2001b) emphasised the factors of political will on the part of governments to implement 
the scheme. Thus, at the institutional and agency levels, transforming the roles, 
responsibilities and thinking within the affected public sector as the most important factor 
(Akintoye, Beck, & Hardcastle, 2003). Consequently, Buttimer (2006) upheld that the 
countries where the use of PPP has been adopted, the evidence of success attained in such 
countries was due to the factor of firm commitment from governments, with cross-party 
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political support, providing direction and guidance. The issues of relevance to the 
governments are leadership, expertise and market development. 
Additionally, Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim (2011) emphasised on bringing the factor of the 
government taking appropriate action against errant partner. Battimer (2006) upholds that 
the countries where the use of PPP has been adopted, the evidence of success attained in 
such countries was due to the factors of firm commitments from governments, with cross-
party political support, providing direction and guidance. Koppenjane & Enserink (2009) 
stressed the success depends on available knowledge, skills and capacity of the public 
regulators and its ability to reduce political uncertainty, that is, political or policy changes 
during the partnership that jeopardize the cost recovery should be minimised to the barest 
minimum. Similarly, Cartlidge (2006) stressed the need for enabling legislation. Finally, 
the OECD (2008) dedicated unit is required to ensure that PPPs are handled properly and 
also regulate the creation of the PPPs to ensure that they fulfil their objectives. 
Furthermore, Abdel Aziz (2007) suggests that at programme level, successful 
implementation of PPP could be attained through: enacting broad enabling legislation; 
selecting the delivery system that would provide the greatest benefits to the public users; 
allowing the use and selection of the financing approach that would achieve the best value 
and benefits to the public or users. For this purpose Larkin (1994) propound for a PPP to 
succeed, require co-operative efforts based on ―mutual respects‖. Chan et al (2004) seems 
to have broadened Larkin (1994) proposition, by exploring the CSFs. The result of the 
study shows the establishment and communication of a conflict resolution strategy; a 
willingness to share resources among project participants; a clear definition of 
responsibilities; a commitment to a win-win attitude; and regular monitoring of partnering 
process were believed to be the significant underlying factors for partnering success. 
40 
 
In brief, the implication of all the above factors identified is that the government should 
consider looking at these factors/principles as the strong criteria for successful 
implementation of PPP in housing. Equally important, the public sector should consider 
the multiple of these factors most appropriate to the local setting, objective and form of the 
PPP. This study will explore on the grounds of the market participation in the case of the 
countries understudy. 
2.7 Critique of enablement low-income housing policy in developing 
countries 
The advent of enablement as the LIHP paradigm shift has attracted comments, debates and 
criticisms on its ideology, principles and its appropriateness in addressing the LIG housing 
in the developing countries. From the reviews of the policy, the groupings of this 
commentary can be made based on their institution of affiliation and ideology. First group 
comprises of the World Bank itself, staff and consultants as proponents of the policy. The 
second group comprises of academics and non-World Bank consultants. The arguments on 
the policy review are polarised along these two extremes. The leading critique of the policy 
initially came from Baken & Smets (1999); Baken & van der Linden(1993); Jones (1996); 
Ortiz (1996) and Jones & Ward (1995). Later criticisms of the policy came from too 
numerous scholars, some of which include Zanetta (2001); Keivani & Werna (2001a, 
2001b); Keivani et al., (2008); Mukhija (2004) and many others. The group of World Bank 
staff who responded to these critics include Cohen & Leitmann (1994); Wegelin (1994); 
Angel (2000);Malpezzi (1994) Pugh (1991); Buckley & Kalarickal (2006); UNCHS 
(1991b); UN-Habitat (2006) among others. The proponents strongly argued that the 
enablement, as framework for developing country's housing sector as a whole, different 
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from previous project based approach, will anchor the development of developing 
country's economy and national housing policy.   
However, a major criticism made by Jones & Ward (1994) was that the attempt of the 
enablement and urban policy reforms to create an efficient delivery could not be reconciled 
with the affordability question, where the majority of people in the developing countries 
were crowded out. Similarly, Gilbert (2009a) argued the most disturbing of these policies 
were their rigidity of application of the same logic in every place at every time without 
considerations of local context. Perhaps, such practice explains why specifically the 
policies of SAP made the developing countries economic indicators worse-off as its 
aftermath. In another criticism, Jones & Ward (1995) the important components of society 
development were not targeted in totality, it seems the Bank narrowed its policies on 
economic issues to the exclusion of non-economic factors. Beyond these economic factors, 
urban inhabitants are equally affected by non economic factors which did not merit the 
Bank's policy attention. 
The World Bank policies in developing countries were further questioned on the grounds 
of deepening market imperfections in developing countries and as such when such issues 
became apparent the state institutions intervention were sought to correct (World Bank., 
2002). When the governments were directed not to intervene in housing, the World Bank 
was directly involved in housing. For instance, in recent times, it is reported the bank has 
spent $16 billion for 278 projects located in more than 90 countries, with a personal 
scoring of achieving over 83% of outcome (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006).  However, critics 
argued contrary to the Bank claim, the direct intervention and policy reforms “have not 
quite worked out the way they were intended” (Rodrik, 2006:974). Earlier, Jones & Ward 
(1994) presented the same argument that the World Bank had failed woefully to create 
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urban and national economies to be sustainable in developing countries. The problem, 
commonly cited with the World Bank policies, are recognised to be top-down; universal 
and mechanical, with absence of input from the bottom and local context realities, it then 
becomes too difficult to implement. In summary, this study argue that these are the 
realities befallen the low-income housing policies of developing countries and which the 
implementation became problematic.  
Overall, the critics of the enablement dwelt so much on the neo-liberalism ideology which 
narrowed on market and individualism. Since it is an ideology, it is then considered that 
the enablement should not be policy in developing countries. The improvised people and 
the volatile economies of the developing countries were considered to be offered with the 
wrong diagnosis to the housing problem. The newly promoted agent was also considered 
inappropriate on the grounds of the private formal market profit motive and preceding 
focus on the high and medium income groups. The inappropriateness of the World Bank 
doctrine was questioned in an environment of an unequal and rising inequality, inefficient 
markets and inefficient governments. The weak institution found in such countries lacking 
all the necessary capacity to enable, would render the strategy ineffective, even though the 
bank recommends capacity building. Aligned with the research questions of the study, this 
research intends to contribute further on how such reform is implemented and showing the 
apparent relevance and the outcome of the reform in comparative terms.  
2.8 Enablement and housing delivery for low-income group from the empirical 
experiences 
The advent of enablement became a popular strategy in the developing countries, as it was 
propagated by the multilateral organisations (Sandhu & Aldrich, 1998). To realise the 
objective, the developing countries' low-income housing policies are redefined and 
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redesigned to reflect the ideas of the new paradigm shift. The reform instituted the strategy 
as the stepping stone to realise the objectives of providing decent and affordable housing to 
LIG. The form of enablement builds a network of state, market and society, such as a PPP 
(Smith, 2003). The question is how well the enablement performed as a strategy of 
alleviating the LIG housing in developing countries? 
The empirical studies on China housing policy reforms (Chen, Hao, & Stephens, 2010; 
Deng, 2009; Lu & Yao, 2009; Li, 2010; Meng et al., 2004; Wu, 2001); Hong Kong (Ho, 
2004; La Grange, 1999; Yip, Forrest, & La Grange, 2007); Tanzania (Kombe, 2000); 
Egypt (Struyk & Roman, 2008); Mexico (Jones & Pisa, 2000); Taiwan (Gough & Tran, 
2009; Tran, Grafton, & Kompas, 2009); Korea (Kim & Cho, 2010); Ghana (Arku, 2009; 
Berry, 2009; Yeboah, 2005); South Africa (Del Mistro & Hensher, 2009; Jones & Datta, 
2000; Wilkinson, 1998) India  (Mahadeva, 2006; Mukhija, 2004; Sengupta, 2006b; Sivam 
& Karuppannan, 2002); Iran (Keivani et al., 2008). These studies have established that 
since their inception produced mixed results. However, the result of the majority of these 
experiences has established that the strategy has failed to improve the LIG housing 
sufficiently and effectively. Instead the market as the new  agent of supply have been used 
as a means to further enhance the supply of housing to middle-and high-income group 
housing. Even with the introduction of relatively government enablement, namely, land 
and financing incentives; there has been little improvement with respect to the creation of 
inclusive participation of LIG in the accessibility of housing to be accompanied from the 
strategy implementation. 
Enablement also reportedly failed in providing available land in South Africa (Wilkinson, 
1998); Ghana (Arku, 2009); Tanzania (Kombe, 2000); Peru (Jones & Pisa, 2000) and in 
many other countries as well. In the case of India, Sengupta (2006a; b) reported that land 
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was one of the major problems faced by the joint venture companies in Kolkata. In Ghana, 
Arku (2009) reported the same failure. Along with the various experiences mentioned had 
one or another experience to share on the inadequacies of the state to made land available 
to the stakeholders. However, the experience of Iran produces a distinct experience on 
land. According to Keivani, et al., (2008:1848) the Iranian government adopted pluralistic 
approach of enablement, succeeded in making adequate supply of land available to the 
participating stakeholders. Such approach scale up the LIG housing delivery in the country 
and such outcome sounds convincing to adopt a pluralistic approach as advocated by these 
researchers. They therefore, conclude that 
―there is evidence that the government of Iran substantially expanded the stock of 
low-income urban housing the study period by directly providing land for its 
construction by individuals and organisations, effectively by-passing urban land 
and housing markets and their shortcomings. The Iranian experience has shown 
that such an intervention can provide a rich source of urban land resources for 
housing the low-and middle-income groups in particular...” 
The enablement had not much improved the housing financing to enable the expected 
participation of the LIG. Mortgage infrastructures continued to remain under supplied in 
most of the developing countries. For instance, the study of  Zhang (2000) in China shows 
that the private market had responded positively by making houses available in the market, 
but because of inadequate financing opportunities the houses remained unsold. 
“It leads to a strange phenomenon that on the one hand a large urban population 
is not adequately housed and on the other hand there is a huge amount of newly 
developed housing units which are unable to be sold” (Zhang, 2000:346).  
Similarly, part of the policy there are emerging mortgage institutions in these countries and 
the findings of Struyk & Roman (2008) show that under nascent mortgage there was low-
incidence of mortgage financing. Their findings in Cairo show that the mortgage financing 
was as low as 25% and cash payment prevails with about 3 of every 4 house purchases. 
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The enablement implementation situation in many countries is seen to be very complex 
and confusing. On the one hand, there is on the part of the government situating LIG 
housing as its cornerstone, with formulation of enabling environments, laws and 
corresponding incentives. On the other hand, there was the nonchalant attitude of the 
governments towards meaningful implementation. The interaction of the two therefore, 
produces situations of uncertainty about its effectiveness on LIG housing delivery. The 
experience of Ahmedabad, India may help to illustrate the complexity. Mukhija 
(2004:2239) stated 
“(i)n the case study, the public sector enabled a private developer with a track 
record of developing affordable housing but, soon afterwards, the developer 
stopped constructing housing for the low-and modest-income groups”. 
Private market developers by their nature serve the groups with effective demand (namely, 
medium-and high-income groups) and profit maximisation. The literature tends to show 
that private developers were inclined so much to above self-interest over the LIG. 
Similarly, it has been reported that when the private developers ceased to see the benefits 
of housing reaching out the LIG, they became discouraged and drifted into high and 
medium income housing (Mukhija, 2004). The consequence led to the general failure as 
evidenced by their shrinking to supply LIG housing component. However, in countries 
such as Malaysia, such attitudes were being tackled through planning regulation, that the 
private developers must have a mandatory LIG housing component in their mixed 
development as precondition of development approval (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011) 
and innovative practice of ‗build then sale‘ (Yusof, Mohd Shafiei, Yahya, & Ridzuan, 
2010).  
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The implication of the review attempted to determine whether indeed there has been 
consistency in meaningful inclusive participation of the LIG in the context of enablement 
strategy. Evidence has been presented to show the contradictions, challenges and the little 
of what had been achieved. This raised the question whether enablement strategy as such is 
capable of addressing the housing of the LIG under the market-driven LIHP. In the 
alternative, the literature seems to propose other alternatives or modification of the 
enablement to improve on its performance efficiency. Such exploration of alternatives is 
the next subject reviewed. 
2.9 The search for an appropriate low-income housing policy in 
developing countries 
2.9.1 Enablement and pluralistic approach in housing policy 
On the contrary to the emphasis of enablement implementation bias on formal markets, 
researchers have advocated for the adoption of a more integrated housing policy (Drakakis-
Smith, 2000; Keivani, Abiko & Werna, 2004; Keivani, et al., 2008; Keivani & Werna,  
2001a; 2001b; Mukhija, 2004; Sivam, Evans, King & Young, 2001; Yeboah, 2005). This is 
what Kervani & Werna (2001a; b) and Kervani et al. (2004) popularised as ‗plurality of 
provision‘ model. This model suggests a holistic integrated model, which 
“would combine adjustments to overall supply and demand conditions of the 
market with the identification and inclusion of all related modes and agents of 
provision in appropriate policies aimed at expanded housing provision by the 
identified modes and agents to carefully selected target groups which form the most 
suitable sub- market for each mode. Such an approach would consider the social, 
cultural and political factors which govern and determine the activities of agents in 
each mode in order to co-ordinate and enhance the positive aspects of each mode 
and counteract their tendencies and actions”(Keivani & Werna,2001b:203).  
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The pluralistic approach as observed by these researchers point at the weakness of 
enablement implementation and serve as a measure to broaden it‘s over concentration on 
the formal private market and to the exclusion of numerous alternatives/complementary 
modes of housing provision. In fact it argued these issues should be given serious policy 
consideration (Fekade, 2000; Keivani & Werna, 2001a; Sivam, et al., 2001). In particular,  
Keivani & Werna (2001a) and Kervani et al. (2004) reinforced that this would not only 
allow the development of specific modes in appropriate socio-economic settings. However, 
allowing the emergence of combined action of the complementary modes to tackle their 
weaknesses, that are capable of enhancing supply to a given target group. The specific 
content of this model comprises of public sector involvement in, and regulation of, land 
and housing markets; diversifies approaches in delivery; partnership as a mode of 
provision; public-customary land owners‘ partnership and public and co-operative mode of 
housing provision.  
The proponents equally recognised the obstacles of political will and institutional capacity 
of governments, and satisfying the requirement of other stakeholders such as private sector 
on the implementation of this model. However, these problems are not insurmountable. 
Furthermore, the proponents of these ideas emphasises seem to be about broadening the 
enabling strategy, by so doing incorporating market, community and co-operative sectors 
in the model. However, this model it fails to take into accounts the key issues of finance 
and allocation and remain unresolved in the model, particularly among the LIG in the 
developing countries. Perhaps the most serious challenge of this model is that it does not 
explain how to address the issue of sustainability and hence remains its unanswered 
question. The next subsection addresses this and other similar issues. 
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2.9.2 Enablement and sustainable housing policy 
The model of sustainable LIHP has been suggested in the literature found not reflected in 
the concept of enablement housing strategy. The scholarly contributions of Choguill 
(Zainul Abidin, 2010) made a point in this regard. Choguill (1996) developed measurable 
indicators which assess the urban efforts in the areas of the economic, social, technical and 
environmental sustainability. Specific to housing policy Choguill (2007:145) defined the 
focus of this model that “in order to be sustainable, housing must be economically viable, 
socially acceptable, technically feasible and environmentally compatible. Government 
housing policy must... be directed to achieving these desirable aims”. In this sense, 
according to Myllyla & Kuvaja (2005) sustainability is considered as a criterion for 
motivated and transparent administration as well as efficient, flexible and equal service 
provision and resource allocation in the developing countries. This is more obvious 
considering the present processes that do not contribute to the transformation towards a 
more just and equal society. The task ahead is to have a multi-faceted decision-making 
process that takes account of economic, political, social and cultural, as well as 
environmental factors, with the consequent acknowledgement that there is need of both 
transparent and better informed decisions (Smith, 1996). These are the conditions that 
Choguill (1996) argued must be met, in order to assure sustainability of human settlements. 
After reviewing the major evolution of housing policy phases in developing countries, 
conclude that the past efforts were “deficient and seriously so” Choguill, (2007:146). He 
therefore advanced five institutional structures to be put in place to realise his sustainable 
housing policy in developing countries. Hence the housing policy conceptualisation must 
be targeted to meet these three primary objectives of household improvement, 
empowerment of the poor majority and giving them “a feeling of self- worth”. In fact he 
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argued the achievement of the last objective will fulfil the first two. The five institutional 
structures are summarised as community engagement; building materials delivery; building 
standard flexibility; availability of mortgage financing and government direct participation 
in land delivery. 
Following on Choguill‘s (2008) publication advocated the concept of ‗sustainable 
neighbourhoods‘, from which the above structure could be laid and achieved. The concept 
is concerned with the social aspect of living, where people are expected to interact and 
solve whatever problems might occur within the locality. From the neighbourhood 
concept, he postulates that the solutions to social issues, including housing can be found. 
Finally, Choguill (2007) concludes that if the above five institutional policies are 
developed and implemented; then sustainable housing policy is feasible and achievable 
particularly to the LIG. The study of Rukwaro (2009) validates the above claim on 
building regulations in Kenya, which shows that building regulations were in conflict with 
the needs and the circumstances of the urban residents. In addition to, the government of 
Kenya had refused to lower the building standards to increase housing supply in the urban 
centres (Fekade, 2000). However, the study of Lizarralde & Massyn (2008a) criticised the 
above grounds, that in South Africa the overall performance of LIG housing projects in the 
studied cases does not depend on community participation. Accordingly to the conclusion, 
he instead suggested a need on its mechanisms and advantages reconsideration in LIG 
housing projects in developing countries.  
2.9.3 Enablement and self-help housing in low-income housing policy 
With the history of self-help housing in LIHP discourse is closely associated with the 
writings of Turner (1972, 1976, 1978, 1980) and the ensued contributions of Burgess 
(1978) as the strong critic of the model. Nevertheless, the self-help housing was adopted as 
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housing strategy, in the guise of site-and-service scheme and promoted by the World Bank 
in the 1970s in developing countries (Harris, 2003; Parnell & Hart, 1999; World Bank., 
1972). The assisted self-help housing was built on the premises that the poor should be 
allowed to build their houses by themselves ably assisted by the NGOs, cooperatives and 
private sector. The role of the state in housing the poor was to be enabler rather than the 
direct provision. Over time due to its peculiar problems of implementation, it made a 
limited contribution to the resolution of the LIG housing (Okpala, 1986) and as such it was 
abandoned to other strategies. 
Despite the self-help strategy problem, is seen as a replication of the same principles to the 
new strategy the current enablement ideas and content by the World Bank (Yeboah, 2005), 
of course with a slight modification and deviation to Turner thought. Although, the 
originality of the Turner‘s self-help ideas were subsequently questioned by Harris (1998, 
1999b), recently researchers have shown an increased interest in self-help strategy as 
panacea to poor enablement strategy to realise their dream of having a home and as a path 
to fine tune the lopsidedness of the enablement implementation in favour of the formal 
private market (Bredenoord, van Lindert & Smerts,  2010; Bredenoord & van Lindert, 
2010; Landman & Napier, 2010) among many other contributors in July 2010 edition of 
Habitat International Journal. Similarly, in recent times UN-Habitat is re-advancing self-
help strategy as a panacea to slum question in developing countries (UN-Habitat, 2010a). 
In a critique of this backpedal from UN-Habitat, Obeng-Odoom (2013:428) posited that 
“the vestiges of the „old‟ order are apparent”. Thus the re-emergence of self-help raised 
additional questions to enablement as strategy of respect in LIHP discourse. 
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2.9.4 Enablement and civil society/NGOs in low-income housing policy 
Although community development has a long history in all societies (Ganapati, 2008a), 
recent developments in the LIHP of enablement has led to a renewed interest in the 
NGO/civil society participation in meeting the housing needs of the LIG (Ganapati, 2009; 
UNCHS, 1996). In addition, the NGOs popularity became increased due to the spread 
democratic space and criticism of neoliberal policies that eroded and created an individual 
free will of consumption and choice (Kim, 2000). There is growing literature on what 
NGOs and voluntary organisations can play an important role in contemporary housing 
problems among the LIG in developing countries (Ganapati, 2001, 2008b, 2009; Obeng-
Odoom, 2009; Sengupta & Sharma, 2009). Already, the success of civil organisation's 
contribution has been celebrated in developed countries, such as the U.K., where Holmes 
(2006) described such success as ―oases of excellence‖. He shows how the housing 
cooperatives comprising of organisations of resident members and local communities were 
able to provide well designed, planned homes and functional neighbourhoods. In practice, 
however, the researchers such as Green (1993) argued despite the civic virtues of 
solidarity, service to others, duty and self-sacrifice were not adequately mobilised and 
enabled under the changing role of the state. 
In a LIHP of the developing countries the contribution of civil society matters much and 
particularly in the creation of synergy with the public and private sectors in housing the 
LIG in developing countries (Ganapati, 2009; Pal, 2008). The civil society institutions act 
as an independent of state and market sectors, are also called ‗third sector‘, ‗voluntary 
sector‘, community based organisation (CBOs) among others. The sector is propelled by a 
constituent of self-governing and self-generating private organisations, share the  
characteristics of free will  and democracy in an attempt to achieve common good based on 
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their right. Other characteristics mentioned include, enjoying tremendous flexibility and 
not constrained by profit driven objective and however sometimes suffer from voluntary 
and accountability failures (Ganapati, 2009). These peculiarities show their potential in 
achieving common good when declared by its members. However, such has been explored 
under the current implementation of the enablement strategy (Keivani & Werna, 2001a, 
2001b). 
In summary, the above models offer, or appear to offer, a solution to some intractable 
problems of housing, creating alternatives for governments to decisively tackle LIG 
housing. However, the bottleneck were not lack of good proposals such as the ones 
presented above, it is rather the lack of strength to implement them and that much time 
were spent on examining what is wrong, sometime outlining theoretical alternatives, but 
not much spent on how these alternatives can be carried out in practice (Dahle, 1998). 
 2.10 Summary 
 
The summary that can be drawn from this Chapter on LIHP under the auspices of state, 
market and society, similar to the previous studies, the distributive injustice in the system 
became further embedded and reinforced inequalities in the allocation system and its 
process. This Chapter demonstrated the apparent positions of the LIG housing in the 
literature are issues of consideration in policy formulation and implementation 
frameworks. However, such issues as they are, raised fundamental questions of the 
systemic problem of development, which interfaces with governance and weak institutions. 
The enablement strategy or market-led LIHP for LIG, the review has demonstrated the 
LIHP strategy exacerbates the housing crisis by preferential segmented treatment and 
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undermining the growth of another set of stakeholders in a housing policy implementation 
environment.  
The review implores the imperative of installing strong institutions, not the strategy. The 
dream of such LIHP is the imperative of LIG housing rather than housing strategy such as 
the one of the present. The desire institution and strategy are the ones that would have the 
capacity on how the challenge can be identified and drawing strategically milestones and 
timelines on LIG housing panacea. This means that credible, vibrant and strong state and 
non-state actors with the political will and vision for addressing the LIG housing challenge 
is what would guarantee and sustain inclusive and engagement in LIHP. This is what 
informed the research question of this study, to understand and explain the LIHP 
trajectories in Malaysia and Nigeria.  
In respect of Malaysia and Nigeria, few studies had been carried out in each of these 
countries on the subject of LIHP. However, there are a limited number of comparative 
studies on the enablement strategy implementations impact explanations under LIHP in 
Malaysia and Nigeria involving formal private sector. Hence, this study contribution 
intends to provide analysis and understanding on Malaysia and Nigeria, of the nature and 
determinants of outcomes associated with their low-income housing policies. Indeed, 
Maclennan (2008:438) strengthens the above claim that “low-income housing issues and 
housing market instability will not fade away, but they have to be understood, and 
changed, in the context of more widely conceived housing systems and policy 
frameworks”. Against the background of this Chapter, the next chapter introduces the 
theoretical models of institutional analysis and new institutional economics as the 
theoretical framework to offer explanation of the LIHP trajectories between Malaysia and 
Nigeria.         
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Institutions, institutional analysis and new institutional 
economics 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study, as earlier stated in Chapter Two focuses on the enablement low-income 
housing policy (LIHP) literature. The implementation of current enablement housing 
policy strategy implores the institutional structure and agency capacity to drive the 
coordination and network of state, market and society to efficiency. The institutional 
context is the fundamental factor in the enablement strategy, even though the strategy 
centres on decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation. Fundamentally, the strategy 
intends to achieve an increase in the allocation efficiency and provide a solution to market 
failures in the housing market. It is an institution that constitutes the determining factor in 
the LIHP environment response under the structure and agents' reflex actions for the 
attainment of the set out objectives. Therefore the analysis of implementation efficiency of 
the current strategy requires the dealing with the institutions and associated structures and 
agents. Consequently, this Chapter explores the institutional analysis (IA), in consideration 
of the structures and agency models as well as new institutional economics (NIEs) are 
employed to offer an interpretation of the countries trajectories in LIHP.  
The institutional analysis is adopted in policy implementation studies while the NIE 
offered a deeper explanation of the variations in the policy in terms of performance and 
outcomes. The content of this chapter covers the background of the IA/NIE, content and 
relevance in housing policy analysis in the context of the strands of the NIE. The focus on 
these concepts essentially is to draw their aspects to serve as a means of understanding and 
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interpreting the subject of this study. Thus, this study, based on IA and NIE became the 
leading framework under the LIG housing delivery under the market rather the hierarchies. 
In relation to the policy change and analysis, it is necessary to highlight the key substances 
of the NIE as the basis to employ the interpretation of policy implementation trajectories 
between the countries.  The political and socio-economic contexts, for example, were 
consistently relevant in explaining the agents‘ behaviour in managing the transaction cost 
and property rights and containing the opportunism syndrome. The chapter begins with the 
review of comparative housing research theories in housing.  
3.2 Comparative housing research theories 
The reasons of cross-national research among others aimed at lesson learning on the ways 
to improve national policy provide alternative policy options and reinforcement of existing 
policy practice. The idea of this activity is legendary, since it traceable in the way back of 
the past centuries (Editor, 1991), where for instance, Aristotle studied the constitutions of 
city-states for the sake of civic betterment. This study is situated within the context of 
comparative policy analysis for this purpose. The concept of comparative policy analysis 
was defined in Endan (1984:23-24) as  
“... studies typically involve cross-national assessment of similar systems to 
determine whether the effects on policy are culturally specific or the result of the 
policy making system. The focus of these studies is systematic evaluation of the 
contextual and experiential knowledge gained from a given policy so that 
generalizations made can be tested”. 
Thus, with this analysis, as earlier stated, the key research questions of the study is to 
establish the similarities and differences between Malaysia and Nigeria LIHP, as it is the 
core of any comparative housing policy research of this type (Doling, 1999a).  
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There have been debates on theories of comparative studies in housing policy among 
scholars (Allen, 1999a; 2003; Allen, Gallent & Tewdr-Jones, 1999; Doling, 1997; Gilbert, 
1991; Haworth, Manzi, & Kemeny, 2004; Kemeny, 1992; Kemeny & Lowe, 1998; Pugh, 
2001). Furthermore,, all these studies have one thing in common, drawing on the 
importance, contributions and shortcomings in comparative research (Haworth, et al., 
2004; Kemeny & Lowe, 1998). Furthermore, for the past decades, comparative research 
scholars have developed frameworks, theories and methods to better understand countries 
housing policies. In particular, Haworth, et al. (2004) outlined the advantages of 
comparative research to be offering cross national evaluation; explanation of changes and 
impacts of policy changes originating at the local and global contexts. Thus, these 
constitute the framework of this study analysis.  
From these efforts, two divides have emerged, namely, convergence and divergence 
theorists in comparative housing research (Kemeny & Lowe, 1998). The former basic 
premise is that modern societies are all trying to reach the same destination and as such it 
is possible to transfer and benefit from the experiences of one another. Thus the societies 
are classified into ―leader‖ and ―laggard‖ (Donnison, 1969). The drawing of lessons and 
experiences (Rose, 1991; 2005; Stone, 1999) can be achieved by the laggard‘s from the 
leader‘s societies (Allen, 1999a; Gilbert, 2004a; Pugh, 1995a). To achieve what Pugh 
(1995a) called ‗structural change‘. Authors such as  Wolman (1992) and Allen (2003) have 
argued that policies used to solve particular housing problem can be re-packaged and 
transfer to use in another society.  Furthermore, Pugh (2001) emphasised that this form of 
research adds insights into new development in housing policies, more so with the advent 
of whole sector housing development promoted by the international institutions. That this 
is capable of generating the prescriptive reform imperatives from the housing policies 
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experiences in developing countries. Finally, van Dijk (2006) implored that comparative 
research is capable of producing ―tailor-made‖ solutions, even where the issues are quite 
similar. 
On the other divide, the divergence theorists (Doling, 1999b; Kemeny, 1992; Kemeny & 
Lowe, 1998) argued it is significant to appreciate the fact that societies are different, as a 
result of their differences in cultural, political and economic history produce different 
approaches in the formulation of housing policies. Allen (2003) stated that overlooking 
such fundamental differences in carrying out comparative research in housing, is the same 
as committing what he called ―Romeo error‖. 
However, against the background of these conflicting positions it is appropriate to state 
that this research is in favour of comparative research, based on the overwhelming benefits 
to derive from undertaking this approach. Therefore, comparative approach would be as an 
empirical tool to carry out this study, to realise what Rose (1991); Wolman (1992) and 
Allen (2003) called ‗lesson drawing‘, ‗policy transfer‘ and ‗learning exercise‘ respectively. 
Allen (2003:20) further states the ultimate objective of this approach that  “researching the 
broader political and cultural context within which housing...policies exist should not, be 
seen as an irrelevant self- indulgence. Rather, it should be seen as an effort of lesson 
learning „exercise‟‟‟. Based on welfare regime literature, in the recent past, the 
comparative researches have analysed housing systems in a broader international context. 
Strong divergent patterns organised in regional or types have been revealed. Comparative 
housing research has mostly focused on the roles of the market and the state in the 
allocation of resources within the housing system. Hence, this study continues on this 
mainstream literature in comparative housing policy research. 
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3.3 Institutional analysis 
3.3.1 Institutional analysis 
This study is situated within the context of institutional analysis. The low LIHP is in the 
arena of formal institution and such evoke the concern on how those institutions implement 
the policy, as the essential activity of institutional analysis (Henriksen & Damsgaard, 
2007). The institution underlines the complex interaction between activities of state, 
market and society, which are connected through a formal organisation (North, 1990). The 
ppp in housing can be conceived in terms of state, market (developers) and society 
(households). Each of these forms a distinct entity in the partnership and mutually related 
to each other. These can be characterised from the development, construction and 
allocation process of housing provision (Doling, 1999). Furthermore, all these are 
embedded in an institutional framework, which may be formal or informal. Moreover, the 
institutional analysis constitutes our nucleus of this research analysis. The market-led 
LIHP connotes partnership governance between the stakeholders. The agent interactions 
under the partnership created interaction of negotiation, contract, monitoring and 
enforcement. These constitute the major issues of policy institutional analysis to resolve 
this study research questions.  
The concept of institution, as subject of the analysis and basic pillar of NIE needs a prompt 
clarification and understanding, in order to identify the areas of its focus and emphasis. 
The most popular definition of institution is the one given by North (1991:97) as  
“the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and code of conduct), and informal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights)... institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and 
reduce uncertainty in exchange... they define the choice set and therefore determine 
transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of 
engaging in economic activity.” 
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On the other hand Williamson (2000) considers institutions into four hierarchical levels, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. According to Williamson (2000), the first level comprises of informal 
institutions of traditions, values, and religion. The development of these institutions 
evolved over a long period of time and institutional change of this class is progressively 
very slow. The second level consists of formal rules such as policies, laws, constitution. In 
other words this expression means the government structures or national level of a country. 
The national institutional structures are defined at this level and from where the economic 
actors operationalised their performance depending on the limits or constraints set from the 
national structures.  In operationalising the level, this study considered it as the macro, that 
is, the national level. The third level is the operational level of governance as well as 
economic activity. This means that the transactions and contracts are executed at this level. 
In operationalising the level, this study considered it as the Meso, that is, the regional or 
city level. Finally, the fourth level is represented at the individual level and in 
operationalising the level, this study considered it as the micro, that is, the level of 
individual or society.   
60 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Economics of institutions 
Source: Williamson (2000:597) 
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Thus, looking at the research questions of this study, the focus begins at the national, 
regional or city and individuals as these interact with the realisation of LIHP. From the 
Figure 3.1 the first level is excluded from the analysis, but considers the remaining three 
levels and therefore considered as macro, meso and micro levels as defined above. At the 
national as the macro level, there has been external pressure to seek private solutions to 
housing delivery. At the state level, as the meso level, there have been efforts to marry 
these imperatives with the state welfare. The welfare was seen as the alternative 
mechanism to achieve even reach to the citizens. Thus, in each of the country, these levels 
constitute the levels of analysis in investigating answers to the key research questions of 
this study. 
For the purpose of this study, institutional analysis and development (IAD) is adopted as 
the framework of the study (Figure 3.2). Based on the levels identified as macro, meso and 
micro levels and fitted against the framework suggests that LIHP outcome depends on the 
three sets of factors (1) institutional structure (context), (2) agency; and (3) the nature of 
the policy incentives. In partnership implementation requires effective transparency in the 
contractual relationships. Additionally, how well the contractual elements of the 
partnership are carried forward, the project itself must be ultimately be evaluated in terms 
of who gets what and how efficiently it is delivered (Axelrod, 2004). All these are 
elaborated in the following discussion. As earlier mentioned, the evaluative methodology 
adopted in this study is the comparative study approach, to study how the LIHP strategy is 
operationalised and implemented.  
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Figure 3.2: A framework for institutional analysis of low-income housing policy 
Source: Adopted from Mooya & Cloete (2010:438) 
Under the new paradigm of LIHP, the prerequisite institutional environment is mandated 
on the government (UN-Habitat, 2012a). The models of Keogh & D‘Arcy (1999), Jenkins 
& Smith (2001), Burke & Hulse (2010), Laffont & Martimort (2009), Ball (2003), Han & 
Wang (2003), Doling(2001) and UN-Habitat (2012a) provide the institutional environment 
context for this study and serve as the institutional structure (Figure 3.3 and 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.3: A conceptual view of the housing development 
Source: Adapted from UN-Habitat (2012a:4) 
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Figure 3.4: The institutional environment of housing development 
Source: Keogh & D‘Arcy (1999:2407) 
The study of Jenkins & Smith (2001) using the concepts of self-help, neo-Marxist and neo-
liberal approaches in understanding the different role assigned to the state, market and civil 
society. Based on Griddle‘s four elements of measurement of state capacity, Jenkins & 
Smith (2001) developed five capacities of state role, namely, institutional, political, 
administrative, technical and economic. These elements of capacity were applied with 
reference to the housing sector on the state relationships with the market and society. This 
constitutes as the enabling playground for the actors as stakeholders to fulfil the 
expectations as well as optimize their contribution and from this context the pattern of 
actors and partnership are defined and contextualised.  
The context of the institutions provides the platform in terms of socio-economic, historical 
and political structure, which may be considered as housing policy environment, and 
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interaction of agents within this environment (Angel, 2000, 2001). Of course the housing 
policy environment space is the creation of the institution where the state, market and 
society interact through the arena of partnership. Hence, the LIHP is analysed as a product 
of history, politics, economic and social circumstances and policy. Thus, the chapter 
examines the concepts of the institutional analysis using structure and agency models and 
NIE, to serve as the underlying theory of the study. 
The institutional approaches on low-income housing provision in developing countries 
where captured by substantive theorising rather than grand theorising and outcomes 
practicable (Jenkins & Smith, 2001; Keivani & Werna, 2001a; Smith, 2003). These 
researches emphasised on the relationship between the main actors namely, state, market 
and society on how they operate in housing delivery. The benefit to generate from their 
effort is to give us “analytical tools that permit the wider assessment of the institutional 
underpinning of political economic and cultural interaction within housing systems” 
(Jenkins & Smith, 2001:504).  
This study has adopted institutional analysis in housing to evaluate the role of the state- 
market in developing countries for the following reasons. Firstly, the institutional roles of 
identifying those aspects of the housing which raise transaction costs and hinder the 
smooth function of market forces. Secondly, the institutional analysis is interdisciplinary 
seeks to incorporate the historical context in which change takes place and finally brings in 
more explicitly the question of equity in the distribution (Handoussa, 1995). Thirdly, it is 
fundamental (Adams, 1993) in explaining how societies differ across time and from each 
other. Finally, it seeks to revisit the state as an institution, to examine the extent to which 
the actors as agent, have shaped choices (North, 1995), in particular, among the LIG 
housing in developing countries of Malaysia and Nigeria. 
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3.3.2 Structure and agency models 
According to North (1990) institutions are the rules which shape and govern behaviour. 
From North (1990) analysis of institutions, made a definite postulation that whatever the 
nature of institutional, formal or informal, provide a framework within which the societies 
function. In fact, North (1994) argued institutions form the incentive structure of a society, 
and therefore, the political and economic institutions, are the underlying determinants of 
economic performance. Hence, Hodgson (2004) implored that public policy devised by 
institutions should aim at how best to serve the interests of the citizens and the public, to 
realise an efficient and socially coherent society. 
“whether we are dealing with formal or informal rules, we need to consider the 
ways in which rules are enacted. While it does not necessarily have to enter into 
the definition of an institution or rule, there has to be some account of how rule – 
systems affect individual behaviour. Pointing to the incentives and sanctions 
associated with rules is not sufficient because it would not explain how individuals 
evaluate the sanctions or incentives involved. We also have to explain why they 
might not, take incentives or sanctions seriously” (Hodgson, 2004:430). 
The implication of this on housing policy institutions' performance should be assessed to 
establish to what extent they have created an enabling environment. The enabling 
environment is the type capable of containing the interest of all the segments of society 
fairly and equally in the course of promoting their welfare. 
However, North (1981) argued that political institutions are not efficient and added that the 
rulers always promoted the concepts of property rights to serve their own interests and in 
the process create high transaction costs in such inefficient property rights. He further 
reiterated the argument of the superior effectiveness of societies which shape their 
individual and collective property rights to achieve incentives for economic production and 
social co-operation. It is argued that he did not offer explanation why competitive forces at 
most times could not contain to get rid of the inefficient institutions (Rowley, 2000). 
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The solution to this unanswered treatise was provided in North (1990). He developed a 
distinction between institutions and organisations and the relationship between the two is 
what create and direct the institutional changes in the society. He argued, as the 
organisation develops over time, they change the institutions of the society and even the 
incentive structure provided by the institutions is changed. This is because, North (1994) 
later emphasised the political and economic institutions are the underlying determinants of 
economic performance. The process of interaction according to Rowley (2000) may be 
positive or negative with respect to economic efficiency.  
Taking developing countries as an example North (1990) argued that the symbiotic 
relationship is undoubtedly negative. This confirmed the North‘s claim that “it is the 
success and failures in human organisation that account for the progress and 
retrogression of societies” (North, 1981:59). This means that institutional arrangements in 
such states which encourage mismanagement and waste are being replaced by new 
structures which force their managers to serve the public interest rather than their own 
(Brett, 1995). 
According to Stein (1995) defined the state as an agent that exercises sovereignty. Society, 
economy or polity is structured (North, 2000) and therefore, institutions are structural 
(Adams, 1993), meaning that they are organised and form a unit of regulated social space, 
that people operate within them, and that there are links and overlaps with the domain of 
other institutions. There are vertical elements of command, power, and enforcement. 
Therefore, institutions are organisation structures or segments of society and this is the 
institutional structure model focus on the forces which organise the relationships of society 
and what drives its dynamics. 
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From the structure put in place, a framework is created on how it should operate and 
realise the objective of the institution. In this regard, North (2000) postulate to realise an 
efficient market, then the government must be in place to produce the structure that will 
work towards the achievement of this objective. This is because, it is the state that hold the 
sole responsibility of defining and enforcing the economic rules of the game (North, 
1989a). Similarly, Stein (1995) further emphasised that central to the reform is the role of 
institutions in the formation of the market. 
Under the agency theory, the governance of the partnership generally involves specific 
definition of property rights, i.e. the rights of the parties to use the production resources, 
disposal of the products as well as the appropriation of the returns between the agents. 
Importantly, the property rights are part of the institutional structure and detail out by the 
state at the macro level. State securing property rights is considered as an important 
condition of economic performance.  
This study has implicitly shown that actor's performances are driven by external and 
internal forces. The former is driven by the quality of the institutional environment 
surrounding the actor, whereas the latter is more internal to the actor characteristics. The 
partnership outcome thus is the state institution driven, by managing the private sector-led 
delivery of housing for the LIG in the countries. This means that the inclusive outcome for 
the LIG increases as a result of more efficient state institutional structure and agents. 
However, the LIHP of market-led delivery are affected by the same quality of the private 
sector agents. It is argued by North (1995) that  institutions provide incentives and 
restriction which affect agents' behaviours. While 
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The market is recognised to be a human construct (Zhu & Sim, 2002). The basic 
assumption postulated by the neo-classical economics is the fact that markets, housing not 
in exception, are determined by the demand and the market capable of supplying to meet 
the demand (Healey, 1991). However, Healey & Barrett (1990) have identified the 
interaction of the agents of the institutions as the key factor to mediate between demand 
and supply. Although the actors priorities may not be based upon economic rationality, but 
times as a political project undertaken  by the powerful actors (Fligstein, 1996). 
Furthermore, Zhu & Sim (2002) identified the efficiency is further constrained by the 
institutional framework which structures the market as a mechanism of both provision and 
denial. Accordingly, the market is not only thriving with activities limited to the organizing 
productive enterprises or the trading of goods and services in competitive markets (Weber, 
1947). The market also thrives in activities that work attainment of the profit-maximization 
objectives such as speculations in money, commodities and the financing of politics. 
Therefore, the formation of markets implies (Stein, 1995) public solutions to the problems 
of property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control and rules of exchange 
(Fligstein, 1996). 
Similarly, Hodgson (2004) stated that Gidden structuration theory considered agent and 
structure as a duality: where both human subjects and social institutions are jointly 
constituted in and through recurrent practices, and where no element has ontological or 
analytical priority over the other. In this theory, structure and agency are mutually and 
symmetrically constitutive of each other. In other words, agent and structure are regarded 
as different aspects of the same process. Furthermore, (Hodgson, 2004:31) simply defined 
structures as “recursively organised rules and resources”. Whilst the agency is both free 
and constrained. It focuses on the actor‘s roles, behaviour and decision of different ‗actors‘ 
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interrelationships in a given process and the consequential impact (Healey, 1991). 
Ultimately, in this theory, human beings are considered as reflective of, and reactions to, 
their circumstances, as well as conditioned by them. Giddens (1990) identified the nation-
state as the principal ‗actors‘ and the corporations as the dominant agents. Furthermore, 
O‘sullivan & Haklay (2000) supported this argument, as it provides greater value as tools 
of scientific investigation. This is buttressed the fact that it recognises the dual nature of 
the individual and societies and their mutually constitutive roles. 
According to Hodgson (2004), the idea of the theory is tied up with on-going processes 
and capabilities. However, the theory was criticised due to the inadequate stand on what he 
called ―stratified ontology‖, ―emergent properties‖ and persistence of social structures. In 
all this, argued further, in the theory the individual and the social levels were conflated into 
the central ground of the recursive structure. The affirmation of the Giddens (1990) that 
social structure is entirely mental and internal, (Hodgson, 2004) argued this downplays the 
fact that the structure consists not merely of persons or things, also of interactive relations 
between persons, in a social and material context. Then, the worry where is then the social 
structure? 
Alternatively, Hodgson (2004) offered an evolutionary framework within which both 
individuals and structures can be explained. The approach involved the causal interaction 
and reconstitution, both from the individual to structure and from the structure of the 
individual. It specifically involves the explanation of the evolution of individual purposes 
and believes, as well as an explanation of the evolution of the structures. The two are 
assumed to be ―endogenously‖ formed and co-evolution examined without conflating one 
into another. 
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Similarly, Jessop (2001) criticised Gidden structuration theory on the grounds that in the 
duality of structure and agency, one in most cases is overlooked at the time of analysis in 
terms of the relationship in the duality. However, Hodgson (2004:31) had earlier resolved 
this issue, shows that structure and agency are not treated as “separate and opposing 
things in the world or as mutually exclusive ways of thinking about the world” but as 
“simply two sides of the same coin”. Jessop (2001) offered what he called “strategic-
relational approach” in explaining society structure, meaning that a given structure 
enlarge and restrict the opportunities of actors over others at the spatial and temporal 
spheres in a given society.  
To realise a successful reform of an institution, North (1995) argued both the institution 
and the belief systems (culture) must be changed. This is what North describes in his 
―mental models‖, to explain the persistence of inefficient institutions when competitive 
pressures created by shifts in prices should lead to expectation in convergence around the 
most efficient available models of economic organisation. These ideas probably informed 
the World Bank‘s 2002 Annual Development Report titled ―Building institutions for 
markets‖ (World Bank, 2002). On this account, Nugent (2008) interpreted the North model 
to mean, particularly the persistence of inefficient institutions in the developing countries 
is to blame their cultures, which either prevent the emergence of efficient institutions or at 
the same time undermine their effectiveness. Gidden‘s (1990) on the other hand, looked at 
the reforms of institutions on their cultural and epistemological implications in cultural, 
political, social and economic livelihood of individuals in the society. These changes, he 
argued have grave consequences on the existing structure of the society on the individual 
choice and preference. 
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While Keivani & Werna (2001a) used the structure and agency used the relation between 
the structure that drives the development process and produces a given pattern at particular 
periods and the agency in a way individual agents develop and practice a strategy. The 
structure consists of the framework created by the economic and political institution and 
their social-economic values created as it relates, for instance, housing and their 
interventions at various levels of the society. The agency is also comprised of land owners, 
investors, developers, consultants, public sector planning officers, policies, community 
groups and any other agents involved in, for instance, housing development. According to 
Keivani & Werna (2001a:69) 
“The relationship between the structure and agency, moreover, is not seen to be 
static or one sided. Rather such a relationship is defined as being dialectical and 
dynamic. Whereby the agents are not just passive players within the structure 
without any influence on its form and extent, instead they are actively and 
continuously involved in reshaping the structure through individual and organised 
pressure and activity in pursuit of their interests which is itself affected and shaped 
by the external pressures put upon them by the structure. At any given point in time, 
therefore, the form of the structure and its relationship with agents is determined 
by the balance between the need of the state to safeguard the strategic interests of 
the dominant mode of production as a whole and the needs of the individual agents 
involved in this sector of the economy”. 
 
3.4 New institutional economics 
The writings of Richard Ely (1854-1943), Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) are recognized as 
the old institutional economics (OIE). The basic premises of the OIE were based on the 
primacy of social institutions in the economy (Hodgson, 2004). The agent behaviour is 
driven by habits and such originates from the social institutions. The implication on agents 
and individuals are evolutionary through learning and adaptation. The relevance of OIE 
diminished immediately after the 2
nd
 World war in America. Notwithstanding, the leading 
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revivalists of the OIE are Geoffrey Hodgson, Michael Porter and M. Grannovelter 
(Hodgson, 2004). 
The NIE is ascribed to the writings of Oliver E Williamson, which all began in the 1980s. 
The NIE is considered different from the OIE (Hodgson, 2001).  It is away from the 
evolutionary tenets of OIE. However, it is premises are within the neoclassical economics. 
The major distinction of NIE is the promotion of transaction costs and the constraints of 
property right on economic performance (Eggertsson, 1990).  
The development of the NIE has developed into five strands. The NIE strands are 
identified as, namely, law and economics; public choice, economic history, property rights 
and transaction cost economics (Grant & Brue, 2007). Looking at the study research 
questions, all of the five streams theoretical approaches are much more relevant to this 
study. Thus, these strands are further highlighted below.  
In recent years, the importance of transaction costs and the critical role of property rights in 
economic analysis have become increasingly emphasised as researchers seek better to 
understand economic behaviour (Williamson, 2000, 2003, 2005). These and other 
institutions offer the housing analyst greater opportunity to evaluate housing choices and 
low-income housing policies compared to neo‐classical economics models of housing. 
This thesis builds upon this growing tradition and examines the leading property rights 
issues affecting housing in market economies. Specifically, several contractual instruments 
which are used in housing markets are identified and examined: listing agreements, sales 
contracts, mortgages, leases and management agreements. Taken together, this study 
represents a research agenda for the economics of contractual arrangements in housing 
markets. 
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Among the conditions necessary for performance improvement is an effective price 
system-that is, a set of property rights that reduces the costs of transacting. North 
(1990:54) asserts, for example, that “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost 
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the third world...”Transaction costs in their simplest 
form are the costs of measuring and enforcing agreements. Where it is possible to measure 
exactly what is being exchanged, it is also possible to devise rules that can define whether 
or not exchange agreements are being observed. Where a measurement is imprecise, 
however, the integrity of the relationship cannot be confirmed. This makes it messy and 
difficult to make exchanges, and enables corruption. Hence, North (1990:7) reasserted that 
―the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the 
organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by 
those institutions, and the feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to 
changes in the opportunity set”. 
North (2004b) identified four kinds of transaction costs. Therefore, their mitigation can be 
addressed through institutions as follows: 
1. Measurement: Goods and services have multiple dimensions that are valuable, and 
must be able to measure all of them if to eliminate subterfuge and corruption. To 
make this possible, there is need to establish a uniform system of weights and 
measures. This must also be able to measure exactly what is being exchanged. 
Measurement is becoming much more difficult as more complex kinds of things are 
exchanged- as, for example, in the capital markets and over the internet. 
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2. Cost incurred in protecting individual property rights: A working judicial system is 
necessary to protect these rights. This is something that have long been talked 
about, and which is absent in many developing countries. 
3. Enforcing agreements: As cost no.2, mitigating this cost requires an effective 
judicial system; it also requires the creation of additional institutions to monitor 
agreements and punish defectors. 
4. Integrating the knowledge that is dispersed throughout society: This cost can be 
mitigated-though only to some extent, given the complexity of modern society-
through the establishment of a price system. This fourth transaction cost is often the 
most significant obstacle to move from understanding performance in rich 
countries to understanding what must be done in poor countries. Consequently, it is 
at the heart of the problems with which are of concerned.  
The dispersal knowledge is a function of the specialization and division of labour that 
underlie economic growth. However, to support continued growth in a society, such 
dispersed knowledge should be brought together for the benefit of the broader society. 
Such integration can involve high transaction costs if the different parties do not trust each 
other or do not know how to measure the qualities and characteristics of each other‘s work 
(North, 2004a). 
The public choice model shares basic assumptions with pluralist thinking but views both 
societal interest groups and government officials as purely self-interested, with the latter 
predominantly concerned with maintaining power by attracting and rewarding supporters 
and favouring certain groups. Rent-seeking via policy formation and implementation is a 
major feature of this process (Evans, 1995).  Partnership displays an interaction that 
involves a mixed-motive game between two players. The prisoner‘s Dilemma game can be 
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used in for instance as implication in selecting a partner, setting up a partnership, choosing 
a modus operandi, building trust, achieving selectivity, and performing monitoring and 
evaluation (Axelrod, 2004). In the public choice model the competition among the various 
interest groups is inimical to the collective interest. Rational politics generates irrational 
economic policies. The model might be placed in either of two categories: state-centred or 
society centred (Ikpeze, Soludo, & Elekwa, 2004).  
Individuals are important in politics only when they act as part, or on behalf, of group 
interests (Olson, 1971). The group becomes the essential bridge between the individual and 
his government. Politics is really the struggle among groups to influence public policy. The 
task of the political system is to manage group conflict by (i) establishing rules of the game 
in the struggle; (ii) arranging compromises and balancing interests; (iii) enacting 
compromise in the form of public policy, and (iv) enforcing these compromises (Olson, 
1971). 
According to group theorists, public policy at any given time is the equilibrium reached in 
group struggle (Olson, 1971). This equilibrium is determined by the relative influence of 
any interest group can be expected to result in changes in public policy (Olson, 1971). The 
policy will move in the direction desired by the groups gaining influence and away from 
the desires of group losing influence. The influence of the groups is determined by their 
numbers, wealth, organizational strength, leadership, access to decision-makers and 
internal cohesion (Ikpeze et al., 2004).  
3.5 Application of the institutional analysis and new institutional 
economics in policy analysis 
The neoclassical economics became a paradigm shift from classical economics point of 
analysis. The shift was away from the circumstances and conditions of production to the 
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one of preferences and needs of individual consumers (Bassett & Short, 1980). Ever since 
the paradigm shift in the latter half of the 19
th 
century has become the integral part of the 
orthodox approach to housing. The basis of the neoclassical economic constitutes that the 
realization of the individual preferences shapes the form of the economy as well as the 
nature of society. In other words, the individual and firms emerged as the priority focus of 
its analysis over the production system. This fitted to the emphasis, since the individual 
and firm each functions to the maximization of utility and profit respectively. Thus, with 
individual as compliment the neoclassical economics represent a description of the private 
market system as well as its justification. 
The NIE is relevant to the study of a policy dealing with partnership as governance as well 
as contracting in developing countries. Since partnership comprises “the complex art of 
steering multiple agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally autonomous 
from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal 
interdependence” (Jessop, 1998:95). The relationship between institution and context is 
one of the cores in the NIE approaches, specifically the work of North (1989a, 1990) 
emphasize on this fact. The widening gap in economic performance between developed 
and developing countries, and accounting for the welfare differentials on institution 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; North, 1990; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 
2004). In particular, North (1990:107) reasserted that institutions  “… are the underlying 
determinant of the long-run performance of economies”. Similarly, on this note North‘s 
(1994:367) work pays attention to the institutional context as a strong determinant that “it 
is adaptive rather allocative efficiency which is the key to long-run growth. Successful 
political /economic systems have evolved flexible institutional structures that can survive 
the shocks and changes that are a part of successful evolution”. 
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Important factors in explaining the relative efficiency of the partnership are the concepts of 
bounded rationality, uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour. The efficiency-enhancing 
role of institutions and organizations is that they reduce transaction costs and the costs of 
opportunistic behaviour. Within this, the partnership is analyses of principal-agent theory 
taking into consideration the hierarchical relationship between the transacting parties. In 
the principal-agent theory, the contracts manifested in the form of lease agreement or 
partnership agreements, as it is called in the countries of this study, constitute the main 
instruments to direct the behaviour of agents in accordance with the preferences of the 
principal.  
The institutional change is viewed as adaptive efficiency rather than receptive as the 
determinant of economic performance and specifically growth. The role of adaptive 
efficiency is the rate at which institutions in a country imbibe a change. The receptive to 
change is what constitutes to explanation to whether countries innovate to a change. North 
(1993b) explains in an institutional context recognizes the presence of a stable and reliable 
property rights system; enhances the reductions in information costs and enhances the 
possibility to spread risks and contract enforcement. These are fundamental ingredients to 
produce a significant context in facilitating economic performance. Under the same work, 
North (1993ab) distinguishes demand-side and supply-side of institutional change. The 
supply sides are the above mentioned factors, while the demand side comprises of the costs 
and benefits of an institutional change to the individuals and society. To achieve an 
economic performance requires the societal institutions, mainly, social, political and 
economic areas. 
A polity that encouraged the right incentives can be authoritarian or consensual. It must 
support or provide (1) an institutional matrix that produces a set of organizations and 
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establishes a set of rights and privileges; (2) stable exchange relationships in political and 
economic markets; (3) an underlying structure that credibly commits the state to a set of 
political rules, and enforcement that protects organizations and exchange relationships; and 
(4) Conformity as a result of some mixture of norm internalization and coercive 
enforcement. Only when this framework is in place can the necessary economic rules be 
established (North, 2004b). 
From the perspectives of the NIE, efficient policies are unlikely. However, the proponents 
suggest the importance of leadership in realizing change. The aspects of the role of 
leadership are on political leadership on reducing transaction costs for the economy as a 
whole by taking care of secure property rights (Besley & Persson, 2011) more specific the 
consequence of irregular stability of property rights. In this regard, Chang & Rowthorn 
(1995) argued the state role is indispensable. This is why the expected roles of the state are 
grouped into two entrepreneur and conflict manager. An entrepreneur state role is to create 
a vision of the future within its ‗institutional reality‘, whereas, the conflict manager role is 
in the resolution of conflicts that may arise as a result of the introduction of a change. It is 
this that sustains the North (1994) division of demand side institutional change.  
Tullock (1989) indicated that the role of government in creating and sustaining monopolies 
by giving privileges to specific groups. On the other hand welfare economics had 
concentrated on the power of private monopolies, regarding government as a corrective 
agent rather than as an active participant in the process of monopoly creation and 
monopoly protection (Schilder, 2000). 
Similarly, Besley & Persson (2011) distinguished the institutional capability of the state to 
carry out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms. On 
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state capacity, two capabilities are identified which construct the state capacity and action. 
(1) Extractive or fiscal capacity which entails the state having the necessary infrastructure 
to raise the revenue from broad tax bases, which could be used to provide services or 
welfare of the citizens. (2) Productive or legal capacity entails of the capacity of the state 
to raise the capability of the state to raise the productivity of the private sector, for instance 
in housing delivery.  
Furthermore, there is need for governments to be in possession of the legal infrastructure to 
provide the regulations and protection of property rights or the enforcement of contracts. 
Hence, Besley & Persson (2011) further identified three types of states: a common-interest, 
redistributive and weak states. A country in a particular time period can end up in any of 
the three possible states. Common-interest state: the revenues are used in the common 
interest and fiscal capacity is constructed by whoever is the incumbent leader. 
Redistributive state: the government is predominantly used for redistribution with the 
incumbent being more or less constrained by political institutions. Same as the first type of 
the state the incumbent built the fiscal capacity of the state, as there is enough political 
stability.  Weak states: lack the capacity to govern effectively. The state is used for 
redistribution, but lacking cohesive political institutions and characterized by political 
instability. Accordingly, the incumbents do not invest in the fiscal capacity of the state. 
Policy failures are found to be very common due to poverty and conflicts (Besley & 
Persson, 2011). 
In the case of partnership, the public sector and private developers standing as an interest 
group in the partnership are the main actors whose behaviours lead to the success or 
failure. One of the major determinants is the rent seeking to condone in the operation of the 
partnership. Using Tullock (1989) analysis shows the role of the government in the 
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creation or protection of government monopoly positions by government participation in 
policies such as  a partnership. When government grants monopoly rights triggers 
expenditures to obtain and safeguard rights, when ordinarily such should have gone into 
productive investments in the economy. The Olson (1971) thesis on rent seeking in 
collective action explains why interest groups with narrow interest are more likely to 
emerge and how these groups are able to obtain privileges the cost of which is distributed 
over society as a whole.  
3.6 Summary 
This Chapter has established that institutions stand as the variable to interpret and analyse 
the current context of LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria. The study aims at contributing to the 
broader debate on enabling private housing markets in developing countries. This type of 
institutional analysis focused mainly on the state, market and society and covers a shift of 
housing policy governance structures from the hierarchies to market. The PPP as an 
institutional change in LIHP, NIE and its concepts were employed in the analysis. Central 
concepts are transaction costs, institutions and organizations. Transaction costs are the 
costs of search, negotiation, contracting, enforcement and monitoring.                                                
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Chapter 4 
4.0 Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The Chapter covers the fundamental issues of the research methodology are presented in 
the form of identification, description, explanation and justification. Firstly, the research 
philosophy of the study is identified and justified. Thereafter, the chapter elaborates the 
entire research approach adopted and the research strategy. Specifically the chapter covers 
the processes of fieldwork, data collection methods and sources were elaborated. This 
chapter also presents the method for analysing data. Finally, the Chapter considers the 
issue of validity and reliability. 
The methodological approach adopted for the empirical aspect of the study is a case study 
conducted in the comparative methodological analysis. They are explicitly the case 
oriented and set-theoretic in nature (Ragin, 2007). The data consists of qualitative and 
quantitative facts, as a means to triangulate the data sources. The data sources for the 
analysis are generated from Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. From the chosen study areas, low 
cost housing projects executed under PPP at the two cities were selected to serve as 
representative context of Malaysia and Nigeria. The respondents consisted of key officials 
from government agencies and formal private property developers on one hand, and 
occupants of the case study projects selected for the study on the other. In both areas, the 
study explores document and literature sources searches to further enrich the primary data 
sources. Thereafter, all sources of data are appropriately analysed to answer the key 
research questions of this study.   
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4.2 The research purpose and significance 
The purpose of this research is descriptive as well as explanatory on the subject matter 
under study. The study provides a detailed and as much as possible accurate context of 
LIHP, the policy implementation, participation of the formal private market and LIG 
integration. The study explains how and why low-income housing policies are different 
between the study areas in relation to the opportunities and constraints in having access to 
housing among the LIG. The comparative study focuses on similarities and differences 
between units of analysis (Neuman, 2007). Beyond description of implementation 
challenges, the study answered the key research question on why the outcome of LIG as 
under the formal private market provision differs between the studied countries. 
4.3 Research approach, design and process 
Research approaches are generally classified into two types: inductive, also known as 
inductive logic or reasoning and deductive, or deductive logic or reasoning (Perry, 1998; 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). The approaches express the relationship between theory and 
research method (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The Figure 4.1 below shows the relationship in 
research methodology. In qualitative method, the inductive approach discovers the theory 
emerging from empirical data, while the deductive approach the research start from a 
theoretical construct according to a predetermined theory in an empirical data (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). Polsa (2013) cited the principle of economy as the advantage of 
deductive approach, since there is predetermined theory that guides the research. However, 
its drawback is the neglect of the empirical circumstances. On the other hand, he cited the 
advantage of inductive approach as the capability to uncover as yet unknown aspects of the 
context. Nonetheless, the disadvantage it may not lead to interesting theory. In any case, 
both approaches aimed at knowledge building. 
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Figure 4.1: The Inductive-Deductive research cycle (cycle of scientific methodology) 
Source: Adapted from Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009:27) 
Research design refers to the plan used to examine the question of interest. In other words, 
the research design is the ways in which the researcher conducted the research to answer 
the question being asked. Research designs tend to fall into three distinct categories: 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods (Mertens, 2010). The mixed method shared 
the characteristics of the first two methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Under these 
broad categorisations, to date various research strategies have been developed and research 
designs are executed using any one of these or both research strategies in the form of 
experiment, survey, case study, grounded theory, ethnography, action research, cross 
sectional and longitudinal studies (Creswell, 2012; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Arising 
from this discussion, a case study strategy was chosen to allow a comparative study of 
LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria and decision is explained below. 
In the field of research method, case study concept suffers from definitional morass and 
penumbra (Gerring, 2004). Notwithstanding, the Yin (2009:18) definition seems to be 
popular and defines case study as “an empirical inquiry that: (1) investigates a 
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Theory 
Prediction, Expectation, 
Hypotheses 
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Evidence 
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Facts, 
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contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when (2) the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. From the context of this 
definition, informed researchers in the research design and its numerous alternatives of 
techniques of data collection and analysis strategies have evolved. Consequently, case 
study method is recognised for both encompass qualitative and quantitative methods (de 
Weerd-Nederhof, 2001; Taylor, Dossick, & Garvin, 2011). And use of case study research 
in research endeavour is recognised to be a platform for achieving research aims involving 
description, test theory or generate theory, and possess exploratory and explanatory power 
(de Weerd-Nederhof, 2001). 
In promoting case study research strategy, Yin (2009) advanced three conditions. These 
conditions are (a) the type of research questions posed, (b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. For Yin (2009) case study research is 
considered to have a distinct advantage when a ‗how‘, ‗why‘ and ‗what‘ question is being 
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control. Also the research questions constitute the basis of research design and strategy 
chosen (Bryman, 2007). The basis of acceptance of these research questions is apart from 
being explanatory, but also “such questions deal with operational links needing to be 
traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009:9). Therefore, the 
research questions posed in this study was with respect to the questions ‗how‘, ‗why‘ and 
‗what‘. The research explored what are the institutional structure contexts and how and 
why they offered an interpretation of the countries under our study of low-income housing 
policies converged and diverged. Yin (2009), strongly advocated that case study is useful 
when the research has little control over the events, and when the focus is on contemporary 
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events. As private sector driven LIHP is the current paradigm widely adopted in 
developing countries, this study is contemporary, and indeed the researcher has no control 
over the phenomenon. 
Research stages framework constitutes the study delimitation. The research focuses on the 
public sector agencies, private sector developers, and the householders who actually were 
in occupation of houses in housing estates chosen for the study. The study commences 
with the literature review, the research problem, objectives and theoretical research as well 
as conceptual frameworks underpinnings the study. Thereafter, such review guided the 
researcher to create the research methodology, comprises of the instruments construction 
and guidelines. The multiple data sources were generated.  
Prior to the actual study itself, the researcher conducted pilot study in Kuala Lumpur. From 
two housing estates, namely, Putra Ria and Terakak apartments, a total of 30 householders 
in each housing estate were selected to administer the questionnaire. After changes made 
on the questionnaire, the actual data collection was conducted. Subsequently, the data were 
analysed using both content analysis and descriptive analysis made from the all the data 
sources. Finally, the findings of the research as well as the conclusion became known 
about the study.  
4.3.1 Case study design 
According to Yin (2009) there are different alternatives to research. He outlines this to 
include a case study, field experiment, panel study, focus group and survey. From these 
groups of alternatives (Gerring, 2007b; Yin, 2009) argues that case study is designed to 
sustain an in-depth understanding of context and interpretation of a phenomenon. The 
principle of the case study interest is in the process rather than outcomes, in context rather 
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than specific variables, in discovery rather than confirmation (Gerring, 2007b). The case 
study, among other alternatives of qualitative research, represents an intensive description 
and analyses of a single unit or bound system. The chosen case study method for this study 
is adopted to understand the low-income housing policy of Malaysia and Nigeria on 
comparable terms, so as to provide a broader understanding (Mukhija, 2010) not only 
relevant to the countries under study, but to other developing countries. 
On the design of case study, Yin (2009) identified four types of design namely (1) simple 
case holistic (2) simple case embedded (3) multiple case holistic and (4) multiple case 
embedded. He goes further to describe three major rationales for a single case to include 
(1) critical case (2) extreme or unique case and (3) revelatory case. The multiple case 
studies are distinct with the single when compared in terms of its methodology and 
naturally require more extensive resources and time. Its distinct superiority over single 
case is often considered more compelling and the overall study is consequently regarded as 
being more robust (Gerring, 2007b; Yin, 2009).  
The current study is on comparative terms, under the purview of the enablement housing 
policy, the findings of the study can only be drawn from the experiences of the public 
sector, formal private market developers/ partners and housing estate householders to 
enrich the study with a detail analysis of the context of the implementation of the 
enablement. This study consequently adopts the use of multiple case studies instead of a 
single case study to investigate the policy implementation between the two countries 
(Gerring, 2007b; Stake, 2006). This is to realise the earlier declared stand on establishing a 
broader understanding of the policy content and context in Malaysia and Nigeria.   
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Data collection was carried out based on multiple levels of the case study city, the selected 
housing estates, the organisations associated with the programme and the documents 
searches at the relevant agencies (Curry et al., 2010). The semi-structured interview survey 
constitutes the qualitative component of the research. The instrument contribution to the 
research was used to explain how the programme is implemented. Unlike the structured 
questionnaire survey, the semi-structured interview questions were generic in nature, 
involving the description of what actually happened in the implementation process, 
particularly, when the programme started and its evolution. It is intended to provide a 
holistic description of the implementations at the city level, as it emerged from the case 
study data sources. The structured questionnaire constitutes the quantitative component of 
the research. The instrument contribution to the research was used to answer the research 
question whether the programme has met the goal of the policy at the society level. The 
two methods combined, it was considered that quantitative method would usefully support 
and extend the qualitative analysis of the study (Denscombe, 2008). 
4.3.2 Units of analysis 
The concept is generally understood to mean the element used to conduct the research 
(Creswell, 2012), for example individual, school, district or state. The unit of states is 
adopted as the unit of analysis and case study. The state stands as a unit of analysis 
because it is socially and politically defined (Gerring, 2007b; Neuman, 2007). In this 
study, the unit analysis is Malaysia and Nigeria respectively. Purposively, the study also 
focuses on the capital cities of these two countries, namely Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) and 
Abuja (Nigeria). The purposive selection is based on those units of study that “...will yield 
the most relevant and plentiful data” (Yin, 2011:88). The essence of the research focuses 
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on context, concept and measurement. The issue of equivalence is relevant and exist to 
some degree in all social research (Neuman, 2007). 
The case study requires consideration of issues within and outside the case. This is 
convincingly stated by Stakes (2006:3)“case has an inside and an outside. Certain 
components lie within the system, within the boundaries of the case; certain features lie 
outside. A few of the outside features help define the contexts or environment of the case”. 
This study was also situated within its outside environment. Such research environment 
was defined to include among others, the institutions that were operationalising the policy 
and its subsequent implementation and its nature;  the particular individuals involved 
directly and the policy framework itself (Eyal, 2010). And the identification of such 
environment constituted an essential part of both the preliminary and actual study. 
Secondly, the structured survey questionnaire unit of study was the head of household. 
This was adopted to achieve time saving and reduce expenses of the student (Fisher, 
Reimer, & Carr, 2010). The focus on the individual household was based the fact that the 
individuals possess information about the programme‘s impact not available to the 
researcher (Eyal, 2010).  The household was important because “citizen reaction 
regarding the implementation process and perceived overall effectiveness of the strategy in 
order to better understand the potential changes in the community context” (Corsaro, 
Brunson, & McGarrell, 2010:515). The LIG cohort constituted the target respondents in 
the embedded case study housing estates (Stake, 2010). In constituting the sample 
respondents‘, the survey was carried out according to the willingness of the household to 
participate in the survey. This is what Ferguson et al. (2009) called convenience sample 
selection, also popularly known as purposive sample selection. 
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4.3.3 Preliminary/pilot study 
The pilot study is recognised to play significant roles and as such strongly recommended to 
be incorporated in the research process (Creswell, 2012; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009; Yin, 
2009). The pilot study was conducted in Putra Ria apartment and Terakak Muhibbah 
housing estates in Kuala Lumpur, where the research questionnaire was assessed for its 
suitability. Using the experience of Tan (2008), in each of the estates, thirty (30) 
respondents were purposively selected, responded to the pilot survey self-administered 
questionnaire and such housing estates are excluded from the actual study. This pilot study 
provides insight into the basic issues to be studied, identified possible problems in the data 
collection and set the stage for actual study.  
The researcher conducted reconnaissance visits to agencies and relevant stakeholder 
private developers, mainly to introduce himself and his study, establish rapport and 
understanding to the researchers ‗gatekeepers‘. The gatekeeper is defined as “an individual 
who has an official or unofficial role at the site, provides entrance to a site, helps 
researchers locate people, and assists in the identification of places to study” (Creswell, 
2012:211). This was crucial to developing trust between the researcher and the 
gatekeepers. 
4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 Population, sampling, sample size and design of the study 
The study sets to answer the key research question that relates to the state, market and the 
citizen (public and private sectors, and the society (households) participation under the 
LIHP to achieve LIG housing in Malaysia and Nigeria. The groupings mentioned 
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constitute the population of the study and the associated housing estates (Gerring, 2007b). 
The identified actor-agent constitute the ―quintain‖ or target (Stake, 2006) of the study.  
In Kuala Lumpur, the number of housing estates constructed under the partnership was 
dispersed and few are comparable to Abuja. But in Abuja, they involved tens of housing 
estates and developers. The land area made available for MHS as the name of the 
partnership projects covers the greater area of Phase III and IV of AMP development. The 
pilot study conducted to identify the projects sites which are PPP projects developed in the 
last ten years. This period of time is seen as the permissible period within which a public-
private partners could still retain information on their activities on the projects executed. 
On case selection, the criterion of Stake (1995) emphasised that the balance and variety are 
important, but the opportunity to maximise learning from a case is more important. It 
means that the selected case(s) should be one that could assist in answering the research 
questions. Also Yin (2009) stated that each case must be carefully selected so that it either: 
(a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). Consequently, the researcher chooses Kuala 
Lumpur (Malaysia) and Abuja (Nigeria) to conduct the in-depth case study. The two were 
selected because (1) they are capitals of the two countries and both have developed rich 
experience of and information on private-sector driven housing policy. (2) Both countries 
have declared commitments to LIG housing delivery and adopted private-sector driven 
housing policy. (3) Both have PPP/joint venture housing projects. This allows the 
researcher to generate rich data regarding the new paradigm LIHP and context issues. 
Although the literature did not state the precise number of cases to choose (Perry, 1998), 
from the established PPP projects obtained from the relevant authorities and field 
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observations, the researchers decided on the number based on the studied phenomena, time 
and resources available (Yin, 2009). Notwithstanding, Perry (1998) urges the number of 
case selections to be between 2 to 4 as minimum and 10, 12, or 15 as maximum. As for the 
method of selection, we used the guidance suggested by Seawright & Gerring (2008) that 
when dealing with a small number of cases, the purposive modes of case selection 
supersede random sample.  
Accordingly, eleven low-cost housing estates developed under the PPP partnership of the 
two cities were purposefully chosen for the study (Gokah, 2006). The case study estates 
and their developers were selected on the basis of their ―information rich cases‖ (Perry, 
1998) instead of a representation of the LIG housing provision under the PPP and  
according to ‗most similar‘ option of the seven procedures produced by Seawright & 
Gerring (2008:306) that “a case should stand for a population”. The adoption of this 
option provides us the strongest basis for generalisation in the context of the two countries 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Table 4.1 shows the selected housing estates and their 
developers in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja Malaysia and Nigeria. A total eleven (11) housing 
estates serves as case study estates. This is similar to the study of  Balthasar (2009) who 
selected 10 case studies for a detailed evaluation. 
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Table 4.1: Showing the case study housing estates and developers chosen for the study 
in Malaysia and Nigeria 
COUNTRY HOUSING ESTATE LOCATION FORMAL PRIVATE 
DEVELOPER 
Malaysia 
(Kuala Lumpur) 
Seri Malaysia Kg. Sri Malaysia, Jalan 
Sg. Besi 
Milek Perusahaan Sdn. Bhd. 
 Sri Penara Bandar Sri Permaisuri Dwitasik Sdn. Bhd. 
 Mutiara Fadason Taman Fadason, 
Jinjang Utara 
Fadason Sdn. Bhd. 
 Fasa 1B-Suria Magna, 
Fasa 33Ci & Cii- Mutiara 
Magna  
Lot 4086 dan 
Sebahagian Lot 
Bersebelahan di Metro 
prima Jalan Kepong 
Magna Park Sdn Bhd 
 Fasa 6A, Pangsapuri Fasa 
6 
Desa  Tasik, Sg. Besi Coneff Corporation Sdn Bhd 
Nigeria (Abuja) Yayale Ahmed  Apo district Shelter Road Ltd 
 EFAB  Mbora distirict Efab Properties Ltd 
 Sunnyvale  Dakwo distict Netconstruct  Nigeria Ltd 
 Kabusa Garden  Dakwo distict Solid Homes Ltd 
 CITEC  Mbora CITEC International Estates Ltd 
 Saraha  Lokogoma Saraha Homes Ltd 
 
Similar to the requisite number of cases for study, there is no definitive guideline on the 
interviews in the literature. As a rule of thumb, Perry (1998) suggested 35 to 50 interviews 
based on the 15 cases selected for a type of this research. He elaborated that there should 
be three interviews at different hierarchical levels within a case study organization. 
However, considering the nature of this research focus, which seems to be „a sensitive 
organizational issue‟ (Jehn & Jonsen, 2010), where the ―… practices were less than 
completely legal” (Mukhija, 2010:416), the organizations, particularly, private developers 
responding to participation in the study was limited. The research involved elites in 
whatever respect is described to be “prohibitively challenging” (Loewen, Rubenson, & 
Wantchekon, 2010). Also Perry (1998:794) affirm interview “...in any Asian organisation 
is difficult ...”. The implication is that “they are capable of frustrating the study by not 
cooperating with the researcher” (Gokah, 2006:68). To validate this claim and justify this 
research limited interviews with private developers in Malaysia; Table 4.2 provides a 
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summary of researchers‘ experiences. Similarly, such lackadaisical attitudes were observed 
in Africa by Gokah (2006) and Loewen et al. (2010). 
Table 4.2: Private Sector developers’ response to researches in Malaysia from 2006-
2012 
Authors Research approach Number 
approached 
Responses received 
 
Number               % 
Abdul Aziz, Yi & Jaafar 
(2006) 
Postal questionnaire 1677 40 2.5 
Abdul Aziz, Jaafar & 
Hussin (2007a) 
Postal questionnaire 1000 160 16 
Abdul Aziz, Yi & Jaafar 
(2007b) 
Postal questionnaire/ 
Interview 
1677 40 (13 
Interviewed) 
2.4 
Jaafar, Abdul Aziz, & Ali 
(2009) 
Postal questionnaire/ 
Interview 
770 38 (17 
Interviewed) 
5.2 
Abdul Aziz & Awil 
(2010) 
Postal questionnaire/ 
Interview 
30 4 12.1 
Abdul Aziz & Kassim 
(2011) 
Postal questionnaire 184 19 10.4 
Abdul Aziz (2012) Interview Not given 11 interviewed Not given 
Yusof, Mohd Shafie, 
Yahya & Ridzaun (2010) 
Interview 246 118 48 
Abu Jarad,Yusof & Mohd 
Shafie (2010) 
Postal questionnaire/ 
Interview 
565 57 10 
Wang & Abdul Rahman 
(2010) 
Postal questionnaire 4076 327 8 
Source: Author‘s compilation 
The selection of the interviewees was in accordance with Creswell‘s (2012) criteria that the 
researcher could select purposively but to ensure representation and competence. In both 
Kuala Lumpur and Abuja, the interviewees selected are the staff of the respective 
participating public and private sectors. In Kuala Lumpur, the departments involved 
include economic planning and joint venture and privatisation, planning, legal and housing 
management. While in Abuja, the departments involved include mass housing, Abuja 
Geographic Information System (AGIS), urban and regional planning, development 
control, legal, compensation and resettlement. On the other hand, only six interviewees of 
private sector developers, specifically two and four in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja were 
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interviewed. On the average of eight interviews in each case study, is within the range of 
nine semi-structured interviews held with stakeholders in a single case study of Sydney by 
Crofts & Prior (2012). The Table 4.3 provides summary of the distributions of 
interviewees and on the details of the interviewees in Appendix G. 
Table 4.3: Distribution of interviewees in Malaysia and Nigeria 
Sector Kuala Lumpur 
(Malaysia) 
Abuja (Nigeria) 
Public sector 4 6 
Private Sector 2 4 
 
The housing estates occupiers/residents as a household (Tan, 2008) constitute the study 
population and structured questionnaires (Appendixes A and B) were administered to a 
total sample of 900 respondents in both Kuala Lumpur and Abuja from the five and six 
case study PPP housing estates selected respectively (Table 4.4). The sample size chosen is 
justified based on the research of Holbrook et al. (2006), where from much of the smaller 
of this research sample population, they chooses 569 respondents from a total sample of 
2,022 units of houses.  
Table 4.4: Showing the distribution of questionnaires administered according to the 
selected study housing estates in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
CITY HOUSING ESATE NO. OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
ADMINISTERED  
Kuala Lumpur Seri Malaysia 100 
 Sri Penara 100 
 Mutiara Fadason 100 
 Fasa 1B-Suria Magna, Fasa 33Ci & Cii- 
Mutiara Magna  
100 
 Fasa 6A, Pangsapuri Fasa 6 100 
Sub-total  500 
Abuja Yayale Ahmed  30 
 EFAB  100 
 Sunnyvale  60 
 Kabusa Garden  80 
 CITEC  110 
 Saraha  20 
Sub-total  400 
Grand total  900 
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This study criterion of selection was based on the housing estates that is completed and 
occupied, and the private developers, as ―gatekeepers‖ consent and allowed the conduct of 
the study in their gated estates. This position concurs with Stake (2006) that only 
volunteering cases are studied. The researcher wish to mention, a particular experience of a 
leading private developer in Abuja, whose estate falls within the study framework, but the 
researcher had to drop the developer and occupants, the reason being that the refusal of the 
developer to consent the survey of occupants and his firm to participate in the study. On 
the other hand, some developers consent the survey to be conducted in their housing 
estates, but the firms refused to respond to the semi-structured interview instrument. Even 
the permission sought to conduct the survey in the estate, was obtained from the estate 
resident associations, as a social network (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006) and not from the 
developer.   
In the case study Abuja, units would have been much more than six selected so far, if many 
of such estates were completed and occupied, much of the estates were at the time of 
fieldwork at different stages of completion. Although there are other estates completed, the 
private developers under the scheme, which developed exclusive high-and medium-income 
houses, were dropped from the selection. The equal number of questionnaires administered 
in Kuala Lumpur was informed on the grounds that there was standardisation of the 
development and allocation of houses and households. In Abuja, this was not the case; 
hence, the number of questionnaires administered depends on the number of low-cost 
housing units provided in the estates. 
There is a need for trust of constituents of the research environment, in this case 
individuals and community's trust in the research is essential. It is the acceptance of these 
parties to cooperate that makes a research to be successful.  Consequently, researchers use 
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a number of strategies to solicit for a maximum cooperation from the respondents and 
ultimately increase the quality of the research (Holbrook et al., 2006). Inadequate of 
cooperation is identified to be one of the major problems faced by researchers in urban 
areas (Holbrook et al., 2006). The non-cooperation is attributable to the mistrust of the 
researchers intention to the host research environment (Josephson, 1970). To realise 
maximum cooperation from the households, due to the uncooperative attitude expressed by 
some of the estate residents, the researcher employed the research strategy use by 
Holbrook, et al., (2006).  
A method commonly used by researchers, to diffuse the misrepresentation of researchers in 
the field, researchers‘ employ the use of indigenous recruit of interviewers from the host 
community to lessen the scepticism (Holbrook et al., 2006).  For instance, the study of 
Holbrook et al. (2006) in Chicago public housing development, employed the use of ―in-
house interviewers‖ and ―indigenous interviewers‖ as a strategy of reaching out on 
sensitive information, relating to residents who might not receive relocation assistance 
owing to their illegal status in the development. The in-house and indigenous interviewers 
are defined as those employed by an academic organisation and those employed by the 
researcher being residents of the communities or neighbourhood being surveyed 
respectively (Holbrook et al., 2006). Based on the findings of the study, they conclude that 
the in-house interviewers demonstrated reliability, quality research, earn more trust from 
the respondents than the indigenous interviewers. However, the use of indigenous 
interviewers was helpful in dealing with difficulties with the community opposition to the 
research. This study benefited from the research experience by employing four experienced 
‗in-house interviewers‘ as field assistants on the recommendation of a full-time staff in the 
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Faculty of Built Environment, University of Malaya for the Kuala Lumpur survey. 
Conversely, six ‗indigenous interviewers‘ were employed for the Abuja survey. 
4.4.2 Research data collection instrument and sources 
To generate data for the case study, Yin (2009) recognised that these may come from six 
sources, namely, documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation and physical artefacts. Yin (2009) further argued the principle that the multiple 
sources of evidence must converge on the same set of facts or evidence (Figure 4.2). 
According to Stake (2006) the interview method, as main source must be complemented 
with the sources mentioned above as a means to triangulate the multiple data sources to 
achieve convergence. This approach has been proven to be useful in clarifying and 
obtaining complete information and the data triangulated to find convergence on the 
subject researched. For example, in Nigeria, some interviewees informed the researcher 
that they did not enjoy financing provided by the government to support the programme. 
However, the researcher found that the newspaper reports revealed that these interviewees 
were the major beneficiaries and in fact in default in repayment of the loan. 
Archival record                                                                 Literature searches 
 
 
 
 
Open ended interviews                                                     Structured interviews and survey 
Figure 4.2: Multiple sources for convergence of evidence 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009:117) 
In conducting the case studies, the interview method was guided by structured 
questionnaire and semi-structured interview instruments, to be able to obtain the context in 
Fact
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the practice of the PPP. Interviewing is described as a mode of inquiry (Seidman, 2006). 
Yin (2009) and Hancock & Algozzine (2006) attached so much importance to interviewing 
as the most important source of case study research. Furthermore, Yin  (2009) has pointed 
out most case study interviews are in-depth and in the form of (semi-)structured interviews 
(Riege, 2003). In particular, the use of this instrument, afforded the research to prove and 
clarify specific issues arise in the course of the interview. Having identified the areas based 
on the periods of development, the next stage sampling process involved interviewing of 
the respondents. Structured (close-ended) questionnaires (Appendixes A and B) and 
Semi-structured (open-ended) interviews were adopted. 
On one hand, the semi-structured interviews to the identified principal stakeholder, namely 
public sector departments (Appendixes C and D) and private developers (Appendixes E 
and F) were conducted by the researcher himself and informally. This is to earn the 
confidence of the respondents that the confidentiality of the data/information would be 
safeguarded. The schedule of the questions is prepared to guide the proceeding of the 
interview sessions. Prior permission was first obtained at the time and day to conduct the 
interview, and permission to record the interview or not.  
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview instrument to elicit for 
the detailed information about the respondents insights on PPP in the study areas. The 
content of the questions asked were within the interviewee department schedule of 
responsibility in relation to the implementation of the programme. Very few recordings 
were done on tape; most of the interviews were carefully recorded by hand.  Extra care and 
attention were made, as much as possible, to record the participant‘s verbatim responses 
accurately.  Wherever possible, supplementary documents and records materials, to back 
up the interview were collected from the respondents. In addition, the researcher adopted 
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the method used by Morah (1990) of interacting informally with staff of both FCDA and 
private developers, which allowed the opening of salient issues in relation to the study 
issues that were not revealed during the interview sessions. 
Similarly, using the method adopted by Egbu, et al., (2008) the structured questionnaire 
survey was administered on a one-to-one basis and involved an interviewer reading the 
structured questions and domain responses and ticking off the appropriate boxes in 
response to the replies of the individual respondent. Field assistants employed were trained 
and the in-house and indigenous interviewers conducted the interviews in Kuala Lumpur 
and Abuja respectively, under strict supervision of the researcher. This method is 
recognised to have the capability of generating best and high quality data (Jane, 2001).  
The respondents of the semi-structured interview were decided next. The researcher 
decided to administer the questionnaire on the participating staff, actively involved in the 
implementation, to serve as respondents, since it was believed that they have sufficient 
knowledge to respond to the research instrument. According to Yin (2009:107)“(k)ey 
informants are often critical to the success of a case study. Such persons provide the 
investigator with insights into a matter and also can initiate access to corroboratory or 
contrary sources of evidence”. Also the same consideration was done in conducting the 
interviews among the participating private developers in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. 
In Abuja, the actual data collection was conducted between November, 2009 and March, 
2010. While in Kuala Lumpur, the surveys of both public sector and household survey 
were conducted between October and December, 2009. But due to the difficulties in 
enlisting the cooperation of private developers to participle in the study, second developer 
interview was conducted in February, 2012. Considering the difficulties encountered, the 
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researcher faced a lot of difficulties to conduct interviews with private developers. In 
addition to a personal effort to advance notice, follow-up and personalisation of contacts, 
and the engagement of three indigenous interviewers, yet could not yield impressive 
fruitful results. This concurs with conclusion earlier made by Cycyota & Harrison (2006) 
that such efforts do not actually work when researching involving executives of private 
development companies.   The non-cooperation attitudes of private developers have been 
expressed in Section 4.4.1 as duly acknowledged in the literature. Consequently, the 
researcher had to depend on two private developers and one was interviewed on the 
―condition that the identity of the firm remained anonymous‖. According to Wiles, Crow, 
Heath, & Charles (2008) such condition is acceptable in a research. Hence, this study share 
a similar experience of Mukhija (2004; 2010) and Ibem (2011b) by relying on only one 
and two private developers as respondents on  PPP housing practice in Ahmedabad (India) 
and Lagos (Nigeria) respectively. 
The researcher, in addition, adapted the use of document review, as a means of 
strengthening the data collected from other sources. According to Yin (2009:103) 
researcher doing case study research should consider the specified documents for review. 
Therefore, the documents collected from Kuala Lumpur and Abuja were the reports, 
management reviews, records of implementation and publications, and the partnership 
agreement, among others and what was made available to the researcher. At the time of 
document reviews, the researcher conducted observations of the nature and type of housing 
structures and infrastructure and facilities, and general environment surrounding in the 
housing estates. 
Similarly, Yin (2009) advanced the archival records to be explored in the data collection. 
He cited as typical examples, this research archival sourced include the historical 
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background of organisations involved in the sphere of implementation and organisational 
charts, to provide the stakeholders background in relation to the policy implementation. 
The researcher was also able to collect the PPP projects, the participating developers and 
their locations from the public sector organisations coordinating the strategy. 
4.5 Method of data analysis 
In this subsection, the comparative data analysis generated intended to highlight the 
structure of context of the case studies, the agencies' responses and the implementation 
outcomes where case studies were conducted. To achieve this both Yin (2009) and 
Anderson (2005) suggested analytical strategy must be planned prior to conducting case 
studies. The results of the analysis are presented in the next Chapters of 7 and 8 based on 
data generated from the multiple sources. 
After the interviews, to analyse the data, content analysis was done manually, as suggested 
by Miles & Huberman (1994). The main issues, dimensions, categories and pattern were 
first determined. As suggested by Jansen (2010) the case diversity could be first 
determined beforehand. It was also suggested that using such content analysis enriches the 
researchers to identify concepts, interpret their meaning and establish relations between 
them (Díaz-Puente, Yagüe, & Afonso, 2008). The deductive analysis enables the 
researcher to assess and determine the conformity of the literature's description empirically 
in the two countries studied. Also the deductive analysis allows the researcher the 
understanding of the common concepts and themes that lucidly illustrate the most salient 
patterns of official‘s descriptions of PPP divergence between the two countries. 
Conversely, the householders structured questionnaires were analysed using descriptive 
statistics. In this case, the quantitative data from the survey was analysed using the SPSS 
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software to find the relevant quantification and the distribution of the responses. The 
analytical process, data were analysed using two separate files, one for each country. The 
necessary data cleaning was done to ensure the consistency and accuracy of the analysis, as 
stipulated in Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino (2005). The analysis of separate files generated 
the frequencies, percentages and cross tabulations.  Literature showed studies used similar 
methods to analyse the effectiveness of programmes in the United States of America 
(Ferguson et al., 2009; Laven et al., 2010). Also, it is earlier mentioned that the 
questionnaires were administered personally to the respondents, similar to Islam (2010) 
study, all the 900 questionnaires administered enter into the analysis. 
Finally, the analysis involved the two major steps in case study data analysis, namely, 
within-case analysis and cross-case analysis. Within-case analysis involved the researcher 
to draw out intimate details of the housing policy content and implementation with each 
country individually and documenting it as thoroughly as possible. On the other hand, in 
cross-case analysis, similarities and differences across Malaysia and Nigeria were drawn 
out (Stake, 2006; Yin, 2009). The final writing and presentation of the entire study was 
structured along this structure of analysis. 
4.6 Assessment of validity and reliability of the research instrument 
The assessment of validity and reliability of research instrument is essential (Creswell & 
Miller, 2000; Meyers et al., 2005; Riege, 2003). To guide the quality enhancing measures 
in social sciences empirical researches, Yin (2009) offered four tests, namely, construct, 
internal and external validities and reliability in relation to this study, each of these were 
examined below. 
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1) Construct validity:  
Construct validity was defined by Creswell & Miller (2000:124-5) as “how accurately the 
account represents participants‟ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to 
them”. This study involved three major stakeholders as mentioned in a number of times, 
namely, public and private sectors as well as society members. Consequently, earnest 
effort was deployed to realise objective judgement accordingly from the research data 
strategies and enhanced the construct validity. To achieve this, the researcher worked with 
the prescriptions offered by Yin (2009). This means that the construct validity was 
strengthened by collecting the study data from multiple sources, mainly from structured 
and semi-structured questionnaire survey, archival records and secondary literature. 
2) Internal validity 
The concept of internal validity was defined by Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009:24) as “the 
validity of inferences about whether the relationship between two variables is causal”. Yin 
(2009)  provided four means of achieving the internal validity. The above ‗chain of 
evidence‘ constituted the singular strength of a case study research and by extension 
internal validity (Anderson, 2005). Also, Jehn & Jonsen (2010) held that comparative 
approach insured internal consistency or reliability. Consequently, the research method of 
comparative analysis was used to realise the internal validity of this study. 
3) External validity 
The term external validity was generally understood to mean the generalisability of the 
research results to other settings (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). And the concept was 
theoretically based (Garcia & Wantchekon, 2010). The issue of generalisation is one of 
major misunderstanding of case study research (see Flyvbjerg, 2006); more specifically it 
was also a problematic issue in external validity and both concerned to case study research. 
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This study, therefore, used analytical generalisation in relation to enablement housing 
paradigm within the context of the countries studied to achieve external validity. This 
meant that research evidence of the study was compared with extant enablement/private 
sector driven housing policy literature. 
4) Reliability 
The term reliability had come to be used to refer to the consistency or stability in 
measurement from an instrument (Creswell, 2012).  The reason for the use of such 
assessment was to avoid the results of measurement error.  In  agreement to Yin (2009) 
tactic of using case study protocol to achieve reliability, the researcher subjected the survey 
questionnaire to Cronbach‘s Alpha reliability test and the results as shown in Table 4.5. It 
could be seen that all alphas were above 0.6. The results indicated an acceptable reliability, 
using the ruling provided by (Moss et al., 1998:178) that “Alpha‟s over 0.6 are considered 
acceptable”. The researcher suspected the use of different research assistants, as explained 
earlier perhaps might be the reason for the different values obtained in respect of Kuala 
Lumpur and Abuja surveys. Also, the number of items used in the analysis as indicated in 
Moss et al., (1998). 
Table 4.5: Reliability statistics of Kuala Lumpur and Abuja questionnaire research 
instruments 
Case study area Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items 
Kuala Lumpur 0.873 44 
Abuja 0.64 35 
4.7 Difficulties encountered and actions taken to overcome them 
The ―gatekeepers‖ to this researcher were the public agencies, private developers and 
householders/residents of the housing estates developed under the partnership. Normally, 
by the nature of the study, the research depended on the cooperation of them to provide 
access to research setting. In particular, the private developers were uncomfortable of the 
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research and others dismissive, brushing it off as ―just another student project‖. This is 
more so when the research “send cold shivers down the spine of an entrenched and 
inefficient administrator” (Taylor, 1970:111). Both of these stakeholders had proven 
problematic in the course of the study and such problems were identified below. 
The private sector developers were wary to participate in the study. The study relied so 
much on their know-how as the strategic and major stakeholders in the study. For instance, 
the researcher could only interviewed four of them in Nigeria from the target of six. On the 
other hand, in Malaysia the researcher interviewed only two. Indeed, the non-cooperation 
attitudes of the developers limited the progress of this study. This problem was 
acknowledged in the literature that 
“gaining access to elites can be difficult as such groups have the ability to resist 
the scrutiny of social researchers. However, access can be eased if the researcher 
has contacts in the field, prior experience and understanding of the culture” (Bloor 
& Wood, 2006:2). 
Nevertheless, based on the advice of this author cited above the researcher made the 
necessary contacts and was what made it possible for the researcher to reach out the 
limited number to accept and participate. 
Contrary to Bloor and Wood (2006) the identified gate keepers were part of the study 
population. So these had the responsibility of allowing the conduct of the study and 
participating in responding to the research instruments. They also represented their interest 
but also the residents of the gated housing estate on the part of the developers. In Abuja, 
the researcher could not obtain the participation of the major developer in the city, namely, 
ADKAN and both the consent and permission to conduct research in the estates were both 
rejected. In other estates, for example, the researcher counted the cooperation of such 
estate residents' associations in EFAB and SUNNYVALE housing estates facilitated the 
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interview of the householders. But the management of these estates refused to be 
interviewed by the researcher. 
The public agencies provided secrecy in government conducts and refusing to divulge the 
necessary documents that matter for the research. However, this problem was resolved as 
suggested by UN-Habitat (2010a) to refer to print media where the policy details are 
divulged by government agencies. Such sources had assisted in reaffirming the information 
generated from the interviews obtained from the public sector officials. 
4.8 Summary 
This Chapter elaborated the research design and process, so as to establish the procedures 
of necessary data and information generated, to enable the researcher to answer the key 
research question of this study. In doing this, the researcher responded to recommendations 
from several scholars in research methodology. The data were collected from the chosen 
case study areas using structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. The 
primary data collected was triangulated with other secondary sources like archival and 
literature sources. By using the case study strategy, this study provided a comparison 
platform to study the context of the policy implementation in the studied countries. In fact, 
Stakes (2006:454) argued that case study was an asset, since it was a platform to 
understand “how a phenomenon occurs in the circumstances of several exemplars (and as 
such) can provide valued and trust worthy knowledge”. Furthermore, the data collected 
was analysed descriptively. Hence, the subsequent Chapters contains the details of these 
data presentation in respect of LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria, in an attempt to have a 
―vicarious experience‖ (Stake, 2010) as a key research question of this study. 
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Chapter 5 
5.0 Malaysia and Nigeria institutional structures context 
shaping the low-income housing policy 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlight the institutional structure of Malaysia and Nigeria. This undoubtedly 
provides an important basis as well as understanding the impact of the structure on the 
effectiveness of a policy strategy in these two countries. In addition, the context 
trajectories in terms of the distinguishing institutional structure context are required to 
support the policy outcome that will be the focus of the subsequent chapters of this study. 
Hence, the chapter analysis would point to the nature of politics and institutional capacity 
and shows how they directed the housing policy. This chapter, therefore, begins with 
discussion on Malaysia institutional structure and subsequently examined the Nigeria 
context.  
5.2 Malaysia 
5.2.1 Geography and background 
Malaysia covers an area of 330,000 square kilometres (sq. kms) and divided by the South 
China Sea into two regions known as Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia and East 
Malaysia (Figure 5.1) (DiPiazza, 2006). Peninsular Malaysia or west Malaysia is situated 
to the south of Thailand and north of Singapore. The peninsular is bordered to the north-
west by the Indian Ocean and to the south-west by the Strait of Melaka, beyond which lies 
the Indonesian island of Sumatra (Andaya & Andaya, 1984). In addition, East Malaysia, 
with the states of Sabah and Sarawak are located on the northern portion of the island of 
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Borneo, and both Sabah and Sarawak share their borders with Indonesia as well as Brunei 
(Andaya & Andaya, 1984). 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of Malaysia 
Source: https://maps.google.com/ 
Malaysia‘s socio-economic transformation within the last few decades has constituted a 
new fashionable model among most developing countries (McCourt & Foon, 2007). These 
phrases cited ring loud bells to many developing countries to look at ‗Malaysia as a  
Model‘ and to become a reference point for policy reforms in most developing countries 
(McCourt & Foon, 2007). In this regard, writers such as Ang & Mckibblin (2007) describe 
the country as ‗rich in financial sector reforms‘; ‗recognised with economic policies worth 
emulating‘ (Ritchie, 2005); ‗successful federation making‘ (Sidel, 2012); ‗well developed 
financial system‘ (Sriram, 2002); ‗one of the few success stories in the world‘ (Mamman, 
2004); ‗a developed successful country‘ (Menon, 2009), ‗growth with equity‘ (Mahadevan, 
2006) ‗a model of stable functional democracy based on consociational philosophy‘ 
(Pramanik, 2007); ‗model in political management‘ (Balasubramaniam, 2006); and “good 
model of a Muslim country with firm commitment to promote Islamic values and 
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institutions” (Pramanik, 2002:63) among others. The above statement represents the 
reaffirmation of what the above authors gave accolades for Malaysia‘s agility, focus, 
commitment and determination, but most importantly for its transformative leadership 
(Zalanga, 2000) and which has become an inherent leadership attribute emerging in Asia 
(Mahbubani, 2011). 
5.2.2 Political structure 
Politically, prior to the 1948 the British Malaya comprises of Federated, Unfederated states 
and British colonies (Hooker, 2003). These combined formed the Malayan Union in 1946. 
Thereafter, Malayan union became the Federation of Malaya in 1948 and continued as 
such until the period of independence on August 31
th
, 1957. The nation that came into 
being in 1957 did not include Sabah or Sarawak. In 1963, however, Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore joined the federation, led to the change of the country‘s name, to the Federation 
of Malaysia, a name it retained after Singapore left the federation in 1965 (Hooker, 2003; 
Bakar, 2007). These political evolutions have significance in the social, economic and 
political transformations of Malaysia.  
The federation is nominally headed by the paramount ruler, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong  
often referred to as the King (Johnson & Milner, 2005). The role of Yang di- Pertuan 
Agong is largely ceremonial, the Prime Minister is the head of government (Case, 2007; 
Johnson & Milner, 2005). So far the country has produced six Prime Ministers and all been 
democratically elected, in contrast to Nigeria.  
Similar to Nigeria, the Federal government of Malaysia comprises of three arms, namely, 
the executive; legislative and judiciary (Case, 2007). The federal constitution determines 
the powers of the governments, but under terms of the federation, Sabah and Sarawak 
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retain certain constitutional prerogatives (Gomez, 2007; Case, 2001). The executive is led 
by the Prime Minister and his cabinet/ministers members and is the highest policy making 
in the country (Ahmad, Mansor & Ahmad, 2003; Chin, 2011). In addition to, the judiciary 
is independent of the executive arms of government and system is based on English 
common law.  
Furthermore, the country has a bicameral Parliament, which consists of a non-elected 
upper house, Dewan Negara (Senate) and an elected lower house, Dewan Rakyat (House 
of Representative) elected after every five years (Brown, 2008; Gomez, 2007). According 
to Economic Planning Unit (EPU) (2011) the senate consists of 70 members, 26 of whom 
are elected for three year terms on a state-by-state basis, with two per state, from among 
the elected members of the federal assemblies. The reminders, i.e. 44 are appointed by the 
King. The monarch chooses these from among those who have achieved some professional 
distinction, and/or from among indigenous tribal communities.  
On the other hand, the lower house, has 222 members (EPU, 2011) and is the real 
legislature powerhouse. Once a bill is passed, it must receive the king‘s approval before it 
can finally be passed into law (Johnson & Milner, 2005). Therefore, unlike Nigeria, ever 
since the attainment of independence Malaysia adopted a parliamentary democracy and an 
elective constitutional monarchy, with a federal system that allows for regional variations 
as well as national unity (Case, 2007).  
Likewise, at the state level, a framework almost similar to that at the federal level is found. 
The state is led by the Chief Minister (or Menteris Besar) and heads the state executive 
council, as the state cabinet (Johnson & Milner, 2005). As a federation, much of the 
political authority in Malaysia is devolved to the state level. The chief minister and chief 
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executive are also generally appointed by the sultan or governor based on the fact that are 
the elected leader of the largest party in the „Dewan Undangan Negeri‟, which is the state 
assembly (Johnson & Milner, 2005).  
Under the state government are the local authorities and enjoy the exclusive power to 
govern local governments except those in Federal territories (Bruton, 2007). Since after 
1976, the local government administration is constituted by government appointees, not 
through elections, suspended as far back as in the 1968 (Bruton, 2007). Consequent to 
decentralisation of planning powers in Malaysia (UN-Habitat, 2009), local authorities 
retain primary responsibility for planning at the local level (Bruton, 2007). Thus, such 
framework has provided a common institutional structure of governance at the local level 
and made active participants in the country's development process, although criticised as 
undemocratic.  
Malaysia‘s more than a half century of independence has been governed by a centrist 
political coalition of mainly ethnically based political parties, led by the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) and demonstrated sustainable parliamentary democracy 
(Pramanik, 2007). The UMNO is the principal Malay party and the dominant party in the 
governing alliance (Pepinsky, 2007) together with the Chinese and Indian communities 
through their respective parties, namely, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) (Freedman, 2006).  
The National Front Coalition (Barisan National (BN)) (previously called the Alliance) has 
governed at the federal level and most states since independence (Weiss, 2007). Under this 
consociational democracy, Malaysia has been recognized with stable political history since 
independence in contrast to Nigeria, notwithstanding having the factor of ethnicity as the 
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organising opinion of politics (Gomez, 2007; Jomo, 2004), as well as a significant factor in 
the political economy (Weiss, 2007). The political stability has enabled the realisation of 
“strong leadership by the cabinet and by the person of the prime minister has ensured 
effective governance and a climate of political and social stability” (Johnson & Milner, 
2005:81). Undoubtedly, the party coalition and political stability have being able to sustain 
the governance of the country over the last five decades with a remarkable transformation 
and success superseding most of its contemporary developing countries. In general terms, 
Freedman (2006:127) described Malaysian democracy as compared to Japanese politics, 
“with a dominant party in power and strong government guidance in the economy” and 
such position was supported by Nelson (2008a).  
Malaysia has had regular elections since independence to date. The first general election 
was held in 1955, two years before the date of independence. In a contrast to Nigeria, since 
then sequentially had eleven general elections uninterrupted, and the last was in 2008 
(Chin & Huat, 2009). These regular elections, have created smooth political transitions, 
political debates and quite widespread participation (Brown, 2008; Freedman, 2006; 
Thirkell-White, 2006; Wong, 2005). The last general election in the 2008 general election 
was widely seen as marking a major change in the world of Malaysian politics. This is 
what Morten (2011) associated to change from ‗subject‘ to ‗participant‘ political culture, 
inspired from the poor regime performance, the emergence of civil society and the 
availability of alternative media. Thus, for the first time since it took office BN lost its 
two-thirds majority in parliament and control of several state assemblies (Chin & Huat, 
2009). Whatever the case, though, the Malaysian political system is clearly thriving, with 
stability, a sense of renewal and popular participation. 
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Regionally, unlike Nigeria, Malaysia stands distinctively in Southeast Asia as its 
governments to be democratically elected and constituted, and never ever had any military 
coup. On this note, the governments of Malaysia were considered to be ruling on the basis 
of a broad-based legitimacy, rather than repression (Pepinsky, 2007; Thirkell-White, 
2006). The political discourse among the electorate and party politics are on the “major 
issues and events have resolved around ...theme of how to build a viable nation out of a 
population which is diverse and disparate in so many ways” (Farouk, 2007:45). The 
discourse, in consequence, informed the government to devise policies and programmes to 
achieve the yearnings and aspirations of its people. 
Politically, the government has employed affirmative policy instrument to address the 
societal transformation (Guan, 2005; Sowell, 2004). The aftermath of 13
th
 May, 1969, 
informed the deployment of such policy to address, in particular, the issue of under 
representation of ethnic Malay participation in the economy, inequality between Malays 
and Chinese, to deepen Malay equity ownership and the growth of the middle class. The 
New Economic Policy (NEP) and its successor, the New Development Policy (NDP), 
Mehmet (1986) and Tan (2008) described as government redistributive policies. 
Accordingly, Choi (2006); Gomez (2007); Tan (2008) and Rasiah, Noh, & Tumin (2009) 
argued the policies have led to the emergence of a Malay middle class which hastened the 
development of an ethnic Malay capitalist class and changed the character of patron-client 
network in Malaysia.  
The policies were focused by an ‗ethnic imperative‘ to create Malay entrepreneurs, and 
involved an ‗efficiency trade-off‘ or what Freedman (2006) called helping “Malays gets a 
leg up”. To these researchers, the consequence has been the public and private sector 
inefficiency (Meerman, 2008; Tan, 2008; 2011, 2012). Also, it was believed that NEP 
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created greater than before increasing competition for resources in the ruling Malay party, 
UMNO, this in turn centralised and tailored patron-client networks around a few key 
leaders (Gomez, 2009; Gomez & Jomo, 1998; Pepinsky, 2007). These political factors 
were eventually to compromise privatisation policies and the accompanying institutions. 
As a result, inefficiencies were tolerated and failure even rewarded (Tan, 2008; 2011). 
In summary, unlike Nigeria, Malaysia has demonstrated political stability and sustainable 
parliamentary democracy since after independence. In particular, the inter-ethnic harmony 
has been realised through consociational politics and immensely contributed to the 
realisation of political stability (Mohamad, 2008; Pramanik, 2007; Sriskandarajah, 2005). 
The Malaysia political stability and continuity have proven to be an important asset for the 
government.  
5.2.3 Governance structure 
Similar to Nigeria, the federal administrative machinery obtained in Malaysia is a three 
level system, namely, Federal, State and Local governments as highlighted in Section 
5.3.1. The Federal government is responsible for matters set out in what is known as 
―federal list‖ which includes defence, transport and education. On the other hand, state 
governments alone are responsible within their areas for matters set out in the ―state list‖, 
which includes land and religion (Ahmad et al., 2003). In addition, other matters such as 
local government and town planning are the concurrent responsibility of the federal and 
states. Constitutionally, since land is under the prerogative of the states, housing is also the 
responsibility of the states. For instance Figure 5.2 shows the governance structure for 
housing development. Similarly, the governance is carried out by the government agencies 
at three main levels, that is, ministries, departments and statutory bodies. Each ministry is 
headed by a minister, and is responsible for formulating, planning, controlling and 
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coordinating government policies pertaining to its functions. Government departments, on 
the other hand, are responsible for implementing government policies. Statutory bodies, 
which are subject to their own governing laws, are established to implement certain 
responsibilities in parallel with the national objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Relations between three tier government institutions for housing 
development in Malaysia 
Source: Adapted and modified from Ahmad, Ahmad & Arbi (2011:89) 
A special mention must be made of the special bodies established under the constitution, 
namely, the National Finance Council (NFC), the National Land Council (NLC), and the 
National Council for Local Government (NCLG). These are powerful committees that 
contribute in the direction of the country‘s development. The NFC membership has the 
Prime Minister, cabinet ministers appointed to serve on the committee and one 
representative of each from each state. The central function of the committee handles all 
issues relating to finance, its policy and national development. The NLC comprises of the 
Federal Government appointed Chairman (a serving minister) and 10 members; and one 
representative from each state. The committee functions in advising on the management of 
the country‘s natural resources. Similar to NLC, NCLG has the same composition and 
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function on issues relating to local government policy and legislation. The fourth advisory 
committee that plays a major role in the country‘s development is the National Physical 
Planning Council (NPPC). The NPPC serves as an advisory council on land use 
development as well coordination in the production and implementation of the National 
Physical Plan (NPP).  
The governance machinery of the country is under the coordination of three councils, 
namely, the National Action Council (NAC); National Economic Council (NEC) and 
National Security Council (NSC). To start with, the entire coordination of all programmes 
and development projects in Malaysia is under the NAC, as the highest level council for 
this task. The NEC and NSC, on the other hand, deal with the issues of economic and 
security respectively. It is important, to note that the three highest level councils are 
chaired by the Prime minister of the country. It is at the level of these councils all the 
responsible agencies in the country reports on the extent of attainment of their policies and 
programmes and progress of the country are scrutinized and evaluated. Similar parallel 
councils exist in the states and chaired by each state Chief Minister. 
Within these government agencies are considered central agencies of the government; 
these are not only responsible for policy initiatives and for preparing guidelines, but also 
for determining management and administration of all other government vision. These 
agencies are the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit 
(MAMPU); Public Service Department (PSD); Economic Planning Unit (EPU); 
Implementation and Coordination Unit (ICU); Ministry of finance and the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government. The MAMPU is responsible for introducing 
administrative reforms in order to upgrade quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Malaysian public service, the PSD is entrusted with the planning, development and 
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Management of public sector personnel. The EPU is the highest planning agency and 
responsible for formulating medium and long term economic development policies and 
strategies for the country, also coordinating and implementing development programmes 
and projects. Evaluating policies and strategies for national development is the main role 
of the ICU. The Ministry of Finance is assigned to formulate, plan, and implement fiscal 
and budgetary policies for sustainable economic growth. 
The EPU, as the coordinating organ of these committees, translate all the decisions of the 
committees into the five-year development plans for the country and the monitor and 
evaluate the implementation of the goals and objectives of the plans. This position is 
supported by Nelson (2008a) who argued that governance in Malaysia is highly 
centralised, even with little legislature's role, shaped by the priorities and perceptions of the 
UMNO inner circle. He further elaborated that on technical matters, these policy makers 
rely on various government agencies, particularly, the EPU in the Prime Minister‘s 
Department.  
Through its political history; governance has been translated into and guided by 
development planning (Embong, 2008) (Figure 5.3). This is in sharp contrast to Nigeria, 
which abandoned the development planning strategy after a decade of its trial (Falola, 
1996). The Malaysia‘s development plans major phases are outlined as follows. The first 
phase is the NEP from 1971- 1990 and was succeeded by the NDP 1991– 2000, which 
retained the basic strategy of growth with equity of the NEP. This in turn was followed by 
the current National Vision Policy (NVP) contained in the Third Outline Perspective Plan 
2001–2010 (Ragayah & Smith, 2005). In summary, the development of the nation is 
projected in two simultaneous plans. One is the five year plans and the second is called an 
outline perspective plan. The national policies on development in Malaysia have been 
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based on broad national plans. Malaysia has formulated five year Master Plans to set 
targets to achieve the above objectives.  In addition to this Malaysia has formulated Vision 
2020 which is for the future of Malaysia i.e. to achieve developed country status.  
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Note: MP =Malaysia Plan 
             OPP= Outline Perspective Plan 
             NEP= New Economic Policy 
             NDP= National Development Policy 
             NVP= National Vision Policy 
             NEM= New Economic Model 
Figure 5.3: Time frame of Malaysian development governance policy framework 
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Similar to Nigeria, town planning and development control are formal activities in 
Malaysia. The legal instrument guiding these activities is regulated by Town and Country 
Planning Act (TCPA), 1976. The sharing of responsibilities according to the three tiers of 
governments shows that the federal government role is exercised by the MHLG and a 
department is designated exercising the federal role. The state governments on the other 
hand perform the role of formulating policies to do with Structure Plans. The final level, 
local authorities are the important bodies in charge of town planning and development 
control. The local authorities prepare Local Plans, which are detailed plans that indicate 
what can be built on each piece of land and the intensity of land use. The One Stop Centre 
(OSC) that approves applications to undertake land development is located in the local 
authority.   
Specifically, in Malaysia, the Local Government planning powers are exercised by local 
authorities and it is recognised to be having a decentralised system (Nooi, 2011; UN-
Habitat, 2009). It is the local authority that serves as local planning authority of its area of 
jurisdiction (Hassan, 2009). Consequently, the local authorities could grant or refuse 
planning permission for development under its area of jurisdiction (Yaakup, Johar, 
Sulaiman, Hassan, & Ibrahim, 2003). To achieve good governance, the Malaysia context 
has decentralized power and resources to state and local authorities in the area of housing 
through the framing of central government functions and policy frameworks. However, the 
central government maintained a firm control of the implementation rather than remain 
adamantly in the entire development process and perhaps it was this central coordination 
that ensures a relative and uniform topography of the urban centres all across Malaysia.  
The contribution of the public service in Malaysia transformation success is widely 
recognized by authors (Abd Manaf, 2011; Mohamad, 2011; Siddiquee, 2007). In fact, the 
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public servants are recognized to have been the leading agents in initiating and 
implementing the programmes. On this note, Mohamad (2011:602) stated that “the 
Malaysian civil service has delivered and we would not be where we are today had they 
not implemented most of the government policies”.  The initiated series of administrative 
reforms have brought about the necessary infrastructure, training, customer focus, 
attitudinal change and promote quality and productivity in the implementation of 
programmes for national development (Siddiquee, 2002; 2006, 2008; Yeoh, 2011).  
The issue of corruption is of concern in Malaysia (Abdullah, 2008). It is expressed in 
different forms, such as rent-seeking and cronyism. Although, it is noted corruption is 
found in every political and administrative system in the world (Brinkerhoff, 2000). For 
instance, Transparency International (TI) reports over the years have reported an average 
position of the Malaysia corruption perception index in comparison with other countries in 
the world. In comparison to like Nigeria is mild. Using Campos, Lien & Pradhan (1999) 
classification Malaysia fall within low and predictable levels, while Nigeria occupying 
high and unpredictable category. Even at this level, Malaysia is ahead of its regional 
neighbours, though displaying impartial implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption 
laws (Quah, 2003).  
To summarise, in Malaysia, the governance instituted over the years constitutes the factor 
that strengthens the country transformation. Such governance progression built over the 
years became a distinct feature of the Malaysia and distinction ahead of many developing 
countries like Nigeria (Pramanik, 2007). The government of Malaysia has carried out 
reforms and programmes to reorient not only the public sector services but even the private 
sector, to refocus on the governance of the nation efficiently and effectively (Siddiquee, 
2006).  
121 
 
5.2.4 Economic structure 
It is impossible to write on the Malaysian economy, explains its reconfiguration and 
transformation or understand the way in which government intertwined with these ideas 
without a spotlight on New Economic Policy (NEP); under which government builds the 
framework to date that sustain the growth and development of the Malaysian economy and 
society. The history of NEP to Malaysia, race riots in May, 1969 in Kuala Lumpur led to 
the formulation of NEP on two-thronged objectives to address the immediate and remote 
causes of the race tension and breakdown of law and order.  
Malaysia, just like Nigeria, is a resource rich country. The country‘s economy after 
independence was dominated by primary agricultural products (Table 5.1). Similar to 
Nigeria at this time, accounting for 30% of GDP and manufacturing accounting for less 
than 8% until the mid-1970s (Ahn, 2001; Bhopal & Rowley, 2005; Kruger, 1982). 
However, as a result of rapid growth in export-oriented manufacturing, its share of GDP 
made a quantum increase from 10.4 % in 1965 to 33.1 % in 1995 (Ahn, 2001) and 51% in 
2007 (World Bank, 2008). In contrast to Nigeria, with this rapid increase the 
manufacturing contributes more than half of the nation‘s GDP and marked a turning point 
towards an industrialising economy. The dominance of manufacturing‘s contribution to 
GDP has been overtaken by the services sector in recent times (BNM, 2012; Rasiah, 2011). 
Table 5.1:  Structure of Malaysian economy by economic activity, 1995-2009 (%) 
Economic activity 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Agriculture 31.5 29.0 27.7 22.9 20.8 15.2 12.9 8.6 8.4 9.5 
Mining 9.0 13.7 4.6 10.1 10.5 11.8 6.2 10.6 14.4 12.9 
Manufacturing 10.4 13.9 16.4 19.6 19.7 24.2 26.4 30.9 29.6 26.6 
Construction 4.1 3.5 3.8 4.6 4.8 3.9 6.2 3.9 3.0 3.3 
Electricity, gas, and water 1.1 1.1 2.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.6 
Services 43.9 38.8 45.5 41.4 42.4 44.3 47.8 46.2 44.0 48.3 
Source: Adapted from Rasiah (2011:11) 
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Malaysia metamorphosed from a liberal, primary-commodity, export-oriented economy to 
a dual economy-where efficiency, multinational corporations manufactured for export in 
tariff-free export-processing zones alongside protected, less competitive, and government-
subsidised local firms producing for the domestic market (Mamman, 2004; Ritchie, 2005).  
The structure of the Malaysian economy followed an evolutionary phase. It started with 
laissez-fairre, developmental and free market economic policies (Table 5.2). Thus, such 
transformations have made ―... Malaysians live in a prosperous state...” (Lazim & Abu 
Osman, 2009:499). 
Table 5.2: Summary of major economic policies evolution 
Policy/ Periods Malaysia Plans 
(MP)  covered 
Policy focal Issues 
Post-independence  
1957- 1970 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Malaya 
Plans, and 1
st
 MP 
Laissez-fairre/Export-oriented, Economic 
/rural development 
New Economic Policy (NEP) 
1971-1990 
2
nd
 MP, 3
rd
 MP,  4
th
 
MP and 5
th
 MP 
Growth with Equity 
National Development Policy 
(NDP), 1991-2000 
6
th
 MP and 7
th
 MP Balanced Development 
National Vision Policy 
(NVP) 2001-2010 
8
th
  MP and 9
th
 MP Vision 20:20, Building a resilient and 
competitive nation 
New Economic Model 
(NEM), 2011-2020 
10
th
 MP and 11
th
 MP Vision 20:20/ Total development; High 
income, Inclusiveness and sustainability 
 
From 1957 to 2005, the Malaysia shows a growth of its GDP at an average 6.5% p.a. It is 
quite an exceptional growth among developing countries. Consequently, the per capita 
income has shown a tremendous change since independence, when it was estimated to be 
US$300 (Islam, 2010) and the country has climbed to the ladder as an upper middle 
income economy (World Bank, 2012) with a per capita income of about US$10,000 (EPU, 
2012). Although it is recognised to be in the middle income traps (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 
2009), Malaysia planned to be a developed economy by 2020 with per capita income of 
US$26,000 (Islam, 2010). In particular, Gomez (2009:348) argued that “(t)he 
government‟s subscription to policies under the developmental state model, particularly 
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during the more than two decades of Mahathir Mohamad premiership (1981-2003), has 
contributed to Malaysia‟s fairly rapid economic development”. 
Similar to Nigeria, Malaysia is a significant net exporter of oil and the second largest 
exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in the world behind Qatar. Malaysia holds 
proven oil reserves as much as four billion cubic feet as of January 2009. As of 2008, 
Malaysia‘s oil production was reported to be 727,000 barrels per day (Oh, Pang, & Chua, 
2010).  
Malaysia has a highly well-developed financial system (Lee, 2003) when compared with 
other developing countries like Nigeria. The system consists of the banking institutions, 
non-bank intermediaries, and a network of money, exchange and capital markets. The 
Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negera Malaysia (BNM)) consolidates the above 
financial system development by providing the needed supervision and regulatory support 
(Sriram, 2002). The studies of Ang & Mckibbin (2007) demonstrate that the country‘s 
financial development has a significant positive impact on economic growth. Similarly, 
Ang (2009) noted that the adoption of financial repression ideology, coupled with strong 
regulatory capacity had stimulated private investment in Malaysia. 
The 1997 economic turmoil that erupted in East Asia, the severity scale and the depth of 
the crisis were enormous and unanticipated (Lee, 2003; Ping, 2008). The crisis drastically 
reduced the values of domestic currencies, contraction of the economies and slowed down 
the economic growth of the crisis-inflicted countries (Chin & Jomo, 2003; 
Chomsisengphet & Kandil, 2007; Ping, 2008). According to Chin & Jomo (2003)  the 
crisis was traceable to financial liberalization and the consequent undermining of effective 
financial regulation both at international and national levels, and the massive withdrawal of 
124 
 
funds in the turbulent financial market in Malaysia. Surprisingly, Malaysia capital control 
policies worked, after rejection of IMF package, sped-up the recovery of the economy after 
a short span of time (Sharma, 2003). 
From the above presentation, the researcher argues as follows. The NEP lays the success 
story of the Malaysian development. Consequently, the source of Malaysia‘s 
accomplishment has been the interactive system of private enterprise and the government 
enabling public policies aimed towards economic growth and social development of the 
Malaysian society. As a result of realising a diversified economic base, the Malaysia 
context shows a reduction in dependence on the primary resource, proliferation of 
industries and the provision of sustainable livelihoods to its people. 
To summarise the review of the economic structure of Malaysia two conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, the productivity has grown with the economy through capital accumulation 
and technological change.  Secondly, the country has registered a shift from low-income to 
high-income sectors. The implication of changing the configuration, growth and 
diversification of the Malaysian economy, have succeeded in achieving rising incomes to 
the citizens and the country.  
5.2.5 Socio-demographic structure 
To exploit the Malaysia resources, the British promoted immigration of Chinese and Indian 
labourers from China and India respectively into Malay land (Ragayah, 2008b). In 
addition, traders from the same countries were encouraged to set up businesses to serve the 
colonial economy as compradors (Idris, 2000). These movements account for the present 
day Malaysian pluralistic society (Ragayah, 2008b). At independence, the ethnic groups 
that are deeply divided and the political stability of Malaysia has always depended on the 
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balance among the three ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian), particularly between 
the Chinese and the Malays (Horiwitz, 1989). 
Sequel to the above, like Nigeria, Malaysia has various ethnic groups, some of which are 
large and exemplary multi-ethnic model due to the absence of overt and enduring political 
conflict (Freedman, 2006; Nair, 2007). The population is 27 million (World Bank, 2008) 
and about 65% Bumiputera meaning ‗sons of the soil‘ (comprises of Malays and smaller 
indigenous groups), 26% Chinese and 8% Indians (Weiss, 2007). However, it is argued 
that the proportion of Chinese population is steadily decreasing in the country  (Choi, 
2006; Menon, 2009). They attributed the change to Chinese out-migration, and argued that 
Malay‘s population is currently approaching 75% of the country's total population. 
The process of income re-distribution had been extremely slow and the pre-existing 
formula for peaceful co-habitation of the three ethnic groups collapsed, leading to racial 
conflicts on 13 May 1969 (Jomo, 1989). Consequently, the Malaysian government 
recognized that for harmony to be re-established, economic and political equity among the 
three ethnic groups was necessary (Bakar, 2007). During 1971–1990, the Malaysian 
government implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP), which had two goals: the 
eradication of poverty among all Malays and reduction in the economic disparities among 
the ethnic groups (Ragayah, 2008a). 
The Malaysia‘s most remarkable achievement during the past three decades has been 
making their majority of the cohort LIG far better-off in terms of basic needs than their 
counterparts in most other developing countries. Although the Malaysian quality of life 
index (MQLI) being prepared by Malaysia EPU based on the indices of the 11 economic 
and social life components, has been criticised for the recognition of equal weights for all 
126 
 
these indicators (Lazim & Abu Osman, 2009). Notwithstanding, the MQLI goes a long 
way to showcase the satisfaction and importance to various aspects of life brought about 
by the economic development realised in the country (Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4). The first 
assessment of the index shows between 1990 and 2002 there was improvement of the 
Malaysians quality of life by 9.82 points  (Lazim & Abu Osman, 2009). This index is 
consistent to the UNDP (2010) that Malaysia has recorded tremendous exemplary human 
development progress. In addition to progress made in education and health sectors, the 
report acknowledges that Malaysia life expectancy is outstandingly high nearing the 
developed countries level.  
 
Figure 5.4: Malaysia quality of life indices in 2005 and 2010 
Source: Adapted from EPU (2012:31) 
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Table 5.3: Malaysia area indices and quality of life index for 2005 and 2010 
Index 2005 2010 % Change (2000-2010) 
Education 106.0 120.4 20.4 
Transport & Communication 115.2 120.3 20.3 
Housing 108.0 115.7 15.7 
Culture & Leisure 104.5 113.5 13.5 
Income & Distribution 102.3 113.3 13.3 
Public Safety 109.0 110.8 10.8 
Health 106.9 110.5 10.5 
Social Participation 96.8 110.0 10.0 
Environment 105.3 106.6 6.6 
Working Conditions 101.2 104.6 4.6 
Family Life 97.2 104.6 4.6 
MQLI 104.8 111.9 11.9 
Source: Adapted from EPU (2012:31) 
The aftermath results show that the benefits of strong overall economic growth were 
widely distributed which was evidenced by the sharp decline in poverty and higher 
attainment levels reflected in the social indicators both among the ethnic groups, in rural 
and urban areas, and the general increase of household incomes (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). In 
general terms, poverty has been reduced estimated at 37% of the population in 1972 to less 
than 4%. The change was most impressive among Bumiputera community, where poverty 
dropped from 65% in 1970, 23% in 1990 to 5% 2007 (Meerman, 2008). Also the 
government is successful in narrowing the ethnic income gap substantially, but not 
eliminated. As measured by the ratio of Chinese mean monthly household income to the 
corresponding of bumiputeras, the disparity had decreased from a ratio of 2.25 in 1970 to 
1.70 in 1990 (Nelson, 2008).  
In fact, the government policy on poverty targets has shifted from broad reduction to more 
targeted eradication on the remaining ―pockets of poverty‖. The government in the 
Malaysian Ninth Plan stated that hard-core poverty (defined as half or less of the official 
poverty line) will be completely eliminated by 2010 (Nelson, 2008). Notwithstanding the 
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decline of poverty, it is argued that income inequality of Malaysian citizens was on the 
increase to some degree. Indeed, this has become a paradox of Malaysian development 
which Nelson (2008a) and Menon (2009) argued has worsened in the country and 
attributable to the way the affirmative policies had been implemented. The disturbing issue 
of this development is that the beneficiaries are the ones that are least requiring support 
and they are the Malay elites and the upper middle class (Gomez, 2009; Menon, 2009; 
Tan, 2011; Tan, 2008). The consequence of this development is the creation of dependence 
culture on state hand-outs, corruption and a cronyism (Menon, 2009). 
Table 5.4: Incidence of poverty and hard core poverty by ethnic groups in Malaysia, 
1970-2009 
 
Year 
Poverty (%) Hardcore poverty (%) 
Bumiputera Chinese Indians Others Bumiputera Chinese Indians Others 
1970
a 
64.8 26.0 39.2 44.8 - - - - 
1976 46.4
a 
17.4
a 
27.3
a 
33.8
a 
- - - - 
1979 49.2 16.5 19.8 28.9 - - - - 
1984 28.7 7.4 10.1 18.8 9.9 2.2 1.9 7.1 
1987 26.6 7.0 9.6 22.8 7.4 1.4 1.8 5.2 
1989
b 
23.0 5.4 7.6 22.8 5.8 0.8 1.2 3.4 
1992 17.5 5.4 7.6 22.8 4.4 0.4 0.5 3.2 
1995 12.2 2.1 2.6 22.5 3.2 0.3 0.3 2.8 
1997 9.0 1.1 1.3 13.0 2.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 
1999
c 
12.3 1.2 3.4 25.5 2.9 0.2 0.3 5.9 
2002 9.0 1.0 2.7 8.5 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.8 
2004 8.3 0.6 2.9 6.9 1.9 0.0 0.3 1.2 
2007 5.1 0.6 2.5 9.8 1.0 0.1 0.3 1.4 
2009 5.3 0.6 2.5 6.7 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Source : Zin (2013:39) 
Notes: 
a  
Refers to Peninsular Malaysia only 
 
b 
Starting in 1989, data are based on Malaysian citizens. 
 
c 
From 1999 onwards, calculation of poverty is based on 2005 methodology 
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Table 5.5: Incidence of poverty of rural and urban strata in Malaysia, 1970-2009 
 
Year 
Rural Urban Total Malaysia 
Total poor 
Households 
(‘000) 
Incidence of 
poverty (%) 
Total poor 
Households 
(‘000) 
Incidence of 
poverty (%) 
Total poor 
Households 
(‘000) 
Incidence of 
poverty (%) 
1970 n.a n.a n.a n.a 1,000 52.4 
1976 864.1 50.9 111.8 18.7 975.8 42.4 
1984 556.4 27.3 93.0 8.5 649.4 20.7 
1990 530.3 21.8 89.1 7.5 619.4 17.1 
1995 281.8 14.9 83.8 3.6 365.6 8.7 
1997 221.8 10.9 52.4 2.1 274.2 6.1 
1999 271.0 12.4 89.1 3.4 360.1 7.5 
2002 198.3 11.4 69.6 2.0 91.6 2.5 
2004 219.7 11.9 91.6 2.5 311.3 5.7 
2009 n.a n.a n.a n.a 228.4 3.8 
Source: Zin (2013:34) 
 
According to the Zin and Smith (2005) Malaysia has attained full employment after 1992 
and which, in statistical terms, remained the same during and after the Asian crisis. They 
further stressed that even if there were unemployment in the country it is short term. 
However, to contain the labour shortage, particularly in the construction sector, since early 
1990s the government has allowed the import of foreign workers in the country and labour 
migration has increased exponentially (Abdul-Rahman, Wang, Woods, & Low, 2012). 
This action formalized practice as Malaysia has relied on foreign workers since the late 
1970s ( Ragayah & Smith, 2005).      
However, as the NEP era progressed, the size of the urban population increased by 4.5% 
per annum, resulting in an increase in the proportion of the population residing in urban 
areas from 51%  in 1991 to 55.1% in 1995. By 2000, this proportion has risen to 61.8%, 
accelerating at an average annual rate of 4.8% (Zin & Smith, 2005), 67% in 2005 and is 
projected to reach 75% by 2015 (World Bank, 2008). The rural population had dwindled to 
36% by 2005 and the labour force employed in agriculture had shrunk to 13% (Nelson, 
2008a). Similarly, GDP contribution from agriculture had dropped to 9% by 2007 (Preston 
& Ngah, 2012). These changes were due to the migration attracted by better economic 
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opportunities and the expectation of an improved quality of life in urban areas, as well as 
the extension of administrative urban boundaries (Zin & Smith, 2005).  
Fundamentally, the restructuring prong of the NEP set a 30% quota for Bumiputeras for all 
categories of jobs in an enterprise, particularly in the modern urban sector, promoted by the 
Malaysian government to encourage them to participate in urban activities, which accounts 
for two-thirds of the rural-urban migrations in the country (Hassan, 2009). The rapid 
economic development and social change as well as urbanisation have increased pressure 
on government to expand housing supply not just to put in place sustainable and effective 
LIHP but ensure that the urban centres have adequate housing delivery strategy.  
5.3 Kuala Lumpur 
5.3.1 Kuala Lumpur description, emergence and its development 
Kuala Lumpur is a city located on the west coast of peninsular Malaysia (Figure 5.5). It is 
located at the near confluence of rivers of the Gombak and Klang, popularly recognised by 
the acronym as Klang valley. Physically, the Kuala Lumpur is hilly and surrounded by 
tropical rain forest, which in particular the forest was replaced by plantations of cocoa, 
rubber and oil palm, developed by conglomerates companies of the British firms (Bunnell, 
Barter, & Morshidi, 2002). The modern times expansion of the city was in these lands.  
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Figure 5.5: Map of Kuala Lumpur and environs 
Source:https://maps.google.com/ 
Kuala Lumpur is the capital and one of the three Federal Capital Territories of Malaysia, 
the other two being Labuan and Putrajaya, directly governed by the Federal government of 
Malaysia. Historically, Kuala Lumpur started in the 1850s as a trading and mining town 
(Wahab, 1990) from three attap huts (Thong, 1983). The milestone records of the city 
began when it became the capital of Selangor state in 1880, capital of the Federated Malay 
States in 1896 and capital in 1948. At independence in 1957, it became the capital of 
Malaya and Malaysia subsequently in 1963 (Bunnell, 2004). Such enlarged political and 
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administrative role as the national focus of attention, Kuala Lumpur “emerged from the 
shadow of Singapore” (Bunnell, 2004:67).  
The national capital status exalted its function beyond political functions in national 
development, as it is the industrial heart of Malaysia. Further upgrading of the city status 
was bestowed on Kuala Lumpur in 1972 and thereafter, two years later a Ministry of 
Federal Territory was created for the city land excised from Selangor state. But the 
ministry had a brief period when it was transferred to Prime Minister‘s Department 
because it was said the then Prime Minister had considered Kuala Lumpur as his personal 
pet project (Bunnell, 2004). The implications of the progression in status, Kuala Lumpur 
enjoyed a special privilege from the government in the forms of unprecedented investment 
in the provision of first class infrastructures, landscapes and services (Usilappan, 2006).  
The Kuala Lumpur has undergone different four phases of growth and development shaped 
by the dominant political order and indeed the global political economy. The four 
identifiable phases recognised are pre-colonial, colonial, national and global phase. The 
details of these phases can be found in Bunnell (2004); Bunnell, Barter & Morshidi(2002) 
and King (2008). Suffice to mention that the phases serve as a key to internal contest, 
engagement and development of the city. For instance, during the Japan occupation 
produces “a society and culture of squatting” (King, 2008:71); during British rule the city 
was made to enjoy some notions of British town planning ‗normality‘ (King, 2008); and 
while during nationalist phase, the city was exposed to contests between the ruling Malay 
nationalists and the overwhelmed Chinese city population. The contest arises where the 
city centres “were completely Chinese-owned while the Malay land was mostly on the 
disadvantaged semi-rural fringes” (King, 2008:91).  
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On the national scale, the advent of the NEP with objectives to achieve the reversal of 
Malay disadvantage position, the government promoted rural-urban migration among the 
Malays (Hassan, 2004). Correspondingly, in Kuala Lumpur the government responded by 
having effective control of the supply of land and capital, and mass housing policy to 
accommodate the growing population (Agus, 2002a; King, 2008). Finally, on a global 
scale, Kuala Lumpur represents “the national centre for advanced producer services 
connecting it up to regional and global financial markets” (Bunnell, 2004:65). Also, 
consistent with the national vision, then it is not surprising that the city has an objective to 
achieve by the year 2020 as ‗world class city‘ in terms of working, living, business and 
governance environments (DBKL, 2003). 
Similarly, the changes Kuala Lumpur has undergone are reflections, succinctly captured by 
King (2007:131) as argued that “cities inevitably convey messages about the societies that 
produced them and are in turn reproduced by them, in their image. This is more so in the 
case of capital cities”. It has a land area of 244sq.Kms, almost the same size as the Abuja 
FCC. While the Kuala Lumpur conurbation covers an area of about 3,000sq. kms. This 
comprises of Kuala Lumpur and more than 30 rapidly growing adjoining cities and towns 
in the state of Selangor (Bunnell, et al., 2002). The agency responsible for the 
implementation of the housing policies in Kuala Lumpur is the City Hall of Kuala Lumpur 
(CHKL), a local government authority, directly administered by the federal government of 
Malaysia and set to achieve the objective of implementation of policies that would create a 
world class city and excellence (Sirat & Ghazali, 1999).  
At regional level, Kuala Lumpur is recognised as the fastest growing city in the Southeast 
Asia and consequently is a representation within the context of the emergent ‗Asian 
urbanisms‘, where the Asian cities are developing by novel model combination of public 
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and private actors (Hogan, et. al., 2012). The Asian Urbanism is a product of the Asia 
distinct transformations in economic, physical, social and informational spheres occurring 
at an unprecedented pace, reproduced within a few decades ago (Y. M. Yeung, 2011) and 
positively contributing to the rising ‗new Asian hemisphere‘ (Mahbubani, 2011). New 
Urbanism is being sustained by another equally distinct emergent of professional and 
business middle class in Asia countries (Davis, 2004; Hattori, Funatsu, & Torii, 2003). 
Perhaps, such phenomenon is what informed the governments of these countries to 
adequately represent the LIG housing within the general development framework of what 
Menon (2009) called ‗conservative pragmatism‘ in development policies. Hence, cities like 
Kuala Lumpur should talk whether that has been achieved and accurately define the extent 
of the success. 
5.3.2 Governance structure of Kuala Lumpur 
The governance of Kuala Lumpur is under the leadership of civil servant known as Datuk 
Bandar (Lord Mayor), an appointee of Prime Minister, since when it was declared and 
conferred the status of a city in 1972. Before then, the head of administration was Federal 
Commissioner and similar to what is being practiced in Abuja, Nigeria. From 1972 to date, 
including the incumbent, CHKL had ten mayors, serving an average of four years, and 
longest and shortest periods served were ten years and three months respectively. The 
Mayor is directly responsible to the Minister of the Federal Territory and Urban Well 
Being (FMFTUW), as the coordinating ministry that plan, manage, implement, monitor 
and evaluate progress and development in Kuala Lumpur. The implementation of such 
programmes depends on policies generated from the Prime Minister‘s department and 
programmes of the CHKL undergo department scrutiny and approvals. Of course, he is 
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being supervised by the department of local government in the MHLG. Ultimately, the 
Mayor is directly answerable to the Prime Minister. 
The organisation structure of CHKL, represent the largest municipal authority as far as size 
and functions are concerned in Malaysia and a state in its own right (Masser, 1991; 
Yaakup, et. al., 2003). The CHKL administration and management are undertaken by 
departments grouped into four secretariats, namely, planning; socio-economic 
development; management; and project implementation and management. In all the 
secretariats there were twenty-four departments, two units and supported by branch offices 
in eleven areas in the city. Each department is headed by a director and sectional heads. 
Altogether, administratively the CHKL is headed by a Mayor, his director-general and four 
deputy director-generals who oversee the above mentioned number of departments. The 
entire organisation and its administration of CHKL is headed by the Mayor, with vast 
power and authority over decision making (Yaakup et al., 2003) as far as administration, 
management and development of Kuala Lumpur is concerned. 
The CHKL is MS ISO 9001:2008 compliant and the authentication were granted in 2009, 
covering a total of 36 scope of certification (DBKL, 2011). In fact, all its operations are 
Information Technology compliant, which CHKL has begun computerising its activities as 
far back as 1974 (Masser, 1991). In addition, quality management service is used in 
guiding the administration of each department in the CHKL. A brief mention of some of 
these departments shows that the economic planning and coordination is responsible for 
ensuring of all developmental and privatisation projects. The development coordination is 
responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation and performance of 
projects under the CHKL. The regulation and promotion of development planning of 
CHKL are responsibility of the Master Plan.  
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The law requires the local authorities required to draw and review after every five or ten 
years, in line with the development of planning and development policies. Over the years, 
CHKL has drawn two major structural plans in 1984 and 2000. The current structural plan 
is drawn against a futuristic date of 2020 when the country is vision to become a developed 
economy. Interestingly, the plan has been subjected to public participation and scrutiny.  
Unlike Abuja, the CHKL more than half of its source of revenue in 2010 was generated 
from general assessment tax and followed by the charges realised from planning and 
building control. The Figure 5.6 below illustrates the details of the varied sources of 
revenue for CHKL. The proactive policy of the CHKL to depend on property assessment is 
commendable and by implication guaranteed it a dependable and sustainable source of 
income, in sharp contrast to Abuja that entirely depends on the federal government and 
ignored assessment tax.  
 
Figure 5.6: City Hall of Kuala Lumpur sources of revenue 
Source: Author based on DBKL (2011:176) 
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The management of CHKL was not only maintaining financial autonomy concurrently 
produces a surplus balance of RM408,237,034 at the end of the 2010 financial year after 
accounting its recurrent and capital expenditures combined (DBKL, 2011). From the 
reading of Abd Aziz (2007) this study understand this has been the financial trend of 
CHKL, maintaining a budget surplus since 1991. This means that CHKL as an agent was 
financially healthy and capable of discharging its duties and responsibilities.  
5.3.3 Economic structure of Kuala Lumpur 
Similar to Malaysian economy generally, in Kuala Lumpur the tertiary and secondary 
sectors of services and manufacturing respectively dominate its economy. On this note, the 
services sector remained the main driver of growth, accounting for about 90% of GDPs in 
(Table 5.6) and with such dominance Kuala Lumpur is considered having the fastest 
economy in Malaysia. Therefore, one can rightly argue that Kuala Lumpur has a vibrant 
and overwhelming dominance of service oriented economy. In fact, according to UN-
Habitat (2012b) Kuala Lumpur is one of the leading world cities in possession of 
favourable business environments and prosperity. 
Table 5.6: Gross domestic product for Kuala Lumpur by type of economic activity 
from 2006-2008 
Activity RM Million (in constant 2000 prices) 
2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture 32 42 38 
Construction 24 27 27 
Mining and Quarrying 2,190 2,126 2,243 
Manufacturing 4,475 4,871 4,994 
Services 56,153 61,644 65,405 
Total 63,515 69,442 73,536 
Growth (%) 8.3 9.3 5.9 
Source: Adapted from Malaysia (2010:371) 
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Similarly, the Malaysia achievement, as noted above, as growth with income distribution. 
The city of Kuala Lumpur as the ultimate destination of the incoming investment in the 
country, translate into having an increase in all income group's household income in the 
city (Table 5.7). From the table, it shows that the mean household income of households in 
Kuala Lumpur, although more than the national mean, grew at an average of lower annual 
rate of 1.8% per annum compared to national averages, from RM5,011 to RM5,488. 
Hence, this reinforces the conclusion of Choon et al. (2011) that major cities in Malaysia 
showed positive human well-being development. Notwithstanding, based on its income 
equalities data base, UN-Habitat (2012b) describes Kuala Lumpur as one of the leading 
most unequal cities in the developing countries, similar to most Asian and African and less 
in Latin America cities. 
Table 5.7: Mean monthly household income and incidence of poverty in Kuala 
Lumpur in comparison to Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysia, 2004 and 2009 
Area Mean monthly income 
(RM) 
Average annual 
growth rate (%), 
2004-2009 2004 2009 
Kuala Lumpur 5,011 5,488 1.8 
Peninsular 
Malaysia 
 
3,387 
 
4,162 
 
4.2 
Malaysia 3,249 4,025 4.4 
Source: Adapted from Malaysia (2010:399) 
5.3.4 Socio-demographic structure of Kuala Lumpur 
According to Bunnell, et. al., (2002) Kuala Lumpur is among the leading fastest expanding 
cities in South-East Asia and such urban growth made the city to be considered as 
‗macrocephaly‘ of Malaysia, having a singular dominance over other cities (Thong, 1996). 
According to Malaysia census results in 2010 shows Kuala Lumpur population was about 
1.7 million people; both as the entire urbanised area and the most densely populated area in 
Malaysia with 6,891 persons per sq.km (DSM, 2011). While the Kuala Lumpur 
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conurbation, known as Greater Kuala Lumpur (Greater KL) formerly known as Klang 
Valley, as of 2010, has a population of 6 million (Tan, 2012). Also, contains 6 out of the 
10 largest cities in the country (Soo, 2007). Figure 5.7 and 5.8 shows the growth of 
population in Kuala Lumpur between 1980 and 2010 and the Greater KL respectively.  
In spite of the overwhelming dominance of Kuala Lumpur as the largest city in the country 
but does not occupy a primacy urban system as in other developing countries (Soo, 2007). 
Notwithstanding, Kuala Lumpur, fitted very well into the tremendous social and economic 
transformations towards government goal of making it a global city (Sirat & Ghazali, 
1999). Fortunately, Kuala Lumpur has remained the focus of government induced rural-
urban migration that encourage Malays substantial shift to urban centres in search of job 
(Drakakis-Smith, 2000). Expectedly, the government compliment by employing strategies 
to contain the continuous expansion of the urban population, particularly in the provisions 
of housing for LIG. 
 
Figure 5.7: Population of Kuala Lumpur, 1980-2010 
Source: Author, based on DBKL, (2003) and DSM, (2011) 
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Figure 5.8: Map of Greater Kuala Lumpur and the distribution of population in its 
area 
Source: Tan (2012:109) 
The population distribution in terms of age group shows remarkable changes over the years 
in Kuala Lumpur (Figure 5.9). There was declined by proportion of young population 
under 15 years old from 33% in 1980 to 22% in 2010, and having the lowest dependency 
ratio of 36.6 in Malaysia (DSM, 2011). However, the city has witnessed the working age 
group of 15-64 years increased from 64% in 1980 to 73% in 2010. Similarly, the older age 
group, 65 years and above has increased from 3% in 1980 to about 5% in 2010. The 
implication of this demographic distribution has consequence on housing and local 
economy.  
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Figure 5.9: Distribution of population by age groups in Kuala Lumpur 
Source: Author based on DBKL, (2003) and DSM, (2011) 
In Kuala Lumpur the distribution of races needs to be presented, because the accessibility 
to low-cost housing is according to one‘s race. The Kuala Lumpur is recognised of Chinese 
demographic dominance in Malay dominated country (King, 2008). However, the NEP 
ethnic intensification of urbanisation in Malaysia has added boost to Malay population in 
Kuala Lumpur ((Drakakis-Smith, 2000). The population of Bumiputra has increased 
significantly in the city, and by 2010 had reverse Chinese historical dominant race in the 
city (Drakakis-Smith, 2000; King, 2008). Accordingly, the 2010 census results show that 
Bumiputra were about 42% of the city population, while the Chinese recorded a declining 
figure of 39% from 43% in 2000 when the Bumiputra were 38%  (DSM, 2011). The racial 
pattern dynamics in the Kuala Lumpur show that when the percentage of Bumiputra was 
increasing, the Chinese percentage was on the decline (King, 2008).  
Accordingly, the changing pattern could be explained in terms of the national context, 
where the country is experiencing Chinese immigration and there are significantly higher 
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fertility rates among Bumiputra and it‘s on the decline among the Chinese (Menon, 2009). 
While on the account of King (2008:168) such dynamics in Kuala Lumpur should be read 
against the background of “grander vision of a globalist, „intelligent‟, redefined, 
reasserted Malay World”. Table 5.8 summarises the changing racial composition in Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Table 5.8: Population by race groups in Kuala Lumpur, 1980-2010 
Race 1980 % 1991 % 2000 % 2010 % 
Bumiputra 305,435 33 469,900 37 541,082 38 696,730 41.6 
Chinese 477,601 52 581,100 46 612,277 43 655,413 39.1 
Indians 127,793 14 141,000 11 142,239 10 156,316 9.3 
Others        8,781          1.0           70,000         6 
 
14,239 1 9,539 0.6 
Non-citizens 113,912 8 156,623 9.4 
Total 919,610 100 1,262,000 100 1,423,749 100 1,674,621 100 
Source: Author, Based on DBKL, (2003) and DSM, (2011) 
Another social dimension of the Kuala Lumpur composition is the issue of religion and in 
the city reflects the multi religious composition of the country very well. According to 
DSM (2011) the religious composition of Kuala Lumpur shows that the two most 
dominant religions are Islam and Buddhism accounting for 46% and about 36% 
respectively and combined stood at 82% of the city population subscribe to these two 
dominant religions. Equally, represented religions include Christianity (5.8%) and 
Hinduism (8.5%). Hence, Kuala Lumpur just like Abuja, it is multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society.  
5.4 Nigeria 
5.4.1 Geography and background 
Nigeria is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. It has land area of 923,768 sq. 
kms. Nigeria is bounded on the West by the Republics of Benin and Niger; on the East by 
the Republic of Cameroon; on the North by Niger and Chad republics and the South by the 
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Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria was a British territory from 1861 until October 1, 1960 when it 
achieved independence as a sovereign nation. The Federal Republic of Nigeria was 
proclaimed in 1963. Prior to independence the Nigeria entity came into being after the 
amalgamation of three territories, that were administered separately and in different 
manner in 1914 (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Kraxberger, 2005). The River and its main 
tributary, the River Benue, divide the country into three major geographical sections: east, 
north and west (Figure 5.10).  
 
Figure 5.10: A map of Nigeria 
Source: https://maps.google.com/ 
At independence and the end of colonial rule, Nigeria was rated with strong socio-
economic fundamentals (Falola, 1996:177). The country was postulated to emerge as an 
economic power in Africa and indeed the entire world, considering its vast human and 
material resources. However, by the close of the twentieth century the country has become 
one of the poorest in the world (Falola, 2004). Unlike the success of Malaysian project, 
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however, the failure of Nigerian project over its political history, following the (Ukiwo, 
2003) is ―poignantly captured by irresistible titles” by providing an update of such titles as 
‗kleptocratic state‘ (Hertog, 2010); ‗Africa promised denied‘ (Pierce, 2006); ‗fractured 
state‘ (Amuwo, 2010); ‗garrison democracy‘ (Omotola, 2009); ‗flawed vision‘ (Henley, 
Tirtosudarmo, & Fuady, 2012); and ‗political corruption: Nigeria‘s perennial struggle‘ 
(Diamond, 1991). 
5.4.2 Political structure 
Just like Malaysia, without exception, Nigeria as a British colony came to independence 
with a parliamentary system based on the West Minster model. The model was redesigned 
in 1963, having a President with ceremonial powers and Prime Minister as head of 
government.  
However, Nigeria post-independence history has been characterized by long periods of 
military rule, political instability and marked by development failures. With exception of 
the first and second republics in 1960 t0 1966, and 1979 to 1983, the republics have been 
short lived, been overthrown in a coup d‘état. There were six successful, four unsuccessful 
plots and two failed military coups (McGowan, 2003). The political uncertainty continued 
as the vicious cycle between the military and civilians, due to what Williams & Turner 
(2008) recognised to be a civilian repeat of ‗failure of politics‘ and military response to 
‗failure of administrations‘. The military rule was characterised by “(b)ad governance, 
endemic corruption, ineffective public institutions, gross human rights abuse, and massive 
deterioration of infrastructures” (Iroanya, 2008:105). Meanwhile, these coups and counter 
coups among the military factions largely perpetuate political instability over a 
considerable period of Nigeria‘s political history (Ehwarieme, 2011).  Ironically, this was 
the period when local ‗capital-accumulating bourgeoisie‘ emerged (Kraus, 2002). In 
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addition to, the most unfortunate implication of regime changes, negatively impacted on 
Nigeria development, for lack of policy continuity (Falola, 1996).  
At the advent of civilian rule after thirteen years of military rules, Nigeria operates a 
presidential system of government, a replica of the United States model. The Federal 
legislature has bicameral chambers, namely the Senate and House of Representatives. The 
elections of all political offices are conducted at general elections conducted after every 
four years at the same time. It is only the office of president and governors have limited of 
two times of a four year term. Under this structure, the independence of the judiciary is 
upheld and maintained. Similarly, at the state level has a governor and single–house 
legislatures. The constitution in Nigeria vests the executive power in the President, who is 
both the Head of state and government. The president appoints a cabinet of unlimited 
number to assist in the ―determination of generating policy of the government‖ (FGN, 
1999). Apart from the ministries, the constitution allows for the establishment of 
independent institutions and agencies.   
Similar to Malaysia, Nigeria operates a three tier-federal structure. In Nigeria, before 1967 
there were four selves administered and autonomous regional governments, namely, East, 
Midwest, Northern and Western regions, and central government. The responsibilities were 
shared between central government, states and LGs. Each of the federating units is given 
relative autonomy to determine certain economic, political and social actions. In Nigeria 
there are 36 states and 774 local governments‘ areas, including the six area councils that 
comprise the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).  
The deepening mistrust among Nigeria sub-cultures, led the political class to adopt a 
formula of ‗zoning‘ arrangement and ‗federal character‘ like affirmative policy, whereby 
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the presidency and other top posts rotate automatically among the six geo-political ‗zones‘ 
in the country. This is why the country is divided into six political zones, among others, for 
the purpose of making an equal representation of political appointments, spread of federal 
government development projects and distribution of resources. However, such 
arrangement in recent times has been overturned by the present president, Jonathan 
Goodluck and in fact, it is on this basis he came on stage in the first instance, as vice 
president, thereby heating up the polity.  
Consequent to the military regimes, Nigeria development indicators became worse, 
economy ruined and battered, oil money used corruptly, corruption formalised, patron-
client and its associated pre-bendalism predominate, poverty broaden, wealth became 
concentrated to a few, society polarised, human rights abused, polity heated and communal 
tensions aggravated, policies implementation relegated and nation lost vision and direction, 
among others (Tordoff, 2002). On this note the researcher can rightly, accept the argument 
of Handelman (2011) and Pramanik (2007) that the country's underdevelopment was due 
to the pervasiveness of military governance. Also, undoubtedly, these entirely combine to 
ruin the country and bedevil the march to orderly progress (Williams & Turner, 2008). 
Since 1999, Nigeria has held four successful multi-party elections (Akhaine, 2011) and 
now perhaps has a ‗continuous democracy‘ (Shugart, 1995). Notwithstanding, this change 
made overwhelming rise in happiness among Nigerians (Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & 
Welzel, 2008). As in many African countries, the citizen envisages a general change in 
their welfare and governance (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, recent 
assessment within the overall continental context, and Nigeria in specific, Lewis (2008) 
shows democracies woefully failed economically with marked features of slower growth 
rates, high inflation and budget deficits even when compared with non-democracies. The 
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experience so far shows that civilian rulers ―govern‖ no better than military (Adejumobi, 
2010b). Indeed, it is the general conclusion that democracy has not changed the tone of the 
military authoritarian in Nigeria (Adejumobi, 2010b; Bates, 2008; Diamond, 2008a, 
2008b; van de Walle, 2012). Thus, politicians enjoy a low credibility rating among the 
citizens in policy implementations.  
As a political system in Nigeria has degenerated into one of instability and worsen by the 
endemic corruption, impacted on policy implementation. Most of the policies planned for 
the development of the country “have either been too hard to pursue or have been 
damaged by fiscal irresponsibility” (Falola, 2004:203). The advent of such policies is seen 
as a conduit pipe to siphon money from this unproductive political class. The current 
political party ruling, namely, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), since when the country 
returned to civil rule from 1999, is hardly not famous for promoting pro-people policies 
and programmes (Kendhammer, 2010). Such dominance allow the politicians to 
reconstitute networks of control and patronage plunder of oil rent, rather than sustainable 
good governance, in spite of the reasonable period of ruling the country, in contrast to the 
Malaysia UMNO dominance. The dominance of the party deepens political clientelism in 
the country and “the clienteist politics tend to reinforce inequality, undermine 
accountability and hamper the provision of public goods” (Lewis, 2008:101).  
Unlike Malaysia, Nigeria‘s elections so far have not been free and fair enough, especially 
the ones held in 1999, 2003 and 2007, labelled as ‗corrupt elections‘ (Bratton & Lewis, 
2007; Lewis, 2003), “brutally fought and outrageously rigged‟‟ (Diamond, 2008a:140) 
under the context of militarisation of the politics (Philips, 2005).  While the most recent in 
2011 was considered mild to the International Observers Missions, but most Nigerians 
considered it to share or even worse than the previous three, considering the dozens of 
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lives and property lost (Lewis, 2011). Hence, it is felt that the political trends in the 
country cannot be said “to be a democracy at all” (Diamond, 2008a:140). The reason 
being that, money politics became absolutely the deciding factor of participation (Mundt, 
et al 2008:683).  
In addition to money, largely the political mobilizations are built in the patron-client 
network. Although, the clientelism was an integral aspect of political life in the larger scale 
pre-colonial societies in Nigeria. But the present day ‗big man‘, also called ‗political 
barons‘ or ‗godfathers‘ (Agbaje & Adejumobi, 2006) act as political entrepreneurs, who 
invest in elections for higher political returns. The implications, the morons, incapable and 
novice gets appointed and eventually built a system of mediocre, incompetent and 
incapable governance framework emerge (Mundt et al, 2008). Succinctly, Diamond 
(2008a:146) summarises the cost of what the weak electoral systems and by extension the 
patrimonialism produces to the nation, thus, 
“the point of neo-patrimonialism, rather is to produce private goods for those with 
access to power. Contracts are granted not on the basis of who can deliver the best 
service for the lowest price, but rather on who will pay the biggest bribe. Budgets 
are steered to projects that can readily generate bribes. Government funds 
disappear into overseas accounts of office holders. Public payrolls are swollen 
with ranks of phantom workers and soldiers whose pays goes into the pockets of 
higher-ups”. 
This was why as far back as three decades ago, Achebe (1984) argued the problem of 
Nigeria was leadership and has remain so even in most recent times reflected on its vexing 
question of political accountability (Uwazurike, 1990).  
5.4.3 Governance structure 
The national governance in Nigeria, just like Malaysia and many other countries consists 
of cabinet ministries, the independent agencies and public corporations. A ministry 
149 
 
comprises of departments and the number of such varies and depends on the functions for 
which the ministry is responsible. The cabinet ministries are headed by ministers appointed 
by the president. The independent agencies are smaller than the cabinet ministries and tend 
to have considerable more focused missions (Dibie, 2003). The same governance structure 
replicates at the states and local government levels, though of lesser size and scales. For 
the state, the cabinet ministries are headed by commissioners appointed by the state 
governor. Furthermore, at all levels the governance machinery is managed by the 
bureaucrats, popularly known as civil servants. However, the governance in Nigeria, it is 
common to recognise the perennial occurrence of ad hoc agencies and committees (Dibie, 
2003). The practice employs despite their presence are not recognised by law and yet given 
wide powers to perform functions which existing agencies of government with the 
requisite legal provisions already have mandates. Such practice over the years has stunted 
good governance and accountability over what is required to bring existing institutions 
work and bring the sorely needed discipline into governance in Nigeria. 
A salient topic in issues relating to governance in Nigeria is corruption and as such 
deserves a special mention first, as the problem pose by corruption is vast “... keeping 
Nigeria from living to its full potential” (Sparks, 2008:116). This is because “corruption 
has been deeply entrenched in the structure of the Nigerian state and society” (Osoba, 
1996:384). For instance, the governance structure in Nigeria over the years has succeeded 
in building public perception and apathy as corrupt and inefficient in service delivery 
(Dibie, 2003). Unfortunately, at the highest level of concern, most especially is the 
political corruption, which grew apace, at unimaginable levels (Islam, 2005). Scholars 
offers an incisive perspective on the corruption specifics in Nigeria (Adebanwi & Obadare, 
2011; Campbell, 2011; Diamond, 1991; Hill, 2010; Lewis, 1996; Marquette, 2012; 
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Ogundiya, 2011; Smith, 2008). These scholarly publications demonstrate the endemic 
corruption in Nigeria and its existence proven even on the basis of international and 
national surveys. For instance, Transparency International (TI) reports over the years have 
reported on poor position of the Nigeria corruption perception index in comparison with 
other countries in the world.  
In consequence, the preeminent dominance of corruption is detrimental to the Nigerian 
society and its governance for at least three major reasons. Firstly, the economy and 
society suffer the most due to lowering of the system‘s efficiency. Secondly, corruption 
translates in the reduction of the total social welfare of the society because of its negative 
effect on the misappropriation and misapplication of funds in the country. Finally, 
corruption in Nigeria has destroyed national capacity, cohesion and increases its 
vulnerability and instability (Adesoji, 2010a). As consequence of these woeful and 
negative values progressively over time, it is then not surprising when Joseph & Gillies 
(2010:185) concluded that “Nigeria has been deprived of honest, effective, and 
constitutional leadership for so long...” Similar, a declaration was made in three decades 
ago, the problem of the country was declared to lies “... simply and squarely a failure of 
leadership... the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to  rise to the 
responsibility...”(Achebe, 1984:1).  
The irony of it all, in Nigeria, the corruption agencies were finding it difficult to prosecute 
culprits, mostly politicians and bureaucrats arising from both the executive and the 
legislature in scuttling the fight against corruption in the country (Adebanwi & Obadare, 
2011). This is not surprising since it has been recognised that “corrupt rentier state use 
low sate capacity to further undermine the legal order and facilitate rent seeking” (Jensen 
& Wantchekon, 2004:837).  
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Nigeria stands as prove to the assertion that no nation develops beyond the capacity of its 
public service. The civil service occupies an important role in the governance structure, 
since its main function is to implement government policies.  The bureaucracy in a country 
constraint by attitudes and operational capabilities could be hindrance to policy 
implementation (Islam, 2005). The Nigerian civil service evolved from the colonial service 
with its historical roots of independent, non-political and meritocratic administrative 
machinery for governing the country. The colonial masters bequeathed the culture of 
employing the best graduates, but this has degenerated that such good virtues are lost. The 
employment in the public sector was characterised by nepotism, cronyism, personal 
connections and bribes (Salisu, 2003). The implication that may be observed, the nation 
governance is skewed and concentrated in the hands of the few, became highly politicised 
institutionalized, captured as fiefdoms and increasing haemorrhaging of development 
resources (Osaghae, 1998).  
The civil service is denounced “for being corrupt, poorly trained and poorly attuned to the 
needs of the poor” (Salisu, 2003:170) despite the availability of training infrastructure as 
shown in Akanji & Bankole (2007). The civil service in Nigeria is characterised with the 
short term in its vision, self-centred in policy formulation and corruption in policy 
implementation, large and unwieldy, weak accountability and low professional standards 
(Adejumobi, 2010b; Dibie, 2003). These attitudes of civil servants have battered and 
eroded the competence of the institution; and policies and programmes became poorly 
conceived and executed and results in perpetuations of suffering to the majority of the 
citizens. The most surprising is that this is the structure that will act as the catalyst in 
managing and implementing reforms such as enablement policy in the country, as the 
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major stakeholder and indeed doubts are not surprising casting on their competence and 
diligence to administer this kind of policy.  
In summary, considering the current governance structure, at all, across the Nigeria tiers of 
government, it is fair to say caricature Nigeria as being in a development logjam, unable to 
dislocate its impediments and unclear how to propel development aspirations in the future. 
Thus, the implication on the implementation of an enablement policy, with the above weak 
governance structure, the Nigeria state has reneged the basic precondition necessary for an 
efficient institutional framework of implementation. 
5.4.4 Economic structure 
Unlike Malaysia, based on World Bank (2012) Nigeria is classified as one of the lower 
middle income economies, with 2010 annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
US$193.7billion and per capita income of US$2160 (World Bank, 2011a). The Nigerian 
economy has demonstrated an impressive ability to consistently show a high rate of growth 
since 1970s. In the past decades, a real growth has averaged 10% per year. However, this 
high economic growth rate has been accompanied by an equally high rate of inflation 
reached 25% per year from 1973 to 1975.  
Similar to Malaysia, Nigeria emerged from colonial rule with predominantly rural 
economies, heavily dependent on the export of primary agricultural products. The colonial 
economy was agricultural products based and this was what accounted for the strong 
impressive economic growth in the 1960s, though became halted by the civil war (Scherr, 
1989). In this context, the classification of nations by World Economic Forum shows a 
mark difference and stages of Malaysia and Nigeria economies. Unlike Malaysia, Nigeria 
economy phase falls within factor driven classification, meaning the economy was 
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dominated by subsistence and extraction businesses, with a heavy reliance on labour and 
natural resources.  
Indeed, more than 70% of its work force was in agriculture outside manufacturing, 
accounted for over 80% of export earnings in the 1960s to early 1970s, has declined 
drastically (Akanbi & Du Toit, 2011). The economic policies in the country completely 
ignored and crippled the contribution of agriculture as a growth generating centre (Henley 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, in the economy over 85% of the population engage in the 
informal economy and constitute the primary sources of a livelihood (Jimu, 2011). 
The import-substituting industrialisation pursued did not accrue economic growth 
performance. This was followed by a collapse in industrial sector and the emergence of its 
mono-cultured economy Nigeria depends almost entirely on the revenues from the crude 
oil industry and generated a fatal flow as ‗Dutch disease‘ and ‗curse‘ (Gboyega, Søreide, 
Le, & Shukla, 2011; Maass, 2009; Ross, 1999). According to Ikpeze, Soludo & Elekwe 
(2004) Nigeria is one of the 20 least industrialised countries in the world. The same 
authors expressed that industrialisation experienced a boom during the period of the oil - 
boom era (1973-1981) when its share of GDP attained 11%. Manufacturing exports, while 
import of manufactured goods was about 15% of GDP or more than 60% of total imports. 
Export of agriculture has declined from a share of more than 80% at independence to less 
than 4%, and that of oil approximately to 95% since the mid-1970s (Gboyega et al., 2011).  
The changing structure of Nigeria has shown a rapid de-industrialisation, continuing loss 
of market shares in traditional export markets and increasing import dependence especially 
food imports. The plethora of studies on Nigeria has generated explanations explaining the 
failure of industrialisation in Nigeria (Bevan, Collier, & Gunning, 1999; Eberhardt & Teal, 
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2010; Kohli, 2004). However, with all these, in discernible experiences the Nigerians have 
seen inept among particularly the political class to bring about a reform. For instance, 
Malaysia borrowed palm technology and palm seedlings from Nigeria in the 1960s. By 
2010, Malaysia had become about the world‘s largest exporter of palm produce while 
Nigeria became a net importer (Adebowale, 2009). The deindustrialisation in Nigeria 
during the last decades created severe social and economic problems. The effects are high 
unemployment, out migration, poverty, the deterioration of security and related problems 
(Riddell, 1997). Authors like (Lall, 1995; Onyeiwu, Iorgulescu, & Polimeni, 2009) have 
reported that SAPs has failed to achieve industrial transformation the share of the industrial 
sector, particularly, manufacturing in the total national output went down as an aftermath 
of SAPs, even with the general economic liberalisation created. 
The Table 5.9 shows the structure of the Nigerian economy. The table shows that the share 
of the industrial sector in GDP has been declining, along with its most important sector, 
manufacturing. In 2006 the share of manufacturing in total GDP was 2.6%, declining to 
2.2% in 2010. With agriculture stagnating even more, it is the oil and gas and services 
accounting for more than half of GDP by 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
Table 5.9: Gross domestic product at 1990 current basic prices for Nigeria, 2006-2010 
(Billion) 
Activity sector 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture 5940.2 
(32.0) 
6757.9 
(32.7) 
7981.4 
(32.9) 
9186.3 
(37.1) 
10363.7 
(35.6) 
Industry 7488.7 
(40.3) 
8085.4 
(39.1) 
9719.5 
(40.0) 
8071.1 
(32.6) 
10221.4 
(35.1) 
a) Crude Petroleum 6982.9 
(37.9) 
7533.0 
(36.5) 
9097.8 
(37.4) 
7418.1 
(29.9) 
9527.8 
(32.7) 
b) Solid Minerals 27.3 
(0.1) 
31.5 
(0.2) 
36.2 
(0.2) 
40.6 
(0.2) 
45.7 
(0.2) 
c) Manufacturing 478.5 
(2.6) 
520.9 
(2.5) 
585.6 
(2.4) 
612.3 
(2.5) 
647.9 
(2.2) 
Building Construction 250.3 
(1.3) 
266.5 
(1.3) 
306.6 
(1.3) 
347.7 
(1.4) 
394.0 
(1.4) 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2741.8 
(14.8) 
3044.8 
(14.7) 
3503.2 
(14.4) 
4082.4 
(16.5) 
4668.7 
(16.0) 
Services 2143.5 
(11.5) 
2502.8 
(12.1) 
2785.7 
(11.5) 
3106.8 
(12.5) 
3460.3 
(11.9) 
Real Estate & Business Services* 808.6 
(4.4) 
925.6 
(4.5) 
1064.4 
(4.4) 
1213.0 
(4.9) 
1373.3 
(4.7) 
Total (GDP) 18564.6 20657.3 24296.3 24794.2 29108.0 
           *This is a Subsector consider to be under services sector 
Source: Adapted from CBN, (2011:248) 
Later on, in Nigeria, just like Malaysia, oil export also became important. Nigeria is the 
sixth world‘s oil producer, in fact provides 12% of USA oil in 2007 and because Nigeria‘s 
oil has low sulphur, considered as sweet crude, is much sought after in the world (Maass, 
2009). In fact, USA purchases approximately 40% of Nigerian production and in recent 
times have moved up, as the third largest exporter of crude oil to the USA, after Canada 
and Mexico (Ariweriokuma, 2009). Nigeria is also home to the world‘s seventh largest 
supply of natural gas (Ariweriokuma, 2009). Nigeria experienced two oil booms in the 
1970s and large income accrued to the government. Oil provides the greater part of Federal 
Government revenues and, through the federal system, of state and local government 
revenues as well. The era of 1970s, the oil booms proceeds were channelled to an increase 
in welfare expenditures, to developing large industrial projects, like unprofitable Ajakuota 
steel mills, which never produced steel and to building the new capital city at Abuja and 
with no result in diversification of the economic base.  
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Similar to Malaysia‘s NEP position as its development catalyst, what explains Nigeria‘s 
economic (mis)fortune is SAPs. Due to the deepening economic crisis and international 
creditors, the Nigerian government in 1987  (Lewis & Stein, 1997) was made to introduce 
economic reform measures under the auspices of SAPs (Ihonvbere, 1993). SAP was 
unfortunately imposed when the Nigeria state does not possess a modicum of institutional 
will and capacity making it properly effective (Sandbrook, 1995). The content of SAPs 
included currency devaluation, trade liberation, and commercialization /privatisation/ 
liquidation of public parastatals privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs (Ugorji, 
1995). So SAPs was conceived as an attempt to correct structural defects of the economy 
through market led macro-economic reform based on the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) (IMF/WB) sponsored prescriptions.  
After years of SAPs implementation in Africa in general, divergence of opinions emerged 
on its assessment. According to the proponents of the reform, namely the World Bank, 
maintains that the reform had improved economic performance, and that, in general, the 
greater the degree of implementation, the better the result (World Bank, 1994). However, 
many writers both in Africa and outside reported contrary position to the World Bank 
position and such writers are too numerous, but suffice to cite (Easterly, 2001, 2005; 
Ihonvbere, 1993; Lall, 1995; Lewis & Stein, 1997; Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003; Sinha, 
1995). At the continental assessment, according to Mkandawire, & Soludo (2003:xii) the 
results of these studies unanimously came up with the common conclusion that 
“adjustment has not worked as promised”. Thus, the above cited authors were unanimous 
that the programme has on the whole, not resulted in any dramatic increases in economic 
output or productivity.  
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Another perspective has it that, in Nigeria context, the SAP and subsequent privatisation 
reforms offered the economic and political elites, to show up their aggrandisement and 
accumulation and deepened the exclusionary position of the majority within the weak state 
apparatus (Gordon, 1996; Ihonvbere, 1993). In other words, economic liberalisation, 
strengthened the ―big man‖ status, mentioned in Section 5.4.2, and patron-clientelism 
culture in the country, which effectively translated into the attenuation of the oppression 
and marginalisation of the poor at the hands of the ‗big man‘. The advent of SAP, neo-
liberalism and privatisation offered increased opportunity for the ruling elites to solidify 
their economic and political power (Gordon, 1996; Lewis & Stein, 1997). Therefore, the 
execution of the privatisation and economic liberalisation thereafter 1987, the benefits 
were mostly limited to the urban areas and the elite, big man, as both military and civil 
servants seized every opportunity to enrich themselves and consolidate their power bases 
(MacLean, 2011). 
The banking sector has been in crisis. The consolidation exercised in the country first 
reduced the number of Nigerian banks from 89 to 24. The limited available formal banking 
sector has a more business concentration on arbitrage opportunities in foreign exchange 
and money market interest rate spreads and limited concentration of lending to the private 
sector and households (Cook, 2011). The banking sector crisis exposures the Nigerian 
corruption deeply eaten the Nigerian business sector (Ugorji, 1995). Even with the limited 
number of financial institutions, specifically, she obtained a figure of 74% of Nigerians 
remained unbanked and 70% among business owners and traders. Also, Cook‘s findings 
validate Fielding (2009) found a mean of 10.5% of households across all the states of 
Nigeria having access to formal credit markets. This has large implications with respect to 
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market-led LIHP, entirely built on formal sector financial support, to significantly improve 
the housing delivery in the country.   
Inflation is a significant measure in an economy, because it affects country macroeconomic 
stability and in particular income distribution. In Nigeria, inflation fluctuates and 
contributes immensely to economic instability and in recent times it is in two digits. 
Fielding (2009) shows the implications of high volatile inflation to include creating 
uncertainty of future prices of products and depress economic growth.  
It is worth adding that the most visible element in Nigeria‘s picture of SAPs failure-the 
devaluation of the value of its national currency (Naira) (Schatz, 1994). The consequences 
of Naira devaluation included inflation, impoverishment of the people, unemployment and 
social insecurity. The inadequate productive sector of the economy further weakens the 
strength of the currency in large part, since Nigeria has emerged as a net importer of basic 
goods and import-dependent economy. The impact of the currency instability is prominent 
with price of instability of goods and services. In particular, the housing industry 
represents a woeful case in terms of the instability, because it is closely wholly imported 
dependent on its materials (Ogu, 1999; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001) and significantly at all 
times affect timely delivery of critical projects (Aibinu & Jagboro, 2002) as private 
developers cannot guarantee the cost at any time during construction. 
Since the late 1980s when Nigeria adopted World Bank‘s SAP, the country‘s national 
development planning has been shelved. Not surprisingly, the Nigerian state has been 
particularly for the heavy involvement of IFIs determines the macroeconomic framework 
of the country. Unfortunately, the country entirely depends on development frameworks 
sponsored by IFIs. These IFIs has taken significant policy leverage, and raises questions as 
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to the extent to which Nigeria can claim ―ownership‖ over its economic policy choices. 
The Nigerian housing policies are attesting to this.  
The idea of national development planning was first laid during the colonial period (Falola, 
2004). Notwithstanding, such ideas and content of plans, provided the foundations for the 
post-colonial state plans (Falola, 1996). Unfortunately, the national development planning 
has been abandoned and been replaced with ad hoc policies like medium-term and rolling 
plans (Table 5.10) (Falola, 1996). All these plans shared a common peculiarity of failure to 
be sufficient, far-reaching, longitudinal or symmetrical enough in scope and coverage to 
pursue the actual national development, since the plans ended up not being implemented. 
Similarly, these non-implemented plans show pervasive lack of continuity in policies as 
government changes in the country. For example, during the democratic era from 1999 to 
date, Nigeria had a different set of economic policies under the rule of the same ruling 
party and instances of Obasanjo‘s NEEDs, Yar‘Adua seven-point agenda, and currently, 
Jonathan‘s transformation agenda. 
Table 5.10: Nigerian development policy framework 
Plan Period Remarks 
First colonial 1946-1955 10 year plan 
Second colonial 1955-1960 Later extend to 1962 
First National 1962-1968 Civil war period 
Second National 1970-1974  
Third National 1975-1980  
Fourth National 1981-1985 Lasted for 9 months 
Fifth National 1986-1990 Postponed until 1988-90 
Rolling plan 1990-1992 National plan abandoned in 1989 
National Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS) 
 
2003-2007 
 
Medium Term Budget Policy 2007-2009  
Medium Term Budget Policy 2010-2012  
Medium Term Budget Policy 2012-2014  
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Just like the common trend of industrialisation policy pursued by developing countries, 
Nigeria pursued the import substitution industrialisation. Unlike its contemporaries like 
Malaysia, since then the Nigeria has been unable to replace the policy with diversified 
export-oriented industrialisation, despite its regional superiority. Even the policy of 
promoting FDI investment attraction, based on export processing zones did not make any 
significant difference outside oil and gas, and recently telecommunications, which is 
recognised to be the catalyst for Malaysia growth (Choong & Lam, 2010).  
In summary, unlike Malaysia, as a result of failure of the country to realise a diversified 
economy, perhaps, contributed to why poverty has remained endemic and persistent. 
Ultimately, there is also a general decline in productivity and the battered economy created 
social deficits such as high poverty rate, unemployment, poor health care delivery and 
deterioration of the human capital (Akanbi & Du Toit, 2011).  
5.4.5 Socio-demographic structure 
Nigeria it is, by far, one of Africa‘s most populous country, contains about 60% of the 
West Africa population and among the ten most populous countries in the world and 
accounts for almost one out of every five Africans living on the continent (Population 
Reference Bureau (PRB), 2011).  According to World Bank (2011b) indicated Nigeria 
population in 2010 at 158 million with an average growth rate of 2.4% between 2000-
2010. From the Nigeria source, the 2006 population census obtained a figure of 
140,003,542 with an annual growth rate of 3.2%. At an average growth rate of 2.4 % per 
annum, it is forecast that the country will have a population of about 178.7 million in 2015 
(World Bank, 2011a). The high population in Nigeria should have been a catalyst for a 
strong economy and sustained development. But the poor management, economic base and 
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resources without diversification, the huge population constitutes a catastrophe with 
dwindling economic base. 
The dominant characteristics of Nigerian population and its urban centre are well known: 
its trends of increase of geographical concentration in urban centres. As part of the global 
trend of urbanisation, the majority of Nigeria‘s population lives in urban centres (Awofeso, 
2010; UN-Habitat, 2008). Between 1960 and 1990, the urban population of Nigeria, grew 
fivefold; the ratio of urban residents increased from 14% in 1960 to 40% in 1990. By the 
year 2020, the ratio is expected to stand at 60% (Awofeso, 2010). The core implication 
issues include access to affordable housing, among others. With the economic downturn, 
collapsed of industrial sector and deteriorating opportunities in urban centres, the majority 
of urban residents are economically marginalised (Mundt et al, 2008). By implication, the 
majority of poor in Nigeria live in the urban centres. By the increasing urbanisation trend 
raises the concern that with the occurrence of poverty among the residents, the question of 
the appropriateness and sustainability of market-led LIHP as the catalyst of meeting the 
housing needs of the LIG cohort arises.  
Similar to Malaysia, without exception Nigeria is religiously and ethnically plural. It is 
reckoned that there are over 250 ethnic groups. Many of which are divided into several sub 
groups. Diamond (1988) described the ethnic structure to be tripod ethnic structure, having 
a kind of centralised ethnic structure. The most commonly practiced religions are Islam 
(50%), Christianity (40%) and a variety of ‗traditional/indigenous religions (10%) (Antai, 
Ghilagaber, Wedrén, Macassa, & Moradi, 2009) syncretism is not uncommon. Instead, the 
ethnic and religious diversities in Nigeria became a major source of a great deal of ethnic 
and religious rivalry and intolerance, mutual suspicion and distrust and even animosity 
between the groups. But most unfortunate in recent times, religious, ethnic, ethnic conflicts 
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have taken a dimension as the most deadly threat to the statehood, political order, national 
security, democratic durability and peace in Nigeria (Joseph & Gillies, 2010; Philips, 2005; 
Watts, 2007).  
The consequence, all these have generated and generating religious and ethnic conflicts 
(Suberu, 2009). For instance, religious violence in the country has become so perennial 
with heavy casualties of lives and property (Adesoji, 2010b). Equally, unfortunately, the 
issue of multi-religious and ethnic diversities in the country are being exploited by the 
governments and politicians to consolidate their control over society and consequently 
entrench exploitative power, production and exchange against the people (Ihonvbere, 1994; 
Kendhammer, 2010). Thus, Unlike Malaysia divided along the line of race only and 
constitutes the basis of competition and conflict, but in Nigeria it is broader and comprises 
division based on religion, region and ethnicity. 
From the Nigerian context, an apparent contrast to Malaysia, poverty and unemployment 
are recognised as the greatest and most troubling challenge facing the nation. 
Unfortunately, however, none of these job-creations and poverty alleviations has 
successfully addressed the problems. The worrisome concern most of these programmes 
were implemented as ad hoc, sloganeering and were not concurred as long term policies 
that would become a regular feature in the country (Eberhardt & Teal, 2010). The National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) based on 2010 socio-economic survey reported a staggering 
112.519 million Nigerians live in relative poverty and subjective poverty in 93.9%. The 
former, that is, relative poverty represents 69% of the country‘s total population based on 
163 million estimates and projected to be 72% in 2011 (NBS, 2011). From the grim report 
of NBS (2012) shows the deteriorating standards of living in Nigeria. Nigerians questions 
the justification of abject poverty in Nigeria, against the backdrop of nation potentials and 
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capacity as a richly endowed nation (Kalu, 2010). With this astonishing proportion of 
poverty, are households capable of acquiring housing under the market-led LIHP? 
It is also worth noting that the increase in poverty levels, further increase gross inequities 
in the country. On this note, the report further indicates that income inequality had risen 
from 0.429 in 2004 to 0.447 in 2010. Specifically, statistical analysis of Oyelere (2009) 
shows in the post democratic era, there is a marked increase in inequality across all income 
groups in Nigeria. More worrisome is that fact that the poverty rate is rising at a time the 
GDP growth rate was put at about 8% in 2010 and the preceding six years. It is of concern 
that many Nigerians are living below the poverty line in an oil-rich country and the poverty 
level shows that the people are gaining least, and often losing out as the country economic 
growth indicates, this is what Lewis (2008:97) described as “growth without prosperity” 
or what also Ross Karl (1997) called ‗a paradox of plenty‘. The paradox is that while a 
privileged few Nigerians are living in opulence, the majority are wallowing in abject 
poverty (Figure 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13). This expectedly has bred social discontent and of 
which the country is currently experiencing with multiple of civil strife (Adesoji, 2010a; 
Arowosegbe, 2009; Ukiwo, 2003; Watts, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.5: Nigeria’s estimated total population and population in poverty, 1980-2010 
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of poverty incidence in Nigeria, 1980-2010 
 
Figure 5.7: Nigeria’s growth-poverty performance 
Source: Akanbi & Du Toit (2011:339) 
According to CBN (2011) the Nigeria‘s unemployment in 2010 was 21.1%, compared with 
12.3% in 2006 (Table 5.11) and the NBS (2011) obtained a rate of 29.3% in 2011.  The 
majority of unemployed were found in the urban areas of Nigeria. A distinct feature of the 
unemployment was associated with a rise among youth with no matching job opportunities 
in the country.  Due to the presence of ‗army of unemployed youths‘, the country in recent 
times is confronted with youth restiveness and militancy, prominent in the oil-producing 
communities whose youths are not gainfully employed and crippling the oil exploitation by 
the oil companies in the region (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012).  
Also the Nigeria economy displays a unique feature of being dominated by the informality 
in almost all sectors of the economy. Indeed, it is estimated that the informal sector 
accounts between 45 and 60% of the urban labour force in Nigeria (Afon, 2007). 
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Table 5.2: Unemployment magnitude in Nigeria, 2006-2011 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total labour 
force 
 
58,933,891 
 
61,249,485 
 
62,946,096 
 
64,960,371 
 
67,039,103 
 
Total 
employment 
 
50,886,826 
 
52,326,923 
 
53,807,775 
 
55,306,572 
 
57,306,572 
 
Total 
unemployment 
 
8,047,065 
 
8,922,562 
 
9,204,515 
 
9,803,029 
 
9,803,029 
 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
 
12.3 
 
12.7 
 
14.9 
 
19.7 
 
21.1 
 
29.3* 
Sources: CBN (2011:140), * NBS (2011: ) 
In summary, on the basis of the above, it seems clear that Nigerian governments will have 
to brace for major policy challenges. The first of these relates to just how the massive 
population that will have in the area in the next say fifty years will be housed, against 
current deficit 16 million housing deficits. Related to this is the capacity of Nigerian 
governments and the private sector to provide the adequate housing delivery framework 
and essential to the pursuit of a decent livelihood. This question will be particularly 
relevant to Abuja where migration is astonishing.  
5.5 Abuja 
5.5.1 Abuja description, emergence and its development 
Abuja, the federal capital city of Nigeria derives its name from a nearby village, which was 
renamed Suleja and the name of Abuja was retained in the capital city (Omale, 2009). Its 
land area of 8000 square kilometres (sq.km.) was excised from Niger, former states of 
Kwara (now Kogi) and Plateau (now Nassarawa) states, and became the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT) and constitutes its bounded states (Figure 5.14). Also, the Federal Capital 
City (FCC) occupies an area of 250 sq. km., almost same size with Kuala Lumpur (Figure 
5.15).  
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Abuja is the administrative and political capital of Nigeria, having central and equidistant 
with the states in the federation (Figure 5.14).  
 
Figure 5.14: Map of Nigeria showing the states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 
Source: https://maps.google.com/ 
 
Figure 5.15: Maps of Nigeria, FCT and FCC phases 1, 2, 3 & 4 respectively 
Source: https://maps.google.com/ 
It is a creation of the then Federal Military Government in 1975 that decided to relocate the 
capital from Lagos. The seat of government finally relocated in 1991. Unlike Brasilia and 
Putrajaya, where its residents when moved into it met “a city without crowds‖ (Scott, 
1998:125), in Abuja, when eventually the capital relocated from Lagos in 1991 (Morah, 
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1993) it was already a bustling and busy. Abuja as state-creation city was to achieve lofty 
goals, in recent time‘s vision declaration of making the city as one of the top 20 planned 
cities globally by the year 2020, in line with nation vision of 20:20:20. 
Abuja, the site ultimately chosen to serve as the new capital of Nigeria has a long history. 
Historically, Abuja as a town was first named after its founder known as Abu Ja, a son of 
the 54
th
 Sarkin Zaria and was located close to one of the tributaries of the River Iku, 21 
kilometres south of Izom (Thomas-Emeagwali, 1989). The Abuja region was first 
inhabited by Gbagyi and Koro ethnic groups as far back as 15
th
 century and engage mainly 
as blacksmiths community due to the presence of iron ore in the area (Thomas-Emeagwali, 
1989). From what this study can understand, Abuja as a settlement has a long history and 
with established traditional institutions. 
First it is duly recognised in the literature that the African country's capital location had 
been long and complex (Hamdan, 1964). The advent of colonialism in Africa and in other 
colonised developing countries, the choice of colonial cities was based on those cities that 
best suited their political and economic interest, very few of them are centrally located 
(Hamdan, 1964; Salau, 1977). Exactly, the cities served as the colonialists entry points, it 
was reported that by 1900 of the forty four colonial capitals; twenty eight were located on a 
coast (Christopher, 1985).   
After independence, in Africa as a continent of ‗eccentric capitals‘ coupled with such 
abnormality, have generated the social, economic and political contests; on the need to the 
relocations of these capitals (Adebanwi, 2004). It is against the background of all these 
informed on the conception and the ultimate construction of Abuja, as a new capital city of 
Nigeria.  For instance, the choice another site to relocated Nigeria‘s capital from Lagos all 
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began even before the amalgamation of protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 (Adebanwi, 2012; 
Moore, 1984). In common to colonial times, the search continued at post-independence 
period, by the post-colonial elites to relocate to city “that performed the functions of 
control and creating loyalty” (Schatz, 2004:115).  
Over the political contestation on relocation of the capital city that became deeply rooted in 
the Nigeria‘s ethno-regional, religious, social, political and economic contests (Adebanwi, 
2012; Moore, 1984). A staunch critic and opponent to relocation, Action Party leaders 
changed position (Adebanwi, 2004) and “suggested a new capital in a central and neutral 
place” (Fourchard, 2010:45). In fact, such suggestion immediately became the defined 
working concept of the Commission, as soon as it was assigned to recommend the 
appropriate site for the relocation, as there was no site that appropriately fitted to this 
recommendation than Abuja (Moore, 1984). 
Firstly, the government on August 9
th
, 1975 inaugurated a seven member committee under 
the chairmanship of Justice Akinola Aguda to advise the government on the relocation. On 
December 20
th
, 1975, the committee submitted its report to the government and 
recommended the relocation of the capital from Lagos to an area south of present day 
Suleja town. The committee advance the reasons of inadequate Lagos land space, 
estimated to be just 67.12 sq.km; predominance of one ethnic group (i.e. Yoruba); the need 
for a centrally accessible, ethnically neutral, secure comfortable, and above all a capital 
that could serve as a symbol of Nigeria‘s aspirations for unity and greatness (IPA, 1979). 
Therefore, Abuja was created to serve and contained the Lagos notorious problems of 
traffic congestion, inadequate land for development, housing and associated high rent, 
congestion, unhealthy slums and filth environment, crime and delinquencies. Indeed, in 
accepting the committee‘s recommendations, the government agreed that “a centrally 
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located federal capital in a spacious area with easier access to all parts of the federation 
would be an asset to the nation and would help in generating a new sense of national 
unity” (IPA, 1979:27). The Abuja fulfilling these promises constitutes the major challenge 
to the government and its administrations. However, researchers like Immerwahr 
(2007:181) advance the argument that in a few decades of its existence coupled with lofty 
expectations, “Abuja, rather than solving the problems of Lagos, merely replicated them a 
few hundred miles north”. Similarly, on same argument Adebanwi (2012) concur that 
Abuja development experiences represent ‗Lagosification‘ of Lagos.  
To give legal backing of the relocation policy, a decree Number 6 of 1976 known as 
‗Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Decree (Act)‘ was promulgated and formally established 
Abuja as Nigeria‘s new capital and created its FCT. The decree serves as a blueprint for 
the entire process for the relocation of the new capital from Lagos to Abuja. An important 
provision in the decree was the placement of the entire land area of FCT under the control 
and management of the federal government (Ikejiofor, 1998a). To effectively discharge 
this responsibility, the federal government established an agency known as ‗Federal 
Capital Development Authority‘ (FCDA) immediately after the enactment of the decree. 
The agency responsibility was to discharge the role of planning, development, and 
management of the FCT (Agba, 1986). One of the FCDA initiatives was the immediate 
commission of International Planning Associates (IPA), a US based Consultants firm to 
develop the FCT Master Plan in June 1977, as part of its assignment to deliver one of 
Africa‘s great capitals and one of the world‘s great new cities (Okafor, 1988). In contrast 
to Abuja, experiences of Brasilia in Brazil and Putrajaya in Malaysia show their concepts 
and designs were based on the design competition generated from within and the best 
chosen from amongst (Moser, 2010; Scott, 1998). The IPA came up with the master plan 
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after 18 months of its assignment and subsequently the document was accented by the 
government in 1979 for implementation (Immerwahr, 2007). Therefore, the master plan 
produced by IPA continued to deepen the concept of colonial capitals as ‗Europe in Africa‘ 
(Hamdan, 1964). With respect to Abuja, Immerwahr (2007) became convinced on this 
assertion, that most of its hotels and government offices were modelled after corporate 
buildings in the United States and Europe.  
Thereafter, construction began on an empty site at the centre of Nigeria, having equidistant 
with the entire major cities in the country. Just like Brasilia “it was a city in the wilderness 
and as “clean table cloth” (Scott, 1998:118), the master plan represents a devised 
simplification to create an order that can be monitored and directed from above. The 
development of Abuja took a period of 15 years, i.e. 1976-1991, and another ten years to 
move all the ministries, i.e. 1991-2000 (Fourchard, 2010). The new town development is 
ultimately is two entirely different from the colonial creation of ―double twin cities‖ 
associated with all the urban centres in the country.  
The master plan shows that the site of the capital city was to be developed in the northern 
eastern quadrant of the FCT (Figure 5.15).  It occupies an area of about 250sq. kms and 
planned land use distribution is given in Table 5.12. The master plan for the city is a 
crescent-shaped, centrally oriented and placed in a prominent position, emphasised by an 
aerial focus on the highest point of Aso Hill (Figure 5.16). The city is planned to be 
developed in four phases (Figure 5.15). The AMP provides for the division of the FCC into 
four phases, namely I, II, III and IV (Appendix H) on an area of 250 square kilometres, 
from the geographical area of the 8,000 square kilometres of FCT (Figure 5.15). Each of 
the phases is further sub-divided into districts. So far only phase I comprising of 5 districts 
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(Garki, Wuse, Maitama, Asokoro and CBD) has been completed. Abuja FCC is planned to 
be developed in four phases  
Table 5.12: Planned land use for FCC, Abuja 
Category of land use Land budget Percentage of total  
Government activity 500 1.96 
Services 891 3.49 
Residential 12,486 48.97 
Light industries 920 3.61 
Infrastructure 1,840 7.22 
Commercial  561 2.20 
Open space and recreational facilities 8,300 32.55 
Total 25,498 100 
Source: Adapted from IPA (1979:71) 
 
Figure 5.16: A crescent-shaped FCC and the four-phases of its development 
Source: https://maps.google.com/ 
Abuja land became a comfort zone of corruption and consequently led to the entire city 
plan and development to be abused and discredited. The abuses came from above and 
below (Adama, 2007). The open spaces and public spaces became encroached, sold and 
ultimately built over. The squatters were able to organise, protest and heard (Scott, 1998). 
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Over time and presently, Abuja lost to be “orderly, modern, efficient and under the 
discipline of the state” (Scott, 1998:129). The problem began right when right from its 
inception, when it failed to be built as precisely as planned (Agba, 1986). 
The emergence of squatter and slums development, which later became quite substantial 
and had produced 65 squatter settlements in FCT for a number of different reasons, as 
protest to have “their own parch of the utopian city” (Scott, 1998:129) as major 
contradictions in Abuja development. The level of out of proportion the squatter 
settlement, became, the city administrators are in a dilemma on what to do with such 
massive problem. Their approaches of integration and outright demolition are used to 
contain. Ironically, the settlements remaining, expanding and housing the bulk majority of 
the city anchored for population, efficiently, even though expensive at their own level of 
the poor and low-paid workers. These settlements constituted over 80% of FCT 
population, while the planned city not completed entirely had reached more than its 
projected population of 1.6 million. The description of Brasilia by Scott, (1998:130) rightly 
fitted Abuja “instead of a classless administrative city, it was marked by stark spatial 
segregation according to social class. The poor lived on the periphery and commuted long 
distances to the centre, where much of the elite lived and worked.” 
5.5.2 Governance structure of Abuja 
Constitutionally, the President governs the FCT (sections 299 and 302 of the 1999 
constitution). The President by right delegates the governance of Abuja to a Minister, in 
most cases a politician, since when it was first created in 1976. Sometimes, the ministerial 
appointee is accompanied by a junior minister known as ‗Minister of state‘. The first 
appointee was known as federal commissioner of special Duties (Abuja), similar to what 
was practiced in Malaysia and subsequently became to be known as the Minister of FCT. 
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From 1976 to date, including the incumbent, Abuja had fifteen ministers comprising of 
five military and ten civilians. They served an average of about two and half years, and 
longest and shortest periods served were five years and few months respectively. Each of 
these exerted considerable influence on the implementing agency differently, in most cases 
different from each other in terms of priority and interest. Consequently, policy continuity 
and misplacement of priority ensued in the administration of the organization.  
At the inception, as earlier mentioned, the FCDA was the only governing agency 
responsible charged with responsibility for the implementation of the master plan and it 
was administered by a board. Later in 1979 it was given the status of a ministry, known as 
Ministry of Federal Capital Territory (MFCT). Although the FCDA and MFCT stood to be 
merged, but the existence of the two organisations continued to be run concurrently and 
FCDA maintaining its own management board (www.fcda.gov.ng). Accordingly, in 2004, 
the MFCT was dissolved and replaced with Federal Capital territory Authority (FCTA). 
To support the FCT governance, the Federal Capital Territory Decree (1976) requires the 
government to appoint an FCDA advisory board and as at the time of this study field work 
one was inaugurated, but dissolved almost immediately when the government was changed 
from President Yar‘adua to Good Luck. As a part-time Governing Board of FCDA, are 
responsible for policy formulation and the Minister serves as the Board Chair. The 
Minister is directly responsible to the Federal Executive Council, as the council that 
approves all his development project budgets and expenditures. Under civilian 
administration, the Minister is additionally being supervised by legislature committees on 
FCT. Overall, the Minister is directly answerable to the President on all issues relating to 
the capital city. The FCT administration is organised around seven Secretariats, and each 
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headed by civil servants as Secretaries. Additionally, there are parastatals as part of FCT, 
providing specialised services.  
Finally, the last tier of FCT governance is the six Area councils, which operate as local 
government areas; they are Abuja Municipal, Abaji, Bwari, Kwali, Gwagwalada and Kuje. 
The traditional governance is also recognised and there are fourteen traditional title holders 
of First, Second and Third Class titles (UNDP, 2005). Legally, these institutions participate 
as stakeholders in land administration of FCT, considering the Court ruling on their 
jurisdictions in this regard. Apart from this, the federal government deliberately or 
otherwise exercises all powers in the governance of Abuja by its agencies.  
An autonomous FCDA, the Executive Secretary (ES) of the authority is the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) who directs and runs the day to day administration of the 
authority. The ES is supported by an Executive Management Committee (EMC), made up 
of the Directors of departments and Heads of Units of the authority. There was from time 
to time President appointed part-time Governing Board to FCDA. The FCDA has nine 
departments and four specialist units reconstituted from the earlier. Unlike Malaysia, 
FCDA, a federal agency is responsible for implementation of housing policies in the 
Abuja. The Department of Mass Housing is charged with responsibility to effectively 
coordinate the implementation of the mass housing scheme in accordance with the AMP. 
Unlike Malaysia, in general terms, the power that manages Abuja lies with the federal 
government and concentrated in the auspices of the Minister (Mayor). There is little power 
at the local government levels, even though local councils are elected and irrespective of 
the party they belonged to, were made to be at most of the times puppets to the Minister 
that be in the city. Thus, the political interest of the Ministers of Abuja, who have a stake 
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in the status quo, has continued to have their sway over the Abuja governance and 
managed things as they have pleased over the decades. This has meant increasing misery 
and deteriorating city for the vast majority of the city population, and fabulous privileges 
and a sybaritic lifestyle among the few in the city. 
Furthermore, unlike CHKL, the current and capital expenditures of Abuja FCTA are 
financed from the federation account. Although we could not access the annual accounts of 
the authority, but records from federal government annual capital expenditure allocations 
shows that nearly or entirely dependent on federal revenue. The Table 5.13 illustrates the 
huge amount and trends of the allocations made to FCTA over the years.  In addition to 
these annual allocations, over the years Abuja development was financed from a statutory 
account, where 7.5% of the federation account revenues was set aside as a special fund and 
ceased in 2002 when such account was declared to be illegal by the Supreme Court 
(Suberu, 2008). On the recurrent expenditures, 100% of such expenditures were financed 
by the government treasury (UNDP, 2005). In fact, tenement as a dependable source of 
funds that can afford to finance city development and management was not exploited in 
Abuja (UNDP, 2005). Other sources like revenues from land allocation and rent could 
contribute so much in financing city management; the so many collections made were not 
adequately managed and accounted for due corruption practices (UNDP, 2005).  
Table 5.13:  FCTA Federal Government annual capital budget expenditure 
allocations for 2007-2012 
Budget year Capital budget expenditure (in Billion Naira) 
2007 46.9 
2008 47.1 
2009 66.7 
2010 96.3 
2011 38.0 
2012 45.6 
Source: Various years‘ budget (www.budgetofffice.gov.ng/budget-update) 
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5.5.3 Economic activities in Abuja 
The city of Abuja was conceived essentially as an administrative city, with few industries 
of small and medium size to support the city‘s population and that there would be no huge 
industrial complexes. The nature of the weak financial position is indicated by the 
relatively higher level of capital expenditure than revenues and the low proportion of the 
funding released to the agency in comparison with the total budget amount annually. 
Perhaps, this position built the inherent weak financial position in Abuja governance. This 
is most apparent in the agency‘s laxity in collecting land based taxes, most especially 
tenement. The weak financial position has an adverse impact on Abuja development. 
FCTA was consistently unable to meet most of its construction targets and postponement 
of the movement of the government until 1991 can be cited as a typical example.  
There are few studies or statistics on employment in Abuja. However, the dominant 
economic activity is public sector dominated economy “driven largely by government 
patronage.”(UNDP, 2005:17). Besides, the IPA (1979) envisaged the city to be dominated 
by informal activities and the reality of Abuja employment today is not beyond what has 
been projected four decades ago. Indeed, Abuja is not an exception from the 
generalisations usually made of African cities as where majority of the populations are 
employed in the informal sector (Huchzermeyer, 2010) as well as to Nigerian cities sharing 
the same feature (Afon, 2007). Apart from government employment, the major tertiary 
services that employed a bulk of the residents are building and construction industry 
considering the long-term programmes of public works. Since Abuja is not yet integrated 
into its next immediate conurbation of the Kaduna-Zaria-Kano industrial centre, industrial 
economic activities are strictly limited to the light servicing kind and engaged as the 
manufacturers of building materials and consumables.  
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A major area of concern for Abuja residents is the high cost of living and this is expressed 
in all aspects of living, be it in education, housing, food, transport and so on. Housing rents 
are exorbitant and unimaginable to what is being demanded and the associated conditions 
attached by the landlords in the city (Ikejiofor, 1998b). Similarly, because of grossly 
inadequate, inefficient and expensive road mode of transport, as the only means available 
in the city, made a private car almost a necessity for family and business use. 
Consequently, during peak-hour traffic holds-up are particularly heavy and long hours of 
workers productivity are lost. Also these descriptions could go on to all other aspects of 
living and represents similar pattern. 
5.5.4 Socio-demographic structure of Abuja 
The city of Abuja was intended as a centre of unity and as an inclusive city for all 
Nigerians in most of developing countries cities (Koenigsberger, 1971). Ever since then, 
the city has witnessed unprecedented growth, especially since 1991 when eventually the 
FGN capital moved from Lagos to Abuja. At the beginning, the construction boom became 
a major source of influx of all types of workers in Abuja. In recent times, the unfolding de-
industrialisation unfolding in the country as well as increasing poverty in the rural areas, 
combined to make Abuja more attractive than it would have been. The major consequence 
of this rapid development in the city and environs is the population explosion, severe 
pressures on the available facilities, distortion of the master plan, and environmental 
degradation in the form of uncollected solid waste, traffic congestion, inadequate potable 
water supply, electricity and, more importantly, long commuting, shopping and leisure 
distances (Adama, 2007; Ilesanmi, 2006).  
From its designed capacity of the FCC of 3.2 million people when the four phases of 
development of the city are completed (IPA, 1979). However, the Abuja population has 
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exploded to the 3 million in 1998 (UNDP, 2005), in just less than 10 years of the relocation 
and recently estimated to be 6 million (Imam, Mohammed, Wilson, & Cheeseman, 2008). 
The population explosion is continuing regardless time-lag of the city development, when 
the first two phases of development were not even completed (UNDP, 2005). In fact UN-
Habitat (2008) report shows that Abuja as the fastest growing city in Africa with an annual 
growth rate of 8.3% per annum. With grossly inadequate housing provision made, over 
90% of the city's resident population unable to meet basic necessity of housing and 
homelessness very common  (Ikejiofor, 1998b) and this explained the sporadic emergence 
over 68 informal settlements within a short period (Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), 2006).  
The characteristics of the city population are those of the young and this is because Abuja 
enjoys the movement of large numbers of people of working age. According to the 2006 
National Population Census (NPC), 60% of the population falls between 15 and 64 years. 
Also, the life expectancy was low, with an average of 52 years for both male and female 
(UNDP, 2005), a little above the national average.  
Similar to the country, the FCT has been a multi-cultural society, characterised with 
representations of most of the country various ethnic nationalities, in addition to the 
original tribes mentioned above.  
5.6 Summary 
The Chapter reveals the trajectories differences between Malaysia and Nigeria. As the 
Chapter demonstrates, Nigeria‘s trajectory is characterised by volatile mono-cultural 
economy with no value chain added, tremendous urban growth dominated by the 
informality and worst of all, weak state institutions deepened by short-sighted leaders and 
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a governance that is totally unconcerned about the plight of the people or that of the 
country. Same country is characterised by grinding poverty and unemployment. Unlike 
Malaysia, the Nigerian political governance over the years could not implement most of its 
policies. The weak institutions, corruption and lack of planning are taking its toll on its 
economic and social development. On the other hand, Malaysia in comparison to Nigeria is 
showing positive trajectory of growth and development, supported by institutions that keep 
political governance focused on long-term objectives. The country boasts of a diversified 
economy, democratic political government and stability, inclusive and empowered society.  
On the contrary to Nigeria, the Malaysia governance as well as the context has exemplified 
a country with a vision and above all optimistic to distribute its growth to all and sundry. 
These combined reinforces differences in the political economy of Malaysia and Nigeria in 
terms of state developmentalism, political ideologies and governance decentralisation. The 
next chapters examined on how the LIHP strategies are implemented to answer the key 
research question of the study and as well offer explanations to the associated policy 
outcomes trajectories between Malaysia and Nigeria.  
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Chapter 6 
6.0 An overview of national housing policies in Malaysia and 
Nigeria 
―Bad administration, to be sure, can destroy good policy; but good administration can 
never save bad policy‖. Adlai Stevenson1 (USA Vice President, 1893-1897) 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the historical evolution of housing policies in Malaysia and Nigeria 
as a response to the study research question on the nature of the countries low-income 
housing policy (LIHP). The Chapter takes a historic approach describing the countries 
LIHP to support low-income group (LIG). The Chapter constitutes the bridge builder 
between the housing policies, the countries structural context and agency responses 
regimes in Malaysia and Nigeria presented in the subsequent Chapters of the study. 
Against this background, the Chapter provides a brief overview of the national housing 
policies evolution, in order to provide the ‗historical depth‘ and housing policy 
environment in context. This Chapter begins with discussion on Malaysia LIHP and 
subsequently examined the Nigeria context. 
6.2 Malaysian housing policy 
6.2.1 Introduction-overview of low-income group and housing policy in 
Malaysia 
Firstly, the housing sector is one major treasure of the national wealth in Malaysia. For 
instance, the property transaction represents about one-quarter (22%) of gross national 
product during the peak years of 1996-1997. The same housing sector accounts for almost 
36% of all lending by financial institutions (Usilappan, 2006). It is estimated that the 
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property industry has direct or indirect links with 142 industries (Usilappan, 2006). There's 
times when the government looked up to the construction industry as the surest route of 
revitalizing the economy in times of economic recessions (Salleh & Meng, 1997).  
In the last decades in Malaysia, government had formulated housing policies as ‗residual‘ 
(Hai & Sendut, 1983) in the Five-Year Development Plans with the ultimate aim of 
making the country ‗a home owning‘ society. These policies were made within the general 
economic policies with the aim of achieving rapid economic growth in the country (Agus, 
2002b). The multi- pronged policy outline in public housing relates to the following focus, 
namely, to assist all LIG; promotion of national unity; eradication of poverty; squatting 
free cities and promotion of a house owning democracy (Thalha, 1980). Hence, different 
from UK historical development of council housing policy, which has been one that 
facilitated private sector rather than state controlled production and consumption of 
housing (Forrest & Murie, 1988), in Malaysia, the LIHP portrays an opposite. Malaysian 
LIHP displays performance in terms of the institutions, regulations and financing in 
support of the housing production and consumption. Similarly, the Malaysian housing 
finance system has produced increasing funding for housing finance through which the 
financial difficulties of the LIG are adequately supported (UN-Habitat, 2005a).  
It was in the 1980s when the economy registered a boom that the government extolled on 
the private sector to join hands with the state in addressing the housing of LIG. The 
maturity, capability, capacity and efficiency of the country housing industry, to achieve the 
economy of scale, the government legislated extensively to ensure the private sector 
participation in the provision of LIG housing (Sirat et al., 1999). For instance, minimum of 
30% of private sector mixed development must be set aside for LIG housing was 
introduced as precondition for their planning approval, in as much their proposed 
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development exceeds 2 hectares of land. Of course there were resentment and criticisms 
towards its implementation from the private sector and even circumventing the rule (Salleh 
& Meng, 1997). Nevertheless, this measure has gone a long way in energising the private 
sector in meeting the housing needs of the LIG, as part of their corporate social 
responsibility. Thus, the public and private sectors are the most dominant actors in the 
implementation process of the housing policies in the country (Agrawal, 1978; Salleh & 
Meng, 1997). However, these developers operate within the confines of legislations 
formulated by the government to manage their practice in the best interest of the public. the 
government in partnership with the private sector is extending series of incentives to 
further enable  their  contribution in tackling the challenges of LIG housing (Abd Aziz, 
2007). The encouraging response received from the private sector in this regard, is one of 
the unique feature of the Malaysia housing policy. 
Common to all developing countries, on the attainment of independence afforded the 
independent states to launch a strong presence in all aspects of development directly; 
consequently, the LIG evolution has been influenced greatly by the NEP as the source of 
national development planning. For instance, the government reasserted in the 8
th
 MDP 
that it would exert more presence, to expand the LIG housing delivery in the country 
(Malaysia, 2001) and a priority for the Malaysian government (Malaysia, 2006). There has 
been an overwhelming government presence, regulating and directing the production and 
consumption, a typical of Asian model (Doling, 1999b). The most common form of 
controls is in the housing development process includes the use of various legal 
instruments. This has become one important and noticeable policy distinctiveness 
regarding Malaysia LIHP is that of greater government control in the interest of the 
society.  
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Similarly, the government has set a political target of realising home-owning democracy, 
expressed as ‗one family, one home‘, which is a replica of United Kingdom ‗property 
owning democracy‘ under Thatcher Conservative government (Holmes, 2006). 
Additionally, unlike Nigeria, governmental rental housing (social housing) exists, as an 
important source of providing a good mix of housing alternatives. UN-Habitat (2011:2) 
had duly acknowledged that where rental systems in addition to owner occupier are 
maintained in a country “contribute to maximising choice and mobility and thus allow 
housing markets to perform more efficiently”. Over the years the Malaysia government has 
been able to pluralise the sources of supply along this thinking and perhaps contributed to 
be in parallel with Nigeria in ameliorating the housing problem. 
The study of Endan (1984) recognised Malaysia‘s housing policy based on impact, to be 
distributive. When it uses public funds to assist LIG; regulatory to the impositions of 
restrictions or limitations are made. However, Abd Aziz (2007) consistent with the Asian 
housing policy model developed by (Doling, 2002) narrowed the above classification. 
Recognising the phenomenon in general terms, she described the housing policy to be 
residual in nature. This meant to say government intervention offer support to those whose 
needs not catered by the market, most especially to the LIG.  
The position of LIG in the above identifications buttresses the high priority it is accorded 
by the government. For instance, the role of the state in the housing policies underwent 
what Abd Aziz (2007) called a cycle of changes from a ‗provider‘ at the initial stage of the 
nation development to an ‗enabler‘ and back to a ‗provider‘ and ‗enabler‘ status in an 
attempt to realise the objectives of the housing policies. The government in its position as a 
provider and an enabler is given more priority to LIG housing. Since it has been 
recognised that the middle- and high-income housing is as good as solved in the country 
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(Sirat et al., 1999), Currently, the state implements policies that promote its role both as an 
enabler and provider, arising from its commitment to address the housing of the LIG in the 
country (Abd Aziz, 2007; Jamaluddin, 2005).  
In spite of Malaysia peculiar housing policy problems, it is showing a success placard, 
better than many countries within its region and indeed in many developing countries in 
the world (Abd Aziz et al., 2008; Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011; Agus, 2002b). 
According to these authors the success of the country in housing was attributable to 
political stability, free market economy which ensures availability of financial facilities in 
the housing industry and the efficiency of the construction industry. However, the success 
of the housing policies and programmes does not end with the provision of house alone, 
but there are other salient issues relating to housing that are seeking for urgent attention. 
Surprisingly, Tan (2008), publication reported glut in the property market due to the 
factors of poor location of unattractive houses built with lack of adequate amenities and 
facilities. Similarly, Salleh (2008) study shows low levels of satisfaction with the 
neighbourhood facilities and the environment of the private low-cost housing in the 
country. On the other hand, Tajuddin (2007:2) cited the disintegration of age-long social 
values and replaced with what he called “community of strangers just living next door to 
one another”. Nevertheless, the LIHP in Malaysia as attained a reasonable progress 
comparable to many developing countries. Against this background, the next sub-sections 
offer the description of the housing policy objectives and its associated policy 
environment. 
6.2.2 National housing policy objectives in Malaysia 
Broadly, the Malaysia‘s housing policy has a primary aim of realising all its citizens, 
especially the LIG, are guaranteed access to adequate and satisfactory housing. This is why 
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according to Agus (2002b:50) government policies made income differentials in housing 
consumption.  This is to ensure that, “people could buy houses of a size and quality 
compatible with the income they received from working”. In addition, the focus of the 
housing policy is the creation of amenable and sustaining housing environment in the 
country. The policies regulations set to ensure comprehensive settlement planning that 
comes with basic and social infrastructure provisions in the housing estates.  
The development of Malaysian LIHP has been associated with many changes since in the 
colonial period (Agus, 2002a). Responding to these dynamics, the Malaysian government 
has developed model unique in its context that will contain the emerging trend of LIG 
housing delivery. At the beginning, there was no specific policy for LIHP in general. Until 
2010, in Malaysia, there was no housing policy document per se in the country (Abd Aziz, 
2007). Prior to this period, the housing policy was adequately articulated in the all five-
year Malaysia national development plans (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011). It is usually 
in these plans that the annual targets and policy issues for housing achievement are 
documented. Common from all these declarations is that the policy objective remained 
consistent to ensure that the country LIG have access to adequate and afford housing 
serviced with all prerequisites facilities (Table 6.1). Thus, the policy was pursued in 
qualitative and quantitative policies of the state and market delivery (Shuid, 2011). 
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Table 6.1: Declared Malaysia housing policy objectives since from 1960s to date 
S/N Policy document Declared policy objectives 
1 National Development Plan 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
 
1970-1975 
 
1976-1980 
 
 
1981-1985 
 
 
1986-1990 
 
 
1991-1995 
 
 
 
 
 
1996-2000 
 
 
 
2001-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
2006-2010 
 
 
2011-2015 
―... to assist families with income of less than 
M$300 per month. 
 ―... to promote the welfare of the lower income 
groups. 
―Promoting national unity through national housing 
programme. 
―The aim is to ensure that all Malaysian in particular 
the lower income groups have access to adequate 
housing.‖ (Endan, 1984:62) 
―... is to ensure that all Malaysians, in particular the 
LIG, will have access to adequate 
housing.‖(Malaysia, 1981:359) 
―Provision of houses not only through outright 
purchases, but also through renting.‖(Malaysia, 
1986:521) 
―... to provide Malaysians of all income levels, 
particularly the LIG, accessibility to adequate and 
affordable shelter. The development of housing was 
also aimed at providing a reasonable standard of 
living as well as promoting social integration for the 
community  in the long term.‖(Malaysia, 1991:363) 
―... to provide Malaysians of all income levels  
accessibility to adequate, affordable and quality 
houses... to give priority to the development of low-
cost houses...‖ (Malaysia, 1996:555) 
―.... the provision of adequate and quality social 
services that are accessible to all, especially the 
lower income group ...‖ ―...focus will be given to the 
provision of adequate and affordable housing for the 
lower-and middle-income groups.‖(Malaysia, 
2001:17) 
―... ensure sufficient quality and affordable housing 
for all citizens, especially for those in the lower 
income group.‖(Malaysia, 2006:40) 
―Ensuring access to quality and affordable 
housing.‖(Malaysia, 2011:247) 
2 National Housing Policy  ―To provide adequate, comfortable, quality and 
affordable housing to enhance the sustainability of 
the quality of life of the people.‖ (MHLG, 2010:75) 
 
187 
 
In the year 2010, the Malaysia National Housing Policy (MNHP) was launched to provide 
a much more formal approach declaration for housing development. The MNHP debut in 
the country was designed to ensure a balanced and sustainable housing and its associated 
environment. The policy objectives of the NHP were aimed specifically at maximising LIG 
housing delivery through effective and efficient strategies of support to market-led 
delivery. Besides, the housing policy was to be implemented on the basis of sustainability 
(Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG), 2010). The late arrival of the NHP 
in the country serves as a remedy in the absence of formal document of declaration on 
housing growth and development relative to other sectors in the economy and the 
prevailing state of LIG housing challenge. It is hoped that the NHP would be effective 
enough it terms of guiding the LIG housing delivery as well as in its accessibility. The 
growing concern being expressed is that could the advent of NHP develop sufficient viable 
options for supply-side constraints in the country. 
The LIHP in Malaysia defined LIG according to the households monthly incomes, to be 
eligible to purchase low-cost house (Salleh & Meng, 1997). In the 1960s, at the beginning, 
those who were defined as LIG were those with incomes of not exceeding M$300 per 
month (Endan, 1984). Subsequently, the eligibility criteria were reviewed to incomes not 
exceeding RM750 when the price was RM25,000 in 1980s until 1998 when it was revised 
once again to a graduated income, according to the size of an urban areas land value 
(Salleh & Meng, 1997). Recently, in 2010, the income threshold increased to RM3,000 per 
month (Table 6.2 & 6.3). Thus, the government always tries to identify clearly the target 
groups entitled to LIG housing. The low-cost housing has relatively low selling prices or 
rentals so as to maintain high levels of affordability by the LIG. The country was able to 
maintain the ceiling price of a low-cost house for about two decades at RM25,000 per unit. 
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Table 6.3: Low-Cost Housing Price in Malaysia 
Period House price/unit Area House Type Target Group 
Before 1970 RM5,000-RM12,000 All All Income less than  
RM300 per month 
1970 - 1980 RM15,000-RM18,000 All All Income RM500- RM700 
per month 
1981 - 1997 RM25,000 All All Income RM750- 
RM1,000 per month 
1998 - 2010 RM25,000- RM42, 000 Based on 
land value 
According to 
location 
Income RM750- 
RM1,500 per month 
2010- to date RM25,000-RM42,000 Based on 
land value 
According to 
location 
Income RM2,500 per 
month 
Source: Adapted and modified from Shuid (2011:46) 
Table 6.3: Four-tier pricing for low cost housing (MHLG, 1998) 
Selling price per 
unit (RM) 
Location (land cost per sq. 
metres) 
Monthly Income of 
target group (RM) 
Type of suitable 
houses 
42,000 A: Cities and major towns 
(RM45  and above) 
 
1,200 to 1,500 
More than five 
Storey flats 
35,000 B: Major towns and fringes 
(RM15 – RM44) 
 
1,000 to1,350 
 
Five storey flats 
30,000 C: Small towns 
(RM10 to RM14) 
 
850 to 1,200 
 
Terrace and cluster 
25,000 D: Rural areas 
(Less than RM10) 
 
750 to 1,000 
 
Terrace and cluster 
In addition to the LIG income definition, the LIHP in Malaysia defined the design of low-
income housing unit. Thus, in the Seventh MP set the design of the unit should be 60 
square metres (M
2
). With three bedrooms, washing and laundry drying areas (Malaysia, 
2001). This was an improvement of two previous designs, namely, one of not less than 
51.1 to 55.7M
2
 and having at least two bedrooms, kitchen, toilet and bathroom (Salleh & 
Meng, 1997). However, the 1998 revision stipulated a design of at least 58.5M
2
 with three 
bedrooms. This study observes that the latest design is a product of the series of 
researchers' recommendations on the need to improve on the design of low-cost housing 
units in the country. The Malaysian housing policy made an appeal to innovate and 
produce housing that is sustainable in terms of efficiency and prompt response well. This is 
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also as a vehicle to achieve national objectives of addressing emerging national unity 
issues and threats to the economy.  
6.2.3 Development of national housing policy in Malaysia 
To contextualise how Malaysia has reached its present stage of low-income housing, it is 
necessary to review how the policy has evolved over the decades, particularly, beginning 
from the colonial period to date. 
6.2.3.1 Pre-Independence- before 1957 
The Malaysia‘s LIHP obtained its legacy from the British colonial administration. To 
weaken the support for the rise of communist insurgency, they built 600 new villages all 
over the country to resettle Chinese, popularly known as ‗Briggs Plan‘ (Agus, 2002a; Tan, 
1983). According to (Mat, 1978) over 650,000 Chinese were involved. The government 
was not directly involved in the construction of the houses, “it provided aids in terms of 
building materials, housing grants and subsistence allowances to the families” (Mat, 
1978:41).. Subsequently, such development set precedence for the new government on the 
attainment of independence in 1957, to accord priority on low-cost housing  (Abd Aziz, 
2007). This was the first period, though on an ad hoc basis, when the government efforts in 
providing housing was meant only to solve specific problems (Mat, 1978). Similarly, the 
British Colonial administration was more concerned with the provision of ‗institutional 
quarters‘ for the upper British employees, who worked in public institutions (Agus, 1989). 
Similar to Nigeria, the colonialists did not lay down a policy framework early enough to 
house the emerging urban population, particularly the need of the LIG.  
Additionally, the housing for the LIG received the further attention of the government 
from the report of ―A Housing Committee‖ that was set up in 1947 to investigate into the 
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housing shortage (Hai & Sendut, 1983). One of the committee recommendations includes 
the creation of Housing Trust. Though it was disbanded in 1975, the Housing Trust (HT) 
became a government agency established in 1950 and commenced its operation in 1952 
(Hai & Sendut, 1983). It served the function of  providing technical and supervisory 
services to the state governments undertaking low-cost housing (Hai & Sendut, 1983).  
During its lifespan the Trust constructed about 20,000 units of houses (Hai & Sendut, 
1983).  
Also, Mat (1978) identified that during the early years, the government encouraged home 
construction on a co-operative basis and first organised in 1949 Housing Co-operative 
Societies with the objective of fostering home ownership among co-operators. The 
Housing Cooperatives functioned as self-help organisations without the profit motive. 
They were treated on the same basis as public utilities by government and statutory bodies, 
thereby meriting the support of the government in the matter of alienation of state lands 
and if state lands were not available, the government acquired land from the private sector 
under the laws relating to the acquisition of land. 
The First Malaya Plan (1956-1960) saw concerted effort to provide well-planned houses in 
urban areas, in an attempt to improve the slum conditions of urban areas. A number of 
low-cost houses were constructed solely for renting. The role of major local authorities in 
major municipalities of Kuala Lumpur, George Town, Ipoh and Melaka was strengthened 
in the management of the rental housing  (Tan, 1983). 
Similar to Nigeria, the colonial housing policy was designed primarily to serve the needs 
of British colonial administrators with a purposive neglect of the locals, particularly the 
LIG which was predominantly in slums and squatter settlements.  While the British 
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administrators were housed in planned and expensive houses, the rest of the inhabitants 
remained largely in unplanned, unhygienic and poorly serviced areas of urban areas (Agus, 
2002a). This policy was responsible for the duality of housing areas in most of the urban 
areas, most especially in those urban centres settled by the colonial administrators. Thus, 
the periods housing delivery was acute and inequitably distributed. Subsequently, such 
development was the major force in shaping the housing policies thereafter in Malaysia. 
6.2.3.2 Early stage of Independence 
The second phase of the Malaysia housing policy covered two Plans period, that is, the 
First and Second Malaya Plans during the periods of 1956-1960 and 1961-1965 
respectively. The emphasis on the policies at the first instance was more in the provision of 
housing to its employees (Mat, 1978). In terms of policy strategy, housing was not 
mentioned in the First Malaya Plan, as one of its priorities and consequently there was not 
a meaningful housing programme during that period. However, in the Second Malaya Plan 
a level of priority was set in its objectives, to assist in large measure in the provision of 
housing. Mat (1978) considered the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) as what laid the 
success of the country in the area of housing in the subsequent years.  He further 
elaborated on such; exceptional foundational policy strategies include ‗hire purchase‘ and 
‗rental housing‘.  
However, (Hai & Sendut, 1983) further drew the major concern of the policy was that 
despite housing was managed by a ministry, the policy was changed from time to time 
resulting in ineffective implementation of housing projects (Mat, 1978). Notwithstanding, 
the landmark of this period for the country housing policy, are the integration of the 
housing programmes with the overall national programmes and the call for the 
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involvement of the private sector which was first nurtured during this plan period (Hai & 
Sendut, 1983). 
The periods after independence and the first two decades thereafter, low-income housing 
delivery in Malaysia was primarily provided by the public sector (Agus, 1989). This study 
observed that even during this period the private sector was very active in the field of 
housing, although concentrating on the medium-and high-income group‘s needs, its 
participation in the LIG housing was limited (Agrawal, 1978). This means that the public 
sector was the single dominant source of housing supply for the LIG. 
6.2.3.3 New Economic Policy (1971-1990) era 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the colonial economic structure created, ultimately 
culminated into a racial crisis in 1969, due to the ethnic economic inequity. The May 1969 
crisis became a major source of inspiration for the Malaysian government to put in place a 
major policy change in the country‘s economic policy and direction to realise ―growth with 
equity‖ in the country. The policy became the principal point of convergence under the 
country housing policies in the years to come, beginning from 1971, to fit into the NEP.  
Therefore, the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) constituted what Hai & Sendut (1983) 
called a trial period, whereby the state governments were given the mandate of developing 
their own development capacity to cope with the housing needs. No specific targets were 
set for each state but the overall expected construction of the states produces 5,200 units 
per year. By the end of this period, all the states built only 13,244 or about 50% of their 
target of 26,241 units (Hai & Sendut, 1983). The not much impressive performance was 
attributed to the dissolution of HT and inflation during the period, made the states not very 
active (Hai & Sendut, 1983). It was during the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) the 
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government at this time concentrated much of its effort on low- income housing and 
transferred the bulk of medium- and high- income housing groups in the private sector. At 
the end of 1980; 39,490 units of houses were built out of 110,320 units planned 
(Jamaluddin, 2005). 
To realise the objective of meeting the LIG, housing needs the entered into partnership 
with the private sector in the construction of low-income housing within the price range of 
RM5,000-7,000 each. Agrawal (1978) cited the example of such partnership with a pilot 
project in Cheras, in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, development on double-storey 
clustered link houses based on high density (58 units to an acre). The Fourth Malaysia Plan 
(1981-1985) policies on housing placed much emphasis on provision of low-cost housing. 
According to Teng (1991:4) 
“realising the social and economic implications arising out of the lopsided supply 
of houses, the government has placed greater emphasis in the provision of low-
income since the beginning of the  Fourth Malaysia Plan”  
The government housing provision emphasised on condominium type of low-cost housing, 
to optimise land use. It is equally worthy to note that during this period the government 
fixed the maximum price for low-cost units at RM25,000 (Jamaluddin, 2005). However, 
the Plan did not succeed much in terms of the planned and actual number of units 
constructed. For example, it was planned to construct 923,900 units, but only 406,100 units 
(44%) of houses were built. This below average performance coincides with the time when 
the country experienced economic crunch. 
It was in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) that the government launched Special Low-
Cost Housing Programme (SLCHP) in 1986 and planned for its completion in 1989. It was 
part of the anti-recession measures designed to stimulate the growth of the economy during 
the recession as well as to increase the supply of low-cost houses. Similarly, one-stop 
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agency, flexibility in the rules, regulations and standards as well as greater access to 
financial facilities from commercial banks were introduced, to reduce construction costs in 
the country (Malaysia, 1986). 
6.2.3.4 Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000) era 
This period covers the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans from 1991-2000. The housing 
policies during these periods were broadly guided by the government National 
Development Strategies of enhancing the role of private sector in the national economy 
(Salleh & Meng, 1997). The strategies were specifically influenced by the Agenda 21 of 
UNCHS, 1994 and HABITAT Agenda 1996 in the housing policy formulation and 
implementation (Shuid, 2004). Therefore, the focus of the housing policies was placed in 
the context of sustainable development, enabling the private sector to shoulder the 
responsibility of housing the citizens and to achieve a target of the citizens regardless of 
income in a decent house (Shuid, 2004).  
It was in the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) that the government realised so much from 
the enablement of the private sector. This began in the Third Malaysia Plan (Agus, 2002b; 
Salleh, 2008; Salleh & Meng, 1997). The private housing developers achieved the low- 
cost housing target set for them under the plan by building 399,000 units or 141% of the 
target. While public sector completed only about 49% of the 174,000 planned. It is also 
worthy to note that the private sector completed 100,728 high cost housing units-five times 
the original target of 26,100 units (Agus, 2002b). 
In the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000), in order to ensure the private sector construct 
low-cost housing, the government through the local authorities imposed 30% quota 
provision of low-cost housing in their residential development. Similarly, the government 
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for the first time included low-medium cost housing category in the Plan for the medium 
LIG. This group is defined within the salary range between RM1501 to RM2500 per 
month. The government planned to construct 350,000 units, but however, only 72,582 
units or about 21% of the target was built nationwide at the end of the Plan period (Shuid, 
2004). The low performance was attributed to the cautions investment decisions exercised 
by the housing developers (Malaysia, 1996). On the other hand both the public and private 
sectors exceeded their targets set for the construction of medium and high-cost housing 
programmes with the record of 104 and 141% performance of 85,000 units respectively 
(Agus, 2002b). 
In an effort to increase the quality of LIG houses, new designs with a floor area of 60 
square metres incorporating three bedrooms as well as washing and drying areas, 
especially in high-rise buildings were introduced. The government in addition introduced a 
four- tier price regime in 1998. Under the 1998 price regime, low-cost houses ranged from 
RM25,000 to RM42,000 depending on the location and type of the house. This was 
introduced as an incentive to the private sector to participate more actively in providing 
low-cost houses for the public (Malaysia, 1996). 
6.2.3.5 Vision Development Plan (2001- 2010) era 
In the pursuit of the plan by government, to make the country become a developed 
economy by 2020, the housing policies are integrated with other types of development in 
the country, such as industrial and commercial development. The sustainable urban 
development has become the focus of housing policies and programmes. The government 
also planned for the attainment of adequate housing to all income groups. Hence, 
specifically, the government has re-consolidated its position to remain as the key player in 
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the provision of the low-cost housing provision while the private sector is to focus on the 
medium-and high-cost housing (Shuid, 2004).    
The Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) a total of 844,043 units of housing were completed 
and about 78% of the total was constructed by the private sector, while the remaining 22% 
of the public sector. Specifically, houses built under the low- cost housing category were 
200,513 units or 86% of the planned target. Of this total, 103,219 units or about 52% was 
constructed by the private sector. A total of 83,910 low- medium cost housing units were 
completed, which was about 64% of the target plan. Of this total the private sector 
constructed 61,084 units or about 73%. This shows that there was a remarkable change of 
response from the private sector if compared to the previous Plan performance of 20.7% 
(Malaysia, 2001). The policy 30% quota of low-cost the houses for the LIG of the private 
developers are continued. However, some states made adjustments to the policy (Salleh & 
Meng1997).  
The housing programmes at this time were based on the human settlement concept, which 
included the provision of public amenities such as community halls, playgrounds for 
children, clinic, shop houses and open spaces. The Housing Development Act (Control and 
Licensing) 1966 was amended in 2002 to expand the scope of enforcement by MHLG to 
include projects by government agencies and co-operatives, provision for quality control 
and timely completion of housing projects as well as the establishment of the Tribunal for 
Home buyer claims.     
The Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) strategic thrusts of housing include reviewing laws 
and regulations to ensure proper development of the housing sector and encourage the 
private sector participation in the construction of low- and low-medium cost housing. 
197 
 
During this period it was estimated that the housing need is about 709, 00 and private 
sector is planned to construct a total of 80,400 and 48,500 of low-cost houses and low-
medium houses respectively (Malaysia, 2006). However, the government during this 
period relaxed its policy of 30% quota requirement for the LIG houses in areas where there 
was poor demand for low-cost houses.  
The private sector was required to surrender to the government the land allocated for low-
cost houses in their mixed development in the event that the project fails. Another policy 
equally adopted by the government is the use of Industrialised Building System (IBS) and 
designs based on the modular coordination concept in the construction of the affordable 
homes in the country. Finally, the government adopted an advanced strategy to improve 
the open registration and distribution system for low-cost houses introduced in the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, in a more systematic and transparent manner, by integrating the database at 
the state level with the centralised one at the MHLG. By the turn of the millennium, having 
satisfied housing stock (Malaysia, 2011), the issue arising is the sustainability of the 
delivery to the LIG segment of society.  
6.2.4 Management and organisation of national housing policy in Malaysia 
Since after the attainment of independence in 1957, Malaysia aimed to promote and guide 
national development through a series of five-year National Development Plans (NDP). 
The housing and specific LIG housing have been an important sector in these plans. More 
so when at the foundational years, the nation housing sector was characterised by squatter 
enclaves (Johnstone, 1983a). The NDPs have considered housing as both a social right of 
citizens and an important economic sector. The development planning in Malaysia has 
succeeded in integrating LIG housing in the national development process, as both a social 
right for citizens and an important economic sector. The government in each of such plans 
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designed a wide range of housing programmes to achieve, most especially to house the 
LIG.  
Under such various development plans, the government vigorously embarked on numerous 
housing programmes, both in the rural and urban areas, with the aim of making Malaysia a 
‗home-owning society‘. Such housing programmes include Special Low Cost Housing 
Programme (SLCHP), Peoples Housing Programme (PHP) and Integrated Peoples 
Housing Programme (IPHP) among others (Abd Aziz et al., 2008; Asek, 2007; Malpezzi & 
Mayo, 1997). In the course of pursuing these programmes informed the government to set-
up series of institutions and agencies as well as legislations to deal with the development 
and allocation. Consequently, the government has created multiple of institutions as well 
as legislations to address the country‘s housing challenges in housing agencies, production, 
marketing and financing. This was due to its under-performing in meeting both the supply 
and demand (Guan, 2001; Johnstone, 1980, 1983a).  
Similar to Nigeria, in Malaysia the programme of housing is constitutionally designated 
state government‘s affair. However, the Federal government remains the source of funding 
of the housing programmes executed by the state governments (Agus, 2002b). The role of 
states government includes incurring the cost of infrastructure provision as well as 
provision of land at minimal costs for housing developer. However, the state governments 
receive a series of loans and assistance from the Federal government to finance such initial 
development costs. Besides, Federal government loans and assistance, some states 
undertake housing schemes in their respective states through their SEDC. They consider 
proceeds realised from the sales of high-and medium-cost houses are used to cross 
subsidise the low-cost houses. The municipal local authorities are also beneficiaries of 
federal government loans and grants. The law also allowed the municipalities to take loans 
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from commercial banks as long as they have the approval of the state governments. In this 
way they have contributed significantly in the development of low- cost housing in their 
areas (Thalha, 1980).  
The housing policy literature strongly emphasises the significant role played by the states 
in East and Southeast Asian countries in general and Malaysia in particular (Agus, Doling 
& Lee, 2002; Doling, 1999). A distinct peculiarity of Malaysian institutional environment 
in respect of housing, like all other sectors of the development, is the dominance of the 
federal government, even though housing constitutionally is a state government affair. The 
Federal government provides policy frameworks in general terms. But it is at the state level 
that the policy is translated into more detailed and strategized.  
The federal government is responsible for the budget allocation and the overall urban 
planning, while the state controls the local governments and land matters. Similarly, the 
implementation of policies associated with housing, the federal government has established 
coordination institutions with the states as well as local governments, typically in land 
assembly and housing delivery (Abd Aziz, 2007; Abd Aziz, Hanif, & Ahmad, 2008). The 
most major feature of government in the management of the housing policy was said to the 
two-pronged strategy. Firstly, direct intervention in the form of Public Low-Cost Housing 
Programmes implemented by the state governments with loans provided by the Federal 
Treasury.  Private sectors were also involved through Privatisation Concept, whereby the 
private sectors were required to develop squatter areas, even though their participation has 
been very slow and less than 5,000 households resettled (Idris, 1991; Jamaluddin, 2005). 
The government prepared 21 projects involving a total area of about 1500 hectares, 10,000 
units of squatter dwellings affected to produce 35,000 units of squatter dwellings affected, 
200 
 
to produce 35,000 units of houses out of which 37% or 13,000 were low-cost housing 
(Idris, 1991).  
Secondly, indirect measures in the form of conditions stipulated in the approval of private 
housing projects (Teng, 1991).  Each housing project approved should consist of at least 
30% low-cost houses and the pegged selling price as well as house design to ensure that 
the private sector, at the same time supplements the efforts of the government (Teng, 
1991). The private sector practice of cross-subsidy in a mixed housing development is an 
indirect measure, whereby the high and medium houses buyers subsidise the prices of the 
house at which the LIG buy houses at the pegged prices (Teng, 1991). 
To further enhance the transparency of the allocation of the low-cost housing to the 
beneficiaries, from the 7
th
 MP the government set up an ‗open registration system‘ (OPS) 
in 1997, in response to the allegations of favouritism, corruption and political interference 
levelled against the former paper based registration system. The efficient allocation system 
of low cost housing allocation system through OPS is one of the features of housing policy 
in Malaysia. The OPS has succeeded by creating a nationwide verifiable waiting list of 
LIG, uniform criteria of selection, control of misconduct and building confidence of 
transparency in the allocation system. Through the operation of the system as at the end of 
2005 about 120,000 LIG were offered to purchase low-cost houses in the country (Shuid, 
2010).  
The government has established enabling institutional structures to address the issue of 
housing generally and in particular the LIG housing. There were many agencies involved 
in implementing housing in the country  (Hai & Sendut, 1983). At the Federal level there is 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), the Federal Land Development 
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Authority (FELDA), former Housing Trust (HT), Employers Provident Fund, the Malaysia 
Building Society Berhad (MBSB) and a number of co-operative societies. At the state 
levels, the agencies comprise of the state and its Development Corporations, City and 
Municipal Councils.  
The Federal government sets the goals and formulates the national housing policy 
strategies, standards and guidance; and provides the finance and its financing framework. 
The activities of the Federal government are coordinated by the MLGH. The ministry in 
collaboration with relevant agencies formulates housing policies to be adopted in Malaysia 
Plans. At the ministry level there are bodies like the National Consultative Council on 
Housing (NCCH), the National Housing Council (NHC), and the National Council of 
Local Governments. The NCCH was first set-up in 1979 (Hai & Sendut, 1983). The 
NCCH functions include giving advice on housing policies. While the NHC coordinated 
national public housing programmes in the country. The National Housing Department 
(NHD) was established during the Third Malaysia Plan and it is an interface between the 
states and the MLGH and mandated to supervise the state government's implementation of 
the low-cost housing policies. 
The State Development Corporations (SDCs) are administered by the State governments 
and financed from the Federal government soft loans grants to execute housing 
development programmes to their respective state governments. The proceeds of the 
repayments and rents received are what constitute an additional source of the repayment. 
While the municipalities constitute another source of low-cost housing for the poor in the 
country (Thalha, 1980). 
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In addition, the NHD builds houses for LIG under the rent and sale category through the 
PHP. The PHP low-cost houses built are transferred to state and local authority for onward 
distribution to the deserving LIG, according to predetermined criteria through the national 
Open Registration System. By 2012, from records shows that NHD built 65,825 units from 
87 projects (Jabatan Perumahan Negara (JPN), 2012)  (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: Peoples Housing Programme implementation status as of March, 2012 
Programme Total project in 
Planning 
Total project 
under-construction 
Total project 
completed 
Total project 
Project Unit Project Unit Project Unit Project Unit 
PHP Rent 1 233 23 13,193 64 62,716 88 76,142 
PHP Sale 1 1,200 7 3,663 23 3,109 31 7,972 
TOTAL 2 1,433 30 16,856 87 65,825 119 84,114 
Source: Jabatan Perumahan Negara (JPN) (Jabatan Perumahan Negara (JPN), 
2012:21) 
6.2.5 Performance of agents of delivery under the Malaysian housing policy 
The LIG housing in the country has become the preoccupation of both the public and 
private sectors (Salleh & Meng, 1997). When the government began building LIG housing, 
the entrance of the private sector began during the 3
rd
 Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) on the 
invitation of the government to contribute its quota in housing the LIG (Salleh & Meng, 
1997). Since then, on broad terms, private sector performance is much better than public 
sector with the total units completed by exceeding targets set for it over the (Table 6.3). 
Specifically, the private developers account for over 90% of housing provision from the 
private sector in Malaysia (Salleh, 2008) and account for a bigger portion of low cost 
housing for Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) (Malaysia, 1996).  
The wide range of incentives and controls exercised by the government to the private 
sector strengthen their capability in meeting the housing needs of the LIG in the country. 
This is more so with the implementation of privatisation policy in the country further gave 
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boosts to the role of private sector participation over the years in the LIG housing delivery. 
In Malaysia, the development of LIG housing is facilitated by the cross subsidy policy. 
The low cost housing is a conceptualised planned and executed, through a regulation 
earlier mentioned of developing a minimum of 30% of development that comprise of low 
cost housing. The profit gained from the medium and high cost, cross subsidise lower cost 
housing. That allows the sustenance of the development of low cost housing by the private 
developers in the country (Salleh & Meng, 1997). This is before the government could 
extend all the prerequisites planning approvals to execute the project. The housing 
provision performance over the plan period is shown in Table 6.5 and financing 
performance in Table 6.6. The performance variation reflects the priority goal of the 
government, resources committed and the state of the economy. The lower records in most 
cases reflect the economic recession the country underwent, most especially during the 
1998 Asian financial crisis (Pugh, 1999). The table shows that Malaysian government 
gives priority to provide adequate housing for its citizens, most especially LIG. 
Table 6.5: Performance public and private sector housing delivery from 1981-2005 in 
Malaysia 1981-2005 in Malaysia 
Programme (1976-80) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
(1981-85) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
(1986-90) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
(1991-95) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
(1996-00) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
(2001-05) 
Plan Built 
(000) 
Public Sector 221  122 400  202 149  174 174  85 230  122 312  189 
Housing for 
the poor 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
35    17 
 
16     10 
Low-cost -       26 177  71 121   74 127   46 60    61 192  103 
Low-Medium - - - - 110  19 37     23 
Medium & 
High 
 
-        38 
 
54    70 
 
28     23 
 
47     38 
 
25     25 
 
67     51 
Private Sector 262  363 525  204 553  204 399  563 570  738 303  655 
Low-cost 30     60 90    19 374   90 217  215 140  130 40     97 
Low-medium - - - - 240   54 94     61 
Medium & 
High 
 
70    140 
 
259   86 
 
178   14 
 
182  348 
 
190  554 
 
169  497 
Total 483  485 925  406 702  378 573  648 800  860 615  844 
Source: The various Malaysian Development Plans (Malaysia, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 
1996, 2001, 2006) 
 
204 
 
Table 6.6: Housing Loans approved and outstanding from financial institutions in 
Malaysia 
 
 
Source 
Loan amount 
approved (RM 
million) 
 
 
% Share 
Loan amount 
Outstanding (RM 
million) 
 
 
% Share 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Commercial banks
1 
60,707 80,327 85.0 91.0 210,017 226,963 84.0 85.3 
Treasury Housing 
Loan Division 
 
5,920 
 
6,254 
 
11.1 
 
7.1 
 
26,716 
 
26,007 
 
10.7 
 
9.8 
Bank Kerjasama 
Rakyat Malaysia 
Berhad 
 
 
115 
 
 
402 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
4,189 
 
 
3,837 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
1.4 
Malaysia Building 
Society Berhad 
 
1,650 
 
396 
 
2.3 
 
0.4 
 
5,274 
 
5,354 
 
2.1 
 
2.0 
Borneo Housing 
Mortgage Finance 
Berhad 
 
 
60 
 
 
37 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
- 
 
 
717 
 
 
682 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
0.3 
Bank Simpanan 
Nasional 
 
768 
 
900 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
3,034 
 
3,132 
 
1.2 
 
1.2 
Sabah Credit 
Corporation 
 
4 
 
3 
 
- 
 
- 
 
163 
 
141 
 
0.1 
 
0.1 
Total 69,253 88,319 100 100 250,111 266,116 100 100 
1
 includes Islamic Banks 
Source: BNM (2011:P24; 2012:P24) 
In summary, unlike Nigeria, in Malaysia the housing finance system supports the housing 
demand to all income groups and most especially the LIG. The primary mortgage market 
was robust under the regulatory institution of the central bank. Equally, noticeable and 
unlike Nigeria, the country's capital market readily supported the housing industry with 
long-term financing.  
6.2.6 Nature and participation of market (private developers) in Malaysia low-
income housing policy 
The literature on not only in Malaysia, but Asia stresses the symbiosis between private 
developers and state, or in general close relations between market and state (Evans, 1995; 
Gomez, 2009). It was argued that closer state and market relations have been considered 
the crucial factor in bringing about the ‗Asian miracle‘ (World Bank, 1993a). These studies 
argued that the dependence of the business on state support by making use of politically 
secured economic privileges to accommodate capital in the development paradigm. There 
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is ample evidence of government to be pivotal in promoting the delivery of LIG housing, 
hence nurturing an inclusive housing policy in the region (Hogan et al., 2012). 
Despite the priority accorded to meeting LIG housing some scholars argued that Malaysia 
is lagging behind the success recorded, for instance, in Singapore, South Korea and Hong 
Kong (Agus, 1989; Agus, et al., 2002; Sirat et al., 1999). This is because in Malaysia, 
resources are committed to commensurate with the prevailing expectations and the 
intervention has been described to be narrowly focused. Therefore, to realise the level 
attained by its neighbours, the Malaysian government, at the onset of Second Malaysia 
National Development Plan, has gone into partnership with the private sector in LIG 
housing and the first pilot projects began at Cheras in Kuala Lumpur (Drakkis-Smith, 
1977). It was during this period that the market intervention into the LIG housing began to 
root for deeper footage which lasted until today. The diversification of the policy in 
housing came in the 1970s due to the realisation that government alone could not take up 
the challenge. In the alternative, the government broadens to the policy framework to 
include the participation of the private sector in the LIG housing delivery in the country. It 
was in the 1970s period, the government efforts to realised housing for LIG became 
diversified with government shifting to both provider and enabler strategies concurrently, 
involving the private sector. This period coincided when the Malaysia pursued the policy 
of privatisation, popularly known as ‗Malaysia incorporated‘ and such change refocused 
policy on private-sector driven economy. Since then, the trend to involve the private sector 
has continued and consolidated as the focus of policy emphasis, with many laws and 
incentives at stimulating housing delivery along the path of market-led. By the 1990s, the 
private sector was taking on an increasingly important role in the provision of LIG housing 
in Malaysia.  This unique policy innovation has been a source of strength of government to 
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realise its political goal of achieving a home-owning democracy and at the same time 
accelerated the creation of an inclusive housing policy in the country. 
The Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, became first effective in 
1969, is the legislative framework that has defined the business of a private developer in 
Malaysia. It vests the government with full authority over private developers operations 
and licensing. Subsequently, subsidiary legislation in the form of rules soon followed after 
the Act came into force (Buang, 2008). The essence of these legal frameworks is to ensure 
that all its citizens from all levels of incomes have access to descent houses and purchaser's 
rights are protected. According to the Act in Malaysia, an authorised private developer is 
defined under Section 5 as one engaging in or carrying on or undertaking a housing 
development (Buang, 2008). These private developers in Malaysia ranged from established 
and financed corporations to small scale developers, which offer a same range of housing 
to all categories of income groups. According to Johnstone (1980) the structure of the 
private sector construction industry in Malaysia comprises of two distinct components, 
namely, the private housing developers and the construction firms, similar to UK structure 
(Gibb, 1999). The former are the entrepreneurs, while the actual constructions are executed 
by the latter.  
The incorporation of the private sector participation the government has continued to 
nurture their participation with supporting policies and innovations, ultimately to meet the 
nation‘s growing LIG housing demand. According to Mastura, Abdul Rashid & Roslinda 
(2009) there were 2000 private developers from different categories in Malaysia. From 
their study also shows that there were 99 and 3 of these developers listed in the main 
second board of Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) respectively. To streamline 
the activities of the private sector with the explicit aims of increasing access and 
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participation of government, market and society, MHLG has been in the vanguard in 
formulating policies and guidelines.  
It is important to state that both the public and private sectors housing productions are 
subject to planning processes and approvals by the respective local planning authorities. 
This is to ensure that before the houses are delivered to markets have met all the standards 
and regulations set. The private sector developers are governed by the Housing Developers 
(Control and Licensing Act 1966; Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) 
Regulations 1989 and Housing Developers (Housing Development Account) Regulations 
1991 (Buang, 2008). These regulations stipulate that the developer must obtain licenses, 
advertising and sales permits from the MHLG before undertaking any housing project in 
the country. This shows that the licenses and permits which enable private developers to 
participate in this industry are regulated at the Federal level. To enhance private sector 
developers‘ performance, a number of incentives and regulations have been introduced. 
The incentives offered include faster development approvals, relaxed planning and 
infrastructure standards and licensing procedures (Bertaud & Malpezzi, 2001). On the 
other hand, the regulations the developers are expected to comply include mixed 
development to include 30% low-cost component, minimum design standards and ceiling 
price of low-cost house (Table 6.3). Although, the legality of this directive is questioned, 
the Malaysian judiciary has upheld this policy to be imposed on private developers in the 
country (Sufian & Mohamad, 2009). 
In Malaysia, the most important private sector agent in LIG housing is the corporate 
private sector (Mastura et al., 2009), rather than an individual house builder most popular 
in countries like Nigeria and Tunisia (UN-Habitat, 2012b). It is this private sector 
developer that made a significant contribution in building housing units in Malaysia‘s 
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urban centres and remained the single dominant housing mode of production, just similar 
to Britain (Barlow & Ball, 1999). The Table 6.5 above shows the contribution of the 
private sector in Malaysia LIG housing delivery. The later MDPs show the dominance of 
the private sector is realised and since then increasing depending on the state of the 
economy. For example, in 6
th
, 7
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
MDPs shows private sector contribution to 
housing contribution realised more than its projected delivery target. Therefore, a 
conclusion can be drawn that in Malaysia it is the private sector which builds the majority 
of new housing units for all income groups. In 2010, Malaysia published its first housing 
policy (MHLG, 2010). The private sector becomes reinforced as the catalyst producer of 
LIG housing. The Malaysia national housing policy (MHHP) shows a number of strategies 
adopted by the government to actualised conclusively LIG in the country by putting in 
place the policy framework. It is expected that these strategies will move-up Malaysia to 
the status attained by Singapore and Hong Kong, its Asian models, in housing its LIG.  
There is a national representative body for private developers in Malaysia, known as 
Malaysian Developers‘ Council. It is a tripartite affiliation of the Real Estate and Housing 
Developers‘ Association Malaysia (REHDA). They are the Sabah Housing and Real Estate 
Developers‘ Association and the Sarawak Housing and Real Estate Developers‘ 
Association. On the Peninsular Malaysia the developers are affiliated  with Real Estate and 
Housing Developers‘ Association of Malaysia (REHDA) (Persatuan Pemaju Hartanah 
Dan Perumahan) formed in 1970 and in 2000 changed to its present name. The 
Association has over 800 members, who are responsible of over 80% of real estate built in 
the country. Another mode of LIG housing supply in Malaysia, is housing cooperatives. 
Though the contribution is not very significant, but represents another source of supply in 
the country. 
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On the issue of financing, the private housing developers finance depends on bank 
financing, to fund their development and historically constitute the singular source of 
financing for them in many favourable terms (Said, 2010). At times supported by 
government financing (Malaysia, 2006). Additionally, among the unique features of 
private housing developers in Malaysia is a diversified business base. In some cases they 
are subsidiaries to a large conglomerate and often financing in a housing development are 
generated from their own assets and revenue, in addition to debt, funding the housing 
development (Mastura et al., 2009). These developments often in housing project built 
medium-and high-income housing, as mixed development that also include low income 
units, as part of the inclusionary planning requirement (Salleh, 2008). 
To sustain the participation of the private sector, the low-cost housing ceiling price has 
enjoyed a series of revision. This is to reflect the inflationary trends and the value of land 
in the country. The goals to achieve from the revision were to have an increase in the 
supplication and quality of housing. This is intended to ultimately meet the national target 
of the LIG housing as shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The private developer‘s sell the 
housing units according to the pegged house price without a direct subsidy from the 
government as a remarkable feature of the LIHP.  
In summary, after four decades the Malaysia government has developed a partnership with 
the private sector developers in housing delivery to house the LIG. The performance so far 
has been lauded and shows that the private sector developers‘ involvement has fostered the 
development of LIG housing delivery in the country (Jamaluddin, 2005). Subsequently, the 
private sector has attained dominance over the state, as the major producers with state roles 
beginning to diminish in the supply of the LIG housing (Hamzah, 2002). While 
acknowledging the state and market in Malaysia, the private developers in the country are 
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recognised to have invested in the property development enterprises. Such expansion and 
development of these private developers are real agents in capitalist development rather 
than simply as products of state policy. They were often polyvalent, with multifarious and 
diversified activities and investments. The versatility of the business base of such 
developers in Malaysia and the diversified specialisation in portfolio investments is 
therefore considered the strength of the vibrancy and success in housing delivery in the 
country.  
6.3 Low-income housing policy in Kuala Lumpur 
In this subsection specifically review the low-income housing policy (LIHP) implemented 
over the years in Kuala Lumpur. In this regard, CHKL is contextualised as one that has 
confronted its housing challenge, particularly for its LIG inhabitants, with a stream of 
policies and programmes to contain and fulfil their housing challenge. Unlike Abuja that 
entirely relied on state at a time and market in recent times, housing policies in Kuala 
Lumpur were broader and comprises of  what Abdul Aziz (2007) refer to ‗mixed strategy‘ 
(Table 6.7), similar to Hong Kong as described by Chiu (2006). Within the national 
context, most especially from the period after independence and NEP, the housing policies 
in Kuala Lumpur have been shifted to provider and enabler and/or both at a time. 
Conversely, because of the magnitude of the city housing challenge, CHKL policies are 
quite more aligned to provider than an enabler.  
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Table 6.7: Category of low-cost housing programmes in Kuala Lumpur 
Types of low-cost housing programme Government 
own projects 
Joint 
venture 
projects 
Project imposed on 
private developers 
through planning 
permission 
Housing programme for hardcore poor (for rent) X   
Housing provided by the developer through 
planning permission (for sale) 
   
X 
Privatization and joint venture project (for sale)  X  
Joint venture project with Employees Provident 
Fund (EPF) (for sale) 
  
X 
 
The programme uses City Hall of Kuala 
Lumpur‘s own housing fund (for sale) 
 
X 
  
National Housing Company (SPNB) (for rent 
and sale) 
  
X 
 
X 
The programme uses City Hall of Kuala 
Lumpur‘s own housing fund (for sale) 
 
X 
  
Public housing programme (for rent) X   
An integrated public housing programme (for 
rent) 
 
X 
  
Source: Adapted from Abd Aziz (2007:192) 
There is body of literature that has been generated on issues relating to LIG housing in 
Kuala Lumpur particularly as it relates to issues like squatting and informality 
(Jamaluddin, 2005; Johnstone, 1983a); accessibility and affordability (Ahmad, et al., 
2012); modes of delivery (Salleh & Meng, 1997); level of satisfaction (Mohit, Ibrahim, & 
Rashid, 2010), financing frameworks (Majid, 1993); land and related issues of housing 
(Omar & Yusof, 2002), success of the policies (Abd Aziz et al., 2008), among others. All 
these studies also demonstrated the multidimensional issues of housing in the city. The 
findings of these studies on Kuala Lumpur are unanimously of the issues of the problems, 
patterns and strategies of the housing the LIG were given the deserved attention and more 
so when compared to Abuja context. 
The CHKL housing policy objectives were first expressed in Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 
1980-2000. It was expressed to ensure that housing was made available to all income 
groups in the city. With the recent structure plan in addition, is to ensure on improving the 
quality of housing and its environment (Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL), 2003). 
Just like Liverpool in UK, CHKL efforts to maintain the supply of LIG housing, makes it 
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possible to increase home ownership in the city, at the same time ensuring the availability 
of rented accommodation. Similar to Hong Kong ‗multi-purpose public housing‘ as 
reported in Chiu (2010), the CHKL employed a similar strategy of a mixed approach that 
included directly constructing, using planning and partnership with the private sector in 
low-cost housing delivery.  
The CHKL response to the housing challenge over the years has been dynamic with a 
number of strategies, in order to address the LIG housing. The evolving strategies were 
necessary since the NEP made Kuala Lumpur as the ultimate destination of government 
induced migration to seek for economic opportunities, most especially among the Malays. 
Such massive drifts of the population into the city generated squatter settlements 
(Johnstone, 1983a). Thus, Kuala Lumpur witnessed a sudden upsurge in housing 
challenges and expressed in the form overcrowding, high rent, squatting and slum 
formation. Following this, the government intervened by direct provision of low-cost 
housing option in the middle of the 1970s (Agus, 1989).  
The drastic reduction of squatters in the city of Kuala Lumpur has been attributed to the 
policy of Zero Squatters Policy pursued by the CHKL, which had early set 2005 as 
ultimate to sanitise the city from squatter colonies (Jamaluddin, 2005). Although the policy 
extends beyond the target year, to a certain extent, the CHKL has credible performance in 
resettling these squatters in Kuala Lumpur (Ahmad, et al., 2012). The success in resettling 
the squatters is realised through a special housing programme to tackle the needs of the 
LIG housing, supported by the federal government (Jamaluddin, 2005).  At this juncture, 
there is need to mention Integrated People Housing programme (IPHP) for rent (Program 
Perumahan Rakyat, (PPR) Bersepadu) which purposefully established to resettle squatters 
within the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (Table 6.8). As mentioned above, the 
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programme is under the management of NHD of the MHLG. The federal government 
provides the financing, while the CHKL provide the land needed for the programme 
project. As part of the objective to achieve the Zero-Squatter city, IPHP is given a label of 
fast-track project emphasis in execution. 
Table 6.8: Characteristics of Integrated People Housing Programme (IPHP) for rent 
in Malaysia 
Target Group A squatter with a monthly income below RM1,500 
Type of housing 11-12 or 16-18storey in the major cities and 5 storey in smaller town 
Size of houses Not less than 60 square metres (650 sq. fit) 
Features 3 bedrooms, 1 living, 1 kitchen area, 1 bathroom and 1 toilet 
Rental rate RM 124 per month 
Source: Adapted from Sufian & Mohamad (2009:120) 
Recently, the Performance Management & Delivery Unit (PERMANDU) in the Prime 
Minister‘s Department, the Malaysia Economic Transformation programme introduced in 
2010 focus on Greater Kuala Lumpur development programme under the 12 National Key 
Economic Areas (NKEAs) (PEMANDU, 2012). Under this programme, the government 
has offered 35,095 units of CHKL low-cost houses for purchase to the sitting tenants in 
Kuala Lumpur at a discount price of RM35,000 less RM7,000 for the national pegged 
price of RM42,000 (PEMANDU, 2012). The government declared to offer assistance on 
down payments, legal fees and low-interest rate loans to eligible LIG who were not 
recipients or purchasers of low-cost houses provided by government. The recorded success 
is commendable considering the long history of squatting (Johnstone, 1983a) in the city.  
The advent of Information Technology, the Malaysian government has legislated for the 
computerised land transactions and registration, as part of the government plan to make IT 
ubiquitous in the whole society. Though, with this technological improvement there were 
grudges against delays in processing and approving applications.  Even where grant has 
been made, issuance of titles to such applicants take a long time, attributed to a limited 
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number of Registry offices, as there was one in each state (Buang, 2007). The consequence 
has been the problem of inability to predict the time frame to obtain planning approval 
before actual construction can take place (Abdullah, 2010).  
To facilitate resolution of these issues in recent times the government has launched  ‗One 
Stop Centre‘ (OSC) in all the local authorities in Malaysia, to facilitate all land 
development processes, with a view to shorten the approval process (Ahmad, Ahmad & 
Arbi, 2011). The judiciary has upheld this planning regulation that a local authority can 
impose, as one of its conditions for granting planning approval, that the developer should 
carry out low-cost housing  as part of his housing project (Buang, 2007). Similarly, it has 
been upheld in the Malaysian judiciary that a local authority can refuse to issue a 
certificate of fitness (CF) to a developer if the latter has not fulfilled all the conditions 
imposed in the planning approval Buang (2007). 
In CHKL set out criteria for one to qualify to purchase a low-cost housing unit, cited in 
wan 2005 are as follows: he or she must be Malaysian citizen; married or divorced or 
widowed; total household income must not exceed RM2,000 per month (now RM3,000 ); 
registered under the ORS; must live or work in the Federal Territory; must not own a 
house or land within 35 kilometres from the city centre and must be eligible to obtain 
housing loans from the government or any financial institution (Dewan Bandaraya Kuala 
Lumpur (DBKL), 2003). 
From all the above and in conjunction with Kuala Lumpur vision 2020 towards World-
class city status, undoubtedly CHKL has significantly improved the quality of housing and 
housing environment by provisioning of low-cost housing units and eradication of squatter 
enclaves in the city. Consequently, this is as a result of the city consistent policy directives 
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on the number of housing programmes and in most cases implemented to boost the supply 
and meet the LIG housing demand as well as eradication of squatter settlements. 
6.4 Nigeria’s housing policies 
6.4.1 Introduction-overview of low-income group and housing policy in Nigeria 
The experiences well documented after the promulgation of these policies, housing in 
general and LIG in particular deteriorate to a non-issue of concern by the governments, 
considering the output quantity generated over the period of their existence (Awotona, 
1987; Ikejiofor, 1999a; Ogunshakin & Olayiwola, 1992).  The quality and quantity of 
housing in the country continued to dwindle as far as the supply and demand are concerned 
due to poor institutional response and framework of implementation. Happily, to 
Nigerians, the existence of these housing policies serves as proves to an open abdication of 
responsibilities to citizens by the governments. 
The period after independence, the housing corporations were established in the other two 
regions of Nigeria. This was the housing corporations subsequently became twelve and 
thirty-six in the federated states, whenever there is an additional state creation in the 
country. Since then, these beginnings of the four regions and present state government 
housing corporations accordingly executed a number of housing projects and estates (Udo-
Akagha, 2006). With this development the approach suffered a weakness that the housing 
corporations‘ projects executed with no coherent policy that could have unified the 
approaches of the states to the national government. The high-income and medium-income 
predominates across the states in the country (Udo-Akagha, 2006). Even, where such low-
cost housing provided targeted the public servants, not the public in the country.  Even 
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then where the limited supply made meant for the public LIG were taken over by the 
middle-and high-income families (Megbolugbe, 1983).  
The Federal Military Government with booming oil rent in early 1970s declared direct 
intervention to deliver 54,000 housing units through the federation. This is as a solution to 
the gross housing shortage. The distribution shows that the plan was to construct 10,000 
units in Lagos as the federal capital and 4,000 units in each of the twelve states at the total 
cost of N1,300 million (Ogunshakin & Olayiwola, 1992). In 1973 the government 
established a federal agency to implement, supervise and coordinate the delivery of these 
housing unit deliveries in the federation. The agency known as Federal Housing Authority 
(FHA) became effective in 1974. The federal housing programmes under the 1975-1980 
National Development Plan were relegated to the state housing corporations to execute 
(Udo-Akagha, 2006). However, the objective of providing low-income housing for the 
LIG workers at highly subsidised rents failed and became conduit pipe of siphoning the 
state resources (Ikejiofor, 1999a). 
The census gives reasonably good statistics on housing stock. For the first time, the 
Nigerian 2006 census incorporated housing and its condition in its census exercise and 
recorded that there were a total of 19.5 million households owning a house of their own, 
out of the recorded population of 140 million in the country (Makama, 2007). The same 
census classified housing units as either broadly owned or rental, but with additional like 
squatting and occupied rent-free. 
6.4.2 National housing policy objectives in Nigeria 
Just like Malaysia, since after independence Nigeria never had a national housing policy 
until in 1991. Consequently, the first national housing policy 1991 defined its focus on 
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“shall be to ensure that all Nigerians own or have access to decent, safe and healthy 
housing accommodation at affordable cost” (FGN, 1991:12). This is consistent with to 
United Nation‘s Charters (UN-habitat, 2009). Also concurrently, the 1999 constitution of 
Nigeria stated in Section 16 (2) d that “the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring 
suitable and adequate shelter is provided for all citizens” (FGN, 1999). From the spelt out 
objectives in the national housing policy, Anugwom (2004:196) summarised the objectives 
as follows 
“To ensure that the provision of housing units was based on realistic standards 
which the prospective home owners could afford. 
To give priority to housing programmes designed to benefit the LIG. 
To encourage every household to own its own house by providing credit. In 
addition, the policy was meant to tackle the increase of spiralling urban rents.” 
6.4.3 Development of national housing policy in Nigeria 
6.4.3.1 Colonial period 
The advent of LIHP intervention dates back at the time of colonial periods. However, it 
was not conscious effort to address the housing but prevailed in the form of slum 
clearance, and development of residential estates, essentially in Lagos. The prompted 
intervention and response was due to bubonic plague in Lagos in 1928 (Udo, 1979). The 
emphasis of the colonialist policies in housing was one that prioritised on the providing 
expatriate colonial staff with a housing of maximum comfort. The Lagos Executive 
Development Board (LEDB) (now Lagos State Development and Property Company, 
LSDPC) were established in 1928 charged with the effective planning and development of 
Lagos. Similarly, the Board function was expanded to develop housing units in 
metropolitan Lagos. Among others, this Board executed the Lagos Slum Clearance 
Scheme (1955-1966). Housing policy was directed to the beautification and enhancement 
of the capital and other major cities, not to meet the desperate citizens' needs of shelter 
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(Okpala, 1986). The activities of LIG housing development were only confined to the 
capital city of Lagos and even less impressive performance due to “high cost of 
implementation contingent on inflation and the lack of proper feasibility studies and 
programme output assessment.” (Megbolugbe, 1983:350). 
Another notable step was taken by the colonists towards housing Nigerians was the 
establishment of the Nigerian Building Society (NBS) in 1956, to provide housing loans. 
The African Staff Housing Fund was also established the same year with the sole purpose 
of encouraging African civil servants to have their own houses. However, it is recognized 
that all these facilities were only available to those who have already- “to whom the 
government was adding more” (Udo-Akagha, 2006:137) and did not immensely benefit 
LIG. 
The role of housing policy of planning and formulation rests with the federal government. 
The body responsible for housing policy in the federal government, the Federal Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development and Environment, plays an advisory role by providing 
guidelines for developing policies. The programmes are to facilitate efforts of the state and 
local governments.  
6.4.3.2 National Development Plans (NDP) period- after 1960 and up to 1983 
The first colonial development plan for Nigeria (1946-1956) recognised the need for urban 
planning as a means of promoting development and welfare. With independence, in 1964 
the Association of Housing Corporations of Nigeria (AHCN) was formed. The regional 
(and later state) governments established Housing Corporations were mandated to begin 
the process of developing plans layouts and building houses for sale to the citizens. Such 
layouts and housing developments were most notable in regional headquarters such as 
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Ibadan, Benin, Enugu and Kaduna as well as a few other large cities such as Ikeja, Kano 
and Port Harcourt. The Housing Corporations served both as estate developers and as 
provider of mortgage finance (Mabogunje, 2004). Consequently, no significant 
development took place in housing during the First and Second NDP (Udo-Akagha, 2006). 
Since, the resources of the government were concentrated in waging the civil war that 
broke out in 1967. 
According to Udo-Akagha (2006), the first significant and direct attempt by the Federal 
government to intervene in positively in the area of housing was during the period of 
Second NDP (1970-1974). This coincided with the advent of the oil boom era. When there 
was a tremendous increase in oil revenues led to a greater intervention in housing 
(Awotona, 1990).  It led to the establishment of a National Housing Program during the 
second NDP period in 1972. The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was created in the 
same year to coordinate the program nationwide. Fifty nine thousand (59,000) units of 
houses were planned for construction –15,000 in Lagos and 4,000 in each of the eleven 
state capitals. This program was still on the drawing board when the Second NDP ended 
and the Third NDP (1975-1980) started in 1975 (Udo-Akagha, 2006). The Federal 
Government decided to participate directly and a total of N2.6billion was earmarked for 
the implementation of the various projects. During this period, a total of 202,000 dwellings 
were programmed for construction comprising 50,000 units in Lagos and eight thousand 
(8,000) units in each of the other nineteen states. It is pertinent to note that by the end of 
the plan period, only about 12% of the houses had been completed (Okpala, 1986) seas of 
abandoned projects littered all over the country (Udo-Akagha, 2006). Notwithstanding the 
gross national failure, according to Mbali & Okoli (2002) quoted in Obansa & Ibigbemi 
(2005); within this period the Federal Government constructed the Festival Town in Lagos 
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comprising a total 11,000 units and the LIG were to receive 55% of these housing units but 
they lost completely in the implementation (Obansa & Ibigbemi, 2005). 
The Federal Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Environment was first created 
in 1975. It was charged with the responsibility of initiating and coordinating policies in 
housing related areas. Though the ministry, existed for a brief period, within this period, 
the following panels and committees were constituted specifically to deal with some of the 
problems of housing delivery, namely, the Committee on Standardization of House Types 
and Policies (1975); Rent Panel (1975); the Land Use Panel (1977) and in 1977, the NBS 
was converted to the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) with a capital base of 
20million Naira, which it was later increased to 150million Naira in 1979 (Udo- Akagha, 
2006). 
In spite of the failure of the Third NDP, the direct construction program was continued in 
the Fourth NDP (1981-1985). The Federal Government‘s budget for housing for this plan 
period was scaled down from N2.6 billion of the previous periods to N1.9 billion. The 
emphasis for this period was on low-cost housing. A total of 40,000 units were to be 
constructed annually nationwide with 2,000 units located in each state and Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT). Out of the state's allocation, 80% was earmarked for the LIG. However, 
by June 1983, only 32,000 units had been completed while the overall achievement was 
only 20% (FGN, 2006). Half way through the implementation, the second phase of the 
program was commenced comprising 20,000 units of two bedroom core houses also for the 
LIG. This Phase of the program failed to take off in most of the Federation (Udo-Akagha, 
2006). Thus, abandoned sites with uncompleted buildings and infrastructure became the 
most visible outcome of the housing program in the 4
th
 NDP (Ikejiofor, 1999a).  
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6.4.3.3 National housing policy initiative period-from 1985 to 1999 
The need for the formulation of the national housing policy in Nigeria became of necessity 
due to severe housing problems in most of the urban centres (Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). 
For the fact that the housing problem quantitatively in Nigeria, is an urban issue (Agbola, 
1987). The problems are recognised to be manifested both in quantity and quality. Thus, 
the advantages of the NHP include producing a common plan of action for housing 
development in the country; the determination and streamlining the roles and 
responsibilities of each tier of government and as a representation to the citizens the 
assurance of government commitment to their housing challenge.  
The NHP 1991 (FGN, 1991) came with the ideals of Nigeria‘s declaration of housing for 
all by the year 2000 and even though the year came without its attainment. The ultimate 
GOAL of the policy was to “ensure that all Nigerians own or have access to decent 
housing accommodation at affordable cost by the year 2000 A. D” (FGN, 1991). The main 
features of the NHP show that for the first time the roles to be played by the Federal, State 
and Local Governments were clearly spelt out in the country housing delivery system. The 
policy acknowledged the defects in the LUD and its contribution to the problem in the 
housing sector of the national economy. It recognized the severely underdevelopment of 
housing finance in the country and detailed how the housing finance in the country was to 
be structured to serve the purpose of the policy.  
As its goal of building materials the policy document states “Nigerian should gradually 
and systematically develop appropriate capabilities to reduce construction cost and 
achieve self-sufficiency in the production of basic building materials”. A clear policy on 
LIG housing was developed in both urban and rural centres, having admitted the past 
Governments policies and program of direct construction of low income houses are 
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failures. Also the importance of the private sector in the housing delivery system was 
recognized, that both formal and informal private sectors “have consistently been 
providing 90% of the housing stocks in the country”. Udo-Akagha, (2006:144) stressed 
that this was the policy the nation was waiting for, “not solve all the housing problems 
though by the year 2000 but a good realistic document on housing to take the nation into 
the next millennium”. With the departure of the administration, the NHP suffers in 
implementation (Olaleye, Asaju, & Aluko, 2005; Udo-Akagha, 2006). Since then, 
surprisingly, the provision of housing delivery has collapsed thereafter with the advent of 
the policy in housing, instead of registering a progress (Ikejiofor, 1999a). The overall 
situation of housing in the country is the one described by UN-Habitat (2008) to be one of 
the most deplorable in the world. This is because, with the change of policy focus, the 
Nigerian state withdrew and slacked in housing; and with weak state institutions could not 
propel, even at the minimalist role, the programme of housing delivery to the citizens 
(Ikejiofor, 1998b).  
The Government signed into law the supposed instrument of change in housing policy in 
1989-the Mortgage Institutions Decree. The Decree sets out guidelines for the 
establishment, licensing and control of private mortgage finance institutions. Expectedly, 
Nigerians from all works of life rushed to establish Building Societies or Primary 
Mortgage Institutions (PMIs) whether or not they know how to operate them. It required 
then a meagre minimum share capital of only N5million. Yakubu (2004) reported that 300 
emerged in earlier years but the number dropped to 80 as of December, 2002. As at the 
beginning the PMIs were concentrated in a few urban areas which in fact limited their 
capacity to mobilize saving deposits. The high interest rate offered by the banks limited the 
attractions of PMIs to small savers. But beyond these factors, it was the inability of the 
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PMIs to differentiate themselves from finance companies, and the fact that there was no 
widespread association of the PMIs with home ownership, that had stifled the mortgage 
industry (Udechukwu, 2008). 
The first National Rolling Plan (1990-1992) represents another change in policy strategy, 
with the adoption of settlement upgrading and sites and services. It was planned that about 
2,000 residential plots were to be provided in each state of the federation, to encourage the 
public and the private sector to play a major role in housing provision. However, at the end 
of the plan period, most of the required sites were not developed (Ogu, 1999). 
A year after the advent of NHP, a Decree Number 3 of 1992 National Housing Fund 
(NHF) Decree was promulgated. The Decree establishes two major sources of funding for 
funding under the NHP, 1991, namely, from ―contributions‖ and ―investments‖ as follows. 
The compulsory contribution was fixed at 2.5% of workers monthly salaries earning 
N3000 and above, and set aside into NHF, attracting at a fixed interest rate of 4%. On the 
other hand, the fund investment was to be generated from banks, insurance and other 
corporate firms in the private sector, who were to invest their loans, advances and other 
reserve funds in the NHF.  
The period of General Sani Abacha, that is, 1993–1998; little was given to the housing and 
the styles of direct government intervention in the actual construction of the houses 
resurface again during this period. The National Housing Programme was launched, with 
the promise of constructing 121,000 housing units throughout the country. According to 
Udo-Akagha (2006); although 1,200 housing units were built (not completed) within the 
first 13 months of the program, NONE was delivered. The poor performance of this 
program was attributed to the absence of a management structure for program 
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implementation, poor costing of the project, the motley of a group of contractors involved, 
fraudulent in the awards of the contracts, among others (Ikejiofor, 1999b). 
6.4.3.4 Another round of national housing policy -May 29, 1999 to date 
From 1999 marking the return of democracy in Nigeria, after a long period of military 
regimes came with the utopian policy under the National Housing Program, targeted to 
construct 20,000 housing units throughout the Federation over a period a four year period 
at the rate of 5,000 units per annum (FGN, 2006). In fact, was soon abandoned owing to 
“the realities on the ground as to the enormity of the problems” (Fortune-Ebie, 2006:4). 
However, the government felt the need to redraw-up a new NHP for the country as a 
demonstration of its commitment to the eradication of homelessness among Nigerians. So 
for this reason, the government produced NHP, 2006; for the second time and as an 
amendment to the NHP 1991 (FGN, 2006). The main thrust and strategies of the new NHP 
is summarized, thus,  
“to seek vigorously to make an increasing majority of Nigerians home owners on 
the basis of mortgage finance. The policy entails involving a large number of 
private real estate developers and State Housing Corporations...promoting the 
growth of many small and medium enterprises to provide local construction 
materials..., mobilizing PMIs..., restructuring the FMBN ... and setting up a 
Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development to regulate, promote, 
monitor and supervise all these changes” (Fortune-Ebie, 2006:7). 
But the so-called amendment in 2006 from the 1991 housing policy, the basic philosophy 
has been the same. But despite these declarations the implementation seems not be 
different from either the former to the present policy. It might not be wrong to speculate 
the third round review of the NHP presently under consideration by the federal government 
would not be different, only in semantics, since its declared goal is the same from its 
predecessors (Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Research Documentation 
and Strategy (OSAP), 2012).  
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Just like the NHP 1991; the NHP, 2006, set to its ultimate goal as one “to ensure that all 
Nigerians own or have access to decent, safe and healthy housing accommodation at 
affordable cost” (NHP, 2006:12). Therefore, it should be understand that the NHP, 2006 
seeks to dramatically increase the home ownership among Nigerians on the basis of a 
robust mortgage finance industry. Nonetheless, it is high time the Nigerian government 
should realise that the Nigerians are not caring for a new policy. But rather its political will 
and action implement the previous ones, considering the UN-Habitat estimates of gross 
widening housing deficits in the region of over 16 million units in the country. In short, if 
the citizens are to be consulted on these formulated policies, the response would be that all 
concerned with the governance of housing should cease from formulating non-
implementable policies and get on committed to implementation of the ones on the ground.  
The government that brought the above reforms is gone and the in-coming has drawn a 7- 
point Agenda and Vision 2020 for National development without having housing 
occupying a prestigious position of its agenda. Recently, part of the country‘s vision 
20:20:20, in the report the country‘s vision 20:2020 and Financial System Strategy 2020 
(FSS2020) has assigned special roles to the housing sector, expecting it to drive the 
financial system and contribute not less than 20% of the GDP to the year 2020. 
6.4.4 Management and organisation of national housing policy in Nigeria 
Just like Malaysia, in Nigeria there are several government agencies covering diverse 
functions towards providing housing delivery for the citizenry. At the different levels of 
government the various agencies involved in housing make the housing system in general 
to be “... prone to duplication, institutional conflict and inefficiencies” (Yunusa, 
2004:140). Beyond what the 1991 NHP did of recognizing the private sector as the focus 
of the policy strategies, the 2006 NHP provided to professionalise the housing industry as 
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well as the delivery by promoting the emergence of tripartite networks of associations in 
the housing sector, namely, REDAN, BUMPAN and MBAN.  
Just like the national economy, which suffered due to abandonment of national economic 
planning, housing has been part of this neglect and as such interventions have been ad hoc 
and piecemeal. The public and private formal sector agents provide limited numbers of 
low-cost housing units, which in most cases focused on the demands of the middle-and 
high-income groups. Notwithstanding, in Nigeria the majority of housing units is supplied 
by individuals in collaboration with small scale, local artisans and contractors (Ikejiofor, 
1997). 
6.4.5 Housing finance system under the Nigeria housing policy 
In 1992, the National Housing Fund (NHF) was created and its custody ceded to the 
FMBN to enrich the bank‘s revenue base. The fund was set up to collect from Nigerians, 
as compulsory contribution, earning up to the minimum national wage at the rate of 2.5% 
of their basic earnings to the fund for a period of not less than six months to qualify for 
access FMBN loans (Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). In addition, the mortgagor must possess 
above 10% of the cost of housing unit to be built or purchased (Udechukwu, 2008). 
Contribution from Nigerians both in the public and private sector workers earning above 
3,000 Naira per annum were required to make available 2.5% of their monthly earnings of 
the Fund. This contribution, once made, qualifies the contributor for a loan from the Fund 
to build his or her own house. In the alternative, a contributor who retires from service or 
attains the age of 60 and is incapable of continuing with the contribution could have his 
refund made within three months, with a 4% interest. The realized Fund from the sources 
was to be disbursed via the PMIs with the FMBN playing the role of the Apex/supervisory 
body (Udo-Akagha, 2006). 
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By the year 2000, the FMBN had registered some 1.8 million employees from some 
17,132 employers. Furthermore, although the FMBN had collected and had over 6 Billion 
Naira in the Fund‘s account, it had only been able to disburse less than N280 Million to 
some 446 contributors both directly and through PMIs (Mabogunje, 2004). The 93% of the 
beneficiaries were of the middle and upper income category (Ogu, 1999). This shows that 
the Fund had done very little by way of benefit for LIG workers to own their houses. This 
dismal performance led to Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) passed a vote of no 
confidence in the scheme and mounted a campaign to dissuade workers from further 
contributing to the Fund. This pressure from NLC made the government to stop the 
deductions from employees‘ salaries and refund the accumulated contributions and further 
contributions to the Fund was changed to be a voluntary choice of the contributors.  
The participating private developers can access loan under FMBN developers financing 
window, which was created in 2002 as estate development loan (EDL) granted to private 
housing developers, State housing corporations and housing cooperatives. The terms 
include building houses within the maximum loan amount NHF contributor could access, 
which at inception was N5million. But in 2010 increased to N15million (meaning the 
houses built should not be sold at more than the stated amount); membership of Real Estate 
Developers Association of Nigeria (REDAN) and at 10% interest rate, repayable in 24 
months. 
The 1991 NHP envisioned the problem of financing and was proactive enough to devise a 
legislation to strategise the realisation of the policy objectives. The national housing fund 
was legalized by decree no. 3 of 1992 (now CAP N45 Volume 11, laws of the Federation, 
2004). In line with the NHP to be private sector driven, the NHF was to be financed from 
the private sector sources, an innovation in the housing delivery in the country.  The main 
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provisions in the NHF were to generate long term housing financing through mandatory 
regular contributions from individuals and corporate organizations as provided in the Act. 
From these sources will absolve the government from direct intervention in financing 
housing delivery in the country (Mabogunje, 2004).  . 
The FMBN as the custodian of the NHF was to disburse the fund as mortgage loans to 
PMIs and Estate developers. The PMIs are the primary lenders to the individual 
contributors. While the FMBN provides ―EDLs‖ to private developers, mostly the REDAN 
members at 10% interest rate for a term not exceeding 24months, for the development of 
housing estates built to target prices not less than N1 million and not exceeding N5 
million, but in 2010 this loan tenor has been increased to not more than N15 million. The 
housing should contain-bedroom to 4-bedroom bungalows for contributors to the Fund.  
The arrangement was that the REDAN members enjoy EDL from the FMBN at 10%, 
which they build housing estates containing priced houses, payable within a maximum of 
24months, so that the money could serve as a revolving fund for other developers to 
benefit. Also the private developers were expected to appoint a PMI firm to do the 
marketing of the estate and access the NHF from FMBN for and on behalf of 
mortgagors/contributors to the FUND at 4% and on-lend same to them at 6% over a 
maximum of 30 years.  
However, the implementation of the NHF shows when the government that promulgated 
the Act did not fulfil its expressed role of making a contribution to the fund. Even some 
corporate organisation refused to make a collection of their employees on the ground that 
they were having an in-house housing scheme. Similarly, the commercial banks and 
insurance companies refused to contribute to the Fund on the reasons that there were to be 
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poor returns on the investment, since the accrual interest was lower than what they pay to 
their investors. This is reasonable since their business interest is profit-making and 
consequently, the NHF fails to realise it dreams of establishing a system that mobilises 
housing finance from the private sector.  The grossly inadequate impact of the NHF on 
workers, prompted the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) demanding the suspension of the 
deductions of workers‘ contributions and refund of what had been collected. 
Most recently, as part of the financial institutions reforms in the country, the CBN has 
introduced a a revised PMIs policy framework  in 2011 and  expected to meet the 
compliance deadline in April, 2013 (CBN, 2011). The policy provides for an increase in 
the minimum paid-up capital of PMIs and change of their generic name to primary 
mortgage banks (PMBs). The new PMBs are grouped into two, whether national or state 
depending on the paid-up capital, as follows: 
a. National PMBs are those with a minimum paid-up capital of N5billion and could 
have branches in all states of the federation 
b. State PMBs are those whose minimum paid-up capital of N2.5billion and could 
only operate in one state of the federation  
Equally worth mentioning, the regulations has precluded the PMBs from engaging in any 
business outside their mortgage functions, like providing current accounts for non-
mortgage customers, granting consumer or commercial loans, project management for real 
estate development etc. (CBN, 2011).    
The structure of the Nigerian financial sector at 2011, there were only 20 commercial 
banks (called deposit money banks (DMBs) from the post consolidated 24. From the 
financial crisis impact, there were mergers and acquisitions of the four banks. Other 
financial institutions comprise of micro financial institutions includes microfinance banks 
and PMIs (now primary mortgage banks (PMBs) effective in the 1
st
 quarter of 2013.   
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6.4.6 Nature and participation of market (formal private developers) in Nigeria 
low-income housing policy 
The private sector has, right from the colonial period, always been in alliance with the state 
for assistance. In these countries, nearly all businessmen were necessarily in politics 
because the state had become the source of finance and contracts; and nearly all politicians 
were in business (Ikejiofor, 1998b). This relationship became intensified as the state 
became a major source of rents-through contracts, direct credit at below market interest 
rates, tariff concessions, and a gamut of incentives directed at the private sector (Daloz, 
2005). Given the overarching dependence of the private sector has largely blurred over 
time. The private sector developers are represented by networks. In recent times, the state 
and private sector under the neo-liberalism have gone into formalize relationships through 
partnership. The trade networks have become the channels of lobbying and influence on 
policy. 
The state, with its coercive force for patronage and fight for booties for personal and group 
interest as well as sectional interests, the key players have been the military, politicians and 
bureaucrats (Ikpeze et al., 2004). Thus, these groups choice of specific policies and their 
implementation was directly related to the need to serve personal and group interests.  The 
staggering expansion of the public sector not only made the bureaucracy more powerful 
than the private sector but also created opportunities for top government servants to build 
fortunes in the private sector (Ikejiofor, 1999a). It is not surprising therefore that the 
economic interests of the bureaucracy coincided with those of the business community, 
and enormous financial resources (Daloz, 2005) has been the key instrument for keeping 
the ethnically divided country together, as well as an arena of fierce competition both of 
which were involved in ―extractive‖ capitalism rather than production. Policies were either 
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designed or implemented by these bureaucratic elites to maximize their extractive power or 
rents.  
The public and private formal sector agents provide limited numbers of low-cost housing 
units, which in most cases focused on the demands of the middle-and high-income groups. 
Notwithstanding, in Nigeria the majority of housing units is supplied by individuals in 
collaboration with small scale, local artisans and contractors (Ikejiofor, 1997). 
6.5 Low-income housing policy in Abuja 
Abuja is built as a national capital and city. Consequently, enjoys the status of symbol of 
unity to all Nigerians. The city represents as an opened opportunity to all Nigerians in 
respective of political, economic, ethnic, religious and regional background. For this fact, it 
was designed that the land allocation in the FCT should strictly adhere to the federal 
character policy. This means that each and sundry has a right to shelter as enshrined in the 
federal constitution. This subsection presents the local context of LIHP content 
implemented over the years. Meanwhile, Abuja is an administrative city, defined its LIG to 
be those on Civil Service Income Grade Levels 1 to 6, and in its upper level is considered 
to be Grade Level 6 (Ikejiofor, 1998a). From the Consolidated Public Salary Structure 
(CONPSS) which became effective from the July 1
st
, 2010; the annual take-home of lower 
and upper low-income civil servants, taking Grade levels 01/ Step1 and 06/Step15 are 
N204,878 (US$1322) and N476,495 (US$3074) (at US$1=N155) respectively. 
Abuja, from inception is planned to tackle the residential segregation found among 
particular colonial established cities. The developments of the city were to be according to 
districts and neighbourhoods of mixed development comprising of all income strata. 
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However, glaring in Abuja today is the residential segregation existence in the form of that 
the city housed the high income and city LIG are found in the suburbs shanties and slums.  
The Abuja Master Plan (AMP) (IPA, 1979) as the blueprint to guide the city development 
and recognised to be as such by the city authorities, made a pertinent observation and 
recommendations, particularly in respect of housing the LIG. The IPA (1979:173) first 
expressed housing as the major task to confront the Abuja administration, “is to arrive at a 
satisfactory balance between residential quality and the ability of households to afford that 
quality”, against citizens‘ expectation to be  accommodated in the city. This is consistent 
to the researchers‘ findings that housing was the most important of all problems facing the 
urban population (Choguill, 1994; Ortiz, 1996). Thus, the IPA (1979) recommended that 
“FCDA must develop a housing policy and programme tailored to the needs of the 
Capital’s population” (emphasis mine).  Finally, in stark, blunt language, the IPA (1979) 
also informed the Nigerian government that “future residents will judge the city not only 
on how the organisation of the city fits their everyday needs. But also on how the demand 
for housing is provided” (the researcher emphasis). Even though in AMP, the IPA (1979) 
did not provide a specific design of housing framework, except what constitute its 
challenge to city administration. Notwithstanding, the articulation of the challenge 
provides a strong base framework to evaluate the city LIHP in its subsequent growth and 
development. 
Researchers have generated literature on how the housing delivery has been met, most 
especially as it relates to housing the LIG in Abuja, namely (Agba, 1986; Daramola & 
Aina, 2004; Ikejiofor, 1997; Ikejiofor, 1998a, 1999b; Jibril, 2006; 2009; Jibril & Garba, 
2012; Morah, 1990, 1993; Ukoha & Beamish, 1997). The issues revisited include 
accessibility, affordability, satisfaction, financing frameworks, informality, resettlement, 
233 
 
land and related issues of housing, level of satisfaction, failures of the policies, among 
others. The findings of these studies are unanimously of the issues of the problems, 
patterns and strategies of the housing the LIG were not given the adequate attention. 
Within the context of the built environment as ‗landscape of domination‘ (Harvey, 1985), 
these findings can be interpreted from the perspective of Moore (1984) on Abuja. This 
goes to reinforce Harvey (1985) postulation that capital cities are planned to serve the 
needs of capitalists, that 
„„more than the business of developing a new capital, Abuja was merely an avenue 
for privileged members of Nigerian society to both spend the country‟s newly 
acquired oil wealth, and build an urban haven for themselves where they can enjoy 
the amenities of a modern community without the nuisance of the „common man‟ ”.  
A principal officer of FCDA was quoted in Morah (1993:265) to have said “Abuja is not 
for the low-income”. Similarly, a former Minister, in more recent time reiterated the same 
position that Abuja was “not a city for the poor”(Amba, 2010:154). The implication of 
these expressions has been neglect of LIG housing delivery from the city authorities since 
from the time of its inception. However,  they fell to reckon the fact that LIG are part and 
parcel of a city,  and a city that does not this group and the proliferation of their problem of 
housing will  undoubtedly constitute a big embarrassment to the administration whether 
this is realised or not.  
The Federal Capital Territory, 1976 vested the entire 8,000 km
2
 of the FCT land area in the 
Federal Government of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) 
and later Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) as the sole agents for its 
administration and management. The implementation in terms of land accessibility 
difficulties with its associated stiff application of development control laws, have made the 
LIG to be excluded from the city‘s land market (Ikejiofor, 1998a). Rather, there has been 
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more deepening exclusion of the LIG by high land price hike, demolition of illegal 
settlements, more stiff development control strategies, proliferating informal sector and 
densification and of informal settlements.  
The growth of Abuja population at a phenomenal rate over a short period of time has 
created an enormous pressure on housing. Housing was only provided to public servants, 
been the ones built by FCDA since the city inception. This growth repercussion is apparent 
on housing in Abuja manifesting in the form of inadequate supply, unmet demand, high 
rent, house sharing and squatting, and the unavoidable going price of houses, among 
others. These housing repercussion built up over time for the fact that the public housing 
delivery, mainly from FCDA could only completed not more than 22,000 LIG housing 
units, while the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) built only 1,571 (Ikejiofor, 1998a). 
Consequently, it was found that even the limited units developed were taken over by the 
middle and high income groups (Suleiman, 2001).  
As of 2012, FHA has completed 11,352 housing units of different sizes. These completed 
units certainly were grossly inadequate and most unfortunately were not within the reach 
of the LIG, even at their subsidised rate of up to 98.5-99.9% of civil servants residents 
(Morah, 1993). As an alternative, public rental housing units have not been made available 
in the city. The average and LIG have had to rely on private renting. Yet the private rental 
sector has been a neglected and largely unregulated in the city with poor quality housing 
stock. To compound the housing problem, in Abuja, the housing needs of the other income 
groups has not been quantitatively tackled since its inception (Aluya, 2007).  
From the inception of Abuja until the decade of monetisation, the civil servants have all 
the way been the single beneficiaries of government housing provision in the city. Even 
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with the monetisation, they are the ones who benefit in purchasing their dwellings as the 
sitting tenant. On this note, more disturbing there has not been a dedicated provision made 
for the non-civil servants‘ population by government right from the inception of the city.  
At the same time with civil servants provision. Consequently, the absolute shortage of 
housing generated rapidly rising rents, overcrowding, large numbers of shared households, 
the growth of small scale private sector housing in the satellite towns of Abuja and even 
homelessness (Ikejiofor, 1997). For instance, Suleiman (2001) reported that the vast 
majority of Abuja residents are tenants crowded into one-and two- rooming houses with 
densities as high as 2000 dwelling units per hectare. With 50-70% of households 
occupying one room are unfair and often the tenants paying rents exceeding 70% of their 
official income.  
Related to the above, in Abuja, a major institutional constraint to housing development is 
the difficulty of acquiring land to both individuals and private developers (Egbu et al., 
2008; Ikejiofor, 1997; 1998a; Morah, 1993; Omale, 2009) and even with attempts to 
improve on it (Akingbade et al., 2012b).  For instance, Egbu, et al. (2008) using Abuja and 
Lagos as their case studies shows that there were 32 key stages to legally secure land and 
development rights, and requires a minimum period of 381 days without a hiccup 
(Appendix H). This finding interpreted the findings of Omale (2009) why over 80% of his 
respondents had to wait for more than five years to secure land allocation in the city.  
Similarly, Akingbade, et al. (2012b) shows the establishment Abuja geographic 
Information Service (AGIS) to improve its land administration efficiency did not change 
much, considering over 92% of their respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the agency 
performance. Even the limited beneficiaries that secured Abuja land, researches have 
shown that it was skewed in favour of the few politicians, military, senior technocrats as 
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well as wealthy businessmen, to the total exclusion of the LIG (Ikejiofor, 1998a). The 
implications of this lopsided allocation of LIG housing in the city were such that the types 
of houses built by this class do not target the demand of the LIG. 
Meanwhile, contrary to Abuja legislation, there is fully commercialised parallel land 
market, similar to what obtained in most of the Nigerian cities being experienced by 
governments in most of Nigerian cities (Agbola, 1987; Egbu et al., 2008; Garba, 1997; 
Swindell & Mamman, 1990; Umeh, 2007). The loopholes in the land administration have 
made it possible for local councils and traditional chiefs to engage in selling and allocating 
land coupled with official connivance have all led to the perpetuation of these malpractices 
in the city. To substantiate this, the study of Ikejiofor  (1997) found that the small-scale 
developers 50% and 40% of them obtained their land supply from local traditional chiefs 
and private landholders respectively. Conversely, the FCT authority has lost control of its 
land administration machinery; nonetheless, the government was more responsive to 
development rights when it comes to government development. Apparently, the realities 
are contrary to the legal framework that was established to make land administration 
cheaper, accessible and easier for the majority. In brief, land availability and its 
administration in the city for housing has not made a significant impact on LIG 
accessibility.  
One of the main issues in Abuja LIHP to tackle is the emergence of numerous of squatter 
settlements, housing workers and the growing service population, within a short history of 
its existence. At the inception of Abuja, the city authorities were with believing that there 
would not be any slum and shanty developing. A former Minister once said “(e) very inch 
of the city has been determined ... There is absolutely no room for anyone to just start 
building sub-standard structures. It is impossible” (Immerwahr, 2007:182). However, the 
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subsequent Abuja development reality in the city has contradicted the above claim, as there 
has been an unprecedented land use violation in the city as the study of Omale (2009) has 
shown. In fact, over 65 of such informal settlements emerge within a short period of Abuja 
history (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 2006). Apart from the 
proliferation of squatter settlements, there is the concern that the majority of this cohort 
group would continue to live in rented accommodation in these informal settlements. On 
this note, many researchers advance the reasoning that the issue of squatter settlements 
represents a consequence of the city administration failures in housing delivery (Ikejiofor, 
1997, 1998a; Immerwahr, 2007).  
Conversely, the absence of employment opportunities, then poverty and low incomes hung 
at the extreme. Hence, no city administration could sanction the housing of their 
populations in these newly built slums. The most widely and commonly pursued policies 
in Abuja were eviction without alternative housing or compensation and upgrading of 
existing satellite settlements, as recognised squatter enclaves through the provision of 
utilities such as electricity, piped water, and drainage facilities. The government was yet to 
pursue the relocation in conventional low-income housing schemes and site-and-services 
projects as alternative policies in addressing the problem, despite the need for humanitarian 
considerations and political pressures to just do that. It was estimated that if the 
government was to be humanitarian, 420,000 plots of land were required to house the 
squatters in the city (UNDP, 2005).  
The city authority responded to these squatter settlements by adopting a bulldozer 
demolition strategy as a primary instrument to address the issue. This action was taken by 
the city authority to restore and maintain the sanctuary of AMP. Although, similar to most 
developing countries experience (Renaud, 1999), the uprooted informal settlements moved 
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further into the FCT and the vicious cycle continues. This action taken by the government 
in its own right, constitute a source of deepening the shortage of housing in the city. For 
instance, it was reported that by the year 2006, the demolition policy caused over 800,000 
people to be evicted from their homes (COHRE, 2006). Watson (2009a) cites this as a 
typical example on how planning resulted in sweeping away the poor in a typical global 
south city. Yet, there was no concrete provision made to provide replacement housing as 
shown from the experience of Idu-Karmo (Jibril, 2009). This approach experience made 
Jibril (2009:12) to conclude that  
„„the government was more interested in getting rid of the squatters in order to free 
what is perceived in government circles as prime urban land for elitist development 
programme. It does not seem to have much interest in helping the urban poor to 
obtain a secured title and have properties of their own. This is most 
reprehensible‟‟. 
The government should realise what is expected is to develop a framework oriented both to 
the present and the future needs of the squatters in the city, rather than the current elitist 
housing policies. 
Similarly, the inconsistencies and changes on the government resettlement policy of 
natives of Abuja in the 845 villages (Sonaike, 2001) affected by the location of FCT have 
added the impetus in the development of squatter settlements in the FCT (Jibril, 2006; 
2009). From the inception of FCT, it was planned either to relocate all these indigenous 
people settlements, outside the territory or within according to the people‘s choice, at the 
government expense (Okafor, 1988).  The intention was to accord equal access to Abuja 
land to all Nigerians without any particular group claiming to be an indigenous (Jibril, 
2006; Sonaike, 2001). However, between 1976 and 2003, there were four major policy 
changes in an attempt to implement the resettlement policy and unfortunately, at all times 
the issue remain far from being resolved. The financing became outrageous, as it was 
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estimated in 2005 the government required N66.0 billion to effectively resettle the original 
inhabitants (UNDP, 2005). Ultimately the government could not realise resettling the 
indigenes out of the FCT. Undoubtedly, the policy changes became one of the major 
sources of AMP distortions. Resettlement of these people continues to linger as a major 
issue in Abuja contemporary development and seems the administrations are at far from 
resolving the issue. 
Another most unfortunate occurrence from the SAP policy formulation to implementation 
to address the broad economic problems were executed without due consideration of their 
effects on housing (Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). The government withdrew from the direct 
production of housing, since this was not difficult for the government as housing delivery 
from the state was very low before the paradigm shift. Since then the housing problems for 
the LIG further deepen from the government source in the city. Also, since then the city 
administration has stopped direct housing provision and shifted to market-led delivery as a 
future source of housing supply (Mabogunje, 2001). The privatisation of housing delivery 
researchers speculates the paradigm shift to exacerbate the problem of housing inequality 
(Hayward, 1997; Sengupta, 2007). Similarly, along the same track of market-led, the 
government has unveiled a new strategy called ‗FCT Land-Swap Initiative‘, under which 
the administration deliver land to investors in exchange for infrastructure development, as 
another framework to deliver housing in the FCT.  
Concurrently, another policy pursued that worsens the housing status of the LIG in Abuja 
was the monetisation of the fringe benefits of all categories of the public servants, effective 
from October 2003 (Talba, 2004). The reform comprises of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria to “divest itself of ownership and possession of properties built, acquired or 
otherwise owned by the federal government and all its ministries, departments and 
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agencies” (Amidu, Aluko, & Oyedele, 2008:232). Consequently, all housing units 
developed by the government for the technocrats, high-medium and LIG were offered for 
sale by public auction to the highest bidder. Unlike in UK policy of ‗right to buy‘ where 
the council houses were sold at very large discounts (Blundell, 2008; Jones, 2010) similar 
to Vietnam (Tran & Yip, 2008) and in Kolkata (Sengupta, 2007) were sold as ‗at very 
attractive prices‘. However in Nigeria, the sale was based on the reserve price set against 
the open market value of the units. Also, the winners of the bid whether sitting tenant or 
highest bidder were made to effect full payments within 180 days (Amidu et al., 2008; 
Omenma, 2007). On this note, it is quite clear why the policy immensely benefited 
emerging housing merchants in the city and was alleged that the housing units were bought 
over by the prominent Nigerian elites and their corporate interest (Amidu et al., 2008).  
Thus, it was the LIG workers typically in Abuja who were left to fend on their own 
housing as tenants. The high property values in Abuja and underdeveloped nature of the 
mortgage sector in the country made it very difficult for the public servants to participate 
in the exercise at open market values and highest bidder basis. The irony of the 
implementation of the scheme, the housing unit sold, there were no contingency 
arrangement made to the public servants who lost out from the sale except their monetised 
benefits, which even the government reneged to pay in lump-sum (Omenma, 2007). The 
outcome shows many of them were forced to relocate on the informal sector housing in the 
periphery of Abuja (Omenma, 2007). Actually this scheme constitutes another form of 
formal forced eviction of the public servants, which the city is notoriously known (Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 2006). Part of the reform the government 
pledged to provide sites and services scheme in satellite towns not only in Abuja but 
nationwide to public servant to build their own houses (Omenma, 2007) and this cushion 
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measure was never implemented anywhere in the country. Unlike Hong Kong that uses the 
proceeds from the sale of subsidised houses to build public rental housing (Lui, 2011), in 
Nigeria, however, it was reported that over N32 billion being part of the proceeds from the 
sale of the houses was unaccounted (DailySunonline, 2010). 
The site and service scheme is given a high esteem in the housing literature. It is recognise 
to hold the potentials of having an inclusive outcome in LIG housing delivery (Onibokun, 
Agbola, & Labeodan, 1989; Rakodi & Withers, 1995). The scholars have made substantial 
evidence available that the poor are capable of providing shelter for themselves (Ikejiofor, 
1997, 2006). Accordingly, this strategy was strongly recommended by IPA (1979) in its 
AMP report. However, the study of Morah (1990, 1993) shows the city administrators 
resentment on the site and services, on the grounds that the poor lacks the resources to 
build their homes made such alternative was never exploited to address the housing 
shortage in the FCT. 
The AMP distortions have been exposed in recent times and which has negatively affected 
Abuja overall development (Ago, 2001; Mabogunje, 2001). The distortions were 
manifested in the form of illegal structures; buildings erected on sewage, services and 
water lines; abuse of land use plan in the city by converting green areas, schools and other 
lands for different uses to residential developments. The most irony of the discovered 
distortions had the official certifications and relevant approvals from the city agencies 
(Daramola & Aina, 2004). As usual, the officials confronted this issue with demolition, 
revocations and re-certification of right of occupancy. The consequence of re-certification 
further compounded the already worsen land and housing inadequacies in the city by 
eroding the value of the certificate as collateral instrument. Its repercussion was the 
creation of instability and undue fear both in the property market, investment and 
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development in the country.  Thus, the statutory certification became demeaned, as it was 
not accepted and recognised as genuine evidence of title to earn a respect as collateral 
security, to source mortgage financing from financing institutions. 
In summary, three decades after the formal relocation of federal capital, it is disheartening 
to record that little progress has been made with the implementation of the LIHP that 
ensure the LIG housing provision in the city. Most unfortunately, the concern expressed by 
the authority has been very little change either. The original concept for the Abuja 
development was to ensure class and income integration from the concept of mixed 
development neighbourhood housing development promoted in the Abuja Master Plan. It 
is obvious to any visitor in Abuja that this has not been the case. The core pattern of 
residential segregation in Abuja was structural, perpetuated by its governance institutions.  
When Abuja is expanding there is a clear need for a definite housing policy framework to 
articulate sensible and efficient housing delivery, not to have multiple spontaneous 
settlements emerging. There is need for housing policies to be instituted to ensure that 
housing development happens in the most appropriate path. Undoubtedly, the MHS has 
brought enormous housing developments in the city housing. The disturbing concern on 
the strategy has been implemented without an iota of LIG in mind, being the majority in 
the city. Sadly, the framework of implementation puts into question, as its appropriateness 
in tackling the housing wrought in the city and the most re-echoing question of this 
development has been-is Abuja for the rich and privileged elite alone? What has so far 
done in terms of housing policy in Abuja over the three decades can be described to be one 
without an articulated implementable housing policy caring for the LIG, and the city 
institutional governance jejune and shambolic policy implementation framework were 
responsible for its excrescence in outcomes. 
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6.6 Summary 
This Chapter has described the content of housing policies in Malaysia and Nigeria as well 
as at the local context of their capital cities of Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. Following these 
housing policies shows commonality in the objectives and frameworks of implementations. 
However, the divergence was found in the agent's commitments and outcomes at both the 
national and local contexts. The chapter has argued that these divergences reflect the 
combined influence of the institutional structures and policy environments, as determined 
by the state. Conclusively, Malaysia unlike Nigeria has adequately progressed in housing 
delivery and affordability among its LIG in terms of coverage, maturity and diversity of 
sources. The next Chapters‘ further addresses the research questions by articulating the 
observations made in this Chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
7.0 Agency behaviours to the low-income housing policy 
strategy implementation in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
 
―Governments sometimes succeed, a fact that should not be lost to view in the current 
glare of the market‘s bright lights‖ 
(Grand, 1991:442) 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding Chapters five and six examine the trajectories of Malaysia and Nigeria 
institutional structure and low-income housing policies. The relevant question that 
deserves analysis is the extent agencies involved constrained and respond to the existing 
structure in meeting the objectives of the strategies designed under their countries low-
income housing policy (LIHP) context. This Chapter, therefore, focuses on the LIHP 
implementation under PPP strategy, for the attainment of LIG housing in Kuala Lumpur 
and Abuja.  It is the basic premises of the Chapter that the way in which the agents respond 
to the implementation schema reflects the highlighted structures in the preceding Chapters.  
The Chapter adopts the agency model to analyse the state and market actors in the 
implementation of the strategy. It is believed that the investigation involving the 
management and operation of the partnership should provide a detailed source of 
implementation context successes or failures (Nwoye, 2002). From this informed the 
researcher the local context on how the agents approached the strategy implementation 
processes in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja.  Thus, in this Chapter contains the findings in 
respect of the study third research question (Chapter 1). In this regard, Tomlinson (2011) 
identified four key areas of housing delivery: planning, procurement, project management 
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and allocation. However, this study transformed these groups into three groups, namely 
pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation stages, consistent with 
Doling (1999b) ‗housing construction chain‘ model. The Chapter first begins with the 
examination of these stages of implementation in Kuala Lumpur. Thereafter the Abuja 
context is considered following the same pattern.  
7.2 Kuala Lumpur 
Under this subsection, present the findings in relation to the public and private sector 
participation in the City Hall of Kuala Lumpur (CHKL) Joint Venture (JV) partnership 
comprises the role performed by each of the agencies, namely public and private sectors in 
the course of the implementation, firstly giving the overview of the strategy background. 
7.2.1 Background 
In Malaysia, the policy of market-led under its dirigisme economy commenced when the 
government launched Malaysia Corporatisation Policy and thereafter Privatisation Policy 
in 1983 (Tan, 2012). The emergence of these policies sets the precedence of partnership 
between public and private sector as co-partners in driving the economy and nation 
development forward (Painter & Wong, 2005).  At the early post colonial period, the 
government-led approach dominates in the development and management of the Malaysian 
economy, most especially due to NEP that began from 1971 (Gomez, 2009). Hence, the 
government directly controlling the economy became a deliberate strategy to boost Malay 
participation in the economy and by extension the adoption of market-led strategy. 
As earlier mentioned, the introduced privatisation in essence, as similar to NEP framework 
that became the action plan, the private sector assumes responsibility in partnership with 
the government in the delivery of goods and services (Mengistu & Adhikary, 2011). As a 
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result, the advent of these policies has implication on housing and particularly the low-
income group (LIG) housing in the country. Over the years, the implementation of the 
policy has shown that the incorporation of the private sector has emerged as a major factor 
in the LIG housing delivery (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011). The policy of market-led 
participation in Malaysia is recognised to have “... received a good response from private 
developers, accepting that the profit made by them in a politically stable country should be 
equally enjoyed by all levels of income regardless of race” (Abd Aziz, 2007:185). Thus, 
the private sector participation became a significant contributor, as their corporate social 
responsibility to the nation, despite losses incurred in the supply of such housing, but 
balanced up through cross-subsidisation allowances (Salleh & Meng, 1997). 
In Kuala Lumpur, the participation between public and private sector in housing, 
specifically LIG housing, first began with a pilot scheme in Cheras in the late 1970s 
(Drakakis-Smith, 1977). Such programmes became formalised with the introduction of 
national policy on privatisation in 1983 as earlier mentioned. Subsequently, in Kuala 
Lumpur, as similar to the concept of ‗fiscal socialism‘ in Vietnam (Kim, 2008) the state 
controls all the land development through ownership, urban planning, permits and 
approvals. It also decides which current land occupants may eventually relocate in the city 
to give way for the squatter settlements redevelopment. Hence, this approach concurs with 
the UNCHS (1996:29) that “(g)overnments have a duty to manage markets for the benefit 
of all their citizens...and intervene where required, to protect the interests of the poor and 
vulnerable...”. 
Unlike Abuja MHS, the JV in Kuala Lumpur is executed under local government structure, 
namely the CHKL. It has been noted that Malaysia has instituted decentralisation in 
planning to LG (UN-Habitat, 2009) similar to countries like the UK (Barker, 2008). This 
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means it‘s the local government that operalitionalise the policies that are mainly 
formulated at the state and federal levels. The decentralisation increasingly empowered, for 
example, CHKL to act independently on matters of local development, including LIG 
housing delivery. In brief, the CHKL engages with the private sector developers under its 
design institutional and regulatory framework in collaboration with the ones at the federal 
and state levels guided by the JV agreement that delivers the housing to the society under 
the sphere of influence exercised by the developers association (Figure 7.1). It can be seen 
that the partnership draws the interactions of the state, market and society and significantly 
influenced by the developers association and of course the housing estates became as the 
end product of the partnership and afterwards transfers to the eligible citizens under the 
supervision of the state. 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
      
 
 
Figure 7.1: shows the structure of CHKL JV framework of implementation 
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7.2.2 City Hall of Kuala Lumpur joint venture partnership implementation 
7.2.2.1 Pre-implementation stage: conditions and incentives of City Hall of 
Kuala Lumpur joint venture partnership 
Essentially, the fieldwork study has established the key departments and sections in CHKL 
responsible in the implementation of the JV. These departments which were established to 
be responsible, namely, Department of Housing Management & Community Development 
(DHMCD), Department of Economic Planning & Development Coordination (DEPDC), 
Department of Physical Planning (DPP), Department of Urban Planning (DUP) and 
Department of Project Implementation & Public Housing Maintenance (DPIPHM). From 
the Figure 7.2 the DEPDC as the coordinating department of the CHKL JV structure is 
elaborated showing the key sections involved in the partnership management. The 
Economic Planning Unit with collaboration with the Joint Venture/Privatisation Unit are 
the coordinating units in the CHKL, charged with the responsibility of implementation of 
the JV projects effectively and safeguarding the interest of the government.  
The Planning Department is the unit charge with the responsibility of processing of the 
development planning approvals. The Housing Management Department functions as the 
clearing unit of the houses allocated with the private developers and involve the 
resettlement of the squatters where their land was to be developed under the partnership 
scheme. The Joint Venture unit established serve as a central unit, serving as a 
coordinating unit in the CHKL. It provides general and project specific advice to the 
CHKL on the housing PPP project. The functions include the development of the legal and 
institutional framework and standards, coordinating between all actors in the joint project. 
Through the Joint Venture unit, the CHKL had built a mechanism of communication and 
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consultation with private developers, with a view to build mutual understanding and 
monitoring the progress of the partnership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Organizational chart of Department of Economic Planning & 
Development Coordination in CHKL 
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venture were either from the government, squatter enclaves for redevelopment or private 
developer land (Moh‘d Yusuf interview, 2009). Exceptionally, there are cases when private 
developers participating with their land. This was due to the incentives offered to the 
participating developers, to realize a reduction in development cost. In respect of those 
projects proposed by the CHKL, normally receives a number of proposals from a number 
of developers and each proposal contains in its own right expression of interest in the 
bidding. The CHKL requires the bidding proposal to contain the background of the 
developer, in respect of financial and experience details. Moh‘d Yusuf (interview, 2009) 
further reiterated that the developer compliance to the standing requirements and laid down 
procedures were what informed of the developer choice by the CHKL. The basis of CHKL 
selection was accordingly based on the developer track records of financial management, 
as well as technical competence was set as the priority. Furthermore, Moh‘d Yusuf 
(interview, 2009) declared that the private developer details the proposed design of the 
project reinforces his likely selection to be given the mandate to undertake the project.  
On the other hand, Moh‘d Yusuf (interview, 2009) elaboration on the second mode of 
selection shows that the CHKL normally enters into a direct negotiation agreement with 
the developer based on the terms of the JV partnership to execute the housing development 
after obtaining all the prerequisite consent and approvals from the relevant stakeholder 
agencies. Notwithstanding, the claim made by Abdul-Aziz (2012:46) is observed that in 
Malaysia public agencies “... were selective as to whom they partnered with”, the practice 
of non-competitive selection was very common. Since, experiences of partnership in the 
country shows that the ‗winners‘ always ―... had prior government links, ... in terms of 
personal connections between corporate figures and the UMNO ...” (Bunnell, 2002:284). 
The basis of this form of  selection falls within the government framework of affirmative 
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policies to support local developers and Malay entrepreneurs (Abdul-Aziz, 2012; Gomez, 
2009). However, it is argued that it was this method of selection that deepens cronyism in 
the public sector management in the country (Gomez, 2009; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). 
Hence, opens the government to public criticisms of bias towards selection of non-
competent developers (Singaravelloo, 2010). Notwithstanding, according to the 
interviewees (Moh‘d Yusuf & Puan Iznah, interviews, 2009) in respect of the JV 
partnership, the CHKL yardsticks of a partner selection consideration were pinned down 
on the developer‘s proposals, capabilities (financial strength) and cognate experiences 
(reputation).  
According to the Moh‘d Yusuf & Puan Iznah (interviews, 2009), CHKL selection process 
is followed by hierarchical levels starting from the level of local authority consent and final 
approval sought at the Federal level. It was through these processes of approval that 
evaluates the developer capabilities. The agents of conducting the evaluation comprises of 
the technical and management staff of the CHKL, while at national level comprises of 
management staff and politicians. Specifically, according to Moh‘d Yusuf (interview, 
2009) highlighted that the proposal of partnership with a private developer, the CHKL 
seeks the approval of Economic Planning Unit (EPU), which serves as the agency 
responsible for economic policy implementation in Malaysia. Additionally, the CHKL on 
its part, the same scrutiny of appraisal were undertaken to establish the competence of the 
private developer, particularly in respect of management, technical and financial strengths. 
A further search proves shows that the pattern of the engagement is consistent with Town 
and Country Planning Act 1976 and the detail procedure is given in Buang (2007). 
According to Moh‘d Yusuf (interview, 2009) once the private developer is selected to 
participate in the JV projects, the private developer was expected to submit the proposed 
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design of the project. On the submission of the designs, the CHKL Privatisation and JV 
department in consultation with relevant stakeholder departments duly vet and approves 
the proposed design and thereafter the CHKL council management approval is sought as 
well as EPU of the Prime Minister‘s Department.  All the selection process done by the 
CHKL was evaluated by the agency of Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister 
office for the necessary vetting and the eventual cabinet approval. It is only when the 
cabinet consent is sought and obtained; the CHKL could enter into an agreement with the 
developer to carry out the development. Also, the CHKL sought for approvals from the 
Development Division of Federal Territory under the Prime Minister Department.   
When all these approvals obtained, the JV unit grants the private developer facilitation of 
all requisite approvals of the development plans for the project from the CHKL 
departments. According to the interviewees (Moh‘d Yusuf & Puan Iznah, interviews, 
2009) that it was the conclusion of these processes the private developer will be made to 
sign the Privatisation Agreement (PA) with the CHKL. The ultimate developer given the 
authority to develop the squatter site, for instance, was charged with the responsibility of 
resettling the squatters on CHKL flats at his expense and thereafter the completion of the 
development the squatters are given the priority to purchase of one unit of low cost house 
(Moh‘d Yusuf interviews, 2009). 
The contract document covers the legal framework for the partnerships, project 
assessments and partnership management. In fact, the researcher established there was a 
standardised PPP contract document prepared by the CHKL. The signatory of the 
partnership project agreement in the CHKL is the Mayor with the private developer 
partner. The PA is paramount in housing JV in Kuala Lumpur, as it serves as a working 
tool to guarantee parties to the partnership complies with the terms of the agreement. This 
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is because the PA contains the rights and responsibilities of both parties. Therefore, after 
the selection of the participating partner, the CHKL conditions partnering developer to 
duly sign the PA (Moh‘d Yusuf, interview 2009). The Appendix (I) contains the 
conditions of partnering with the private developers as expressed in a JV PA document. 
The main feature in the PA the developer was expected to complete the development 
within a stipulated period of 36 months. The profit was to be shared according to the 
agreed percentage based on the MDV determine based on the profit realize from the 
development (Moh‘d Yusuf & Puan Iznah, interviews, 2009). 
Unlike Abuja that has an explicit policy on the maximum land size of allocation to the 
private developers, the CHKL had no such policy at the time of the fieldwork of this study. 
The private developer takes possession of the land once the CHKL issuance of notice of 
possession of the site. This right is granted to the developer on the conditions that the 
project has received the development order and prerequisite building plan approvals from 
the relevant authorities. In CHKL JV, there is an exclusion clause in the PA prohibiting the 
developers from mortgaging the lands granted for the project. In one of the agreement read, 
it is expressly stated that “the developer shall not assign, transfer, charge or part with 
ownership of the ... land to any person or body”. Conversely, some public agencies in 
Malaysia allowed the mortgage only when the developer could pay 30% of the land value 
in the event of default (Abdul-Aziz, 2012). However, this was not the case in CHKL JV 
partnership. 
Additionally, the developer is required to document proof of financing programme, 
including equity capital contribution and secured financing from a reputable bank or 
financial institution in the country. The partnership became only effective and valid only 
for the fulfilment of this requirement. Submission of irrevocable performance bond from a 
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licensed Bank in Malaysia to the CHKL accompanied by 5% of the construction cost. This 
requirement is provided to serve as the project lien, in case the developer breaches any 
term of the partnership. The bond remains valid until six months after the expiration of the 
defect liability period. 
The private developers interviewed (Zulkifili Ibrahim,  interview 2010 and Anonymous, 
interview 2012)  expressed that under the JV agreements, were responsible in seeking and 
obtaining all necessary approvals from the relevant authorities in respect of the design 
specifications, construction, completion and commissioning of the project. These covers 
approvals in relation to layout plans, building plans including plans for roads, drainage, 
sewerage, sanitation, mechanical, electrical and telecommunications installations, 
electricity and water supply. Similarly, the Zulkifili Ibrahim, interview 2010 and 
Anonymous, interview 2012 claimed were not given special concessions from these 
statutory authorities. However, in the course of securing the approvals, the CHKL 
endeavours in most cases rendering assistance to the developers in facilitating the approval 
process to the relevant authorities, in as much as the developer has satisfied with all the 
authorities' requirements (Moh‘d Yusuf, interview 2009). 
 The CHKL does not offer any financial support to the developers. Consequently, all cost 
associated with the development construction and ultimate completion were borne by the 
developers. In addition, the developer was responsible for other cost incidental to the 
development like development charges, planning fees, all charges relating to conversion, 
subdivision, issuance of strata titles, certifications fees, among others. The private 
developers from the sale of the houses realise the development capital. In the Malaysia 
equity capital and borrowing constitute 30% of the development costs (Abdul-Aziz, 2012). 
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Unlike the UK ‗―Section 106‖ agreements‘, which is negotiable between Housing 
Associations and Local authorities on how much they can contribute to infrastructure and 
affordable housing before obtaining planning permission approvals (Schwartz, 2011), in 
Malaysia it is mandatory.  Innovative participatory management techniques have also been 
used to engage private developers in LIHP. The planning requirement of having a 
minimum of 30% of the mixed development obliges developers to produce LIG housing 
within each development and the study private developers accepted to have complied with 
the regulations in their respective projects. Additionally, the policy has generated added 
advantage of inclusive LIG housing neighbourhoods by integrating different levels of 
housing within one housing development. The private developers are also required by law 
where a housing development covering a land area of 50 hectares or more to submit an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports (Buang, 2007). Equally important, under 
the Land Acquisition Rules 1998, amended in 2000, also where the project involves a land 
to be compulsorily acquired for the development, the JV partner is required to make a 
payment of an amount equivalent to 125% of the market value of the land. A part payment 
of 50% is made on the application and the remaining payment of 75% when approval is 
granted (Buang, 2007). 
At this stage, this activity is in compliance with the Housing Development (Housing 
Development Account) Regulations 1991; under the Housing Development (Control & 
Licensing) Act that the JV partnership operated under a Housing Development Account 
(HDA) with a reputable bank. The HDA serve as the custodian of progressive payments 
received from the purchasers of the units of the development; loans obtained for the 
development; interest received and payments in respect of the development. The HDA is 
managed by a Manager, who serves as the trustee of the account and exercise fiduciary to 
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the parties of JV partnership. The manager handles all the transactions in relation to the 
development subject to the approvals of the partners. In the case where the partnership 
collapsed, the CHKL took the responsibility of managing the HDA and in part pursue to 
complete the development. The HDA manager function among others prepares a monthly 
report on the status of the Account, submitted to the committee. At the completion of the 
development the Account is subjected to Auditing on the approval of the CHKL (Moh‘d 
Yusuf & Puan Iznah, interviews, 2009).  
The peculiar feature of PPP generally is risk allocation (OECD, 2008). Under the housing 
PPP it is recognised that private partners are made to assume all risks associated with the 
housing development process. The covered risks comprise those of finance, time, 
workmanship quality, cost and sales. On the part of the government, are held responsible to 
the house-buyers, society and political leaders for the project progress and delivery. The 
most common that arises from housing development, inclusive of PPP in Malaysia was 
project abandonment (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Khalid, 2010) as well as poor 
workmanship (Chohan et al., 2011). This is how the public sector shoulders the 
responsibilities of private sector adverse actions (Abdul-Aziz, 2012). 
In summary, in Kuala Lumpur, the JV partnership is controlled by the public sector 
institutional, legal and regulatory policy frameworks to direct the participation of the 
private sector. The regulation is aimed to achieve effective and efficient partnership 
outcomes.  
7.2.2.2 Implementation stage: organisation, management and coordination 
The partnership thrives under a mechanism of monitoring. Since, the completion of the 
projects was stipulated in the PA to be undertaken within 36 months/3 years. Hence, the 
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instituted coordinating committees should be the strength of the partnership. This was what 
ensures the inter-flow of information in the course of implementation of the projects 
between the CHKL and private developers. This is how all the stakeholder departments in 
CHKL participated in different roles and functions in sustaining the partnership progress. 
From the data gathered, the departments and committees sustained close coordination with 
the private sector. Hence, it has been found in the Njoh (1996) study that inter-
organisational relations positively produced organisational effectiveness in housing policy 
implementation.   The implications of these working committees in the partnership built a 
mechanism that constantly monitored the progress of the projects and remedy the problems 
as they appear and ultimately deliver a positive outcome. In CHKL the institutional 
framework provided the developers to be monitored through the channels of filing monthly 
development progress reports; joint project management committee and joint management 
of the housing development account.  
On the account of these monitoring mechanisms provided, all the interviewees in CHKL 
agreed that the officers in charge were in close contact with the developers. On this 
account the project received closer coordination. In particular, Puan Iznah (interview, 
2009) shared that as a desk officer of one the project, she reports to the management on the 
project progress on a regular basis until its completion. Moh‘d Yusuf & Puan Iznah 
(interviews, 2009) indicated that the developers were to present the monthly progress 
reports showing, for example, the development level of completion progress, disposal of 
the housing unit‘s progress and collection and transactions in the account.  
It is gathered that each CHKL JV project has a Joint Project Management Committee 
(JPMC) and comprises of seven members. Sitting on the committee include the Mayor as 
chairman of the committee, or his representative; three members representing the CHKL, 
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appointed by the Mayor and the balance of three members representing the developer. 
When issues of financing are involved, the committee sits with the HDA manager. The 
overall function of this committee provides the monitoring and coordinating of the 
partnership. In essence, create financial accountability and discipline; guarantee that the JV 
project conforms to the designated use, guidelines and regulations. This was conducted 
quarterly and at the same time reporting of the JV partnership progress to the Mayor. The 
committee meeting allows for approval and monitoring of the partnership parties; approval 
of the development budget, management of HDA account. Among these approvals, include 
the appointment of contractors and sub-contractors by the developer, which are subject to 
the CHKL approval. The essence of this is to ensure that only capable ones are appointed.  
Though, this might not hold when it was inserted in the PA that the sub-contractors must 
be from Bumiputra firms. Meanwhile, the interviewees in CHKL stated there was a 
provision of fortnightly meetings between the CHKL project staff and the developer and 
such meetings continued until the project is completed and certified with the issuance of a 
Certificate of Fitness of Occupancy. 
In Kuala Lumpur, in addition to all these coordination‘s and monitoring from the CHKL, 
the Prime Minister had a keen interest in the progress of housing developments in the city 
in particular, the former Prime Minister, Tun Mahathir Mohamad reported that   
“I used to call City Hall every week to find out how certain projects were 
progressing. Later I asked them to report to me directly, complete with pictures and 
progress reports. This practice of close monitoring helped to get everyone to work  
...” (Mohamad, 2011:363). 
In summary, the above shows extensive mechanisms of consultations on JV partnership 
issues drawing both actors in public and private sectors. The guide has been the 
development agreement that provides the rules and principles of the partnership, in a way 
259 
 
the partnership can be coordinated through regular meetings and thus produces a 
purposeful partnership. It is the conclusion of Abdul-Aziz (2012:49) that close monitoring 
“... helped to ensure that the private partners conformed to expectations in terms of output 
and conduct”. Thus, there was mutual role played by the stakeholders in the various stages 
of the implementation phases. Similarly, more importantly, there was co-ordination and 
monitoring in the relationship of the stakeholders in the course of implementation.  
Field work data further show that the JV private developers participation, the government 
offered incentives to the private sector, with a view-to reducing the development cost and 
collectively sustaining their participation in the provision of low-cost housing to the LIG in 
the study area. The range of incentives provided includes easier access to CHKL land or 
squatter land; the reduction of the parking space requirement of 1:1 to 1:4 and exemptions 
from the payment of development charges and improvement service funds. Also the 
private developers are offered with ‗one-stop approval‘ section in the CHKL, that provide 
timely approvals for the development of low-cost houses, view of streamlining the delays 
and cost associated with the development and building plans applications. 
To sustain the participation of the private sector, the low-cost housings ceiling price has 
enjoyed a series of revision, reflecting the inflationary trends and the value of land in the 
country (Salleh & Chai, 1997; Salleh & Meng, 1997; Sirat et al., 1999). The goals to 
achieve from the revision were to have an increase in the supply and quality of housing and 
ultimately meet the national target of the LIP housing (Chapter Six). The primary data 
indicates that the four-tier pricing is the guide on pricing of the low-cost housing 
development among the private developers in the study area. The private developers sell 
the housing units according to the pegged house price without a direct subsidy from the 
government. 
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In the course of the JV implementation, Zulkifili Ibrahim (interview 2010) and 
Anonymous (interview 2012) accepted that were responsible for generating the financial 
resources to carry out the project. Similar to the practice in Vietnam (Kim, 2008), in 
addition to the firm‘s equity capital, the additional sources of firm's resources were 
mentioned to be in two parts. One, loans from obtained from the financial institutions as 
bridging finance to boost equity capital. The second comes from the end-financing 
generated from the same financial institutions in financing the consumers in the housing 
unit purchase.  They are responsible for the project, though sharing a bulk of the project 
risk. However, though the researcher could not ascertain in the course of the fieldwork, 
however, the private developers' projects were identified to be  characterised with the 
shabby construction of houses which were built with inferior building materials (Chohan et 
al., 2011; Gnanarajah, 1997). 
7.2.2.3 Post-implementation: allocation and management 
Unlike Abuja MHS, in Kuala Lumpur JV private developers are required to contribute 
30% of development profit made by the firm for the project (Table 7.1). The DBKL arrives 
at its share of the profit through monitoring and auditing the project account transaction 
and auditing at the completion of the project. In another alternative, CHKL JV private 
developers were required to contribute 20% of the proceeds of the sale of the development 
or completed housing units to the CHKL which would then be resold to LIG.  
Table 7.1: The City Hall of Kuala Lumpur entitlements from a JV project 
Item No. CHKL entitlements 
1 10% of the total land value upon signing of a partnership agreement, the rest in 
pre-set stages 
2 30% of gross development value (GDV) 
3 Low-cost units at 5% discount from the non-Bumiputra market selling price 
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The LIG housings constructed are high-rise condominium, structured by the strata titles 
(Figure 7.3). Strata title means the ownership of a unit in a subdivided building high-rise 
building. The ownership of the unit is evidenced by a separate title called the strata title 
under STA, which issued in respect of the unit. The housing development project executed 
by the private developer is usually conferred with the master title for the development of 
the project. The CHKL withdraws the master title, for subdivision into separate individual 
titles to the legitimate buyers on completion of the development. Under the Strata Title Act 
(1985) as amended 2007, require when building of more than two storeys to be divided 
into strata titles at the completion of the development and such law allows the development 
of condominium apartment or flat houses with building for common amenities. 
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Figure 7.3:High-rise developments from the study sampled low-income housing 
estates in Kuala Lumpur 
The housing units built in the form of high rises offset the scarcity of lands, high land 
value and development cost (Salleh & Chai, 1997). The high-rise is not matter of choice 
for Kuala Lumpur; it is necessitated to the city by its land scarcity and corresponding high 
value. The low-cost housing units are comprised of high-rise buildings mostly 25 to 35 
storeys high, a typical of Asian urban development‘s (Chiu, 2000; Yuen, Yeh, et al., 2006), 
wherein these cities there were about 85% of the housing stock are high-rise. In Kuala 
Lumpur, this is also made it possible for the low-income housing to be provided at the city 
centres not further out from the city centre.  
Like condominium housing elsewhere, it consists of individually-owned units with 
collectively-owned common areas and infrastructure. The legislation requires the 
developer to continue managing the project, based on the service charge contribution from 
the housing unit‘s occupants and later such transferred on occupants managed by their 
appointed management committee, known as a Joint Management Committee (JMC). This 
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form gives the individual unit holder's title over the space they occupy while the land and 
common property are controlled by the JMC. The JMC is responsible for maintenance and 
the management of the common properties other than the units of which the individual 
titles have been issued and registered. The JMC also takes responsibility in addition to 
maintenance of the common area, include insurance and/or informal mediator between 
residents. Conversely, to Abuja MHS, the JV housing estates are also gated estates in 
Kuala Lumpur (Figure 7.4). 
 
Figure 7.4: Gated housing development from the study sampled low-income housing 
estates in Kuala Lumpur 
In Kuala Lumpur, the private developer before granting the beneficiaries the title of the 
housing unit is legally mandated to maintain the common areas of the high-rise. Prior to 
this the buyers of the housing units were made to sign the ‗Management Agreement‘ or 
‗Deed of Mutual Covenant‘ with the developer of the project at the time of the purchaser 
signing the sale and purchase agreement (SPA). Under the agreement, the purchaser 
undertakes to pay the developer to be determining the service charge to be determined by 
the developer all through the management period to be covered for the upkeep of the 
common areas in the housing estate. 
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In addition to the policy of the sales of the housing units, the interview with the CHKL 
housing management officials specified as part of the government affirmative policy 
required the private developers to reserve and sale 30% of the housing units to the 
Bumiputeras. Also the same class of the citizens is to be given a 5% discount. The 
interviewee (Yusuf interview, 2009) informed the researcher that where the units reserved 
for the Bumiputeras were not taken by them, the CHKL purchase the excess and sale back 
to the Bumiputeras at later dates. This was part of government policy to the attainment of 
national unity through housing. Perhaps, this is the reason why the study respondents 
claimed to have purchased the housing units from government rather than the private 
developers as shown in Chapter 8. 
The provision in Section 8 of the STA 1986 requires the developer to the forward Strata 
Titles application for a project development within 6 months of receiving the Certificate of 
Compliance and Completion (CCC) (previously Certificate of Fitness for Occupation). 
Basically, subdivision under the STA 1985 means the registration and issuing of a separate 
strata title for every unit in a building of two storeys or more. According to Housing 
Buyers Association complaints used to be on non-issuance of strata titles but replaced by 
shoddy workmanship from the house buyers. 
The LIG qualify for the low-income housing by meeting a range of criteria. From the data 
generated from the DBKL show that the eligibility to receive an allocation of low cost 
housing the applicant must be a citizen, an income of RM750-RM2500, has a family and 
those whose land was acquired for the development, among other requirements. Hence, 
although important, the allocation is more based on ethnic origin, there was less emphasis 
on the credit worthiness (Bertaund &Malpezzi, 2001). But there are times the allocation 
revised when the beneficiaries failed to fulfil the credit criteria. Nevertheless, to ensure 
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inclusive participation of the LIG, innovative policies were implemented. Such include the 
provision of ETF withdrawal, favourable response from banks and other financial 
institutions, and BNM policies on housing finance had greatly sustained the participation 
of LIG. The implementation provides that after the allocation and reserve made, if the 
quota were not taken by Bumiputera that the units could then be allocated to other 
interested buyers. The respondent in DHMCD explained that this policy aimed at ensuring 
that the government objective of creating greater interaction among various ethnic groups 
in the society is realised through the creation of multi ethnic communities. 
The allocation of the houses to the beneficiaries was carried out by the state in conjunction 
with the developers. Notwithstanding, the beneficiary selection is entirely determined by 
the CHKL DHMCD. The interview data shows that the allocation processes were 
monitored by the DHMCD. The actual sales were actually carried out by the developers, 
who then submit the list of the buyers to the DHMCD for verification and approval, before 
the sales became effective.  
7.2.2.4 Problems of implementation 
The developers show that their common problems include delays in obtaining approval, no 
waivers, escalating material costs (e.g. steel and fuel), labour shortage and dependence on 
foreign labour etc. The developers while complying with the LIG housing requirement 
have mounted pressure on government to reverse on this policy-in a recent plea to the 
government, the Developers Council asked that the ceiling price of the LIG housing be 
revised and a two-year nationwide exemption to the LIHP be given in the face of the wrath 
of the unprecedented global financial crisis and the survival of the industry. There were 
complaints of mismatch in the allocation. There were many units not occupied by the 
original applicants, but many deserving applicants had to wait for years to get their units. 
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The low take up rate for the new units show that the database is out-dated as many people 
who register long ago no longer need them.   
7.3 Abuja 
Under this subsection, presents the semi-structured interview findings in relation to the 
public and private sector participation in the Abuja mass housing scheme (MHS) 
partnership. This covers the role performed by each of the agencies, namely public and 
private sectors in the course of the implementation, firstly presenting the overview of the 
strategy background. 
7.3.1 Background 
The government privatisation, in the form of monetisation/sale of houses to the sitting-in 
tenants; demographic pressures; overstretching of social amenities, together with 
government moves to restore the prestige‘s of the AMP by demolition of shanties and 
illegal buildings all around the city, created rapidly expanding demand for housing in 
Abuja. The demand was further deepened with the earlier final relocation of all federal 
government establishments in 1991, resulted in an expansion of the city housing demand, 
which doubled simultaneously. Unlike Malaysia, a conspicuous absence of social rental 
housing provision in Abuja, similar to all other cities in the country. Similarly, the state 
policy on allocation and accessibility to land in the city was problematic to both 
individuals and developers. The allocations were one polarised in favour of the privileged 
few and because of limited outreach, further deepens housing demand, considering the 
UN-Habitat (2008) that Abuja was the fastest growing city in Africa. This has generated 
important implications for the housing delivery as much as stunting the development of the 
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housing sector and counterbalancing the supply against the unmet housing demand in the 
city. 
The second housing policy, in 2006, was a second-leg policy change in the institutional 
setting that boosted the development of market-led LIHP in the country. The first 
promulgated policy has been in 1991. As the 2006 housing policy boost up the entry of 
private developers, by recognising setting of REDAN, MBAN and BUMPAN (2006). 
Indeed, the 2006 policy reinforced the 1991 policy declaration by creating positive effects 
in terms of entry of market-led focus of housing delivery. Consequently, between these 
two policy periods, the nation witnessed unprecedented emergence of the formal private 
developers under the banner of REDAN as well as international firms. Hundreds of private 
developers emerged within a short period of the commencement of MHS in Abuja and 
nationally with the change of focus of the national housing policy to private sector driven 
delivery. Similarly, the PPP programmes launched in the country, the likes of Abuja MHS, 
constitute a major change in the housing market in the country, by emerging as a potential 
popular source of land and housing (Adegun & Taiwo, 2011; Ibem, 2011a). 
Against this background, by 2000 the idea of PPP housing strategy came up to address the 
housing challenge in the city. The advent of such development in Abuja was facilitated by 
the city governance inadequate budget to provide prerequisite infrastructures and political 
expediency to come to terms with popular protest against government actions of 
demolitions. Based on the Mabugunje (2001) publication, the idea of engaging the practice 
of PPP in housing development became a policy in MFCT.  
The designed framework of implementation is shown in Figure 7.5 when the MHS 
commenced in the 2000 as a partnership between MFCT/FCDA and the private sector 
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aimed at the delivery of satisfactory residential environment at an affordable cost to the 
residents of FCT (FCTA, 2008). The framework of implementation planned guided by the 
PA, the FCTA was to provide the land and primary infrastructures, while the private 
developers under the umbrella of REDAN are to develop the housing units with their 
provided funding and project management. However, depending on availability of the 
fund, would be supported by FMBN with a cheap bridging finance. Also, they are to be 
responsible in the provision of all the basic estate amenities, tertiary infrastructures and 
those primary infrastructures not provided by the government. As a condition of the 
partnership, the developers were expected to affiliate to at least one PMI, to serve as a 
source of marketing and disposal of the developed housing units. Unlike, the practice in 
southern Nigeria states (Ibem, 2010) and Kuala Lumpur, in Abuja MHS there was no 
provision in the DLAs on sharing of the accrued profits made by the private developer. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: The figure showing the structure of the Abuja MHS framework of 
implementation 
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The Abuja MHS shows three distinct periods observed in the course of implementation, 
representing changes in government associated with the MFCT minister in-charge, namely, 
 Mass housing land allocations between 2000 and 2003: During this period land 
allocations were made to both the private and public organisations for MHS 
development, with sizes from 5 hectares to a maximum of 250 hectares. The land 
allocations were first made in Mbora, Gaduwa and Dutse districts. It's on record 
that “44 allocations of land were made with neither periodic distribution nor list 
were made” (FCTA, 2008:6). 
 Mass housing land allocations between 2005 and 2007: Unlike the former, it is 
called as such; when allocation first made to the private developers, were expected 
to complete the project within 18 months. Similarly, to the above 195 allocations 
were made also “with no periodic distribution or list” (FCTA, 2008:7). Most of 
these allocations were made in Saraji, Kafe, Dakwo, Wumba, Lokogoma and 
Galadimawa districts devoted wholly in Phase III of the city to the scheme. 
 The era of Department of Mass Housing (DMH): The DMH is created in response 
to the manner MHS was handled under the ad hoc committee of the previous 
periods. The DMH was created to streamline and ensure an accountable 
implementation. Hence, the DMH at the time of the fieldwork was assembling a 
database of the whole past allocations, receiving new proposals on allocations and 
has produced a standing guidelines on MHS implementation and in fact gazetted as 
a law on how to regulate the conduct of MHS in Abuja. 
Consequently, the government all along these phases had devoted the entire Phase III and 
IV of the city for MHS, representing, perhaps, the largest PPP housing scheme in the 
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world. The study of implementation outcomes in Abuja MHS is provided in the subsequent 
subsections of the Chapter. To this end, the findings have revealed an interesting array of 
disappointments, most of which were envisaged in the conceptual framework of this study.  
7.3.2 Abuja mass housing scheme partnership implementation 
7.3.2.1 Pre-implementation stage: conditions and incentives of mass housing 
scheme partnership 
The lofty of the objectives of the MHS was meant to provision of adequate and affordable 
to meet the ever growing demand for shelter in the FCT (FGN, 2009). While, the PPP 
objective, as the MHS strategy  was adopted“... to assess and leverage private sector 
technical and financial resources for government‟s developmental projects” (UNDP, 
2005:166). The PPP established framework the public sector provides the land as well as 
the prerequisite primary and arterial infrastructures. Also, similar to Tunisia practice (UN-
Habitat, 2011) a government agency, namely FMBN was to support the private developers 
with the estate development financing and general public to  finance development and 
acquisition respectively.  Using the commercial banks, the private developers were granted 
funding of more than N10billion, from ‗estate development loan‘ from FMBN. The 
financing was made on the conditions that the private developers will develop houses of 
the range of value of N4.5–N5 million and not to use the fund for infrastructure 
development. This housing unit‘s price was intended to comply with the maximum amount 
the contributor can access from the National Housing Fund (NHF). The private developers 
were expected to obtain and provide bank guarantees, perhaps against non-payment of the 
bridging finance. However, by October 2010; the private developers were in default to the 
tune of over N7 Billion, this will be elaborated later. 
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As a practice of PPP worldwide (Yescombe, 2011), at the commencement of the MHS in 
2000, the MFCT established a PPP unit under the office of the Minister. The steering ad 
hoc committee comprises of the PPP Steering Committee (PPPSC) responsible for policy 
decisions, the PPP Technical Committee (PPPTC) responsible for the evaluation of the 
technical and commercial contents of all proposals and PPP Unit (PPPU) as the 
administrative secretariat responsible in the collection of the receipt, preliminary review 
and collation of all proposals for transfer to the PPPTC. Abuja MHS ad hoc committee 
constitutes a parallel agency to the mainstream FCDA, responsible for all Abuja 
development. The ad hoc committee was partly in response pressure on FCTA to deliver 
alternatives to housing in the city after a series of demolitions of illegal structures, 
shanties, slums and squatter settlements in around the city, as corrective measures to the 
observed city master plan distortions. The pressure to provide immediate alternatives made 
the government consultative processes and contributed to hasty policy decisions. It was 
observed the responsible departments retained nominal responsibility for development of 
design regulations and approval of building plans, authentication of beneficiary eligibility. 
Interdepartmental communication and coordination remains poor as FCTA departments 
continue to restrict the role of FCDA to implement the scheme. In the process, the 
departments get weaker and MHS became poorly managed. 
However, the difficulties of land allocation, construction supervision, monitoring and poor 
record keeping, informed the establishment of the substantive as Department of Mass 
Housing (DMS) in 2008 under the FCDA; to effectively co-ordinate the implementation of 
the MHS (Bamalli, interview 2009). Since the department's inception, has produced 
operational guideline of the MHS that was not in existence at the time of the ad hoc 
committee management. The guidelines have been approved by the Federal Executive 
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Council (FEC) and gazetted on October 21
st
, 2009 (FGN, 2009). The revision was to 
correct the previous lapses and control the past abuses of the scheme, where large parcels 
of land were given to private developers at the expense of others. The new guideline 
specifically stated the maximum allocation of 10ha and 20ha for the scheme, for housing 
developments in the satellite towns and the FCC respectively (FGN, 2009). However, 
violations of the guidelines abound in allocation of excess of the approved maximum sizes 
in the form of favouritism, were common. 
Accordingly, at the commencement of the scheme according to UNDP (2005) the MFCT 
made an advertisement in national dailies soliciting for participation in the MHS as 
developers. Accordingly, the advertisement attracted 121 developers applied out of which 
46 were selected for participation having fulfilled the participation requirement of 
financing, technical and innovation criterion. Paradoxically, at the time of inception there 
were no guideline principles to ascertain the financial, technical and technological 
competence of the participating private developers. However, it is not clear on what 
criteria how the applications were vetted and approved. Since until 2009 there was no 
operational guideline the ad hoc committee had to work with and this remained unclear, 
because there were no records to prove otherwise. However, according to one official 
interviewed (Anonymous, 2010) asserted that most of the selections and the subsequent 
allocations of land to the private developers were made without due process, but rather 
based on what he called “man on man relationship”.  
The in-house committees that investigated the past implementation, namely FCTA (2007, 
2008) reaffirmed the above assertion that all the land allocations made were without a 
verifiable list of the beneficiaries. This strengthens an earlier trend observed at the early 
stage of Abuja development that what matters in securing contracts and land was 
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“patronage rather than on merit” (Moore, 1984:174). This means that the entire process 
of land allocation to the private developers, on issues like size, the conditions of the grant 
and quantification of the units to be developed or expected were conspicuously absent, 
similar to what characterise the country as “planning without facts” (Nafziger, 2006:667). 
The FCTA much later has developed the qualifications for private developer participation 
and assigned responsibilities between the FCDA/FCTA and private developers in MHS as 
shown in Appendix K. It is in the fulfilment of all these requirements that the private 
developer will be allocated land for the development. Under the first phase of the scheme 
the participating developers were issued with letters of intent and allocations. Similarly, at 
the beginning of the scheme, the private developer will be made to sign what is called 
“development lease agreement” (DLA) with the FCTA/FCDA. The development lease 
agreement constitutes the contract between the two stakeholders and contains each party's 
responsibility as shown in Appendix K. However, the MHS developments are undertaken 
before infrastructure is available, not before adequate and sufficient infrastructure was in 
place. Meanwhile, the title to the land remains with the landowner, FCDA/FCTA and as 
later mentioned the title is only conferred directly on the purchasers of the housing units 
based on the list supplied by the developer to the AGIS after the payment of all fees and 
deferred charges.  
The MHS aimed at mobilising the private sector through the provision of generous 
incentives of land allocation. Hence, the MHS was echoed by a variety of incentives. In 
contrast to Kuala Lumpur context, the incentives for private developers in Abuja MHS 
were very generous. The participating private developers and other stakeholders were 
assured to have access to well serviced and secure plots of land for the MHS housing 
development.  Similarly, the private developers were assured that the contributors to the 
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NHF would have access to the units developed through mortgage financing that would be 
granted. Thus, the private developers experience a significant expansion in land 
accessibility as a result of such generous land allocation serves to resolve the major factor 
of housing development experienced by private developers. Consequently, there were 
tremendous responses of the private developers that enlist in the government policy of 
private sector-driven housing development.  The bulk of participants 93%, were found to 
be from private developers under the umbrella of REDAN and the remaining shares 
between international construction companies, public corporations and formal 
organisations staff co-operatives enlisted for participation (Table 7.2). A major finding of 
the study shows the participation of private developers in Abuja MHS is organised under 
the umbrella of REDAN, to benefit from the enabling environment opportunities offered 
by the government. There were no sufficient records to present the number of international 
developers engaged and even including cases of independent allocations like the one 
reported by Babatunde & Low (2013) where a magnitude of 500ha of land allocated to a 
Chinese company. 
Table 7.2: Distribution of participating developers engage in MHS in Abuja 
S/N Developer Number % 
1 Private Developers 122 93.1 
2 Public corporations 6 4.6 
3 Staff cooperatives 3 1.5 
4 International company 1 0.8 
Total  131 100 
Source: Generated from FCTA (2007, 2008) 
The breach of the DLA was specified that failure to complete the construction within the 
specified period, the developer was entitled for one extension for a period of six months. 
Afterwards, if the project remained uncompleted, the government shall take possession of 
the undeveloped land and pay the lessee for the improvement made on the land. However, 
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the new DMS has drawn up a guideline as earlier mentioned that goes beyond the 
agreement, that it seems proactive. However, the issue that remains is the faithful 
implementation of the document, since almost all the developers were in contravention of 
this provision. Basically, because at the time fieldwork due to the absence of pertinent 
records of the implementation of MHS, the DMH was conducting audits of the existing 
housing projects and private developers. Relying on the submission of the private 
developers, Shehu Bamalli (interview, 2010) informed the researcher that the DMH was to 
determine the developers‘ compliance with approved guidelines on planning, regulations, 
development control, infrastructure services specifications and quality of the structures. 
Impliedly, the auditing exercise was to inform the department on ways in devising 
strategies to correct the abnormalities observed in the scheme implementation. 
The literature on Abuja indicates land accessibility and affordability constitute the major 
constraint to housing developers (Akingbade et al., 2012a; Egbu et al., 2008; Ikejiofor, 
1997, 1998a). However, the advent of PPP MHS came as a relief to private developers. 
This is because the FCTA is having the entire land of territory, as its land bank. Under its 
control and administration, in effect government can acquire land enough land for the 
scheme and hence FCTA could devote the entire land of Phases III and IV for the MHS. 
The public sector incentives to private sector developers include contribution of land and 
financing. The FCTA, unlike CHKL, in addition to land has liaised with another 
government agency, namely, FMBN to support the partnering developers with a bridging 
finance. Against this background, under the NHP reform, the FMBN opened what it is 
called ―estate development window‖ known as ‗estate development loan‘ (EDL) to private 
developers and ―NHTF loan window‖ to PMIs, to attract massive participation of both 
developers and house buyers in mass housing delivery in the country. The loan to be 
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accessed by the private developers, minimum of N50million was to be used specifically for 
housing development, excluding the cost infrastructure provision. The loan attracts an 
interest rate of 10% p.a., half of the prevailing rate in the private financial institutions, but 
limited for a period of 24 months. At the beginning of the MHS, the loan was granted to 
private developers to develop housing worth a value not exceeding N5million before the 
current review to N15million (Appendix K for conditions of grant). Additionally changes 
introduced in terms of grant include the developer to pledge and mortgage the land as well 
as the individual titles to be submitted directly to the Bank. Just like in U.K. as reported by 
Mullins & Walker (2009) state made a financial grant to private developers as provided in 
2004 Housing Acts to develop social housing units. While  Nentjes & Schopp (2000) 
earlier reported the intentions of government of making direct funding was to translate into 
lower housing price to house buyers from the private developers.  
In this study, among the private developers interviewed, namely, (Oladapo Popoola, 
Johnson and Yakubu Sunday, interviews, 2010) were denying from enjoying this source of 
financing but from the scrutiny the researcher discovered these developers we interviewed 
accounts one-fifth of debt unpaid the tune of about N2.5 billion. To promote affordability, 
the FCTA and FMBN required the developer to develop housing at prices not exceeding 
N5million but the current increase of loan tenor from NHF to N15million (Nubi & 
Oyalowo, 2010). This is because a condition of terms includes selling the housing units 
exclusively to the NHF contributors and the values should commensurate with the 
maximum loan facility a contributor could enjoy. In Abuja MHS the study came across a 
number of large tracts of land allocation made as large as 500 hectares with non-
commencement of actual housing construction and many cases of non-completion with no 
end in sight. As observed in Abdul Aziz (2010) such development raises the question of 
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ceiling on the land size for PPP. Although the FCTA has limited the PPP land allocation to 
the REDAN private developer members, there is still need to reconsider the policy on the 
ground that huge land size, the limited time normally given for the development to be 
completed against the background of national economy and politics on one hand and the 
developer‘s financial resources and technical capacity. Based on these there is need for 
FCTA to review the current size of land for the MHS project to a manageable size. This 
study would strongly wish such large tracts of land are parcelled out to certify and 
competent private developers rather than relying on a single developer having a large tract. 
Also found in MHS there were foreign capital in participation and becomes a noteworthy 
finding since it has not been reported in the context of housing in Nigeria. Although, such 
participating foreign capital it is common in other countries like India (Sengupta, 2006a); 
Thailand (Kim, 2008) and Ghana (Arku, 2009).The advent of foreign capital into housing 
in Nigeria, as part of globalisation, has raised the concern on their relevance to the housing 
problem in the country and how such interventions are permeating solutions and strategies 
to address the housing crisis in the country. 
Considering the hasty implementation, the government did not carry out a thorough 
scrutiny, to distinguished established developers with resources and expertise capacity, 
from some of which likely to have been formed opportunistically in response to the 
incentives that goes with participating in the scheme. Therefore, the selection 
compromised experience and resources of these developers. The ad hoc committee on 
MHS implementation which enable fast disbursement of land and subsequently financing 
from FMBN were sought after by the developers. Such enablement incentives attracted 
several developers and individuals with little or no experience in MHS projects. 
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7.3.2.2 Implementation stage: organisation, management and coordination 
The stakeholder departments and agencies in FCDA and FCTA all have necessary stake to 
ensure the new agents of housing delivery, namely the private developers, carried out its 
responsibility according to the development agreement entered with the city authority. 
However, these agencies became complacent and allowed the scheme to slip into 
institutional failure in terms of administration and coordination. In fact, the MHS 
implementation shows that stakeholder departments in FCTA/FCDA failed to exert their 
statutory responsibility. Instead, deliberate or otherwise, they allowed themselves to be 
rendered ineffective in the manner of MHS implementation. Consequently, the apparent 
result staring into all in Abuja was a collapse in the vision and objectives of the MHS and 
under the complacent of the city authority to govern and manage the partnership for 
success, and prevent the scheme drifting into a crisis and failure. 
At the beginning the land allocation was made to the private developers at no cost, apart 
from the meagre processing fee paid, as a government equity contribution to the scheme. 
From the field work data and up to the time of writing the thesis there was conflicting 
records of total land allocations made by the government. For instance, UNDP (2005) 
indicated the first phase MHS allocations made comprises of about 2,132 hectares of land 
to 35 developers with allocations ranging from 5 to 225 hectares. Similarly, from the 
records obtained during the fieldwork shows far less. However, the figures in Jibril & 
Garba (2012) looks more comprehensive, for the fact of showing an updated record and 
more reliable. On this note, this thesis adopted the figures obtained from this source in 
entirety as shown in Table 7.3 and 7.4. The FCTA MHS had made a total of 15,301.7Ha of 
land to private developers at different sizes, being part of the land devoted in the entire 
Phase III and IV of the city development (Figure 7.6). This land area equals to 60% of the 
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FCC, Abuja and Kuala Lumpur. Hence, this study can report that the implementation of 
MHS has resolved the issue of land for housing delivery for private developers. Indeed, 
this is the commendable aspect of MHS in Abuja that the public sector had been faithful in 
making land available to the private developers participating. In fact, interestingly, all the 
study private developers‘ interviewees, namely, (Oladapo Popoola, Johnson and Ayo Bello 
interviews, 2010) except Saraha Homes developer accepted that the land was allocated to 
them at ‗no cost‘.  
Table 7.3: First phase list of mass housing allocations according to district 
District Total 
Allocation 
Total 
Hectare 
Size of 
Lowest 
Allocation 
(Ha) 
Size of 
Highest 
Allocation 
(Ha) 
Size of 
Average 
Allocation 
(Ha) 
Wumba 46 478 5 40 10.39 
Kafe 26 567 15 100 21.81 
Galadimawa 21 460 20 30 21.90 
Dakwo 20 204 5 20 10.20 
Lokogoma 61 731 5 100 11.98 
Mbora 10 170 10 25 17.00 
Total 184 2610    
 
Table 7.4: MHS land allocations in the northern and southern districts of the city 
 
S/No 
Northern districts Southern Districts 
District Size (Ha) District Size (Ha) 
1 Bunkaro 836.78 Dakwo 568.5 
2 Gwarimpa II 433.52 Duboyi 336.29 
3 Ido Gwari 627.41 Dutse 540.94 
4 Idu-Sabo 428.85 Gadua 481.66 
5 Kado 489.51 Galadimawa 661.05 
6 Kafe 598.63 Lokogoma 800.4 
7 Karsana North 915.47 Saraji 561.07 
8 Karsana East 765.81 Wumba 591.94 
9 Karsana South 605.23   
10 Karsana West 509.72   
11 Kodo 376.75   
12 Nbora 537.13   
13 S. Gida 741.02   
14 Wupa 284.02   
 Total 8149.85  4541.85 
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Figure 7.6: Distributions of allocations for mass housing in the northern and southern 
districts of the city derived from Table 7.5 
Source: Adapted from Jibril & Garba (2012:8-9) 
However, the availability of land has created a challenge whereby the land was 
opportunistically allocated and developed. Considering the opportunities offered many 
private developers have sprung up to access the highly valued and privilege Abuja land 
given at no cost. The business of selling the lands and enjoying unprecedented gains is 
becoming a popular among the private developers in Abuja. This misconduct made the 
private developers to be popularly called ―land grabbing merchants‖ or ―briefcase 
companies‖ firms owned by politicians, proxy civil servants and hesitant business men. 
Thus, this agents conduct looks similar to the mafia syndicate in Mumbai (India) that with 
political support had taken over the city land development (Weinstein, 2008).  
When the MHS took off, the government bore the payment of compensation amount of 
crops and economic trees on the lands to the affected farmers/native land owners. 
However, in the course of the implementation, the public sector renegades this 
responsibility and instead transfers the financial implication on the developers, while 
retaining the service of carrying out the assessments on the behalf of developers. Of 
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course, such payments of compensation made by the private developers expectedly build 
up into the cost of development of the project. 
In addition to the land granted, also under the scheme, the FCTA was to provide primary 
infrastructure whilst the developer was to provide secondary and tertiary infrastructures 
“compliant with the standard specified by the Master Plan of Abuja” (FCTA, 2008:6). The 
government provides that “FCDA shall subject to availability of funds provide primary 
infrastructures to the Estate/mass housing sites” (FGN, 2009:B1600). Also, it was 
provided in the agreement that where after the completion of the estate, the government 
fails to provide the primary infrastructures as stipulated, the developers were allowed to 
provide such infrastructures as necessary to make the estate habitable. At the initial stage 
of the scheme, such provision made by the developer was recorded at the expense of the 
government, but later it is changed to, at no cost to the government and thus the developer 
borne the expense. Thus, the framework enshrined the government to be responsible for 
the primary and arterial infrastructure, though qualified with a provision on subject to the 
availability of financial resource to the FCTA. 
Reference to MHS, on commencement of the scheme, the cost became outrageous and thus 
necessitated the government to sets aside the commitment to make infrastructures delivery. 
For instance, from the records of the DES obtained shows that the FCDA cost of providing 
infrastructure to relatively flat and rough terrains in Abuja was estimated at about N10,000 
and N17,500M
2 
respectively. Consequently, there are many of the plots in districts 
allocated for MHS for more about ten years without the provision of infrastructures made. 
In Abuja, failure of the government to provide the infrastructure on the grounds of non-
availability of these large amounts of money required, there were some private developers 
development carried out without the prerequisite physical infrastructure. The development 
282 
 
went on based on the anticipation that such infrastructures would be provided later. Thus, 
the government did not fulfil its commitment to the provision of infrastructures in many of 
the allocated MHS developable lands. Consequently, the private developers were 
developing the lands by providing only the basic they could to make the estates habitable, 
for example, roads, electricity mains and water, even though of inferiority quality (Figure 
7.7). In fact, fieldwork observation of many of the MHS districts had no infrastructure and 
the interview with the private developers shows that the failure of the government to 
provide these infrastructures necessitated them to make such provision, like access roads, 
water, electricity main and transformers at their sites and which all add up to the cost of the 
developments, with serious consequence to the unit price of the houses produced. In 
addition to the consequences of the non-fulfilment of the FCTA obligations resulted in a 
delay in completing the housing estates and delivery within the stipulated periods given in 
the DLA. 
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Figure 7.7: The infrastructures provisions provided by the MHS private developers 
in Abuja 
The promotion of MHS in housing by the current NHP in housing delivery depends 
entirely on the banking industry. However, Nigeria banks did not achieve a significant 
contribution to the housing delivery, most especially to the LIG. The reason being that the 
short term nature of their funds, made them not offering long term credit, especially for 
housing acquisition and development to both the developers and home buyers (Okpala, 
1994; Wapwera, Parsa, & Egbu, 2011).  
Against this background, the FMBN guideline stipulates the EDL private developers 
beneficiaries stipulated target price and plan specification of the housing units to be 
developed, so that they can be affordable to the NHF contributors. The plan initial target 
only the NHF contributors. Therefore, the prices must be between NGN1.5 million and 
NGN5.0 Million. If the developers were to develop outside the cost and housing plan units 
specified, must then be financed from their resources. Initially, to ensure that the NHF 
contributors secured the allocation, the developers were required by the FMBN to obtain 
and present list of such contributors‘ commitment, through an accredited PMI and at least 
one PMI must be associated with the estate development. Perhaps this explained why all 
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the private developers had one subsidiary PMI or had a retainer-ship PMIs to do the 
marketing of the estate to the prospective buyers.  
Considering the indispensability of infrastructure and the failure of the FCDA to provide, 
the private developers used the loan amount to provide both infrastructure and housing 
units, and perhaps explain the half way execution and completion of the projects. At the 
inception of the FMBN financing scheme, 31 applications were approved for the 75 private 
developers‘ applications received, to the tune of N12.2 billion (USD$82.3million) in 
respect of 7,397 housing units. However, only N5.2billion (about USD$35million) was 
disbursed (Mabogunje, 2004b). An update from Fortune-Ebie (2006) shows that by April, 
2006 through this window the sum of about N10 billion (about USD$67million) has been 
disbursed. From Table 7.5 shows the most updated amounts FMBN has approved and 
disbursed the sums of about N70.5 and N37 billion respectively to private developers, 
EDL. While the amounts approved and disbursed to the NHF contributors through primary 
mortgage institutions (PMIs) were the sums of N50.7 and about N25 billion respectively.  
Table 7.5: Summary of National Housing Fund (NHF) operations (As of February, 
2011) 
S/N INDICATORS CUMULATIVE AS AT 
FEBRUARY, 2011 
1 
2 
3 
NHF Collection (N) 
Refund (N) 
No. of Refund Cases 
64,604,387,162.35 
952,272,753.89 
50,812 
4 Registered Contributors 3,573,667 
5 
6 
7 
NHF loans  (PMI) Approved (N) 
Estate Development Loans (EDL) Approved (N) 
Total Loans Approved (N) 
50,729,742,294.79 
70,494,261,970.91 
121,224,004,265.70 
8 
9 
NHF Loans (PMI) Disbursed (N)  
NHF Loans (EDL) Disbursed (N)  
24,819,332,788.89 
36,749,435,773.96 
10 
11 
Total Loans Disbursed (N)  
Housing Units financed  through NHF Loans 
61,568,768,562.85 
16,469 
12 
13 
Housing Units financed  through EDL 
Housing Units financed  through  MBB 
27,524 
9,525 
14 Total Housing Units financed 53,518+ 
Source: Adapted from Status Symbol (2011:7) 
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Just like land grabbing observed above, many of the private developers jostle to access the 
loan, few with good intentions to use the resources for the purpose it is meant for, another 
sees it as an opportunity to grab from the FMBN as their share of ‗national cake‘ (Housing, 
2005). From the interviews result shows that only two, namely, Johnson and Ayo Bello 
(interviews, 2010) of this study four private developers‘ interviewed accepted to have 
accessed this loan from the FMBN. Others claimed to have used their company resources 
and bank loans to finance their MHS project. The scrutiny into the result of the 
implementation shows the insincerity and fraudulent practice of some of these private 
developers had diverted the loan to other uses, while others did not settle the loan as when 
due.  
The arrangement the EDL was to serve as revolving and sustainable funding of market-led 
housing policy in the country. However, with the above practice the amount could not 
revolve to other developers to access the fund. In fact from this attitude of private 
developers, were indebted to FMBN to the tune of NGN11.24 billion (about USD$75 
million) (NBFTopiconline, 2009). From the list of indebted private developers the 
researcher identified that those three of the respondents that refused to disclose to the 
researcher whether they had accessed the loan and were found to be indebted to the tune of  
about NGN2.5 billion (about USD$17 million) accounting for more than one-fifth of the 
total loan outstanding. These factors notwithstanding, there was gross absence monitoring 
of the responsible institutions to ensure strict compliance, which allowed much of the 
funds to be diverted to other uses other than the purpose for which it was meant for.  
Another finding of the study indicates that the developers offer a choice of full cash and 
instalment payments, which the purchasers were expected to complete within a maximum 
period of between 3 and 6 months, which varies from the study developers. The intended 
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beneficiaries were expected to make an initial deposit payment of 10% of the amount of 
consideration and subsequently the remaining instalment are made subsequently as the 
project progresses to completion. The instalments payment terms regime also varies, but 
the most common obtained from this study sample estates are 70%-30%; 50%-30% and 
20%; and 30%-40% and 30% as most popular combinations. The high cost of down 
payments up to 50% of the house value was required; apparently wanting to recover the 
capital up front, meanwhile from an underdeveloped housing finance system favours the 
high-income group. The majority of Abuja LIG cannot afford to meet instant cash-and-
carry payments and the duration instalment payments required by these housing 
developers. The financing constraint to enable the participation of the LIG exposes the 
FMBN housing finance system fails to respond primarily to their needs. The constraint is 
further compounded since relief cannot be found from the private banks, whose financing 
were mostly engaged in consumer loans, and mostly on very short term basis. 
Under the new housing policy, did not change the sources by which state funding was 
allocated to the housing sector. In fact, as in Abuja context, only the beneficiaries were 
broadened not only to the LIG, but include the new agents of housing delivery, by creation 
of developers financing window made available to them at lower  interest rate. However, 
the disbursement of the funds was made on the agreement that the funds were to be 
devoted strictly to housing development excluding infrastructure provision. Therefore, the 
government made such financing to MHS participants, but did not include financing of 
infrastructure provision. In terms of the state financial support for LIG, LIG contributors in 
the FMBN were to be the only beneficiaries and the non-contributors were excluded from 
the state financial system. In general, the system of state support for LIG did not change 
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under the new market-led housing delivery, though the maximum amount that can be 
borrowed was increased from N5million to N15million (Nubi & Oyalowo, 2010). 
The supervisory departments do not rigorously apply existing regulatory frameworks 
which could have improved the housing delivery, was undermined. The absence of a 
department during the first decade of the scheme implementation to account for the 
implementation weakens the drive to improve on private developers‘ performance. 
Consequently, the practice of implementation was absolutely not under the FCDA/MFCT 
supervision, coordination and control. The private developers have taken advantage of the 
unrestrictive and poor coordination, coupled with the fact that they were left to their 
discretion on the ground. Unfortunately, the outcome shows that the developers skimming 
off and producing housing units that are lopsided to the expensive units affordable only to 
high-income class.  
The Abuja Master Plan stipulates that any development to be executed, a detailed site and 
development plans and engineering design are compulsory. However, the allocations of the 
MHS were made “arbitrarily without recourse to neither the detailed site development 
plan nor engineering design for those districts” (FCTA, 2008:28). In fact, the Director of 
DMH stated “... may not submit and get ... final designs before executing the mass housing 
project...” The MFCT/FCDA did not have the detailed prepared land use plans and 
engineering designs of the districts before the allocations were made to the private 
developers. With this abnormally, the private developers also went into development 
without equally preparing their individual estates land use plans and engineering designs. 
Even the few that submitted the plans and design, many did not secure the Department of 
Engineering Services (DES), Development Control Department (DCD) and even the 
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Department of Urban and Regional Planning (DURP) approvals, but all the same went 
ahead with the developments.  
Deficiencies have been reported in land allocation in the form of multiple allocations of the 
same plot to many developers; revocations and reassignment of allocations (Table 7.6). 
When planning was done by the DURP later, made some private developers lost their 
allocations and some also lost their allocations on the ground that their plots were taken 
over to accommodate the proposed Commonwealth Games village 2010. Hence, there 
were cases of multiple allocations, encroachments and disputes between the private 
developers. Besides, out of desperation for housing could be attributable reason in Abuja 
were paying for houses before even the completion of developments, this was in contrast to 
Kuala Lumpur.  
Table 7.6: Number of private developers affected by relocation and revocation of land 
under Abuja MHS 
S/No District Number of 
affected 
developers 
by 
relocation 
Total land 
size affected 
(Ha) 
Number of 
developers whose 
allocation 
revoked/withdrawn 
Total land size 
revoked/revoked 
(Ha) 
1 Wumba 22 200 2 15 
2 Kafe 1 100 2 40 
3 Galadimawa 4 85 4 80 
4 Dakwo  11 129 - - 
5 Lokogoma  8 190 2 30 
6 Mbora  10 170 - - 
 Total  56 874 10 165 
Source: FCTA (2007:4-12) 
Of recent the MHS enables the public sector to consolidate the realisation of building a 
structure of high standards in the urban areas. This is what the officials in Abuja reiterate 
that the private partners must built ―standard housing‖. To guarantee this, the operational 
PPP guidelines set high minimum standards to which all the private developers must 
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conform and consistent with Abuja master plan standard. Earlier studies have criticised 
such policy (Ikejiofor, 1999b; Morah, 1993; Njoh, 1995). Nevertheless, such declared goal 
was far from being realised under the private developer‘s development. Unfortunately, the 
responsible agencies allowed the private developers went into development without prior 
approvals of their developments. For instance, the DES observed the consequence of such 
development made by the developers in the future would create the situation where the 
estates internal services  infrastructures might not be able to integrate with the whole city 
infrastructures “due to differences in levels and in some situations , encroachment on the 
roads right of way” (FCTA, 2008:34-35). The FCTA (2008) report shows that from the 79 
private developer‘s on site, only 51 or 64.5% made applications for development approvals 
and only 13 private developers‘ secured requisite approvals of the DCD.  
The implication of these developments on MHS housing development, despite the 
tremendous response enjoyed,  the public sector as a major stakeholder of the scheme have 
displayed absolute incapability of steering the programme to one of success stories due to 
the absence of an effective administrative machinery to build the required commitment, 
coordination and control. For instance as in 2008 there were only 32% private developers 
on site and only 13% them carry out the development with approved building plans 
(FCTA, 2008). The reluctant to terminate the non-performing developers even with poor 
and non-performance was most unfortunate. On the other hand, the participating private 
developers were busy building high income and luxury homes for the rich Nigerians all 
over the MHS housing estates, with little or no consideration for the LIG housing that 
could be affordable to the majority of Abuja residents. The MHS was progressing at a very 
slow pace, absolutely contrary to the contracted three years of completion and additional 
extension of six-months earlier signed on the development agreement. If the development 
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had progressed as scheduled, the provision of more lopsided housing units in the city to the 
demand of medium-and high-income groups, would have created reality to the need for 
expansion to accommodate the need of the LIG and more of the neediest be reached and 
the stock of housing supply increased more rapidly.  
In the course of the implementation, the development lease agreement provides that the 
developers were made to sign before the commencement of the project it was found that 
both sectors, were working outside the context of the agreement. The consequence has 
been the observed discrepancies in the way the MHS was implemented, specifically 
without coordination and supervision. For instance, in-house report observed that “many of 
the buildings in the ... sites were poorly executed using poor materials” (FCTA, 2008:47-
48). Consequently, the poor nature of the workmanship prompts the DCD to demolish 127 
structures in one private developer housing estate at Kafe district and in another instance 
some of the estates have registered cases of building collapse under the scheme (FCTA, 
2008).  
In general, the Abuja property market is characterised with uncertainties and the 
participating private developers are not spared. The MHS and development at all times 
await the announcement of revocations of land in Abuja as soon as there is a change of 
ministerial appointment. In 2012, it is reported that the Minister of FCTA appointed in 
April of the same year, has ordered the revocation of land allocations by the immediate 
past administration. The reasons at most times given include favouritism, non-compliance 
of due process and nepotism in the land allocation process.  In recent times, there was a 
report of political corruption surfaced with unproven allegations against the FCTA 
demanding for a certain portion of 400 hectares of land allocated to an international 
developer (Malaysian Garden estate) (Desert Herald, 2012). The MHS shows it was 
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characterised by poor, fragmented and uncoordinated implementation practices. 
Extravagant and uncoordinated distribution of land and finance were made, unfortunately, 
that does not respond to Abuja priorities and inadequate housing of LIG. Conclusively, 
such experience in MHS validated the assertion of Jomo & Anis (2009) PPPs in 
developing countries suffer from all sorts of corruptions. Thus, facilitated the emergence of 
what Weinstein (2008) called ‗criminalisation of land development‘ at a magnitude not 
ever registered in the history of the city and expectedly from a predatory state (Diamond, 
2008b).  
Furthermore, the amazing failure of MHS could be attributed to the institution framework 
of implementation. It was at its most critical stage ad hoc and due to the absolute absence 
of strategic planning, it was hastily conducted. The most surprising irony, the FCTA did 
not rely on the existing civil servants agents, who perhaps could be implied the political 
leaders had no confidence or trust in them. This study made a pertinent observation that 
unlike CHKL, there was no such forum available in the course of the MHS in Abuja, to 
create a continuing dialogue and co-operation between the public and private sectors, so 
that the private developers could be more disciplined. Consequently, on the general note all 
the stakeholder departments do not have accurate records of the private developers, 
development and management, in terms of the number of housing units under construction, 
constructed and disposed and other pertinent details of the scheme. 
7.3.2.3 Post-implementation: allocation and management 
In Nigeria, the common PPP housing provision schemes types in Nigeria are site-and-
service and turnkey schemes (Ibem, 2010). The Abuja MHS housing development is turn-
key or new housing development units. However, the type of scheme found in this study 
was turnkey, common to what obtains in Kuala Lumpur (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 
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2011). As similar practice obtained in India and South Africa (Lemanski, 2009; Mukhija, 
2004) for instance. The developments were in the form of a block of flats, terrace, semi-
detached and detached bungalows with very little incorporation of multi-storey block of 
flats (Figure 7.8). MHS shows the private developers monotonous estates consolidating 
territory in MHS districts that largely been developed without systematic planning or 
regulation. 
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Figure 7.8: Houses types provided under the MHS by private developers in Abuja 
 
Consequent to the manner of implementation the end result shows that the private sectors 
were producing houses and infrastructures that were not in compliance with the 
specification of the development agreement signed. The field work made a pertinent 
observation that the mixed development densities in the form of detached, semi-detached, 
terraced and block of flats known by Abuja development was apparently ignored and 
dumped by the private developers. Similarly, much of the development by the private 
developers concentrates on high and medium costs, with very few units or none at all of 
LIG housing units (Table 7.9). The developments mostly were in the form of mansions, 
duplexes, bungalows and few units block of flats targeting the rich and very few units for 
the poor. Even the authorities of FCTA upheld the above observation by criticising such 
extensive low-density developments that were not commensurating with values of land in 
the city, considering the high cost of infrastructure provision in the city (FCTA, 2008). 
There was gross reluctance on the part of the MHS developers to incorporate low-cost 
housing where the need for housing was of the greatest in the city. Thus, the majority of 
the developers virtually had very limited provision of low-cost housing units.  
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Figure 7.9: High-cost development by the private developers under MHS in Abuja 
 
The MHS was among the first large-scale formal private housing development in its 
history of development. In the post-implementation phase, shows that through MHS 
undoubtedly large mass housing has been delivered to the middle-and high-income groups, 
but with very insignificant to the majority of the city inhabitants, LIG. Among other 
factors, the choice and expensive houses reinforced their focus on high-income groups. 
The MHS development further reinforced segregations along class terms, specifically 
where the provisions excluded the LIG and poor. These policy deprivations raise the 
concerns on distributional equity that arises in the implementation of the scheme as an 
emerging issue. This is because the emerging trend, as the predominant focus of supply by 
private developers in the high-and medium-class, accounting the singular focus of the 
scheme rather having broader inclusion of all classes raises a pertinent concern. The issue 
of concern in which the developments by the developers focus skewedness was particularly 
noticeable in favour of the rich. This was unmistakable, when considering the entire phase 
III of the city was devoted for the scheme, the city polarisation, concentration and 
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exclusion will flourish in the city. Therefore, such inequity in accumulation of the benefits 
of MHS in disproportionate terms, demands for sanctions and priority consideration from 
the FCTA. On the assumption on colossal state resources made available to the developers, 
were expected to reciprocate  by either making low-cost housing available and meeting the 
high demand in the city at reasonable and affordable prices, or will comply with the 
development agreement undertaken to at least 30% of their development for LIG housing. 
However, all these expectations did not fit in all respects of the MHS developers in Abuja, 
as the private developers have built housing estates that flourish in a mismatch between 
demand and supply. The state housing policy in terms of enablement and the behaviour of 
market agents, one would have expected that the state emphasises on market-driven 
delivery, the private developers should be able to challenge the previous government-
provider strategy.  
Along the line of Mabongunje (2001) suggestions, the MFCT only grant the OPS 
developer access to land to develop, the title to land rest with the authority. It is after the 
development and sold out to the general public that the developer is expected to submit the 
list of the beneficiaries. The list is to be accompanied with a site development plan, 
engineering infrastructure design and ‗as-built‘ drawing with survey data for each plot to 
the FCTA (DMH, 2009). After all the necessary assessments the beneficiary is to be issued 
with a certificate of occupancy (C of O) on the payment of relevant statutory rents and 
charges. Apart from the guidelines prepared on the issuance of the C of O to individual 
beneficiaries of the housing scheme. However, the interviews with households and 
developers show that the issuance of C of Os had been yet to commence in respect (Shehu 
Bamalli, interview, 2010) of the MHS housing estates so far completed. On the part of the 
DMS attributed the delay to the developers, who were yet to make submission of the list of 
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their beneficiaries to the relevant department. In any case this negates the whole idea of 
conferring titles to the beneficiaries, which they could have used the title document to 
source for capital or even to arrange for a mortgage to cover the initial cost of acquisition 
of the houses sold on ―cash and carry basis‖.  
Similarly, the post-implementation phases of the MHS produces houses that have been 
developed without all the prerequisite development permits and building approvals. Verily, 
even the few that had obtained the approvals, the monitoring of the on-going development 
by the FCTA/FCDA was not practiced. Until the advent of DMH, at the time of the 
fieldwork was preparing for creating the structure of monitoring the private developers‘ 
developments, prior to the department emergence as coordinating unit, practice grossly did 
not monitor the development process. Unfortunately, afterwards the FCTA DDC pursued 
both of these defaulting developments after completion with demolitions. The common 
justification had been on non-compliance to the AMP; carrying out development without 
obtaining all the requisite permissions and approvals; the developments were below the 
standards of the Development Standard Manual of the city; encroaching on state land and 
extending their development beyond the designated site allocated. In comparison to Kuala 
Lumpur, these patterns of attitudes were conspicuously absent. Thus, the poor 
implementation of MHS had resulted in frequent demolitions of fully developed housing 
estates worth billions of Naira (Figure 7.10).  
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Figure 7.10: A MHS estate demolished under MHS in Abuja 
One begins to wonder what kind of institutions that allocates the lands at almost free of 
charge, could not subject the developers to seek for all the prerequisites approvals. In one 
of this study case study estates, informal interview had with the residents, informed the 
researcher that they bought the houses in the estate not for house per se, but for the sake of 
the land. These occupants later demolish the house and reconstruct new structures. The 
implication of these shows that the stakeholder departments were not carried along to 
coordinate and monitor the developments. In fact, a pertinent observation found, there was 
no known existing standing committee that is comprised of all the stakeholder departments 
responsible for the coordination, monitoring and review the performance of the MHS in 
Abuja from time to time to ensure success of the scheme and another one comprising the 
public sector and private developers, like the JPMC in Kuala Lumpur.  
In addition, this singular action of the authority had built a sense of uncertainty and risky 
partnership among the participating private developers in Abuja MHS. Undoubtedly, this 
failure arises from inept government to ensure strict compliance of the DLA as well as the 
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private developer's concern on profit maximization by downgrading the building standards 
by developing the housing outside the law.  
From the Table 7.8, it can be seen that the lowest cost of a private developer housing unit 
for the LIG was N2 million. This going price rises raises the crucial concern about how 
many LIG can actually afford the houses at these prices, in a situation of absence of 
mortgage and availability of financing in the country as well as in the city? To ameliorate 
the affordability and broaden the participation of the city dwellers, corporate organisations 
staffers constituted as staff cooperative and became additional developers under the MHS. 
These cooperatives are registered as REDAN members, as it was the statutory requirement 
to enjoy the state incentives.  Consequently, through the MHS, housing estates were under 
construction by civil servant as cooperative association estates in Abuja. So far there are 
examples like Central Bank of Nigeria, the Federal Road Safety Commission housing 
estates, among others at various stages of completions. 
Table 7.8: Selling price and rental values of some MHS Estates in Abuja 
Developer Outright selling price Annual rental values 
CTEC a. 1bedroom-from N2million 
b. 2bedroom- from N4million 
c. 3bedroom- from N5.5million 
a. 1bedroom-N500,000 
b. 2bedroom-N800,000-
N900,000 
c. 3bedroom-N1.2million 
Yayale Ahmed 
Estate 
―Low-cost housing-from N6million‖ (Poopla )  
Kabusa Garden 
Estate 
a. 2bedroom- N3.5-N8.5million 
b. 3bedroom- N4.4-12.0million 
a. 2bedroom-N600,000 
b. 3bedroom-N900,000 
Sunnyvale 
Homes 
a. 3bedroom- (Semi-detached)- N13million 
b. 3bedroom (Detached+BQ)-N17.5million 
c. 4bedroom (Semi-detached)-N30million 
 
 
Gated communities are an urban phenomenon known to be spreading all over the world 
(Polanska, 2010; Webster, Glasze, & Frantz, 2002). The emerging trend with high demand 
for residential development in a secured gated estate with facilities and amenities, this is 
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more in Nigerian cities as a typical metaphor of Dupuis & Thorns (2008) ‗risk society‘. 
Essentially, due to escalations of insecurity challenges (Pratten, 2008) not only in Abuja 
but in similar urban centres in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2010a). Also, this new kind of 
development is an example of a new form of social ordering and economic segregation, 
replicating the colonial Africa experience (Njoh, 2008). Historically, this form of 
development is strongly associated with Abuja development right from its inception. 
However, in recent times, gated housing is being reinforced as the dominant form of the 
MHS private developers‘ housing estates as the ‗gating machine‘ (Vesselinov, Cazessus, & 
Falk, 2007).The private developers promoted luxurious gated and guarded residential 
estates, aimed at attracting the medium-and high-income groups (Figure 7.11).  
Similar to any other city (Grant, 2009), the private developers through MHS became a very 
popular pattern of their development in Abuja. As a typical gated housing development 
(Richter & Goetz, 2007), the MHS housing estates are totally separated from the rest of the 
city by walls, fences and security installations. The dominating gated housing therefore is 
explained by the MHS private developers which delineated the boundaries of their 
development distinct from the adjacent developer. In other words, the new development 
reinforces the city residential differentiation, as it is the common practice associated with 
this form of development in both developed (Vesselinov, 2008) and developing (Glasze & 
Alkhayyal, 2002; Jurgens & Gnad, 2002) countries.  
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Figure 7.11: Gated housing development from the study sampled MHS estates in 
Abuja 
Unlike CHKL JV, the implementation process of MHS in Abuja has been ‗market-led‘ 
whereby the private sector wholesale predominates over the public-sector management and 
coordination of the partnership, similar to the way Booth (2005b) described the UK 
regeneration partnerships in Britain. This is the case at the consumption stage. Unlike, 
Kuala Lumpur, at Abuja MHS the approach of disposals of the housing units developed 
was in entirety handled by the developer of the housing estate with no state intervention on 
who is to be allocated. Even, where the state requires the developer to partner with at least 
one PMI was only intended to streamline access to NHF from the FMBN and goes to such 
contributors in respective of income levels. The strategy implementation, as the findings of 
this study suggest the high-income households have continued to benefit from the houses 
built by the private developers since the buyers would need to make instant payments 
within a short span of period in order to meet the payment of the going house price. This 
concurs with Tran & Yip (2008:316) that under the housing market reform in Ho Chi Minh 
City show the units “ended up in the hands of speculators who were well connected to the 
developers”. 
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Analogously, the developers in Abuja that enjoyed state resources should afford to sell the 
houses at affordable prices to LIG. Yet, the prices were exorbitant even to medium-income 
group in the city. The prices of houses varied considerably among the private developers 
depending on the type of houses and location of the estates. In fact, there were no standard 
prices in the operation of the Abuja MHS, depends on the developer, location and unit type 
features. The price list obtained from the developers strengthens this claim (Table 7.7). 
Similarly, in the cases where the sale of bare land or subdivision plots in the estates, the 
prices also vary. The buyer payment comprises of the land, estate infrastructures and 
building supervision as under cover that it was the developer development. One of the 
private developer interviewees informed the researcher that the Estate sub-divided land 
price was N9million and the amount comprises the price of land and infrastructure at 
N7million and N2million respectively, though he did not give the dimension of the land. It 
is therefore assumed to be a standard plot of the land in Abuja. 
In summary, the details of MHS implementation remained much obscured and so also the 
depth of its contribution in housing the LIG in the city, even to the FCTA/FCDA. The 
responsible departments could not supply records of what number of housing units 
developed, what units produced by whom, how many developers participating and who 
were they and what the extent of progress attained . Even at the time of the fieldwork, this 
was because the department entirely relied on the private developers to supply the 
documentations on their activities. The DMS was working retroactively to build these 
records, and because the department entirely relied on the private developers to supply the 
documentations on their activities, such detail records could not be obtained. This is the 
tragedy of MHS implementation in Abuja, Nigeria, to use the metaphor of  Hutabarat Lo 
(2010) that ‗a city is a mirror‘ of a nation. 
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7.3.2.4 Problems of implementation 
The private developers observed their major problem of their participation under MHS was 
an irregular change of political leaders as ministers of FCTA. The changes at all the times 
jeopardises the continuity of the implementation of the MHS. The abandonment of LIG 
housing component in the MHS by the private developers was a problem of 
implementation of the scheme from the perspectives of the government. Thus, such 
conduct, the private developers exposed the government to adverse possession and 
consequently, the private developers have made the MHS to be liken to what Abdul-Aziz 
(2012) called ‗in a hostage situation‘ (a situation not found in Malaysia). Other 
inadequacies of implementation include of project abandonment, gross time slippage and 
engaging in raw land transaction without development. 
The government all provided technical support to the private developers in the form of 
identification, valuation and payment of compensation to the occupants of land granted to 
the developers for the MHS. Responses obtained from a staff of DMH (Alhaji Momoh, 
interview, 2010) finding from the study reveal that government first undertook to carry out 
the identification and bear the burden of settling the previous land owners, but later 
changed its policy and transfer the burden on the developers. The interviewed developers 
(Johnson, interview, 2010) expressed that they had encountered the problem and had a 
dispute with the previous land users before they could build the perimeter wall to secure 
the land area allocated to them for the scheme development.  
Financing undisputedly, among the private developers was a major problem, particularly 
on the availability and affordability of sources of financing in the course of their business. 
Long term financing was an intractable problem in housing financing in the country. 
Finding from the study revealed that major sources of financing for developers were 
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largely firm's capital for financing the housing projects. At the same time some have 
reported (Johnson, interview, 2010) that they have sourced additional funds from private 
banks, but reported on the high interest rates, limitation of the amount that could be made 
available at a time and even that made available on a short term basis. The interviewed 
private developers also complained of the cost of building materials to be high and 
increasing.  
Accordingly, the private developers associated this reason to why the MHS housing 
construction of all types of housing units to be expensive. This in a way was further 
complicating the already difficult housing affordability equation in the city. Similarly, the 
construction sites of MHS estates at the time of the field work there were very few of the 
developers on site and the developers attributed the suspension of the construction works 
to the factor of inadequate funds to continue the construction. Lately, the REDAN have 
attributed the abandonment of the projects to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) bank 
reform that made the banks weakened to provide funds and guaranteed, to secure financing 
from the FMBN (Guardianonline, 2010). In addition, the units cost tend to be very high, 
unaffordable and the disposal to be on the basis of cash and carry sale within a limited 
grace period to complete the purchase payments difficult.   
Government enablement and facilitating under the MHS comes in different ways. By MHS 
undisputedly the government has succeeded in increasing the production of housing overall 
without budgetary allocations. However, what discernible was widespread abuse of the 
MHS policy by FCTA and developers, mutual interest and coordination to the fulfilment of 
the scheme objective and the exclusion of the city majority population, particularly the 
LIG. As several studies have shown, attenuating policy coordination has been a major bane 
of policy implementation.  
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7.4 Summary 
This Chapter has examined agency behaviour to the strategy of PPP as well as institutional 
framework features of implementation in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. The results of the field 
work showed that institutional framework was consistent in Kula Lumpur in contrast to 
Abuja in moderating the implementation of the housing strategy. The two agencies share 
similar approaches in PPP in housing delivery, but the coordination of the partnership was 
most exemplary in Kuala Lumpur than Abuja. The content of the implementation capacity 
as well as coordination in respect of the colossal resources committed to the partnership 
drive the partnership impressive outcome in Kuala Lumpur than in Abuja.  
On the other hand, despite the generous enablement incentives and support provided by the 
government in Abuja, the agents did not demonstrate impressive performance to 
correspond the colossal resources committed unlike what obtained in Kuala Lumpur. The 
coordination provided in Kuala Lumpur over Abuja is reflected in the governance capacity 
and vibrancy of the private sector. Furthermore, findings presented in the Chapter reinforce 
the argument that institutional and government direct intervention in the implementation of 
the partnership is critical to drive the partnership for success. The institutional weaknesses 
have stunted the partnership outcome in Abuja; while in Kuala Lumpur it was the 
institutional and legal framework that sustain private sector committed to the LIG housing 
delivery.  
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Chapter 8 
8.0 Low-income housing policy strategy outcomes from the 
experience of households in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter examines the modalities of implementation of the low-income 
housing policy (LIHP) delivery strategy in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja. Similarly, this 
Chapter presents the outcomes of the context discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. This means 
that the composition of the countries institutional structures and agents stands to represent 
the similarities and differences in low-income group (LIG) experiences in the two 
countries under study. The essence of this Chapter is to establish the outcome of the 
strategy as whether it is successful or otherwise, how it has deepen and expand the housing 
of LIG. The Chapter first begins with the examination of the Kuala Lumpur householders‘ 
experiences and thereafter the Abuja case is presented.  
8.2 The study context in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
From Chapter 2 indicates the need to consider the impacts of a housing policy strategy on 
the LIG. This is to be consistent with previous studies that LIHP strategy are usually 
followed up with an impact analysis (Milligan, Dieleman, & Kempen, 2006).  The advent 
of this strategy is further intended to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and broaden the 
provision to all and sundry in the society. This is on the account of private-sector 
capability to serve consumers beyond the reach of public-sector and their ability to reach 
out the market demand through innovation, flexibility and economical solutions (UN-
Habitat, 2006; UNCHS, 1996). The Chapter presentation, therefore, focuses on LIG 
experiences under the strategy and demonstrates its impact. The JV partnership constitutes 
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a booster to government political slogan of achieving ‗home owning democracy‘, by 
generating substantial supply of LIG housing. The policy implementation literature 
emphasised that the policy outcome or area of focus constitutes the source of examination, 
to be able to identify a policy impacts (Bushouse, 2011). The following sections cover the 
details on the household‘s experiences in the case study cities of Kuala Lumpur and Abuja, 
first examining Kuala Lumpur and then followed by Abuja. 
8.3. Case study- Kuala Lumpur 
The following subsections represent the findings of this study based on data collected from 
the LIG householders in Kuala Lumpur. 
8.3.1 Socio-economic background of respondents in Kuala Lumpur 
Of the 500 household‘s respondents interviewed the result shows that heads of such 
households were fathers with three quarters of all the respondents and across the housing 
estates the distribution are not distinctively different (Table 8.1). The remaining one 
quarter was shared between mother (5.2%); single parent (about 2%) and father passed 
away (widow as head of the family) (Table 8.1). However, there are a significant 
percentage of bachelors, 17% were found to be in this group (Table 8.1). The significant 
proportion of bachelors could be attributed to the present mean age at first marriage for 
males and females to be 28.0 and 25.7 years respectively (DSM, 2011). The pattern is 
consistent with the social order of the society that recognizes the father as the head of the 
household and head of households has a social responsibility to make provision of a house 
for the family.  
According to the age ranges of the head of households, a substantial majority (77%) were 
between 26 to 50 years and 15% accounts for those above 50 years (Table 8.1). 
307 
 
Specifically, the majority were from age range of 26-40 years with almost half (about 
47%) of the total respondents. On the other hand, the same pattern of distribution of the 
age range of between 26-50 years according to the housing estates shows that the 
distribution obtained range between the least (68%) and highest (85%) recorded in Seri 
Malaysia Apartment and Desa Tasik respectively (Table 8.1). The age of the head of 
household is important in the housing policy discourse as it is used as one of the 
characteristics of the household to qualify low-income earner within Kuala Lumpur. 
Similarly, this is consistent with the city age group reported in DBKL (2003) and DSM 
(2011) that this same group constitute more than 70% of the Kuala Lumpur population and 
increasing proportion of the aged population.  
Similarly, the Table 8.1 present the data result on the household of the respondents and the 
size of the household has implication on the housing space requirement. For the household 
size, the modal size 3-4 accounts for about 45% of all the respondents; the 5-6 accounts for 
another about 34% and two combined accounting for about 80%. The 1-2 and over 6-
person households account for 9.8 and 11.8 respectively (Table 8.1). The distribution 
according to the housing estates shows the regularity of the pattern across the estates that 
the modal size accounting for the highest percentages, except in Desa Tasik (Table 8.1). 
While on the proportion of the number of household members within the age range, the 
result shows that one or two members within the age brackets predominate across the age 
ranges and of all the respondents, the age range of 26-40 accounting for about 70% (Table 
8.2). This household size and structure represent a typical urban household in Malaysia 
(Mahari, 2011). 
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Table 8.1: Percentage of head, age range and size of household distribution of the 
Kuala Lumpur respondents 
 Housing Estates  
 
Total 
Freq.   % 
Seri Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Head of 
household 
Father 
Mother 
Father passed 
away 
Single parent 
Bachelor 
 
 
83 
4 
 
- 
3 
9 
 
 
64 
7 
 
1 
3 
23 
 
 
75 
8 
 
- 
- 
16 
 
 
79 
3 
 
- 
2 
16 
 
 
72 
4 
 
- 
- 
21 
 
 
380 
26 
 
1 
8 
85 
 
 
74.6 
5.2 
 
0.2 
1.6 
17.0 
N 100 100 100 100 100 500  
Age range of 
head of 
household 
18-25 
26-40 
41-50 
51-58 
>58 
 
 
 
6 
38 
30 
19 
7 
 
 
 
13 
52 
25 
9 
1 
 
 
 
3 
49 
36 
9 
3 
 
 
 
1 
45 
39 
14 
1 
 
 
 
13 
51 
22 
11 
3 
 
 
 
36 
235 
152 
62 
15 
 
 
 
7.2 
47.0 
30.4 
12.4 
3.0 
N 100 100 100 100 100 500  
Size of household 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
>6 
 
19 
41 
26 
14 
 
11 
46 
37 
6 
 
6 
38 
39 
17 
 
4 
48 
37 
11 
 
9 
51 
29 
11 
 
49 
224 
168 
59 
 
9.8 
44.8 
33.6 
11.8 
N 100 100 100 100 100 500  
 
Table 8.2: Percentage of household member’s distribution between the age groups in 
Kuala Lumpur 
Number of 
members 
Household members’ age groups (years) (%) 
<1-6 7-12 13-17 18-25 26-40 41-50 51-58 >58 
(N=187) (N=172) (N=155) (N=228) (N=343) (N=171) (N=76) (N=22) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
13 
58.3 
32.6 
7.5 
1.1 
0.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
61.0 
28.9 
6.4 
- 
0.6 
0.6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
59.4 
31.6 
7.1 
1.3 
0.6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
43.4 
29.8 
10.5 
9.6 
3.1 
- 
- 
1.3 
- 
0.4 
0.4 
37.3 
50.1 
7.9 
2.9 
0.3 
0.9 
0.3 
- 
0.3 
- 
- 
60.8 
37.4 
1.2 
0.6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
57.9 
42.1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
68.2 
31.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Total (N=500) 37.4 34.4 31.0 45.6 68.6 34.2 15.2 4.4 
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The ethnicity and religion are very important variables in Malaysia and has implication on 
the approach to the allocation and privileges in low-cost housing affordability and 
accessibility (Agus, 1989; 2002b). The distribution of respondents‘ analysis in term of 
ethnicity groups reflects the ethnic composition in the housing estates and generally in 
Kuala Lumpur, where after the NEP there is a significant influx of Malays into Kuala 
Lumpur from rural areas (Agus, Doling & Lee, 2002; A. A. G. Hassan, 2004; N. Hassan, 
2009). From the distribution of the responses of all the 500 respondents shows that the 
majority were Malays (91%), while Chinese and Indians account for 4.2 and 4.0 
respectively (Table 8.2). The ethnic composition in all the housing estates shows 
dominance of Malay as the majority, with more than four-fifth in composition and 
corresponding to the national ethnic composition (Table 8.3). Though Malays are the 
majority ethnic group in the country, there are Chinese who constitute a significant 
minority as well as Indians.  
Similarly, consistent with the ethnicity distribution, the result obtained shows that Islam 
was the dominant religion with 92%, the remaining respondents subscribe to religions of 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism (Table 8.3). The distribution across the housing 
estates shows the same pattern of distribution having Islam as the dominant religion of the 
households (Table 8.3). Generally, the Malays are Muslims, Chinese are mostly Buddhists 
and most Indians are Hindus. The variation percentages between ethnicity and religion are 
attributable to the fact that the religion of Islam is equally practice by other ethnic groups 
in the country, other than Malays only. 
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Table 8.4: Percentage of ethnicity and religion distribution of the Kuala Lumpur 
respondents 
 Housing Estates  
Total 
 
Freq.         % 
Seri Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Ethnicity 
Malay  
Chinese  
Indian  
      Iban 
 
95 
3 
2 
- 
 
90 
3 
6 
1 
 
93 
2 
4 
1 
 
91 
5 
4 
- 
 
87.9 
7.1 
4.0 
1.0 
 
456 
20 
20 
3 
 
91.4 
4.0 
4.0 
0.6 
Religion 
Islam 
Buddhism 
Hinduism 
Christianity 
Others 
 
95 
2 
2 
1 
- 
 
91 
1 
4 
3 
1 
 
96 
1 
1 
2 
- 
 
90 
1 
4 
5 
- 
 
90 
1 
3 
6 
- 
 
462 
6 
14 
17 
1 
 
92.4 
1.2 
2.8 
3.4 
0.2 
 
In consideration of the occupation of the respondents, the general trend found to be that the 
respondents were identified to be in various occupations, with more than 90% employed. A 
household having a source of income has been recognised in housing literature as a critical 
factor in relation to accessibility and affordability in the housing market (Leung & Tsang, 
2012).The distribution of the 464 employed respondents from the study data result shows 
that the majority (about 63%) of the respondents were employed in the private sector, 25% 
were employees of government and 12% to be self-employed (Table 8.4). The same trend 
found in all the housing estates respondents with more than four-fifth to be employed and 
majority employed in the private sector (Table 8.4).  Furthermore, the Table 8.4 indicate 
that the respondents earning a monthly income of RM2,500 and below constituted 82%; 
while about 18% of respondents earned above RM2,500. This high concentration of the 
respondents earning a monthly income of RM2,500 and below is an indication of income 
group that occupies these housing estates in Kuala Lumpur are in LIG. The findings 
illustrate that the LIG at the estates are even, with all the housing estates having more than 
three-quarters as LIG beneficiaries.  
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Considering these outcomes in terms of previous research suggests that the strategy was 
reaching out to the housing demand of the LIG in Kuala Lumpur. The patterns in broad 
terms are similar to the work of Abd Aziz (2007); Abd Aziz, Hanif & Ahmad (2008); 
Ahmad, Abd Aziz, Hanif & Ahmad (2012) . What this finding suggests to is that in Kuala 
Lumpur the empowered LIG has developed over a significant period of time, due to 
government concerted policies over the past decades ago.  
On the other hand, of the 36 that responded that were not employed, been due to age factor 
of either being younger or older, were receiving support in the form of monthly pension, 
siblings and parents' assistance. In addition to, others were receiving support of less 
importance comes to them from social welfare and in-laws (Table 8.4). The analysis of 
head of household age group, sex, employment and income of the respondents provides the 
basis for a further analysis of LIG housing outcome, on how the policy implementation 
proves to be one of achieving its policy objectives. 
Table 8.5: Percentage of economic background distribution of the Kuala Lumpur 
respondents 
 
Economic background 
Housing Estates Total 
 
 
                        Freq.      
% 
Seri Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Employment 
Yes 
No 
 
91 
9 
 
97 
3 
 
96 
4 
 
93 
7 
 
87 
13 
 
464 
36 
 
92.8 
7.2 
Sector of employment 
Government 
Private 
Self-employed 
 
28.6 
56.0 
15.4 
 
29.6 
57.7 
12.4 
 
26.0 
59.4 
14.6 
 
19.4 
66.7 
14.0 
 
23.0 
73.6 
3.4 
 
118 
290 
56 
 
25.4 
62.5 
12.1 
Monthly income 
<RM750 
RM751-1200 
RM1201-2500 
RM2500-3500 
>RM3500 
 
2.2 
6.6 
62.6 
18.7 
9.9 
 
3.1 
12.4 
71.1 
10.3 
3.1 
 
1.0 
21.9 
56.2 
18.8 
2.1 
 
3.2 
22.6 
50.5 
20.4 
3.2 
 
2.3 
27.6 
67.8 
1.1 
1.1 
 
11 
84 
286 
65 
18 
 
2.4 
18.1 
61.6 
14.0 
3.9 
Source of support for 
family 
Parents 
Siblings 
Social welfare/Government 
Pension 
In-laws 
 
 
- 
77.8 
- 
22.2 
- 
 
 
25 
- 
- 
75 
- 
 
 
- 
50 
- 
50 
- 
 
 
- 
42.9 
- 
57.1 
- 
 
 
50 
8.3 
8.3 
25 
8.3 
 
 
7 
13 
1 
14 
1 
 
 
19.4 
36.1 
2.8 
38.9 
2.8 
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8.3.2 Accessibility to housing unit’s acquisition in Kuala Lumpur 
The responses of all the respondents obtained indicate that more than 50% and about 48% 
of the respondents as owner-occupiers and renters respectively and the purchase were 
made during the last 10 years ago (Table 8.5). In all the housing estates, except in Mutiara 
Magna and Seri Panara Apartment, there were more owners than tenants (Table 8.5). 
Perhaps, this suggests that the house owners utilise their houses for investment. It is also 
alleged that the LIG let out their low cost units and become squatters in other areas (Sufian 
& Mohamad, 2009), though this is debatable considering the government frantic efforts of 
eradicating squatter enclaves in the city. The major finding of the study shows that there 
were renting tenants in all the housing estates units studied, to almost a level of equal 
numbers of the owner occupiers. Of the 500 respondents, 243 representing 48% were 
found to be renters. Against an earlier study reported in Sufian & Mohamad (2009) that 1/3 
of the occupiers of Kampung Kerinci Pantai in Kuala Lumpur were tenants, our findings 
indicate that the renters are on the increase in low-cost housing units in Kuala Lumpur. 
This is significant against the background of the number of migrant workers in Kuala 
Lumpur (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2012). Unlike Doha (Rizzo, 2013) and Singapore (Sze & 
Sovacool, 2013) where provision has been made to accommodate a similar influx of 
migrant workers, in Kuala Lumpur, there had not been specific housing provision made to 
accommodate them. The most viable accommodation for them is the low-cost housing 
units. Since, all these low-cost housing estates are within less than 15 kilometres from the 
city centre, the farthest is Mutiara Fadason with a distance of 11.2 kilometres, while Suria 
Magna has been just of a distance of less than one kilometre. Furthermore, the remaining 
three housing estates are located within these two extremes. Interestingly, all these housing 
estates have public transport connection and it takes about a maximum of 30 minutes to the 
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Kuala Lumpur central. Consequently, as such became very attractive for tenants in the city 
and could be reason of this bulk of renters in these case study housing estates.  
Table 8.5: Percentage of status and duration of occupation of the Kuala Lumpur 
respondents 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
 
Freq     % 
 Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Status of 
occupation 
Owner-occupier 
Tenant  
 
 
68 
32 
 
 
42 
58 
 
 
52 
48 
 
 
52 
48 
 
 
43 
57 
 
 
257 
243 
 
 
51.4 
48.6 
Duration of 
occupation 
<1 Year 
1-5 Years 
6-10 Years 
>10 Years 
 
 
27 
72 
1 
- 
 
 
15 
77 
8 
- 
 
 
16 
53 
30 
1 
 
 
8 
42 
48 
2 
 
 
29 
70 
1 
- 
 
 
95 
314 
88 
3 
 
 
19.0 
62.8 
17.6 
0.6 
From the responses of the 257 respondents that were owner-occupiers the data result shows 
at the time of purchase, about 90% indicated that their incomes falls between RM750 and 
RM2,500 per month (Table 8.6). This is a major finding of the study in relation to Abuja 
context. The data represent an indication that the housing allocation goes to the target 
beneficiaries of the LIG. 
Similarly, further findings from the same group of respondents indicate that about 60% 
obtained the housing units from the private developers. While the other significant 
percentage of 39% claimed to have made the acquisition through government sources 
(Figure 8.1). This collaborate with the prices on the  purchase, as only half of the 
respondents claimed to have purchase the housing units at the government controlled 
prices (Table 8.5). The level of prosperity enjoyed in the country suggest so LIG 
Malaysians could acquire spacious housing units with the increase in income. Additionally, 
finding shows the effect of a government effort to rationalise the allocation through 
maintaining an open registration register that document all of those who are in need of 
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such houses by limiting the favouritism that allows the houses to fall into the hands of non-
target income groups (Shuid, 2010).  
 
Figure 8.1: Source and price of houses acquisition by the owner occupier in Kula 
Lumpur 
 
Table 8.6: Percentage of income at the time of house purchase and present of the 
Kuala Lumpur respondents 
 
Monthly 
income 
 
Housing Estates  
 
Total 
Seri Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Before Now  Before Now  Before Now  Before Now  Before Now  Before 
Freq.   % 
Now 
Freq.   %  
<RM750 
RM751-
1200 
RM1201-
2500 
RM2500-
3500 
>RM3500 
1.7 
 
11.9 
 
64.4 
 
13.6 
8.5 
2.2 
 
6.6 
 
62.6 
 
18.7 
9.9 
- 
 
26.8 
 
68.3 
 
2.4 
2.4 
3.1 
 
12.4 
 
71.1 
 
10.3 
3.1 
4.1 
 
18.4 
 
65.3 
 
12.2 
- 
1.0 
 
21.9 
 
56.2 
 
18.8 
2.1 
- 
 
50.0 
 
37.0 
 
10.9 
2.2 
3.2 
 
22.6 
 
50.5 
 
20.4 
3.2 
2.4 
 
63.4 
 
34.1 
 
- 
- 
2.3 
 
27.6 
 
67.8 
 
1.1 
1.1 
4 
 
76 
 
129 
 
20 
7 
1.7 
 
32.2 
 
54.7 
 
8.5 
3.0 
11 
 
84 
 
286 
 
65 
18 
2.4 
 
18.1 
 
61.6 
 
14.0 
3.9 
Total           236 100 500 100 
 
315 
 
8.3.3 Financing housing units’ acquisition in Kuala Lumpur 
The method of housing financing among the LIG, is a factor that occupies an important 
position in most countries' housing policies, as a vehicle to drive the attainment of policies 
goals and objectives (Datta & Jones, 2001).  The issues of concern in housing financing are 
its affordability and availability to both the governments, developers and society. In 
Malaysia, the banking industry has lent enormous sums of money into the property sector. 
Direct property lending has been up to 36% and indirect property lending could be even 
more (Usilappan, 2006). The housing-related assistance such as EPF contributed 
significantly in improving the LIG participation in Malaysia, as it is the practice in most of 
the Asian countries, modelling after Singapore experience (Yeung & Howes, 2006). 
However, in Nigeria such alternative was not in existence.  This shows the effect of the 
low-income housing policy in Malaysia, as one characterised with extensive subsidies and 
incentives on the supply side to reach out to the target beneficiaries. 
In the mode of payment, from the study result, over 75% of the respondents made the 10% 
deposit first and later paid by instalments (Table 8.7) and for the distribution across the 
housing estates (Table 8.7). This is finding is consistent with the Sale and Purchase 
Agreement where the buyers were required to pay 10% of the amount of purchase as 
deposit of the house price. The subsequent financing of the unit purchase came from 
savings, banks and EFP, employer, government (Table 8.7). Similarly, the result shows 
that the major sources of acquisition were from private developers and government (Table 
8.7). The buyer‘s mistaken government as the developer as such counted government as 
source of purchase. This is because it is discovered the allocation approvals to purchase the 
housing units are handled by the CHKL Department of Housing Management.  
Furthermore, the result of survey data (Table 8.7) shows that about the entire respondent 
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(92%) did not face financial difficulties in making the acquisition.  This is contrary to 
Gnanarajah (1997)  where it was expressed the difficulties faced by LIG in obtaining 
finance to make purchase as a major issue in housing delivery in Malaysia. This is not 
surprising because, in Malaysia, to ensure the participation of the LIG, the financing of 
house purchase, the interest rate was fixed at 4 and 5% repayable in 25 years. The most 
common criterion for property purchase in Malaysia is that the monthly mortgage 
instalment should not be more than one-third of the gross monthly household income, 
which defines income ‗affordability‘. Different financial institutions in Malaysia have 
different criteria in calculating the repayment capacity, however, most work on the basis of 
1/3
rd
 of gross household income for mortgage expenses, and the margin of financing can 
go as high as 95% of the value of the house and the length of a loan can range from 30 
years or until the borrower reaches age 65 (Said, 2010).The findings are consistent with 
other studies that argued housing finance is available to most of Malaysians thus making 
them capable to have their own house (Said, 2010; Usilappan, 2006; Warnock & Warnock, 
2008). 
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Table 8.7: Percentage of processes of house acquisition by the owner occupiers among 
Kuala Lumpur respondents 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
 
Freq       % 
 Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Sources of 
financing 
Personal saving 
Bank loan 
Employees 
Provident Fund 
Government Loan 
 
 
8.8 
83.8 
 
- 
7.4 
 
 
2.4 
71.4 
 
- 
26.2 
 
 
1.9 
75.0 
 
1.9 
21.2 
 
 
- 
71.2 
 
1.9 
26.9 
 
 
- 
74.4 
 
2.3 
23.3 
 
 
8 
195 
 
3 
51 
 
 
3.1 
75.9 
 
1.2 
19.8 
Availability of 
financing 
Yes 
No  
 
 
79.4 
20.6 
 
 
81.0 
19.0 
 
 
80.8 
19.2 
 
 
86.5 
13.5 
 
 
97.7 
2.3 
 
 
217 
40 
 
 
84.4 
15.6 
Upfront payments 
made 
None  
1-5% 
6-10% 
11-20% 
>50% 
 
 
6.5 
3.2 
74.2 
3.2 
12.9 
 
 
2.4 
- 
97.6 
- 
- 
 
 
3.9 
2.0 
90.2 
3.9 
- 
 
 
1.9 
- 
96.2 
1.9 
- 
 
 
19.0 
- 
76.2 
4.8 
- 
 
 
16 
3 
214 
7 
8 
 
 
6.5 
1.2 
86.3 
2.8 
3.2 
Terms of financing 
Offer guarantor 
Employer as 
guarantor 
On no term 
 
59.7 
 
- 
40.3 
 
14.6 
 
- 
85.4 
 
13.7 
 
2.0 
84.3 
 
19.2 
 
- 
80.8 
 
14.3 
 
- 
85.7 
 
66 
 
1 
181 
 
26.6 
 
0.4 
73.0 
Methods of loan 
repayment 
Monthly salary 
deduction 
Monthly instalment 
payment  
Yearly instalment 
payment 
 
 
 
8.1 
 
91.9 
 
- 
 
 
 
31.7 
 
65.9 
 
2.4 
 
 
 
19.6 
 
78.4 
 
2.0 
 
 
 
28.8 
 
71.2 
 
- 
 
 
 
26.2 
 
73.8 
 
- 
 
 
 
54 
 
192 
 
2 
 
 
 
21.8 
 
77.4 
 
0.8 
Problems of 
repayment 
Yes  
No  
 
 
16.1 
83.9 
 
 
7.3 
92.7 
 
 
13.7 
86.3 
 
 
1.9 
98.1 
 
 
- 
100 
 
 
21 
227 
 
 
8.5 
91.5 
Receiving housing 
allowance 
Yes  
No  
 
 
24.2 
75.8 
 
 
15.5 
84.5 
 
 
20.8 
79.2 
 
 
18.3 
81.7 
 
 
19.5 
80.5 
 
 
91 
373 
 
 
19.6 
80.4 
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Table 8.8: Percentage of period of occupation and acquisition of the Kuala Lumpur 
respondents 
 Housing Estates Total 
Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Duration of 
occupation 
<1 Year 
1-5 Years 
6-10 Years 
>10 Years 
 
 
27 
72 
1 
- 
 
 
15 
77 
8 
- 
 
 
16 
53 
30 
1 
 
 
8 
42 
48 
2 
 
 
29 
70 
1 
- 
 
 
19.0 
62.8 
17.6 
0.6 
When purchase 
made 
<1 Year 
1-5 Years 
6-10 Years 
>10 Years 
 
 
10.3 
89.7 
- 
- 
 
 
2.4 
90.5 
7.1 
- 
 
 
5.8 
34.6 
55.8 
3.8 
 
 
1.9 
13.5 
80.8 
3.8 
 
 
14.0 
83.7 
2.3 
- 
 
 
7.0 
62.3 
29.6 
1.6 
 
Of the owner occupiers, seven (7) were established to have purchased the units neither 
from the government or developers, but from individual owners at the open market price, 
and the prices range between RM46, 000 to more than RM76,000 (Table 8.9). This kind of 
transactions is allowed in Malaysia context, most especially when the transaction took 
place over the minimum period allowable to the owner for sale. The minimum period was 
ten years, but the government has reduced such period to 5 years. The bulk of renters about 
90 % sources of the houses for renting were from individual owners (Table 8.9). The 
probable reasons why there were these large numbers of tenants could be attributed to the 
status of the KL attracting influx of migrant workers, owners have bought units elsewhere 
and rent out their low cost units or could be the owners were no longer resident in the city. 
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Table 8.9: Transactions in low-cost housing units in Kuala Lumpur 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
 
Freq.     % 
Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Sale/price at purchase 
RM46,000-RM55,000 
RM56,000-RM76,000 
>RM76,000 
 
1 
- 
- 
 
- 
1 
- 
 
- 
1 
3 
 
- 
- 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
1 
2 
4 
 
Source of rental 
Employer 
An individual owner 
Extended family member 
Hostel 
Estate agent 
 
- 
93.8 
3.1 
- 
3.1 
 
1.7 
98.3 
- 
- 
- 
 
2.1 
97.9 
- 
- 
- 
 
2.1 
95.8 
2.1 
- 
- 
 
- 
94.7 
1.8 
3.5 
- 
 
3 
234 
3 
2 
1 
 
1.2 
96.3 
1.2 
0.8 
0.4 
 
8.3.4 Extent of Satisfaction of joint venture housing estates in Kuala Lumpur 
Housing satisfaction refers to household appraisal of the conditions of their housing 
environment, in relation to their needs, expectations and achievements. The level of 
satisfaction could be determined according to primary and secondary satisfaction as 
defined in Jamaluddin (2005). The primary satisfaction relates to the physical aspects of 
the dwelling, while the secondary aspects relates to the neighbourliness of the dwelling. In 
this study the residents‘ satisfaction with their dwelling was explored.  
Across all the housing estates the study found that 80% respondents were satisfied with 
their houses (Table 8.9). The results show that, in general, the respondents are quite 
satisfied with their dwelling. The table also shows the results of which aspects of the 
housing environment have the most impact on resident satisfaction. In fact, the study of 
Salleh (2008) on the private developer housing estates shows that neighbourhood factors 
were the dominant factors that determine the levels of residential satisfaction. This study 
shows a change that Malays are satisfied with their dwelling than an earlier position 
reported of dissatisfaction in Sulaiman & Yahaya (1987). The satisfactory satisfaction 
among the respondents is in line with the literature, both in public and private low-cost 
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housing in Malaysia (Mohit et al., 2010; Mohit & Nazyddah, 2011; Salleh, 2008, 2012; 
Salleh & Badarulzaman, 2012).   
The study also investigates the level of satisfaction of common facilities in the housing 
estates. The study found that the respondents were satisfied with all the estate's facilities 
except the parking space. From Table 8.10, it can be observed that other than a parking 
space, the majority of the respondents were satisfied with the children's playgrounds, place 
of worship (for Muslims) and shopping centres. The problem of parking space became an 
unresolved issue in the country‘s low-income housing policy, where only 1:4 provisions 
are made in the CHKL planning policy document. The LIHP in Malaysia the issue of 
parking space has received attention on the ways to ameliorate.  The Mutiara housing units 
are with 650 square feet and comprise of 3 bedrooms and 2 bathrooms. The only facilities 
provided are 500 parking spaces and lifts. Among major problems of the housing estate 
was parking space as there are 500 parking spaces for approximately 5000 residents, which 
is apparently not enough, considering that the study have established high rate of car 
ownership among the study respondents (Table 8.11). This is consistent with the overall 
national average of 1,137 private motorcars and motorcycle ownership  per 1,000 in 2011 
as reported in EPU (2012). 
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Table 8.10: Extent of satisfaction among the respondents in PPP housing estates in 
Kuala Lumpur (%) 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
 
 
Freq.   % 
Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Extent of satisfaction 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
3 
69 
 
15 
10 
3 
 
- 
84 
 
8 
7 
1 
 
- 
68 
 
17 
15 
- 
 
1 
89 
 
3 
7 
- 
 
- 
86 
 
8 
6 
- 
 
4 
396 
 
51 
45 
4 
 
0.8 
79.2 
 
10.2 
9.0 
0.8 
Religious place of 
worship 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
 
25 
70 
 
4 
- 
1 
 
 
5 
90 
 
3 
1 
1 
 
 
2 
94 
 
2 
4 
14 
 
 
1 
88 
 
4 
6 
1 
 
 
1 
85 
 
14 
- 
- 
 
 
34 
427 
 
27 
8 
4 
 
 
6.8 
85.4 
 
5.4 
1.6 
0.8 
Children's playground 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
17 
58 
 
17 
7 
1 
 
3 
71 
 
20 
6 
- 
 
- 
55 
 
26 
19 
- 
 
1 
92 
 
5 
2 
- 
 
- 
83 
 
8 
8 
1 
 
21 
359 
 
76 
42 
2 
 
4.2 
71.8 
 
15.2 
8.4 
0.4 
Parking space 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
9 
46 
 
11 
31 
3 
 
1 
14 
 
7 
56 
22 
 
- 
10 
 
2 
54 
34 
 
2 
63 
 
7 
28 
- 
 
- 
74 
 
3 
20 
3 
 
12 
207 
 
30 
189 
62 
 
2.4 
41.4 
 
6.0 
37.8 
12.4 
Shopping/community 
centre 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
 
18 
58 
 
8 
11 
5 
 
 
6 
85 
 
8 
1 
- 
 
 
6 
79 
 
7 
8 
- 
 
 
20 
76 
 
3 
1 
- 
 
 
36 
64 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
86 
362 
 
26 
21 
5 
 
 
17.2 
72.4 
 
5.2 
4.2 
1.0 
Location to place of 
business 
Yes 
No  
 
 
63.7 
36.3 
 
 
75.3 
24.7 
 
 
64.6 
35.4 
 
 
73.1 
26.9 
 
 
74.7 
25.3 
 
 
326 
138 
 
 
70.3 
29.7 
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Table 8.11: Percentage of means of transport of the Kuala Lumpur respondents 
Means of 
transport 
Housing Estates Total 
 
 
Freq.          % 
Seri 
Malaysia 
Apartment 
Seri Penara 
Apartment 
Fasa 6, 
Desa 
Tasik 
Mutiara 
Fadason 
Mutiara 
Magna 
Own a vehicle 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
98 
2 
 
 
94 
6 
 
 
93 
7 
 
 
96 
4 
 
 
87 
13 
 
 
468 
32 
 
 
93.6 
6.4 
 Car 
None  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
13.3 
62.2 
60.6 
22.3 
- 
- 
1.0 
 
11.7 
60.6 
22.3 
2.1 
2.1 
1.1 
- 
 
8.6 
65.6 
20.4 
5.4 
- 
- 
- 
 
16.7 
61.5 
20.8 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
19.5 
64.4 
13.8 
2.3 
- 
- 
- 
 
65 
294 
94 
11 
2 
1 
1 
 
13.9 
62.8 
20.1 
2.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
Lorry 
None  
1 
 
100 
- 
 
97.9 
2.1 
 
100 
- 
 
100 
- 
 
98.9 
1.1 
 
465 
3 
 
99.4 
0.6 
Van  
None 
1 
 
96.9 
3.1 
 
100 
- 
 
98.9 
1.1 
 
100 
- 
 
100 
- 
 
464 
4 
 
99.1 
0.9 
Motorbike 
None 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
29.6 
54.1 
11.2 
4.1 
1.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
43.6 
42.6 
10.6 
- 
- 
3.2 
- 
- 
 
37.6 
47.3 
9.7 
3.2 
1.1 
1.1 
- 
- 
 
51.0 
36.5 
7.3 
2.1 
2.1 
- 
- 
- 
 
52.9 
32.2 
8.0 
4.6 
1.1 
- 
1.1 
- 
 
200 
200 
44 
13 
5 
4 
1 
1 
 
42.7 
42.7 
9.4 
2.8 
1.1 
0.9 
0.2 
0.2 
 
The estate developer‘s estate plan was expected to make provision of one unit of parking 
space for every four number of low-cost housing units. The call for one-for-one parking 
unit has not been really realized in the low-cost housing development, as it requires more 
of the developable space to devote for parking space. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
respondents expressing dissatisfaction of parking space. The researcher observed the 
inadequate parking space created the problem of indiscriminate parking, obstructing traffic 
flows (Figure 8.2). On the playgrounds the researcher observed that the developers 
provides swings, seesaws, slides among others,  on the estates for the children to play and 
to be in proximity to their homes (Figure 8.3).  
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(A)       (B)   
Figure 8.2: Parking space at the basement (A) and indiscriminate parking (B) from 
the study sampled low-income housing estates in Kuala Lumpur 
 
(A)       (B) 
Figure 8.9: Children playground (A) and place of worship (mosque) (B) from the 
study sampled low-income housing estates in Kuala Lumpur 
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About two thirds of the respondents (65%) were satisfied with their place of residence in 
relation to their place of business (Table 8.10). The high incidence of means of transport 
among the respondent can be interpreted as a factor explaining the level of satisfaction and 
perhaps the dissatisfaction could be attributed to the tenants who were mostly migrant 
workers residents on the estates. The findings concur with the findings made earlier in the 
study area in both public and private developed housing estates cited above. 
8.4 Case study- Abuja (Nigeria) 
Similar to Kuala Lumpur, the following subsections represent the findings of this study 
based on data collected from the LIG householders in Abuja. 
8.4.1 Socio-economic background of respondents in Abuja 
The socio-economic background characteristics examined include gender and age of the 
head; household composition, occupation and income variables of the household. Unlike 
Kuala Lumpur, in Abuja the questions of ethnicity and religion are excluded, because their 
less significant effect on housing accessibility. More than two-thirds of the head of the 
households were fathers (Table 8.12). The research of Mabogunje (1990) quoted in 
Wapwera, Parsa, & Egbu (2011) reported that in Nigeria just like in most African societies, 
the male gender is the dominant heads of household and seen as moral guardians of the 
household. In consistence with this, the Nigerian cultural setting recognises fathers as head 
of households.  About 85% of the head of households ages range between 26 and 55 (Table 
8.12). It is also at these ages that families are formed and look forward to have a house of 
their own. Even in developed countries it was found that changes in the household 
composition act as important determinants of decisions to move into home ownership 
(Arland & Nordvik, 2009)(Gandelman, 2009). This perhaps supported the composition of 
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the study respondents, where more than three quarter of the respondents (about 78%) were 
found to have a household size of between 3 and 6, to seek for shelter on the basis of 
available tenures (Table 8.13). The distribution according to the age groups of members of 
the household is shown in Table 8.13.This household size and structure represent a typical 
urban household in Nigeria. A significant finding shows a remarkable percentage of 9 and 
11% as mothers and single parent as head of households respectively. This finding of the 
present study is supported by Gandelman (2009) study on some Latin America countries 
that women were found to be associated with lower probability to enter into home 
ownership, and on the other hand the study identified a higher probability associated with 
single family heads, separated or divorced women to enter into home ownership. 
Table 8.12: Percentage of head, age range and size of household distribution of the 
Abuja respondents 
 Housing Estates   
 
Total 
Freq.   % 
CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Head of household 
Father 
Mother 
Father passed away 
Single parent 
Bachelor 
 
54 
14 
7 
26 
- 
 
96 
- 
- 
4 
- 
 
73 
8 
3 
15 
3 
 
60 
20 
10 
10 
- 
 
83 
15 
- 
2 
- 
 
87 
- 
13 
- 
- 
 
301 
34 
16 
47 
2 
 
75.2 
8.5 
4.0 
11.8 
0.5 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100 
Age range of head of 
household 
<25 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
56-65 
>65 
 
 
1 
36 
25 
19 
17 
2 
 
 
- 
22 
29 
42 
7 
- 
 
 
3 
16 
50 
13 
19 
- 
 
 
10 
- 
40 
20 
20 
10 
 
 
2 
10 
37 
40 
12 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
23 
67 
10 
- 
 
 
6 
81 
133 
121 
55 
4 
 
 
1.5 
20.2 
33.2 
30.2 
13.8 
1.0 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100* 
Size of household 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
>6 
 
33 
45 
23 
- 
 
12 
52 
33 
3 
 
11 
51 
35 
3 
 
10 
55 
15 
20 
 
15 
40 
38 
7 
 
- 
57 
27 
17 
 
68 
191 
120 
18 
 
17.1 
48.1 
30.2 
4.5 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100* 
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Table 8.13: Distribution of household members between the age groups in Abuja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the employment status of the respondents, more 90% were found to be employed 
(Table 8.14) and majority in the government sector (51%), private sector (about 29%) and 
self-employed (about 20%). The finding reiterates the administrative function of Abuja. 
Abuja is an administrative capital of Nigeria; the majority of its resident was civil servants. 
Being wage employees, the respondents enjoy housing allowance to ameliorate the 
housing difficulties in the city. Similarly, almost the entire respondents fall above the 
Nigeria housing policy definition of LIG, as someone earning N100,000 or less per annum. 
On the other hand, the 32 households unemployed registered as respondents could be 
considered as either ageing or retired households, as more than 75% claimed to be 
supported by siblings, family relations or pension (Table 8.14). 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
members 
Age group (years) 
<1-5 6-18 19-25 26-45 46-55 >55 
None 56.5 32.0 69.0 31 31.0 87.5 
1 34.0 37.0 18.4 28 28.0 12.5 
2 9.0 26.0 9.8 38 38.0 0.3 
3 0.5 4.0 2.2 2.5 2.5 - 
4 - 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 - 
5 - - 0.2 - - - 
Total (N) 400 400 400 400 400 400 
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Table 8.14: Percentage of economic background distribution of the Abuja 
respondents 
 
Economic 
background 
Housing Estates  Total 
 
                      
Freq.   % 
CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Employment 
Yes 
No 
 
94 
6 
 
96 
4 
 
88 
12 
 
70 
30 
 
92 
8 
 
100 
- 
 
368 
32 
 
92.0 
8.0 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100 
Sector of employment 
Government 
Private 
Self-employed 
 
51 
22 
26 
 
54 
31 
15 
 
29 
51 
20 
 
57 
14 
29 
 
80 
13 
7 
 
40 
23 
37 
 
189 
105 
74 
 
51.4 
28.5 
20.1 
N 103 96 70 14 55 30 368 100 
Annual income 
N75,000-100,000 
>N100,000 
 
2 
99 
 
- 
100 
 
- 
100 
 
- 
100 
 
- 
100 
 
- 
100 
 
2 
364 
 
0.5 
99.5 
N 101 96 70 14 55 30 366 100 
Source of support for 
family 
Parents 
Siblings 
Extended family 
/Social relations 
Pension 
 
 
29 
42 
 
29 
- 
 
 
50 
- 
 
50 
- 
 
 
10 
30 
 
- 
60 
 
 
33 
- 
 
67 
- 
 
 
- 
60 
 
40 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
 
7 
9 
 
10 
6 
 
 
21.9 
28.1 
 
31.3 
18.8 
N 7 4 10 6 5 - 32 100 
 
8.4.2 Accessibility and acquisition of the mass housing scheme housing units in 
Abuja 
Housing ownership goes for a number of reasons (Megbolugbe & Linneman, 1993). 
Beyond the consumption value of home ownership, investment value occupies a primary 
position for obvious reasons and it is considered as such by many investors. Similar to 
Kuala Lumpur, in Abuja the findings show a reverse trend of distribution of the developed 
housing units under the MHS. From the responses of the 189 respondents that were owner-
occupiers the data result shows at the time of purchase, about 85% indicated that their 
income falls above the NHP income level of N100,000 per annum to be classified as LIG 
(Table 8.16). This is a major finding of the study in relation to Kuala Lumpur context. This 
means that the majority of low-cost housing beneficiaries were not in the LIG. The 
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distribution across the housing estates shows 100% except in CITEC and Sunnyvale (Table 
8.16). 
The findings indicate that more than 50% and about 48% of the respondents were found to 
be renters and owner-occupiers respectively (Table 8.15). The same pattern of distribution 
could be observed across all the housing estates, except in Saraha estate where the owner 
occupiers were more than the renters (Table 8.15). Similarly, it was found that more than 
two-third of the respondents was in occupation of the houses between 1 and 5 years (Table 
8.15). Perhaps this is so because renting in Abuja in most cases are for shorter duration and 
subject to renewal of the tenancy and about 90% sources of the houses for renting were 
from individual owners (Table 8.15).  
The MHS was based on the assumption that the city LIG would be able to secure financing 
from the banks and FMBN/PMIs. However, the findings of this study pointed to the fact 
the availability of such financing was seldom available to the cohort group. Apart from the 
reason of gross inadequacy, LIG could not afford bank loans or meet the bank lending 
conditions, particularly the high interest rate. Beyond the LIG housing, the financing 
directed at acquiring the MHS, fewer are mostly probably linked to mortgage financing, 
rather were based on ‗cash and carry‘ basis of financing. 
Instead, these findings suggest that the buyers are outside the cohort of LIG and it is this 
study speculation these buyers that many bought the houses are investors and did for 
investment, as the house serve as the available options of cost recovery. This compared to 
practice in Ghana where 40% of the Grant (2007) surveyed respondents bought their 
houses for investment. Similarly, there are quite a number of studies that reaffirm the 
position of the house serve as a source of income, even among the LIG, that part of their 
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premises serve as a means of diversifying their source of income (Sinai, 1998; Tipple et 
al., 1999). This study finding suggests that there are emerging investors acquiring the 
houses developed from the private developers in Abuja, and the houses are rented out 
immediately. Against the background of housing shortage among the LIG in Abuja, there 
is need to put forward measures to control the emergence of this trend in the interest of 
equity. 
Table 8.16: Percentage of responses on status and duration of occupation of the MHS 
housing estates, Abuja 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
Freq.   % 
CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Status of occupation 
Owner-occupier 
Tenant  
 
43 
57 
 
46 
54 
 
49 
51 
 
90 
10 
 
45 
55 
 
43 
57 
 
190 
210 
 
47.5 
52.5 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100 
Duration of 
occupation 
<1 Year 
1-5 Years 
6-10 Years 
 
 
39 
52 
9 
 
 
6 
86 
8 
 
 
14 
79 
8 
 
 
10 
90 
- 
 
 
12 
88 
- 
 
 
13 
87 
- 
 
 
73 
303 
24 
 
 
19.0 
62.8 
17.6 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30   
Source of rental 
Government 
Private Developer 
Employer 
An individual owner 
 
1 
4 
- 
94 
 
- 
9 
4 
87 
 
- 
7 
- 
97 
 
- 
40 
- 
60 
 
- 
14 
3 
83 
 
- 
- 
- 
100 
 
1 
18 
3 
188 
 
0.5 
8.6 
1.4 
89.5 
N 69 54 30 10 29 18 210 100 
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Table 8.16: Percentage of Abuja respondents’ income at the time of house purchase 
and now 
 
Annual 
income 
000 
Housing Estates Total 
CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Befo
-re 
No
w  
Befo
-re 
Now  Bef
ore 
Now  Befo
re 
No
w  
Befo
re 
Now  Befo
re 
Now Before 
 
Freq.   % 
Now 
 
Freq.   %  
<N50 
N501-
75 
N751-
100 
>N100 
2.4 
 
7.3 
 
51.2 
39.0 
- 
 
- 
 
2 
98 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
10
0 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
10
0 
3.3 
 
- 
 
10.0 
86.7 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
2 
 
3 
 
24 
160 
1 
 
2 
 
13 
85 
- 
 
 - 
 
2 
364 
- 
 
- 
 
0.5 
99.
5 
Total 
(N) 
41 101 46 96 50 70 10 14 30 55 12 30 189 100 366 100 
 
8.4.3 Financing of housing units acquisition in mass housing scheme, Abuja 
In home affordability income is critical to the LIG housing market participation, and more 
so under market-led delivery, where the developer motive is profit maximization. The 
financial availability constitutes a major challenge to LIG housing accessibility, 
availability and participation in developing countries. Using theoretical postulation that “... 
the way cities are built and their appearance reflect the way they are financed because 
methods of financing dictate modes of construction rather than the reverse” (Renaud, 
1987:30). Simply, the way Abuja city housing is financed is the way the city is developed. 
Equally, it has been a theoretical assumption that the availability of subsidies enhances 
LIG participation in housing delivery and thus the provision of small quantities of finance 
to LIG is capable to yield a significant inclusiveness of this cohort group in housing 
delivery (Datta & Jones, 2012). However, subsidised financing from the previous studies 
shows that such does not reach the cohort of poor and LIG, mostly such financing goes to 
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the high-and medium-income groups in developing countries (Okpala, 1994). Accordingly, 
against this background, the researcher studied Abuja LIHP in terms of financial support 
made available to market-agents and society.  
Further details of the data show only 3% used FMBN facilities to purchase the housing 
units. While 46% source the money from personal saving and assistance from relations, 
bank loan and employer financing account for 34 and 7% respectively (Table 8.17). The 
sources of financing distribution across the housing estates are shown in Table 8.16 
replicate the same pattern. In both shows the interplay of traditional source of housing for 
most Nigerians through accumulation of savings and assistance by borrowing from 
relations and friends occurring in the acquisition of houses on these estates. This concurs 
with similar finding in Nigeria made by Adegun & Taiwo (2011), in contrast to Kuala 
Lumpur. Hence, from this finding shows the most important sources of financing of 
housing acquisition among the respondents were own saving and loans from relations, 
contrary to Adegun & Taiwo (2011) claimed as preference, should be considered as last 
resort when one has no alternative. Other issues related to the financing of housing 
acquisition investigated included upfront payments, availability, terms of loan, methods of 
repayment and problems associated with the repayment (Table 8.17). The data in this table 
reinforces the problematic nature of housing finance systems not only in Abuja, but 
Nigeria as a whole, as one of the most pressing problems in LIG housing delivery. 
In a country where the civil servants earn a very low income and more than 70% of the 
population were poverty-stricken (Ewhrudjakpor, 2008; NBS, 2012). Even, with the 
presence of the commercial banks in the financing intermediaries, the financing from this 
source was in most cases short-term rather than on long term and considered as more of 
consumer loans rather mortgage financing. Hence, the financing was inappropriate for 
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housing purchase and worst still, the financing was unaffordable among the LIG, due to 
the stringent requirements and high interest rates that goes as much as 20-25% (Ojo & 
Ighalo, 2008). The financial institutions are reluctant to extend financial support to LIG for 
the perception of financial recklessness. Consequently, the MHS estates have emerged to 
be servicing the non-targeted socio-economic groups who are the ones who can afford to 
the spot prices payments.  
The Nigerian literature has shown at different times on the position of sources of financing 
for housing development and acquisition are generated through traditional and non-
conventional sources (Okpala, 1994; Udechukwu, 2008; Wapwera et al., 2011). Contrary 
to the believe of Mabogunje (2004) the finding demonstrate that the emphasis on cash and 
carry basis housing market has not changed with the LIHP that encourages home 
ownership through mortgage financing.  This study further strength the findings of Struyk 
& Roman (2008) which shows under nascent mortgage there is low-incidence of mortgage 
financing with about 25% and cash payment prevails with about 3 of every 4 house 
purchases in Cairo.  
Equally important, the inadequate mortgage availability, might be the explanation for a 
negligible number of LIG participating and dominance of the market by the emerging 
group of investors buying over the houses developed by the market. The finding contrast 
strongly to developed countries, where most first home owners and investors use mortgage 
funds to finance the purchase of properties.  
The study of Ndubueze (2009) finding indicates a ratio of about 3 to 5 Nigerian urban 
residents were having housing affordability problem. Similar researchers have shown that 
income level prove as the major factor that affect house purchase (Arimah, 1997; 
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Onibokun, 1990; Udechukwu, 2008) and sourcing of loans from formal financial 
institutions in Nigeria (Ojo & Ighalo, 2008).  From the study data, the annual income of the 
respondents at the time of house purchase and now obtained shows that the majority of the 
respondents (84.7%) earns more than N100,000 per annum (pa) and the remaining 15.3% 
earned less than NGN100,000 (Table 8.17). Furthermore, the same distribution is 
maintained across the case study housing estates, in fact, it is 100% in four of six the cases 
(Table 8.17). Using the NHP, 2006 income benchmark as to the definition of LIG, the 
result shows that the majority that bought the housing units are outside the bracket LIG. 
The result of this study showed that 3% of LIG receiving financing from the state subsidy 
financing was minimal considering the over ambitious programme of meeting the housing 
of the LIG through mortgage financing in the country. This singular finding highlights the 
difficulties that LIG have in reaching out to mortgage financing not only in Abuja but the 
whole country and even the little made available are laden with nepotism, corruption and 
exclusion of the masses (Udechukwu, 2008). The mortgage financing being currently 
developed shows that it lacks immediate relevance for the poor, despite much emphasis 
being placed on it in the current LIHP (UN-Habitat, 2005a) and insignificant (Okpala, 
1994; Wapwera et al., 2011). Moreover, under a neoliberal LIHP (Mitlin, 2011). Nubi & 
Oyalowo  (2010:15-16) argues that “... this review is based not on social consideration for 
Nigerian citizens, but on the drive to meet the housing need of very few high income 
earners who will take advantage of the low interest offered by the Fund compared to what 
the commercial banks offer.” Similarly, as in most African countries, it is high income 
groups and privileged individuals who eventually have access to these subsidised 
mortgaging financings, because of their privileged position in the society (Pillay & Naudé, 
2006; UN-Habitat, 2005b). 
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Table 8.17: Percentage of processes of house acquisition by the owner occupiers 
among Abuja respondents 
 Housing Estates Total 
 
 
Freq.% 
 CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Sale/price at purchase (in 
Millions) 
N1,500-1,999 
N2,000-2,499 
>N2,500 
 
 
12 
22 
66 
 
 
- 
- 
100 
 
 
- 
6 
94 
 
 
- 
- 
100 
 
 
- 
- 
100 
 
 
- 
- 
100 
 
 
5 
12 
173 
 
 
2.6 
6.3 
91.1 
N  41 46 50 10 31 12 190 100 
Source of purchase 
Government 
Private developer 
Employer 
Individual owner 
Others 
 
5 
90 
- 
2 
2 
 
- 
85 
- 
15 
- 
 
- 
80 
16 
4 
- 
 
20 
80 
- 
- 
- 
 
10 
81 
- 
10 
- 
 
- 
67 
- 
33 
- 
 
7 
157 
8 
17 
1 
 
3.7 
82.6 
4.2 
8.9 
0.5 
N  41 46 50 10 31 12 190 100* 
Sources of financing 
Personal saving 
Bank loan 
FMBN/Mortgage financing 
Employer financing/ Loan 
Family/Relations assistance 
 
27 
22 
46 
- 
5 
 
59 
41 
- 
- 
- 
 
8 
22 
42 
18 
10 
 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
 
71 
16 
13 
- 
- 
 
17 
42 
- 
- 
42 
 
68 
51 
46 
11 
14 
 
35.8 
26.8 
2.4 
5.8 
7.4 
N 41 46 50 10 31 12 190 100 
Availability of financing 
Yes 
No  
 
44 
56 
 
91 
9 
 
67 
33 
 
100 
- 
 
100 
- 
 
100 
- 
 
94 
43 
 
68.6 
31.4 
N 41 21 42 12 9 12 137 100 
Upfront payments made 
1-5% 
6-10% 
11-20% 
21-35% 
36-49% 
>50% 
 
- 
22 
34 
22 
2 
20 
 
- 
11 
15 
26 
9 
39 
 
4 
8 
54 
20 
8 
6 
 
- 
20 
- 
50 
20 
10 
 
- 
7 
13 
32 
19 
29 
 
- 
50 
8 
25 
- 
17 
 
2 
28 
53 
49 
17 
41 
 
1.1 
14.7 
27.9 
25.9 
8.9 
21.6 
N 41 
 
46 50 10 31 12 190 100* 
Terms of financing 
Offered a collateral 
Offered a guarantor 
Employer as guarantor 
On no term 
 
61 
35 
4 
- 
 
58 
42 
- 
- 
 
25 
40 
35 
- 
 
67 
33 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
86 
14 
 
- 
100 
- 
- 
 
34 
31 
14 
1 
 
42.5 
38.8 
17.5 
1.3 
N 23 19 20 8 7 5 80 100* 
Methods of loan repayment 
Monthly salary deduction 
Monthly instalment payment  
Yearly instalment payment 
 
11 
86 
3 
 
63 
37 
- 
 
29 
56 
15 
 
29 
71 
- 
 
56 
22 
22 
 
100 
- 
- 
 
39 
61 
9 
 
35.8 
56.0 
8.2 
N 28 19 41 7 9 5 109 100 
Problems of repayment 
Yes  
No  
 
 
48 
52 
 
 
38 
62 
 
 
20 
80 
 
 
60 
40 
 
 
- 
100 
 
 
- 
100 
 
 
42 
80 
 
 
34.4 
65.6 
N  29 21 41 10 11 10 122 100 
Receiving housing allowance 
Yes  
No  
 
74 
26 
 
52 
48 
 
55 
45 
 
64 
36 
 
79 
21 
 
- 
100 
 
178 
118 
 
60.1 
39.9 
N  76 82 56 11 52 19 296 100 
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8.4.4 Extent of Satisfaction of mass housing scheme housing estates in Abuja 
On the satisfaction, the researcher directly asked respondents to provide their own 
assessment of their self-perceived assessment of satisfaction of their housing units. Both 
the tenants and owner occupiers expressed satisfaction to their houses with 67% of the 
respondents and over 80% satisfied with the locations in relation to their place of business 
(Table 8.18). The geographic location of MHS was in better locations than the earlier 
housing projects at the early periods of Abuja development as further away from the city. 
This finding shows different findings to earlier work of Morah (1993) and Ukoha & 
Beamish (1997) in the city of Abuja. For instance, Ukoha & Beamish (1997) study 
respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their housing overall under the public sector 
housing provision. In a recent study of Jiboye (2009) on public housing in Lagos the 
tenant‘s satisfaction level with the management of the estates was below average. 
Similarly, this finding concurs with Salleh (2008) that private developers were providing 
satisfactory levels of housing units in Malaysia. Although, there are variations between the 
studied housing estates, the study respondents expressed slightly satisfaction with some 
common estate facilities, such as children's playgrounds, parking space and religious place 
of worship. However, more than one third (40%) indicated were not satisfied with 
shopping /community centres provided on the estates (Table 8.18). This is also similar to 
findings made by Salleh (2008) in Malaysia. 
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Table 8.18: Extent of satisfaction among the respondents in PPP housing estates in 
Abuja (%) 
 
 
Items 
Housing Estates Total 
 
 
 
Freq.   % 
CITEC EFAB Kabusa 
Garden 
Saraha Sunnyvale Yayale 
Ahmed 
Extent of satisfaction 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
13 
83 
 
5 
- 
- 
 
5 
64 
 
5 
23 
3 
 
6 
33 
 
35 
26 
- 
 
20 
80 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
5 
73 
 
2 
18 
2 
 
- 
93 
 
- 
7 
- 
 
31 
269 
 
39 
57 
4 
 
7.8 
67.2 
 
9.8 
14.2 
1.0 
N 110 100 80 20 60 30 400 100 
Religious place of 
worship 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
 
2 
5 
 
4 
4 
82 
 
 
12 
40 
 
30 
16 
2 
 
 
3 
28 
 
41 
26 
3 
 
 
45 
55 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
44 
31 
 
13 
6 
6 
 
 
10 
57 
 
7 
27 
- 
 
 
52 
112 
 
76 
52 
98 
 
 
13.3 
28.7 
 
19.5 
13.3 
25.1 
N 106 100 80 20 54 30 390 100* 
Children's playground 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
- 
2 
 
6 
4 
88 
 
- 
22 
 
35 
32 
11 
 
- 
23 
 
42 
32 
3 
 
45 
55 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
55 
40 
 
3 
2 
- 
 
- 
7 
 
20 
73 
- 
 
42 
79 
 
82 
84 
104 
 
10.7 
20.2 
 
21.0 
21.5 
26.6 
N 103 100 78 20 60 30 391 100 
Parking space 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
36 
63 
 
- 
- 
1 
 
23 
52 
 
6 
2 
17 
 
10 
29 
 
28 
26 
8 
 
20 
80 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
25 
62 
 
4 
9 
- 
 
- 
33 
 
10 
57 
- 
 
85 
200 
 
33 
45 
24 
 
22.0 
51.7 
 
8.5 
11.6 
6.2 
N 104 100 80 20 53 30 387 100 
Shopping/community 
centre 
Very satisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Very unsatisfactory 
 
 
42 
57 
 
- 
- 
1 
 
 
- 
- 
 
41 
50 
9 
 
 
- 
8 
 
16 
56 
20 
 
 
20 
30 
 
40 
10 
- 
 
 
- 
8 
 
4 
63 
25 
 
 
- 
17 
 
37 
47 
- 
 
 
48 
80 
 
75 
143 
39 
 
 
12.4 
20.8 
 
19.5 
37.1 
10.1 
N 104 100 80 20 51 30 385 100* 
Location to place of 
business 
Yes 
No  
 
 
91 
9 
 
 
98 
2 
 
 
64 
36 
 
 
86 
14 
 
 
98 
2 
 
 
83 
17 
 
 
329 
46 
 
 
87.7 
12.3 
N 102 98 75 14 56 30 375 100 
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There are other issues from the private developer participation in Abuja to raise doubts to 
the position of this finding that the private developers intervening has improved the level 
of housing satisfaction in Abuja. The MHS were provided with very little provision of 
community facilities, schools or shopping facilities. But against the background of public 
sector agencies reports that the houses produced by these developers were very poor 
because of the use of inferior and substandard building materials and infrastructures. In 
particular it is reported that “many of the buildings in the ... sites were poorly executed 
using poor materials” (Federal Capital Territory Administration., 2008-48). There were 
cases of buildings collapsing and demolishing of substandard houses on some of these 
estates by the DCD due to the earlier mentioned observations. In Abuja, just like the 
practice of Parshwanath Group in India (Mukhija, 2004) the houses were supplied to the 
housing market in the form of what the developers called ―carcass‖ , meaning without 
fixtures and finishes, to at least lower the development cost and make the houses 
affordable to buyers. It is the buyer who would later complete the house according to his 
financial strength and taste. Previous literature have reported this strategy by the private 
developers as a means to maximise profit and expectedly compromised satisfaction of the 
housing units (Mukhija, 2004; Rukwaro & Olima, 2003). In Abuja with a gross shortage of 
housing compounded by rapidly rising rents, overcrowding, large numbers of shared 
households and even homelessness (Ikeojifor,1997), the current housing status of the city 
makes most households feel satisfied when they have secured one as their residence. These 
reasons generated a positive high satisfaction percentage among the study respondents. 
This finding concur with Jansen (2012) that even with relatively poor housing quality high 
satisfaction can be obtained due to individual preferences. 
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8.5 Summary 
The LIHP under the PPP outcomes from the experience of households in Kuala Lumpur 
and Abuja in this Chapter reinforces the findings in the previous Chapter. In this context, 
the participation of LIG in the housing delivery was achieved with strong socio-economic 
fundamentals as well as the policy environment supported by a state political commitment 
to realise a home-owning democracy with both supply and demand incentives in Kuala 
Lumpur made a lot of difference in comparison to Abuja. The outcome in participation of 
the LIG in Kuala Lumpur unlike Abuja also shows a successful one by displaying their 
broader presence in the allocation and financing framework. Additionally, the 
fundamentals of prospering economy, economic opportunities, state commitment as well 
as cooperating private partners supported the positive outcomes found among the LIG 
participation in Kuala Lumpur than in Abuja. Indeed, such spurs LIG participation as well 
as deepening the policy aim to ensure that the LIG have access to affordable and decent 
housing in Kuala Lumpur.  
However, the success made by the Malaysia government in general in boosting the LIG 
housing delivery raised the concern when in recent time the government under the private 
developers pressure sending forth  new policy to change the 30% mandatory low-income 
to low-medium income housing in a housing development component needs a rethink. The 
success attained so far need to be maintained and sustain in the future of the LIG housing 
in the country. 
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Chapter 9 
9.0 Low-income housing policy in Malaysia and Nigeria: a 
critical comparative review and discussion 
―Surviving a failure gives you more self-confidence. Failures are great learning tools...‖ 
Jeffrey R. Immelt, (CEO, General Electric) quoted in Nadler (2007:24).  
9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter compared the findings made in Malaysia and Nigeria, based on the data 
presentations made in Chapters 6 to 8. The comparison of the research findings will be 
presented, in which the common and unique practices in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja will be 
highlighted. Once again, in this study the key research question is to address puzzle about 
why there were different trajectories in low-income housing policy (LIHP) in Malaysia and 
Nigeria. 
9.2 Analysing the low-income housing policy in Malaysia and Nigeria 
9.2.1 The nature of low-income housing policy framework in Malaysia and 
Nigeria under the enablement strategy 
The fundamental shift in LIHP since the early 1980s represent acceptance and domination 
of neo-liberalism as market–led delivery became the cornerstone of housing policy in 
developing countries. Similarly, such policy pursue has been adopted in almost all aspects 
of social welfare and governance. Specifically to the LIG, yet the shift from government to 
market have led to new questions about the ability of markets to deliver. The results of the 
study demonstrate a mixed picture in relation to Malaysia and Nigeria. 
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Historically, the LIHP that emerged in Malaysia and specifically in Kuala Lumpur was as a 
result of deeper parts of its society transformation and renewed its concern of the state in- 
rather than its retreat from LIG housing delivery, at a much earlier before the debunk of 
World Bank path dependent enablement housing policy. At the time when it all began in 
the late 1970s, the state and its local market, rather than foreign capital, constructed a 
formidable alliance in LIG housing delivery and shaped the institutional framework 
environment that allowed its materialisation. Since then the most salient on state 
engagement with the market is the gearing of state housing policy towards market-led 
delivery complimented also by state direct provision. 
The Malaysian LIHP though operates within the general framework of global paradigm; it 
shows a different institutional logic by instituting state prominence in regulation. Indeed, 
such institutional logic is consistent with the Asian regional models that contrasted with 
European models as earlier reported by Doling (1999b). Similarly, Malaysia and just like 
other Asian countries, represents autonomous states in existence within the NPE inspired 
by World Bank (Evans, 1995; 1996; Wade, 2003; World Bank, 1993a). These countries' 
LIHP models reaffirm their features of developmentalism and states capacity enhancement 
realisation, which of course have been inspired by the domestic politics rather than by as 
much as external inspirations. It has been noted that this has been practiced successfully 
and remain a feature of LIHP in Malaysia (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011). With this 
policy the important role of the private developers in the housing of the LIG in the country 
was assured and promoted. To secure the participation of the developers the government 
responded with easing the land acquisition, one-stop approval centre to realize faster 
approvals, among others to contain the problems of high prices of land prices, delays in 
land transactions and development plan approval commonly experienced  by the 
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developers (Bertaud & Malpezzi, 2001). Therefore, the Malaysian context indicates 
rewriting of the rule of the game, instead of taking the template from the gatekeepers, even 
in their stern faces. On the other hand, the Nigeria LIHP is characterised by weak 
regulatory enforcement, by lax and corrupt institutions for overseeing and coordinating the 
policy and lack of mortgage financing institutions. Both these constraints set limit to the 
provisioning and accessibility of the poorer population‘s access to housing in Nigeria. 
Common Malaysia and Nigeria low-income housing policies have as their basic objective 
priority on the advancement of LIG housing. From the policies, it is noticed that states 
objectives are similar- to provide decent and affordable houses to their citizens, 
particularly the LIG. Expectedly, in these countries focus on LIG is not surprising 
considering the status of LIG accessibility and affordability concern in the housing market 
of developing countries (Abd Aziz et al., 2008; Ibem, 2011a; Yang & Shen, 2008).  
Under these housing policies, the government‘s declaration of the priority shows the 
commitment in tackling the LIG housing. Again, the declaration arises from the awareness 
of state collective responsibility and commitment of its resources to realise the policy 
goals. Thus both countries demonstrate to improve/reform present and grasp the future of 
LIG housing delivery. However, the implementations of the policies, the countries differed 
in terms of state presence. In contrast to Nigeria, in Malaysia, the state was very much 
present in all the phases of policy implementation consistent with Doling model (Doling, 
1999b, 2002). With this strong emphasis placed on LIG, yet compared to Malaysia, 
Nigeria has been correspondingly slow to ensure the LIG participation, even under the 
government direct provision. Given Malaysia being a developmentalist state (Embong, 
2008), contextual differences are what one might expect in the policy outcome. On the 
other hand, Nigeria context were not on track in realising its LIHP objectives in spite of 
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having a strategic one. This was due not just to the fact of different social bases and social-
political settings but the understanding of politics and institutional actors that govern the 
different response pattern. 
9.2.2 The institutional structure of the state enhance or constraint the extent of 
participation of the market and the low-income group in Malaysia and Nigeria 
This question addresses the vitality of an IA/NIE and the associated structures and agency 
models in understanding the LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria.  The study has examined how 
LIHP operated under the broader institutional structure context. It also investigated the 
agency that governs the administration of the policy, its regulation and the delivery of its 
target outcome objectives. These institutional contexts influence the policy 
implementation, enforcement, coordination and supervision of the partnership as the policy 
strategy, and indeed the entire functioning of the strategy towards housing the LIG. 
The concepts of structure and agency are two basic models in the implementation of 
housing policy (Burke & Hulse, 2010; Jenkins & Smith, 2001; Keivani, Parsa, & Mcreal, 
2001; Keivani & Werna, 2001a). Agency is the core of the functionalist school, in which 
holds that autonomous individuals and agencies make and remake social reality. Agency in 
housing policy in short, should be one based on an active development by the state. A 
carefully designed strategy and together adequately supported by a proactive institutional 
framework and intervention is desirable. On the other hand, the structuralists maintain that 
social beings organise their lives within the parameters of existing political, governance, 
economic and social structures. These structures facilitate and at the same time attenuate 
agency goals and mandates. Thus, the agency plays a major role in bringing about change 
or makes the most of existing structures. 
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Conversely, the analysis demonstrates that market and LIHP are supported and constrained 
by the pre-existing national structural context.  Accordingly, any change or intervention 
needs to be working in the country context or structure (Wright & Pandey, 2010). The 
study of Malaysia and Nigeria structural constraints has an overriding impact on LIHP 
outcome. This study observed how the country differences context accounted in their LIG 
outcomes. The agencies coupled with resilient structure are the major platform of our 
comparative study premises. Consequently, the case studies demonstrate the impossibility 
of implementing the strategy without the support of agents and more or less 
institutionalised structures. As the case studies in this study demonstrate, also, the market 
is critically dependent on other stakeholders for its success or otherwise. 
The context structure is paramount to the stake holding agents in the two countries. For 
instance, the context in Nigeria has been in flux and became a source of policy weakness, 
as it was once argued constituted a product of the wider institutional context (Dickinson & 
Glasby, 2010). It pursues a broader agenda for liberal reform across the entire economy-
shifting from direct state control toward greater reliance on markets. This is to foster 
allocation of resources and as a guide to operational economic decisions. In sharp contrast 
to Malaysia, it observes the situation where the market was directly under the state 
interventions and regulations. The inclusive and exclusive outcome of a LIHP becomes 
visible in relation to factors of socio-political support. The vibrancy of the private sector, 
impact of sustainable and consistent planning was elements of focus.  Agencies on 
implementation, competent civil servant/policy environment were the principal 
determiners. Supporting institutional structure, continually improving the implementation 
framework was directed through innovation and vertical and horizontal linkages with other 
stake holding agencies. 
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In the countries studied, the participation in delivery of LIG housing by the private sector 
had entirely different meanings, not only to the private sector but to the state and society. 
For instance, the Nigerian state did not reinterpret the colonial legacy of its housing policy 
since after independence. It means essentially away from its historical origin of LIG 
exclusion, marginalisation and alienation, even from a model of new town development of 
Abuja and engagement of formal market to ameliorate and reform. This is where the 
Malaysian state engagement with its market gave a significant meaning to the active 
participation. It has now attained the dominant position in the LIG housing delivery in the 
country. The Malaysian state, engagement with market was not something that is suddenly 
achieved at the moment. However, such engagement evolves over time. Nigeria state 
should learn to stimulate its participation and engagement with the market and LIG to do 
this. This could be realised by making the state and market to understand and ultimately 
realise a purposive and meaningful agency. 
The implementation scenario in the two countries presented the understanding of the 
political actors' understanding of the stark reality of the LIG housing delivery challenge. In 
Kuala Lumpur, this fact could be understand that the political actors has evolved 
formalities coupled with the precision of tactics and strategies with the new actors of 
delivery, structures and processes to produce a sustainable policy implementation 
framework, capable of promoting its home owning democracy. On the other hand, Abuja 
though the political actors were made to engage with the new agents of delivery according 
to the unfolding housing challenge. However, they did not seem to understand the 
vocabulary of the paradigm shift under the enablement framework. More significantly, this 
is why it does not strategize, even with much resources made available at its disposal. 
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Commonly, despite these contrasts, both have enjoyed favourable response from the new 
agents in the policy implementation. 
Most unfortunately, the state institution implementation framework that results from the 
Abuja MHS facilitates the ‗capture‘ of rent associated with the scheme by the privileged 
agents and agencies in the partnership. Specifically, state agents have connections to the 
scheme from both domestic and international capital. Let first mention of international 
capital, before the domestic. Unlike Abuja, in China as reported by Sit & Yang (1997) 
which they called ‗Exo-urbanisation‘, the intervention of foreign capital contributed 
tremendously in the transformation of urban in terms of landscape transformation. The 
participation of international coy in MHS is not yet realized a significant impact on the city 
housing. Perhaps this could be attributed to the conditioned by the nature of Nigerian 
governance institutions (Chapter 5). Since it has been noted that the MNC firms operating 
in countries where domestic institutions and policies that provide avenues for rent-seeking, 
their contributions produces negative outcomes (Jensen, 2005). Similar to the local agents, 
the MNC constitute “small global elites lining its pockets at the expense of everyone else” 
(Garrett, 2004:84). Thus, the consensus in the literature the contribution of the MNC is 
conditional on host economic conditions. The recent allegation on the FCTA minister 
seeking for expropriation of 80% of the 400ha of land grant to an international capital to 
him reinforces the above claim.  
Consequently, on Abuja context, the exclusionary outcome can be pinned on the 
imperviousness of a massively corrupt Nigerian state to the lacklustre attitude of the 
participating market, capitalising on the weak state capacity. The nature of economic 
agents is characterised to be as described by the former Governor of Central Bank of 
Nigeria quoted in Ahuwan (2002:271) 
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“(t)here appears to be a certain built-in stubbornness in the attitude of the typical 
Nigerian economic agent ... It manifests itself in a strong propensity to circumvent 
laid-down rules of economic behaviour and to resist control and regulation ... it 
tends to encourage a kind of softness and lukewarmness in the application and 
implementation of legitimate rules of economic conduct. Hence it provides a fertile 
ground for bribery, corruption, idleness and the contrivance of get-rich quick 
attitude which are antithetical to hard work and discipline.”  
These attitudes of the private developers conduct in MHS are not rooted on individual 
firms, but are reflections and indeed related to the broader political economy structures as 
well as practices in the country.  
The key concern on MHS was on the abandonment of the institutional framework of 
implementation. Consequently, the scheme management drifted into haphazard and 
uncoordinated governance due to failure to institute sound administrative and coordination 
systems of control that would provide effective implementation. The institutional 
framework of policy implementation in Abuja had always been weak and such had been its 
story for much of its history, imaging the city to Nigerians as a citadel of dispensing 
patronage and rents accumulation (Adama, 2007; Akingbade et al., 2012a; Gbadegesin, et 
al., 2000; Ikejiofor, 1998a; Moore, 1984; Morah, 1993). Yet instead of addressing these 
stereotype weaknesses from a scheme like MHS, the Abuja authorities did not demonstrate 
otherwise. This is apparent from its inability to harness the colossal resources of the land 
and financing committed to MHS, as a vehicle to realigned Abuja into the national housing 
policy framework that envision to provide decent and affordable housing to all Nigerians. 
Rather, the Abuja authorities allow the private developers to corner the scheme and 
showcase it as a site of what Harvey (2003) called ‗accumulation by dispossession‘. 
The implementation of the scheme is expected to be smooth and functional with clearly 
defined rights and responsibilities backed by all the necessary regulations and legal 
frameworks. Producing the unambiguous framework will ensure efficient implementation 
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and predictability towards achieving costless transactions and efficient partnership. 
However, the implementation of the scheme had exemplified high transaction cost and 
insecure property rights. This study, first note that the scheme was first managed by an ad 
hoc committee without clearly defined guidelines and managed by few loyalists of the 
Minister. The implementation shows insecurity in the rule of the game depending on the 
minister, as there were series changes of the ministers and the reviews and revisions of the 
modalities of implementation of the scheme (FCTA, 2007, 2008). It was first called MHS 
and then changed to Accelerated Development Programme. The allocation sizes were 
reduced and there were revocations and withdrawals. For instance, during El Rufai regime 
73 developers allocations were withdrawn (Umoh, 2012). Hence, the inadequate lack of 
communication between the governance of MHS in the FCTA officials and private 
developers, frequent changes in the allocations wrought havoc with the housing 
development.  
The FCTA was also not forthcoming of its obligation under the MHS in infrastructure 
provisions and development to support the facilitation of the land allocated development. 
Umoh (2012:46) after review the issue of property rights under MHS noted that “it does 
not seem that developers engaged in the MHS can safely or soundly form expectations 
regarding their MHS allocations”. Given the high transaction cost and insecure property 
rights in the implementation of MHS, the conditions that must prevail for such a policy 
ought to be, respectable developers, with a good track record, with a market and feasibility 
report, all approvals obtained and within areas already provided with infrastructure so that 
that risks are minimal. Thus, MHS failure and LIG housing in Abuja are both products of 
the dialectical relationship between structure and agential behaviour. Additionally, MHS is 
also a representation of Abuja historical contradictions within the Nigerian government 
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and socio-economic landscape transcending, the ineptitude governance, and made more 
apparent in the failure of both the stake holding partners of state-market in the scheme to 
execute their legislative functions effectively. 
Conversely, in Malaysia, state plays a prominent role under the market-led delivery and the 
political sphere seem to be a total grip on the process, by having established institutional 
framework of implementation. Although, the results differ from some published studies 
(Beh, 2010; Rasiah et al., 2009) this study findings are consistent with those of Abdul-Aziz 
& Jahn Kassim (2011), Ahmad et al., (2012), Mohit & Nazyddah (2011), Singaravelloo 
(2010) among others. The institutional presence can be seen from the entire process, 
namely the entire housing development, consumption to enabling environment made 
available to the market and society. In addition, the coordination of the entire process stood 
distinct to the context of Abuja. In part, the LIG housing in Malaysia has been strong by 
the national context the programme of social engineering that has been on for more than 
four decades ago; in contrast to Nigeria which none of such ever existed. 
The findings of this study of the institutional inadequacies of MHS in Abuja presented in 
the previous Chapter, demonstrate that the LIG exclusion and marginalisation due to both 
Nigeria‘s structural constraints and agential behaviour. Conversely, the significant LIG 
housing differences observed in Kuala Lumpur compared to Abuja context is attributable 
to both Malaysia‘s structural factors and agential behaviour. The performance observed 
from Abuja context has deepened exclusion and marginalisation of the LIG and condemn 
poor to the shanties of the city suburb (Ikejiofor, 1998b).  The resulting consequence on 
Abuja has been the growth and expansion of squatter settlements, and as a new planned 
town development is penalised with the unpleasant unprecedented growth of shanties 
compounded by its steadily declining deprivations all around the city (COHRE, 2006). 
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Thus the institutional structural fault of Abuja fosters a predicated on duality of two 
housing world: formal one for the rich at the centre, while the informal one to the poor at 
the outskirts of the city, as commonly found in all the Nigerian cities (Gandy, 2006; 
Immerwahr, 2007). 
From the above discussion, it conclusive that agents‘ as well as institutional quality are 
fundamental factors in the attainment of housing policy goals. The comparatively high 
outcomes in Malaysia LIHP reaching out the target beneficiaries as well as market active 
performance than what obtains in Nigeria, shows evidence of what North (1990:7) 
described as “... lock-in of the institution that comes from the symbiotic relationship 
between institutions and the organisations that have evolved as a consequence of the 
incentive structure provided by those institutions...”. On this note, the institutions appear 
stronger in Malaysia and weaker in Nigeria and such pattern could stand as interpretation 
of why the differentials in the outcomes of their LIHP. 
Additionally and in summary, using the NIE proposition that economic system 
characterized with  high asymmetric information, notably, the existence of moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems, leads to severe distortion and sometimes complete 
collapse of the economic system (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, from all of the above, unlike Kuala 
Lumpur, in Abuja both public and private sector partners face high transaction costs and 
insecure property rights due to asymmetric information problems, which appear in all 
aspects of partnership transactions. These costs related to searching, monitoring and 
enforcement costs, which are directly related to the information problems inherent in the 
partnership implementation. The uncertainty regarding the ministerial appointments and 
inability to monitor the use of land and finance further reinforces the higher units of 
transaction costs. Likewise, the physical and socio-economic cost also contributed to the 
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partnership failure in Abuja. These include absence of infrastructures, mortgage finance 
and high incidence of poverty. These costs are more apparent in Abuja whereby over 70% 
of the population are poor, high incidence of unemployment, informality of economic 
activities and nascent mortgage financing. Hence, this study is in agreement with 
Williamson (2003, 2005) and North (1990, 1992, 1995) that NIE elements are relevant in 
explaining economy and thereby relating economic performance to state and governance 
institutions. 
9.2.3 The roles played by the state and market under the enablement low-
income housing policy as facilitators and enablers in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
This study finding shows the LIHP, to be market-driven, is operationalised in the form of 
PPP, though called by different names in the countries capitals, namely, JV and MHS in 
Kuala Lumpur and Abuja respectively. The study shows the organisation of partnership 
and in outcomes in favour of the LIG in Kuala Lumpur and against in Abuja. According to 
the partnership, the states assumed an enabler and facilitator to the market and society, 
while the financing and constructions are executed by the market. The state institutions 
oversee the entire partnership to ensure its consistency and regulation. This pattern of 
implementation is consistent with the World Bank framework and its international housing 
policy (Sengupta, 2006b). From the context of the new paradigm in LIHP shows a marked 
difference between the countries of the study. Though, the policy enjoys 
internationalisation, for instance, in Malaysia was in divergence whereby the state has 
overwhelming centralisation in implementation of the policy, while in the case of Nigeria, 
the state demonstrated a ‗rolling-out‘ posture pursued by disengagement and 
decentralisation. Consequently, the outcomes of this study suggested, are striking for their 
differences. This can argued that the LIHP has been influenced by the state institutional 
351 
 
structure and agency framework manifesting in the structure of implementation as well as 
the outcomes and reaffirm Harris (1999a:1170) assertion that “housing policy reflects the 
political ideology of government in power”. 
Similarly, the private developers performance was unique not only under the JV but the 
entire LIG housing delivery in the country, equals to success by this class of developers in 
Bangkok (Dowall, 1989). Consistent to what was reported that “the large majority of 
private developers are in the business for the long term and will not blemish their 
reputation with non-compliance” (Salleh & Meng, 1997:23). Accordingly, the private 
sector predominates as the major source of housing provision in the country. Mohamad 
(2011:659) reaffirms this dominance that “(n)o one builds just one house ... in Malaysia-
private developers usually build whole towns...”. Consequently, as presented earlier, 
generally, the significant contributions made by private developers in Malaysia the 
government has accorded them a larger responsibility  since from the 7thMP as major 
stakeholder in LIG housing delivery. 
Conversely, in Nigeria this study found entirely different scenario of ineffectiveness, 
despite state generous allocation of expensive Abuja land and financing to emerging 
opportunistic network of developers. This is contrary to findings of Keivani, Mattingly & 
Majedi (2008) in Iran. Notwithstanding, the important role played by standards and 
coordination in a partnership successful, however, such ingredients of success, the MHS 
failure were buttressed by the failure of the FCTA to respond appropriately with respect to 
the coordination of the scheme despite having explicit defined role and responsibilities in 
the development agreement. The absence of standards and regulation enforcement resulted 
in MHS implementation was out of scheme objective context. That outcome is especially 
evident in Abuja as increased proliferation of squatter settlements and slums and the 
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polarisation of the city with the wealthy and rich only, while the LIG were expelled to the 
outskirts and catered by the informal and small holder developers. 
The emergence of MHS in Abuja has been spectacular, for the fact that the FCTA had 
devoted the entire Phases III and IV of the city to the scheme, in an attempt to resolve the 
pervasive constraints in housing delivery (Buckley & Karickal, 2005). According to Jibril 
& Garba (2012) the MHS since inception covers a land area of over 15,301.70 hectares 
distributed across 22 districts of the Abuja development phases. This is unique and in 
contrast to the practice of similar programmes elsewhere failed in providing land available 
in South Africa (Wilkinson, 1998); Ghana (Arku, 2009); Tanzania (Kombe, 2000); Peru 
(Jones & Pisa, 2000); India (Sengupta, 2006a; b) and in many other countries studies have  
shown.  
The FCTA supports the participating private developers with land and the FMBN provides 
the financing, the latter to the local participants only. Such orientation has contributed in 
boosting the engagement of participating partners both locally and internationally, as it is 
part of neoliberal ideology (Harvey, 2005). Considering the generous enablement 
provisions made available to the participants, in many respects, stands the best chance of 
actually addressing the housing wrought in the city, and significantly balancing the 
housing supply and demand. With the expectation that the scheme, though paradoxically, it 
can provide a solution to the housing supply deficit in the city. Expectedly, such generous 
enablement of participation attracted participants locally and internationally and as such 
deepens once again, MHS as opening as conduit of state patronage and rent seeking of the 
politicians, merchants and bureaucrats as previously reported in the Nigerian housing 
policy literature (Awotona, 1990; Dlakwa, 1984; Ikejiofor, 1999a; Morah, 1990), as the 
practice and implementation has shown.  
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Given, the housing wrought in Abuja, the MHS enjoyed a high political priority. But given 
the nature of the Abuja historical record of not having inclusive governance just like the 
country, the advent of MHS orientation to the city LIG and poor, the market-led delivery 
for LIG remain low; implementation sluggish and therefore strongly incapable of 
significantly capturing the massive housing demand of this cohort group in the city in 
absolute contradiction to the premises of the strategy as promoted by UN-Habitat (UN-
Habitat, 2010a). Meanwhile, given the availability of enabling resources made available in 
the MHS, some of the private sector developers were pursuing business interests, acting as 
fronts for civil servants and politicians or nonetheless constitute these elite firms. The 
ongoing MHS is a typical case of rampant corruption and refurbished patronage, as lands 
and financing direct to clients of the patrons. Many private companies sprang up to gain 
access to free ‗national cake‘ by forming alliances with the power that be, enabling them to 
operate outside the operational guidelines and got scot free. The kleptocratic elites became 
instead the focus of the supply of their private developers and to the total exclusion of the 
LIG. This group who have become excluded in MHS completely became displaced and as 
protests, are colonising the FCT land by erecting spontaneous settlements at an 
unprecedented rate (Ujoh, Ifatimehin, & Alaci, 2009).  
The MHS was highly politicised if one considers the scheme was administered through a 
phalanx of the ad hoc committee under the office of FCTA Minister, rather than the regular 
FCTA/FCDA administration structure. Equally, the selection of participating partners was 
grossly questionable. Given the history of pre-bendalism and patron-client relationship 
with the Nigerian government (Ogundiya, 2011), it is not surprising the MHS provide the 
basis for local accumulation through a housing development in a highly prime and 
expensive land, which was entirely inaccessible to the majority of individuals and 
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corporate developers. The speculations were ripe in the Abuja that the scheme provides 
other avenues for Abuja development continued rent distribution and accumulation. 
Conversely, the MHS received the government priority not as a panacea of its housing 
crisis, but because the government used the scheme to extend state rent and patronage to its 
political partners and cronies. All these were validated if one looked at the way the scheme 
was administered, coordinated and managed. Other studies corroborated this finding by 
stating that neoliberal policies like of MHS as a ‗Trojan horse‘ of accumulation and 
corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2005; Jomo & Anis, 2009); does not promised economic 
performance (Cohen & Centeno, 2006). This practice expound Kim  (2004) work on 
‗market without property right‘.  
The pervasive politicisation of the government programme has hampered the ability of 
FCDA/FCTA to manage the scheme in a consistent and transparent manner, and corruption 
and political interference have influenced the selection and distribution of partnership 
resources. Within the bureaucracy deficiencies in technical and management capability 
were exacerbated by poorly defined organisational structures, namely, poor coordination 
between FCTA departments and with the private sector developers. Political uncertainty 
and the tendency of incoming Minister to overturn the arrangement of their predecessors, 
has contributed to a poor management of MHS which has further affected the performance 
of the scheme. The subjugation of the national interest in the personal interests of those in 
power is an entrenched feature of Nigerian politics (Adejumobi, 2010a). This is the way 
political opportunism found among the administration, jeopardised the attainment of 
significant impact on the housing crisis in the city.  
The MHS shows, the nature of the Nigerian state and its patrimonial politics. A 
programme like this MHS should involve a transparent and accountable process of 
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implementation. However, where leaders treat governance as it does not matter to 
transparency and accountability would treat its citizen‘s welfare in the same way. The 
MHS came on board at a time of primordial lacklustre Nigeria state. Perhaps, this is why 
the state agent, namely FCTA, failed conspicuously in its attempt to address the city's 
housing crisis, even at a time when the residents had been subjected to its demolition 
exercise carried out by itself of all what it considers shanties and illegal occupations in the 
course of correcting the AMP distortions and which mostly affected the LIG and poor.  
Meanwhile, the idea of MHS came up as the panacea to the displacement and demolition 
carried out by the state in Abuja. However, the failure of the MHS had a deleterious impact 
on the LIG and city administration. The city is currently experiencing the meteoric growth 
of slums and squatter settlements despite the ones earlier demolished by the state, within 
its short period in existence.  The failure of the state to provide decent and affordable 
shelter in the city, certainly made the small producers to make a major impact, even with 
none at all support and enablement from the state, who in any case attracted the lucrative 
housing delivery to the LIG and poor in the city (Ikejiofor, 1997). Therefore, this study 
argue that the state failed to provide to the society, because it allowed the MHS to be 
implemented unambiguously as agent for high-and medium-income group housing 
delivery. This adequately concurs with the city administration and politicians that the city 
does not belong to the LIG and poor (Amba, 2010; Morah, 1993) and further deepens the 
assertion earlier made by Moore (1984) that Abuja was developed as a safe haven for the 
rich and well to do. 
From the Kuala Lumpur context reaffirm that Abuja shows that to consign the coordination 
of partnership must be government-driven; meaning that the current MHS government's 
lacklustre especially its relationship with the private developers as it affects LIG. The 
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MHS requires a much more coordinated and framework of implementation transparent and 
accountable than what obtains at the moment. The expectant framework that can operate 
on the city level, capable of directing the programme to invigorate the LIG integrated into 
the scheme, since so far the implementation remains largely divorced in unmet LIG 
housing demand. 
The findings of this study in Malaysia and Nigeria show that market partnerships were of 
vital importance to the housing policies of the countries. The case study analysis result also 
establishes that state-market partnership operates through the countries formal private 
sector. Such operational strategy is consistent with the common form suggested by the 
World Bank enablement housing policy (World Bank, 1993b) and defies the broader and 
pluralistic proposed by UN-Habitat under the Agenda 21 (UNCHS, 1990, 1997).  The 
operational formal private sectors were constituted under trade associations networks in all 
the countries. In Nigeria such associations comprise of REDAN, BUMPAN and MBAN, 
while in Malaysia they are known as REHDA. All of these associations develop linkages 
with participating firms among themselves and the state. The Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
context show a similarity of tactic, of constituting such trade associations. Among the 
advantages enjoyed by these networks, allows the participating market under the 
partnership to expand and protect their interest in the partnership with the state, and front, 
to press their common interests and demands on the state. What's more, the networks were 
found to be crucial for the functioning of the partnerships and these networks shared quite 
similar objectives of advancing common front in partnering with the state. The associations 
worked in both contexts, promoting the partnerships and constitute sources of generating 
necessary incentives from the state, and in a way are important front enhancing their 
position in the partnership. Such network associations became a source of implementation 
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challenges in both contexts. For instance, in Abuja in spite of indubitably benefitted from 
government subsidies in the form of land and financing (I.U Jibril & Garba, 2012), but 
unfortunately such groupings have defied government implementation regulations and 
even declined to make prompt repayment of financing extended, at all the times the 
defaulters enjoyed the association‘s protection. While in Kuala Lumpur it was in the form 
of project abandonment (Khalid, 2010), to the detriment of buyers and government 
objectives. 
In Abuja it was open to all to participate from both local and international participants. 
Therefore, this study may characterise partnership as non-selective or selective. This is to 
argue that under the MHS characterised by state support available to participating 
developers combined with financing, the majority of developers, in order to attract state 
support, applied under REHDA without much scrutiny from the state institution. This is 
turn contributed to the apparent failure of the scheme, as it was used opportunistically to 
benefit from a rentier state. The performance of these developers was entirely dependent 
on the state resources support, unfortunately, the level of state support and its impact on 
LIG housing had a very negligible impact on their housing in the city. The state generosity 
in enablement of the private sector should have –with little to show for it in return and with 
appalling results in terms of LIG housing in the city. The incentives extended to the private 
developers, did not succeed in fostering the LIG housing delivery. Indeed, the development 
agreement contravention was apparent from the outcomes of the MHS output. Hence, these 
private developers could be christen as ‗predators club‘ in contrast to Malaysia ones as 
‗producers club‘ after Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2003).  
This study finding also found that the implementation of the PPP had deepened the 
distribution pattern in favour of the high-and medium-income groups. This finding concurs 
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with similar findings reported in the literature in other context (Arku, 2009; Yeboah, 2005; 
Zhang, 2000). The FCTA, as agent of the society, did not ensure the minimum stipulated 
for LIG housing in the private developers housing estates strictly complied as per the 
development agreement clauses signed.  In fact, this study shows the MHS management 
were not keen on addressing this lopsided development. So for this reason, not only does 
this failure polarise the city, but it also appears to generate antagonisms between state and 
society. The antagonisms arise from the fact that the LIG colonies were continuously under 
demolition by the government, when in actual fact the substitute arrangement, namely, 
MHS did not make adequate provisions to enlist their participation. This conflict became 
deeper when the LIG perception of government reform strategies, such as MHS, appears to 
be at all times to their exclusion. Therefore, the absence of adequate provision under the 
MHS, to enlist the participation of LIG, made it easier to comfortably report that this 
cohort group did not benefit from the scheme. 
The MHS was intended as a solution to the city housing polarisation and boost efficiency 
and productivity in meeting the geometrical increase in demand for housing from the city 
administration. The outcome suggests that if these formal sectors, considered to be highly 
and efficiently organised, and are unable to improve the city LIG housing, then the strategy 
behind state withdrawal and privatisation needs to be re-examined. Moreover, the result 
indicated that state complete withdrawal and transferring the responsibility on the market 
would diligently deepen the problem-by further marginalising the poor and LIG from 
having reached of decent and affordable housing in the city and many considered the 
strategy as lethal to the LIG in the city. The exclusion outcome reported here is similarly 
reported in the literature in other context (Adegun & Taiwo, 2011; Arku, 2009; Chen et al., 
2010; Dowall & Ellis, 2009; Gough & Tran, 2009; Ibem, 2011a; b; Sengupta, 2006b, 2007; 
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Tran & Yip, 2008). Moreover, these studies concur on the fact that there were no dynamic 
efficiency gains from the private sector in LIG housing. The outcome as part of the 
overarching consequence of crude of capitalism, Paasi (2003:960) generalised this point 
that “... instead of homogenising the world, is producing increasing polarisation and 
uneven development at all spatial scales from local neighbourhoods to global networks”. 
Thus, by implication these findings and many others put resistance into the narrowed 
concept of enablement and reinforces the consequences of crude capitalism.  
As Adegun & Taiwo (2011) notes in his study on LIG in Nigeria, the market response to 
society inclusion is dependent on the state institution capacity and empowerment. The 
bottom line, then, is not the participating for-profit agents‘ interest, but rather the ties 
between the state institution quality, vibrant private sector and the empowered society.  
The policy scholars argue that the way forward lies not only in creating the policy, but in 
actually creating adequate empowering the stakeholders to make effective demand on the 
state to demonstrate the commitment to a successful policy outcome (Meagher, 2011). This 
undoubtedly requires a workable policy supported with an implementation framework 
capacity to deliver the policy objectives. Furthermore, requires the empowerment of 
society's citizens‘ capability to ensure their adequate participation. 
 The MHS failure is largely a case of institutional failure, which strength the absence of 
appropriate institutional frameworks of implementation thesis that could work according to 
the terms of the scheme reference. The observed scenario was such that both the state and 
market operate on parallel lines, on the thinking that all will work, unfortunately, none but 
failure on the expected provision for the societal majority grouping in the city. The 
polarisation of Abuja housing space through MHS contrasted sharply by the few elites 
chosen luxury homes at even European standard provided by newer agents of delivery, 
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while the poor and LIG were excluded to the suburban squatter settlements and slums. 
These adjustments are similar to the findings of Bredenoord, van Lindert & Smets (2010), 
who found that the failure of the new strategy made the excluded class to indulge in 
exploring alternatives of informality and self-help. It is this regard; perhaps that self-help 
strategy discourse is re-emerging in the housing policy debate that was popular in the 
1970s and early 1980s (Habitat International 34(3) edition), as major panacea once again to 
the deepening housing crisis in the global south. Such refocusing regards on self-help 
capabilities of the individual as a viable alternative to change and progress to the 
polarisation of habitat in the global south.  
Notwithstanding the credibility of such thinking, such position ignored the concern with 
the need to reconfigure the implementation through positioning of appropriate institutional 
mechanism that could bring the LIG and stakeholders into the mainstream LIHP strategies. 
The argument is such that requires the reinvigorating state responsibility to its citizens and 
at the same time incorporating market social responsibility to its immediate constituency, 
particularly the vulnerable LIG in the society. Undoubtedly, the Kuala Lumpur context is 
case of reference along this thinking. In other words, the Kuala Lumpur case suggests that 
active state and market institutional framework couple with an extended enabling 
environment of participation to the society could work on resolving the hydra-headed LIG 
housing challenges in the like context of Abuja. 
The argument that MHS was constituted as a forum by its masters as a political coalition 
front to extend state rent and patronage, to which the Nigerian state has excelled in this 
regard, could not be in doubt. Considering the Nigerian state being a rentier, a reading on 
MHS could be made that its housing implementation seems to provide a means of 
strengthening the already grand accumulation among the Nigerian elites. Perhaps, this was 
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why there was outpouring of developers to have access to the state largesse. There was 
domination of MHS of the political class in the implementation and elitist network of 
REDAN. The grand accumulation was achieved through these structures they designed and 
implement.  REDAN as antecedents to neoliberalism space became established as its 
instrument under MHS and ultimately became the key player representing ―market 
interest‖ in the scheme. This is one of the recorded success of the housing policy in the 
country, its successful creation of networks, the likes of REDAN, BUMPAN and MBAN, 
which had been able to articulate one voice offering support to state housing policy interest 
and providing a voice to market interest at the same time. With all these efforts, the market 
has neither change its orientation to LIG housing need, even with large state largesse of 
land and financing. The authors like Bond (2000) are absolutely right that the market 
participation has not constituted a refuge to the LIG in Africa context. Thus, it was the 
accumulation motive that predominate, that is why the market deepen the exclusion and 
polarisation of the city against the majority residents, namely the LIG. 
The above finding, has answered the question whether MHS has been successful in 
addressing the LIG to own housing in the city. The implementation of the scheme has 
indeed become an additional source of deepening the overall exclusion of LIG in the city. 
Mechanisms of exclusion, among others include the going price couple with the nascent 
mortgage institution reinforces the exclusion. Hence, in this context, it can be said that 
MHS has been unreasonable ineffective during the past decade of implementation in 
addressing the LIG housing in Abuja. At the same time, there have been important social 
and economic costs associated with the failure of the MHS. Economically, the MHS could 
not be considered to be efficient in a free-market economy, when there was oversupply of 
houses to the limited medium-and high-income groups in the city. Socially, the MHS raises 
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many questions related to the issue of social justice, considering the emergence of income 
polarisation in the city, which has been aggravated by the income as a major determinant 
of participation in the MHS. 
This study result seems to indicate that the LIHP has been rather successful in Kuala 
Lumpur as it has reduced and contributed in moderating economic segregation in Kuala 
Lumpur. In addition, to earlier reported in the literature that the construction of low-cost 
housing in Kuala Lumpur does not keep pace with demands and needs (Agus, 1989; 
Aiken, 1981; Johnstone, 1983b), cannot be claimed at the moment. Unlike Nigeria, the 
state in recent years there has been an increasing focus on further expanding home 
ownership, in particular on enabling more LIG to own their house. Fundamentally, in 
Malaysia its major financial institutions remained stable and public support to protect the 
financial system was at maximum. In general terms, this supports the Malaysian 
government confident to pursue the private-sector led housing delivery since the 
mechanisms of a robust financial system, particularly mortgage system. Consequently, this 
strong fundamental made the Malaysian LIG to be easily accommodated under the market-
led housing delivery. The finance is generally leveraged by mortgage borrowing. The 
mortgage has been fixed and allows easier budgeting over the years and since the interest 
rate is cheaper, sustained the participation of the LIG. On the other hand, from the findings 
of this study it becomes clear that the Abuja authorities have not generated capacities to 
drive the partnership for success, when the development agreement signed with the 
participating private developers was not enforced and such conduct had intensified 
uncertainty in the partnership. 
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9.2.4 The low-income housing policy practice changes the housing outcome 
among the low-income group in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
The major challenge confronting the developing countries is the desire of housing to be an 
integral part of the nation‘s development (Arku & Harris, 2005). However, the task of 
translating this understanding into a realistic engagement of all the stakeholders is another. 
A development of housing is ideal, guided by state and one that would be broad base is a 
tall claim. The Malaysian and Nigerian cases suggest that there is an important lesson to be 
learned from the housing as contributor to the economy and development. Towards 
national development, housing has to be actually integrated in this path of development. It 
is important to ensure that housing integrations remain real. In this regard, the Malaysian 
case for instance, through continuity of national development planning has demonstrated 
this, unlike the Nigerian context. 
The developing country's reputation as an unreasonable unfair and unequal society has 
been significantly deepened by the impact of market-led LIHP. The major area of 
contention has been facing a contest between economic efficiency and social equity. The 
consequences of which have become serious policy issues. The dissenting voice of 
individualism and rationality have repeatedly valued above the social consequence of the 
over reliance on the formal market delivers. The expansion of informality/slum settlement 
around the cities, in particular, Abuja as a new town development and other cities in 
general, offer support to the assertion. 
The growth of housing inequality in access is natural, because markets reward people 
unequally. Orthodox economic theory does not claim that market, even if perfectly 
competitive, will produce equity, social justice (Stiglitz, 2010). The market merely 
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expands the supply of the high income group and as such widening the gap between rich 
and poor and opening the door to greater society's fragmentation. The deepening and 
polarisation can be seen where the higher income group was increasingly concentrated in a 
few gated housing estates, while the LIG were concentrated in the marginalised outer 
suburbs informal settlements (Amba, 2010; Ujoh, Ifatimehin & Alaci, 2009).  Ikejiofor 
(1997, 1998a) and Morah (1990, 1993) reviewing the housing accessibility and distribution 
in Abuja highlights two major points. First, the housing inequality in Abuja has developed 
against the background to this lies in the indifference to LIG housing policies pursued 
since its inception. Secondly, the LIG housing became worsen under the policies of neo-
liberalism with focus on market deregulation and privatisation, when the housing market 
adopting its exclusive focuses on high and medium income class. In conclusion, the MHS 
as neoliberal project and a class instrument implemented in Abuja, its outcome reinforces 
the argument of Harvey (2005) that neoliberal policy is always a vehicle of capital 
accumulation through what he also called ‗accumulation by dispossession‘ (Harvey, 2003) 
of the majority by shifting the benefit to the local and international capitals, and their 
cohorts in government only. 
From the beginning, the enablement LIHP was promoted as the only panacea to housing in 
developing countries. About three decades later, the results remain divided over its impact. 
The proponents of enablement argue that its adoption, as housing policy, would overall 
benefit the poor and LIG in developing countries. Pugh (1991) points out  this argument 
that the market would entrench efficiency as what it does. Concurrently, Struyk (1990), 
UNCHS (1996), UN-Habitat (2011) and as an example argues that the major strides to 
reform the developing countries housing policy have improved productivity and 
inclusiveness. Meanwhile, in contradictions the same authors elsewhere reports the 
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deepening marginalisation of the LIG and increasing number of slum dwellers (UN-
Habitat, 2010a). 
The expected benefits of enablement to the housing industry have brought mixed benefits 
to countries. While there has been a sustained growth in units produced by the private 
sector, a large component of this supply has not been targeted to LIG. The fastest growing 
housing deliveries have been high and medium income housing, all heavily targeting 
medium-and high-income class. A study of Arku (2009) in Ghana, for instance, shows that 
there was significant changes that private sector/market have brought to the country was 
the excessive supply to high income housing were becoming common place, with the 
proportion of LIG housing relegated to the background. 
The entrenched slums also have a causal link to the policies of enablement, most especially 
in the case of Abuja, Nigeria. The slum and informality of settlements have seemingly 
become an intractable feature of the post-neo-liberalism due to market declining public 
sector alternative housing of particular concern is the deepened growing of such 
informality for example there were over 60 of such settlements (COHRE, 2006) within a 
short span of Abuja existence. These emerging slum housing more than 70% of all the city 
population and the number has been rising, with even new emerging trend housing sharing 
among households (Ikejiofor, 1998b). More disturbing still are the figures that over 
600,000 of households are displaced by government demolitions over the past 
years(Watson, 2009b). This rise confirms that those who evicted are likely to resettle in the 
same form of settlements, and the vicious cycle continues due to their disadvantaged by 
poverty (Ndubueze, 2009) and inadequate access to finance (Mitlin, 2011) of what the 
market offers. Not surprisingly concern about slums and squatter settlements has been 
growing rapidly (UN-Habitat, 2010a). This report was categorical that the population of 
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slum dwellers was on the increase. Thus, full impact on LIG of enablement is manifesting 
in different degrees, and clear patterns are emerging. 
For many, researchers, slums and informal settlements remain most renowned problem not 
only in Nigeria in particular but most of the developing countries. There are significant 
costs both to the individual households and to society from deepening slums and 
informality. Non-monetary costs such as congestion and varying degrees of health 
implications have been widely documented. In turn governments carry the direct costs of 
provision of infrastructures and services to these settlements. There are also less easily cost 
but still tangible social ramifications in the form of children's education, crime and loss of 
community cohesion. 
Nevertheless, critics argue that, despite the paradigm shift, the LIG housing in developing 
countries, the long standing underlying problems remain and the actual benefits have been 
far from achieved. Authors, among others similar to (Argent, 2007; Arku, 2009; Forrest & 
Hirayama, 2009; Kamel, 2012; Smith, 2004) gave an overview, the thrust of which 
remains relevant: 
1. Profits have been rebuilt at the expense of building an inclusive housing policy and 
housing policy affordability and accessibility inequality deepens. 
2. The expected returns on expanding the supply for LIG have not materialised. 
Overall, the private sector participation has determined the LIG supply in spite of 
huge investment. 
3. In the course of restructuring aimed at reducing the dependence on government, the 
overall performance has proven a point there is a need for more dependence on 
government that it first conceptualised.  
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In comparative terms, Abuja MHS performance has been less than impressive in 
comparison to Kuala Lumpur JV. Such in part arises because the Nigeria government 
misinterpreted the concept of enablement implementation, by adoption of complete 
withdrawal from LIG delivery. This is contrary to the UN-Habitat report on the state of 
African cities, which stated that governments have a greater role to play rather than one of 
withdrawal as to what obtain at the moment. This fact suggests that the challenge of 
implementation relies on market structure without the complimentary government 
participation was not workable as per LIG housing delivery is concerned (UN-Habitat, 
2008). A key to LIG housing attainment under enablement paradigm, as mentioned by 
Mukhija (2004) is the level of participation of government in the delivery, that is, the level 
of support by government in the form of institutional framework of implementation. A 
review of housing policy in Asia (Chiu, 2008; Doling, 1999b) confirms that government 
painstaking participation at the level of development and production are crucial. While 
acknowledging the conditions of government participation, Shuid (2011) argues that 
government empowerment of the LIG is equally important. High level of poverty and poor 
mortgage institution with nascent mortgage industry in countries like Nigeria have 
produced weakness on the capability and extent of market-led LIG housing delivery 
(Adegun & Taiwo, 2011). This is an important point in the debate about the market-led 
LIHP in developing countries. As researchers suggest part of the market-led housing 
delivery which has called for a shift from government direct production to market may 
have been self-defeating, with a growing population of LIG lacking sufficient housing 
supply to afford and stimulate further demand. 
The MHS indeed can be considered another added source of further deepening the 
polarisation of the city along the lines have and have-nots, as what Immerwahr (2007) 
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called ‗class segregation‘ and deifying the call for a strategic governance (Healey, 2002) to 
building the city's future of inclusiveness. Overall, the involvement of private developers 
proves that Abuja was only interested to perpetuate a deepening housing polarisation. The 
MHS was made to look good through generous land and financing provisions to the private 
developers. However, under the current form of housing delivery, Abuja administration 
does not demonstrate any form of concern with compassionate consideration on to whom 
and for whom the provision was made by the new agents of delivery. If Abuja 
administration has outlived relevance in meeting the housing of the LIG, so are private 
developers, under the new housing policy in Abuja.  
Conversely, much more ambiguous the contribution of these new agents of delivery is the 
exclusion of LIG provision in their housing estates. In circumstances in which the 
mortgage industry was at an infant stage and their mode of accessibility on ‗cash-and-
carry‘ basis, the MHS became exclusionary, building once again on the previous paradigm 
order-in favour of the high-and middle-income groups. Indeed, the market-led delivery 
under MHS principal target was to the high-and middle-income groups only. The market-
led LIHP further, continued to build the former status-quo of the city polarisation and 
exclusion through the market and this has led to believe that, the approach is neither a 
solution but a problem to the LIG in Abuja (Ndubueze, 2010). 
Coincidentally, at the time of implementation of the MHS in Nigeria, there were stark 
growth of poverty in the country and such development has generated significant impact in 
the housing industry commanded by the market. The market-led policy under this mass 
poverty in the country has thrown the entire objective and strategy into jeopardy. In 
addition, the financial crisis has contributed to slack in the implementation, even in the 
delivery of onerous focus of the developers and the worst set back to the scheme was the 
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state had to retrace back in its earlier undertaking to make provisions of infrastructures in 
the scheme designated areas. This made the developers with no choice than to provide the 
infrastructures and further translate into higher unit cost of the houses produced due to 
additional development cost. 
Abuja socio-spatial segregation and polarisation in Abuja city and a striking dualism 
emerged between the city modern formal development (FCC) and the informal squatter 
settlements (sub-urban and satellite towns).  The dualism is reflected in the contrasts 
between the infrastructures and living conditions of the poor in squatter and slums, and the 
homes and property of the few wealthy elite. The inactive government attitude to MHS 
made the housing unaffordable not only to LIG, to most of the city population. Meanwhile, 
at a time Abuja is described as a city ‗full of houses without people and people without 
homes‘. The private renting was the last resort to the majority of the city population at the 
satellite towns and squatter settlements, renting small and expensive housing units and 
some being sub-tenants. Furthermore, all these in most cases constituted the city socially 
excluded LIG. Equally, the booming and expansion of a large squatter population in Abuja 
is a reflection not only of the pathetic economic well-being of the people but also of 
governance failures in the city and as it is in the country. 
The implementation of LIHP underlying the public-private sector is based on partnership 
arising from a formal institutional setting. The Malaysian context has created an embedded 
a framework of participation between the stakeholders of private and public sectors. The 
public sector is responsible for setting the target, policy environment and coordination, 
managing and controlling the private sector (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn Kassim, 2011). The 
private sector is under the control and regulation set by the public sector. All conducts of 
private sector agent decisions do not have the right to make decisions for their own case or 
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for the industry without taking recourse to the state instituted institutions of policy 
governance. While in Kuala Lumpur, unlike in Abuja, there was a remarkable centrality of 
the partnership delivery, the government attitude towards the market remains ambivalent. 
The state agent had created consultative processes with the market, in the form of JPMC, 
but the government still tends to have a paternalistic and ―command and control‖ attitude 
towards the market, rather than retiring as mere facilitator and enabler.  Bureaucratic 
procedures were as prominent in the partnership. Thus, concur with Underhill & Zhang 
(2005a:1) that the state-market partnership has been constituted as an “integrated ensemble 
of governance”, as distinct ‗state-market condominium‘ in Asia countries development 
(Underhill & Zhang, 2005b). 
From the context of Malaysia and Nigeria studied, it was apparent in the provision of LIHP 
provision actualisation of LIG participation or otherwise, either one of inclusion or 
exclusion. Equally, the outcomes rightly demonstrated it is a responsibility of the state to 
take a decisive action on the policy implementation. The studies have proven that LIG 
housing is constructed through such state commitment and will (Abdul-Aziz & Jahn 
Kassim, 2011). Whenever the state had provided an institutional framework in the policy 
implementation, LIHP is most likely to realise its policy inclusiveness (Tibaijuka, 2009). 
This study, particularly the Kuala Lumpur case, has shown that institutional framework 
embedded in the system is extremely beneficial to programme progress, success and 
sustainability not only to the LIG but to the market within the framework of overall 
market-led economy. Taken as whole, this study findings are consistent with the 
considerable concern that has been expressed about the implications of stark market-led 
LIHP for LIG and developing countries, ranging from exclusion outcomes to deteriorating 
housing delivery. The context of Abuja and especially the proliferations of informal 
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settlements; LIG exclusion and greater inequalities in MHS reinforce this view. 
Nevertheless, the Kuala Lumpur context shows that the LIHP implementation points to a 
positive impact on the LIG and city. This contradicts some of the initial earlier arguments 
that emphasised on ‗state rolling back‘ which undoubtedly carries “the mantra of a 
destructive neo-liberalism” (Harvey, 2003:941).  
In sum, the enablement LIHP strategy presents a mixed position. There is little doubt about 
the scope of its impact. Abuja in Nigeria has become a nation in transition. Most 
obviously, it has shifted from a mixed economy, underpinned by a considerable 
government intervention, to a more open economy with a diminished direct role for 
government. As such, it is pursuing total integration into capitalist economy driven by self-
interested individualism, and the fostering of entrepreneurial spirit such shift, comes with 
profound negative housing's impact on the part of the nation and its citizenry. It 
exacerbates social fragmentation as housing becomes more unevenly distributed. Such 
fragmentation is producing housing colonies within Abuja. This has been manifested in 
heightened informality of urban quality and infrastructure. 
9.2.5 Lesson learnt from the comparative experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria 
in low-income housing policy implementation  
What are the long term implications of the housing policy in relation to LIG housing? 
What lessons can be learnt from the experiences of the two countries and to other 
developing countries? This section focuses on issues related to comparative experiences of 
Malaysia and Nigeria and identifies lessons that could be obtained and constitute sources 
of policy learning to Malaysia and Nigeria‘s low-income housing policies. Enablement has 
been promoted internationally as a key approach to promoting the LIG housing delivery in 
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developing countries LIHP and strategies. Similar to Miligan, Dieleman & Kempen (2006) 
study the experience from the LIHP in these countries demonstrates several key learning 
elements in strategy implementation,. In particular, the case study cities afforded 
opportunities for learning lessons on the need for good implementation arrangements 
among the entire stakeholder partners. 
9.2.5.1 The lessons for Nigeria from the Malaysia low-income housing policy 
context 
The lessons in LIHP delivery in Malaysia have extant relevance to Nigeria, for the fact that 
both share same period of paradigm shift to market-led housing delivery. However, the 
Kuala Lumpur JV partnership is older than the Abuja MHS programme. As early as 1989, 
the CHKL had pioneered partnership with the private sector by having the first pilot 
project in Cheras. The JV has drawn a distinction to Abuja MHS, by identifying the 
housing challenge in the city and using institutional frameworks and facilitations on 
private developers to partner in addressing the challenge. Hence, in comparison to Abuja 
MHS, the Kuala Lumpur JV ticks almost all the boxes of critical factors of a successful 
partnership- agency structure, administration machinery, and coordination and 
undoubtedly all of these factors has been able to promote win-win partnership outcomes 
that respond to the city LIG demand for housing, consistently within the overall national 
LIHP objective. It was not only the organisational linkages that facilitate the commitment, 
but also as the case shows a political leadership to make an inclusive outcome indisputable 
among the LIG in the city. 
From the comparison of the partnerships in Kuala Lumpur and Abuja, it is obvious that to 
accomplish the goals of the scheme effectively cannot be realised cheaply. The 
implementation of LIG housing in Kuala Lumpur illustrates confidence and strong political 
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will with the partners, mainly market and society as well as state, as a general trend in the 
region (Underhill & Zhang, 2005a). Equally noticeable, was the strong partnership spirit 
and empowered participation can be seen among the private sector developers and society 
in Kuala Lumpur respectively. Specifically, the policy aims at realising home owning 
democracy among its citizen, was pursued in all its ramifications. In general terms, the 
Malaysian case study, therefore, holds relevance for other cities and countries seeking to 
improve the quality of life of its LIG in urban areas. The Kuala Lumpur experience points 
to the ingredients required for a successful partnership are making enormous prerequisite 
resources available, technical competence and administrative as well as legal frameworks. 
In addition, there is a need to consider the major issue prominent in LIHP literature is the 
issue of financing, particularly its availability to the LIG through the formal sources. The 
Kuala Lumpur LIHP has demonstrated a deserving priority to house the LIG in the city by 
making access to finance available. This lesson contrasts with that of Chiu (2010) who 
argue that there were difficulties of financing experience transferability, believed to be 
shaped largely on historical precedence. However, it was an  earlier lesson pointed for 
Nigeria could learn from India‘s experience (Mills-Tettey, 1988) is relevant in relation to 
what is observed in this study, making Malaysia exceptionalism experience in relation to 
the mobilisation of all necessary sources of funding for housing, not only from the 
government allocations but also through mechanisms for raising funds on capital markets, 
pension fund and through saving schemes. 
Accordingly, the implementation of MHS on an ad hoc basis with no proper emphasis on 
wider programmes aimed at LIG housing delivery for the LIG call for a change, especially 
from the private developers who do not extend to them the deserving attention in the 
implementation. Hence, there is a need for MHS development to change its focus in the 
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housing development, to reflect the existing structure of the society, where in Abuja 70% 
of the population belongs to the LIG and thus their development should essentially focus 
on this group. 
Malaysian government efforts at diversifying the policy delivery base serve as a useful 
strategy to catalyse delivery and enhance the success of having penetrated reach of LIG 
housing. An active and effective participation of both state and market offers new 
directions for consolidating LIG housing delivery. This represents a relevant option for 
achieving not just housing policy sustainability championed by Choguill (2008), but also 
social justice and equity, which are important in LIHP that are found lacking in the Nigeria 
LIHP and in most of developing countries. 
The Asian model, as the main strategy devise used to deepen LIG housing, was, in its 
novelty, diversity, development and elaboration, unique to Asia (Ronald & Chiu, 2010; 
Ronald & Doling, 2010). This is the model that has produced “greater proportions of 
home owners than do western countries”(Doling, 2002:179). As the model were being 
developed, World Bank were busy determining the housing policy in Africa and other 
developing countries culminating in the World Bank housing policy first appeared in 1974 
(Zanetta, 2001). Nevertheless, with the failure of all the strategies over the periods of 
implementation of World Bank strategies, the views and thinking of the Asian states on 
LIHP, to a great extent, appeared to them (World Bank, 1993a). It is against this 
background that the Asia with different economic backgrounds, culture and experiences 
resisted the World Bank prescription of their LIHP. In recent times, the Asian in general, 
and Malaysia in particular developed model in modification of World Bank recent LIHP of 
enablement and to procedural outlets for its implementation: the model was government 
and market partnership (Doling, 1999b), in other countries in Asia include like Singapore, 
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for example is state-led (Yuen, Kwee, & Tu, 2006), while Taiwan which is based on free 
market principles (Chiu, 2008). The Asian model premised on the state role and market 
control by the state, as a counterpart to the western neoliberal housing policy (Doling, 
1999b). By the western view, although government participation in housing policy is 
required the international standard stipulated a minimal role which states should accord to 
housing policy (Pugh, 1994a). However, Asians considered such standards to be treated 
with modification in the implementation of their housing policy. It was to neutralise the 
excesses of sole market-led and to eschew its abuses, that the Asian model was elaborated 
(Ronald, 2007). The Asian model provides that the state is responsible for individuals and 
was entitled to direct the function of the market. Thus, the markets are subject to state 
control and regulation more deeply (Ronald & Chiu, 2010). 
From the Malaysian LIHP context, exposes the Asian model is wider and more penetrating 
than the World Bank enablement in expanding the scope of LIG housing. The enablement 
minimalist doctrine, it may be recalled postulated the exclusion of state in certain terms of 
implementation. However, the Asian model went beyond the definite content of the 
framework. By a qualified government social welfare responsibility, the Asian model 
contrary to the enablement, which World Bank inspired it, permitted the use of state 
institutions as the platform in the enforcement of the public interest. It was in an attempt to 
have an inclusive LIHP that enablement World Bank paradigm shift was elaborated and 
often relied upon by Asian countries. The model aimed at strengthening state control and 
regulating market by prescribing that market should only operate according to the dictates 
of the state. However, by insisting on state presence in LIG housing, the model impliedly 
means states led is needed to tackle the LIG cohort housing challenge. Its implication was 
to ensure the central jurisdiction of the countries private sector over, and, to some extent, 
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the sole agent of LIG provision and investment. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this study 
that the Asian model would make an appeal to Africa states, like Nigeria in formulating 
coherent and future LIHP. More specific, the Malaysian context strongly strengthens the 
firm believe that LIHP can be implemented effectively without the exogenous content and 
dictates. The emphasis that needed to be stressed here is that Malaysia could stand as a 
model for many developing countries such as Nigeria, as it stood as a prove that a country 
can house its LIG population and is possible, even in an international system dominated by 
the path dependant housing policy originating and in the interests of powerful multilateral 
agencies such World Bank and IMF. 
The lesson to Abuja and Nigeria government in general is needed to give the deserving 
attention to its LIG. The required attention should be demonstrated by making political 
expediency in compelling the all the legislation associated with the LIHP implementation. 
This is because Malaysian model has demonstrated how a country with vision, 
determination and planning, works towards solving LIG housing (Abd Aziz et al., 2008), 
which in some societies defies solution (Malpezzi & Sa-Aadu, 1996). In particular, 
concurrent with these substances in a LIHP, these case studies further illustrate the premise 
that to achieve successful outcomes for LIG housing delivery purposive leadership must be 
spearheaded by government and a need to be garnered in the course of implementation 
(Zalanga, 2000). Hence, even where the housing is market-led by the private enterprise, the 
LIG housing provision makes a high degree of government involvement inevitable. 
The Malaysian context, displays exemplary contribution in its modest LIG housing 
delivery that allows the state to subject the market function under its strict control and 
regulation. The state exercising policy autonomy is not in doubt and perhaps such have 
strengthened the state to enjoy its autonomy (Embong, 2008) and made it capable of 
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achieving a significant difference in housing its LIG and LIHP goals. Thus, the Malaysia 
experience in LIHP points to the fact that the state control of the market and the reduction 
of social and economic inequality constitute the most promising path of advancing a LIHP 
that is all inclusive of the LIG. This study demonstrated that the fundamental difference 
between the two countries was in relation to the high level of state commitment chosen and 
the consequent achievement in LIG delivery, were at the heart of promoting inclusive 
housing policy in Kuala Lumpur and exclusive one in Abuja. 
From the Malaysian context this study can conclude that the market has a voice in the 
country‘s housing delivery to the citizens, inclusive of LIG, and the government was 
increasingly respecting such presence. Such purposive market presence and participation in 
LIG housing delivery could be taken as an example to other countries, like Nigeria, of how 
to do it. The state has played an active role in promoting the market participation, and the 
engagement has integrated in LIG housing dynamism in the country.  An impressive 
outcome actually depends on the policy implementation and supporting policy 
environment nurtured by the state having the political will and sensitive to the plights of its 
citizens. This is what is sent forth recently in African ‗new institutionalism‘, the 
resourceful of  power organisation as the most important resource in economic 
performance (Bates, et al., 2012). These are the factors that propel the development of 
Malaysia (Embong, 2008) and impliedly LIHP reasonable success. This study have a firm 
believe that the Malaysia case could be taken as a good role model for implementation in 
other countries such as Nigeria where the extent of market integration and engagement was 
yet to produce an impressive outcome. 
The predominance of middle class in Malaysian society and the availability of adequate 
financing for this class boost their effective housing demand without even government 
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subsidies. Such landmark achievement has implication on low-income housing delivery by 
deflating their encroachment on the LIG housing delivery and making the realisation of the 
low-income housing programmes by government easier. Thus, a lesson Nigeria to learn 
from the Malaysian experience is that empowering the middle-income class households 
can significantly contribute to make the low-income housing delivery meeting the target 
beneficiaries. 
In Abuja context, the MHS failure to capture the majority by producing houses that were 
not at affordable prices to the city cohort of LIG, necessitated them to adopt adjustment 
measures. This is because the LIG households in Abuja society in which they live in was 
one in which they are embedded in poverty, geographic isolation, the limited access to 
resources and for all that, produced an exclusion outcome in policy implementation and 
outcome (Akingbade, et al., 2012a; Ikejiofor, 1998a).  To this end, they voiced out the 
failure of government to adequately engage the market successfully, by the spontaneous 
emergence of squatter settlements all around the city, meanwhile when such trend was in 
decline in Kuala Lumpur. As a result, the same state that does not make adequate provision 
pursued them with demolition and displacement (Amba, 2010). The measures popular in 
Abuja include squatting as liking to what Davis (2004) called ‗planet of slums‘ all around 
the city on the FCT land owned by the federal government; purchase of land from the so-
called indigenes; house-sharing among others (Ikejiofor, 1998b). To safeguard the city 
master planning, the eviction and bulldozing approach are the dominant feature of the city 
governance; the effects are made further away to the city periphery where they settle again 
illegally (COHRE, 2006). In fact a recent study using GIS shows that between 2000 and 
2006 there was an expansion of slum area of a particular corridor of Abuja development 
from 31.52km
2 
to 104.51km
2 
(Ujoh, Ifatimehin, & Alaci, 2009). With such demolitions 
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generates inadequate availability of housing, with severe consequences of overcrowding, 
lack of sanitations and health services (Adama, 2007). Such spontaneous settlements 
constitute areas of deprivation, where they are inadequately provided infrastructures by the 
FCDA.  On a general note, when cities like Kuala Lumpur are closed at resolving squatter 
and settlements challenges, Abuja in the new millennium is at the moment depicting 
another unique form of the process of slumification, as epidemic of government 
indifference to the LIG housing, as a characteristics of African governments 
(Huchzermeyer, 2010). 
Each of the case study capitals simultaneously presents a critique of the World Bank 
neoliberal capitalist housing policy, as they have unfolded with different trajectories of the 
implementation process. The Malaysian case departs from the dominant framework‘s 
preoccupation with state intervention and dominance, rather than withdrawal, by having 
institutional and legal regulations of the entire process. On the other hand, the Nigeria case 
capital remains in the mainstream framework with but the pathetic outcome of polarisation 
of the city and exclusion of the LIG. 
The context of MHS gives further evidence that despite the committed resources of land 
and financing, the strategy does not focus on the most important target, that informed the 
conceptualisation of the programme, that is, the cohort LIG in housing provision. The 
implication shows that there are deep problems with commitment, coherence and capacity, 
significantly important in the delivery of housing. The emerging trend in Abuja market 
driven housing delivery calls for improving the housing of LIG by either realigning the 
programme to planning, with the capacity to implement, of which would strategically 
linked to achieve the desired objectives of the scheme. Undoubtedly, the MHS was 
constrained by the inadequate governance capacity to ensure prudent management of the 
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scheme and such impedes housing delivery and goals. The scheme was implemented with 
the gross absence of adequate planning and implementation capacity. 
Corruption in Nigeria is perceived to be widespread and entrenched in all spheres of the 
society (Ogundiya, 2011). The effect has created an organisational culture through the state 
governance institutions (Smith, 2008). In MHS implementation context, the corruption is 
not only manifested in favouring the some developers, in the form of preferential selection. 
It is important to note, in the context of the scheme that the tolerance of poor or complete 
lack of, performance in both government departments and developers is a form of 
corruption (World Bank, 2010). The inefficient and ineffective use of land and financing 
made available to these actors was obvious and significant, as the manifestation of the 
corruption described in this study. The patron-client nature of the Nigerian state (Daloz, 
2005) coexisted with, if not contributed to, an immoral ethos of its market and society 
where everybody tried to get as much as possible and contribute as little as possible. This 
led to a morally corrupting and economically unsustainable housing delivery mechanism in 
Abuja. In the long run, the consequences of such attitudes have entrenched in organisations 
lack of credibility and poor management, in its image. With such tainted image, the society 
internalise a culture of non-performance on FCT governance and such could have 
devastating consequence on its political legitimacy (Myers & Murray, 2006). 
If there is one thing Nigeria could learn from Malaysia LIHP is visionary and political will. 
Of course, there are many lessons, but the single most important is how the Malaysians 
aspire to build a permanent solution based on socio-economic fundamentals and favourable 
policy environment. The findings from Kuala Lumpur context, shows that it was the 
political will and managerial leadership (van Donge, 2012) rather than decentralisation and 
privatisation or the mere existence of policies, that determine, how effective such LIHP 
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will be. The political will translate into national targets, the allocation of the necessary 
resources, the drive to ensure implementable and, broadly, the acceptance of accountability 
at all levels to political representatives and directly to the people. As shown above, the 
absence of political will in Abuja context was what made it distinct from Kuala Lumpur. 
The political order, race riot and economic conditions of the majority of Malaysians were 
that occasions for government participation to Bumiputera and their interests became the 
housing focus of national development (Agus, 1997). Hence, the government LIHP 
became committed to participate for the protection and provision of housing for LIG in 
conjunction with the market. 
9.2.5.2 The lessons for Malaysia from the Nigeria low-income policy context 
The implementation of MHS is a unique case compared to JV in Malaysia. Although there 
might be peculiar characteristics of outcome in particular to MHS, much of it has been 
experienced in, and can be generalised to, the other PPPs. This suggests that there are a 
number of lessons that can be drawn from the MHS experience and applied elsewhere. The 
Nigerian experience exemplifies the current obstacles of LIHP to achieve LIG housing 
delivery and suggests the policy measures required to overcome such obstacles. Unlike 
Malaysia, Nigeria was unable to exploit the available resources to move the LIG housing 
forward, resulting in high levels of informality and proliferation of housing deprivations 
among this class of citizens. Against this, the Malaysian LIHP are considerably effective in 
promoting LIG housing, thereby increasing both accessibility and affordability, thereby 
increasing the overall policy objective adequate and affordable housing. Now that 
Malaysia has promulgated its housing policy, it should learn from the Nigerian context, 
that such policies are meant to be implemented (van Donge, Henley, & Lewis, 2012) as it 
constitute a framework of principle course of action. Thus, lessons of Malaysia from 
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Nigeria (1) housing policy must focus on the ultimate goals and objectives; the Nigeria is 
not breaking even because it was focusing on the intermediate steps (2) housing policy 
should start at the planning stage. It is difficult to realize the policy vision without 
adequate planning in existence (3) the housing policy stakeholders must be made to 
understand that the goals and objectives were set to be achieved. This is because then the 
objective expectations of each partner are shared and responded. 
9.3 Comparison between Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
There are significant similarities as well as differences. There are several common features 
with respect to the LIHP and its strategies in Kuala Lumpur and Nigeria. The comparative 
analysis explains why Kuala Lumpur was able to make a favourable outcome than Abuja. 
First, the shift in housing policy focus- market-driven delivery, in both Malaysia and 
Nigeria case studies, has redefined the role of the state from being a provider to enabler 
and facilitator. This has the led to institute institutional framework of implementation, to 
coordinate the provisioning of housing for the cohort LIG in the countries. Most 
similarities are to be found with reference to the organisations and objective that keep a 
distance from the state and/or that were established to strengthen state policies towards 
housing the LIG. One example is provided by the commonality of countries low-income 
housing policies ambivalence towards the market as a panacea of LIG housing, as it is 
observed to be the central focus of every neo-liberalism policy (Mitlin, 2011; Sandhu & 
Aldrich, 1998). The comparison of Malaysia and Nigeria shows that there are significant 
similarities in their LIHP in the manner of objectives and strategies employed to promote 
LIG housing deliveries in their respective countries, although there were broader 
approaches in the former than the latter. This does not mean that there are no differences. 
As this study demonstrated, shows how the countries implementations displays the 
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influences of context, political will and accountability to its policy, as a canon of policy 
governance were quite different from how, the states demonstrated concern and capability 
in realising its declared LIHP objectives and strategies. More specifically, the structural 
context in the countries has apparent significant impacts on the LIHP. For instance 
political stability, economic diversification and empowered society in Malaysia marked a 
distinct contrast in comparison to Nigerian context. The Malaysian success was heavily 
dependent on the state and market ability to subsidise the LIG housing, and such was 
absolutely absent in Nigeria despite the need for it due to the striking poverty among the 
majority of the population. The two case studies of Malaysia and Nigeria can be divided 
into distinct groups, one in which there is penetrating political will and state presence, and 
another in which is divorce of political will and requisite state commitment in the LIHP 
implementation. The Chapter first provides a conclusion of the countries studied before the 
overall conclusion of these findings for broader subject of the study. Meanwhile, the case 
study countries had created an institutional environment that allows the flourishing of the 
market. 
Secondly, in both cities, the state institutions are involved in the implementation. This 
phenomenon is naturally expected, since the state as an institution has a vital role in both 
the society and market synergy performs functional coordination. The society requires a 
strong state to intervene and coordinate the market function, to realise equity and 
efficiency as well as the market requires state enablement in the form of incentives and 
support. However, the degree and depth of state participation and subsequent engagement 
was observed to be greater in Kuala Lumpur than Abuja. The degree of state institutions 
presence results in considerable supervision and coordination under an established 
institutional framework of implementation. Furthermore, once such state presence takes 
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place, it generates other stakeholders‘ commitment to the policy objectives and focus. 
Secondly, the market JV partnership in Kuala Lumpur on a general note performed more 
efficiently and effectively than its counterpart in Abuja in the provision of LIG housing. 
This suggests that the developers in Abuja were generally not contributing to the housing 
of LIG than in Kuala Lumpur, suggesting additionally the need for restructuring the market 
partnership participation in Abuja and at the same time promoting an inclusionary LIHP. 
In spite of these similarities, there are clear differences in terms of performance between 
the two case studies. First, the Kuala Lumpur JV stood among the contributing strategies in 
LIG housing in the city and emerges as its dependable source of LIG housing delivery.  On 
the other hand, in Abuja, MHS as the only strategy in progress, the performance so far 
shows the exclusion of LIG and to their corresponding housing demand. To this end, there 
was no sign of improvement whatsoever with respect to LIG emanating from the current 
approach to ameliorate the city dwindling housing supply.  Indeed, there was perpetuation 
of deepening exclusion housing delivery for LIG in Abuja, even though the government 
had made a generous grant of land and financing to the private developers, yet the supply 
has since deteriorated under the scheme. 
Secondly, the deepening housing delivery in Abuja under the scheme raise the question on 
the governance quality and institutional framework, considering the resources that has been 
committed and when such incentives were not available to Kuala Lumpur developers, yet 
made a reasonable contribution to relieve the city LIG housing deficit. On the other hand, 
the difference made in Kuala Lumpur partly happened as a result of institutional and legal 
framework in existence. This observation suggests there was a negligible impact of the 
policy on the performance in Abuja, while a clear impact of the policy was quite 
observable with respect to the performance of private developers in Kuala Lumpur. In 
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general terms, in Kuala Lumpur and just like other cities in the country, the market has 
generated a noticeable contribution to the sustainability of LIG housing delivery. 
Accordingly, the market vibrancy and capability have remained high as a dependable 
source of LIG delivery strategy in Malaysia. 
With specific to market, it is useful to differentiate the level of commitment and attitude 
towards state policies as well the society. One of the main observable differences between 
the two countries is the strength and impact of the market in LIG housing delivery. The 
market in Malaysia arose during the NEP direct government intervention in the economy; 
as such   the market became deeply embedded in the state and society framework and has 
developed strong links to the country development paradigm.  The market therefore 
became strong anchors of realising government policies objectives and target. However, in 
Nigeria such visionary viable market never evolved due to the hegemonic and the 
transactional role of the alliance between state and market and the concurrent weakness of 
the state institutions. The formal private sector is a late phenomenon and is today made 
little or no impact in comparison to the informal private sector in meeting the housing 
delivery of the LIG in Abuja and the nation in general. 
Another obvious distinction between Malaysia and Nigeria is the outcome of partnerships 
and the overall LIHP. In the case of Malaysia, the market has been contained within the 
elaborate and pragmatic approach of state-market partnership. The policy of LIHP is 
executed according to local resources; there was no international presence in Kuala 
Lumpur, meaning to say all the participating firms were local firms. This means that the 
state institutional framework succeeds in domesticating the implementation by partnering 
with local market and efficiently succeeded in having an effective compliance to the policy 
implementation framework. In addition, the administrative centralism of the policy 
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provided at the federal level contributed in streamlining the policy and preventing the 
derailment of the policy focus and objective. In consequence, the strategy enjoyed a 
modest continuity. The relative strong governance capacity exemplified both from the state 
and market is complimented by extensive support being made available to LIG, in 
financing and governance. Therefore, the state earned the confidence of the market and in 
part support the state policy objective of realising a home democracy to all Malaysians. 
In Nigeria, the market led housing delivery was mostly depressed by deepening poverty 
and unemployment among the majority members of the society. The mass poverty and 
unemployment was at high levels in the Nigerian society generally, meaning that LIG were 
at the margin of economic allocation platforms. The neoliberal policies adopted as the state 
economic policy, further entrenched the market led supply, yet the presence of a formal 
housing market for LIG has been limited so far. In addition, despite, state generous 
endowment with land and financing, to achieve the partnership objective, the state 
institutions lost its coordination to regulate the market. The result was a boost to the 
informality as the last resort alternative to the LIG in Abuja. Consequently, informal 
settlements have become one of the most notable duality features of the city. The market in 
Malaysia, in contrast, has been one enjoying conducive state diligence and responded by 
accommodating to the LIG housing delivery. The market supply has become the 
dependable source of LIG housing supply in Kuala Lumpur and most of the Malaysian 
cities. In sum, the comparison above has centred on state, market and society in a broader 
context. The state has been the basic framework for well managed and all-in-all-coherent 
LIHP which in addition was accompanied by the strict state control and coordination. The 
outcome of this LIHP strategy on LIG has been coherent and progressive on the role of the 
state and market in addressing the LIG housing. While in Nigeria, both state and market in 
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action, LIHP emasculated and also in connection with LIG became excluded and housing 
shortage and informality deepens. Thus, the countries divergences are reflections on the 
way and manner the local context politics, welfare and financing embedded in the low-
income housing policies, as in part, interpreting the contrasting performance and outcomes. 
The partnership between state and market in Malaysia has been instituted for more than 
four decades ago, when on state invitation partner with the market in the provision of LIG 
housing in the country and most especially in Kuala Lumpur. With this long history, in 
contrast to Nigeria, the partnership has become more resilient as a panacea in LIG housing 
provisioning. Equally, the market housing provision in the country has equally long 
history, although over time was on more on high- and medium-income provisioning. The 
advent of JV and other similar partnerships couple with the enabling environment with 
strong economic and political fundamentals had gone a long way in sustaining and 
supporting the partnership between state and market. At the societal front, the national 
economic growth with broader distribution, expressed in poverty decline and increase in 
quality of life, provided great opportunities of participation among the target beneficiaries. 
All these combined with strength the state political will; to implement the JV projects 
produces a favourable outcome in Kuala Lumpur than in Abuja. 
The partnership must be transparent, clear, simple, consistent and helpful to the 
stakeholders. Once adopted such policies must remain intact and not easily altered 
although a certain level of flexibility is desirable, as a rigid set of rules will not allow for 
variations. Above all there is a need for consistency and uniformity of application for 
stakeholders. Any attempts a partnership create uncertainties, to avoid implementations 
hiccups. As shown from the Kuala Lumpur context, a framework of implementation under 
state-led created a proactive safety net to contain market imperfections to reach out the 
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LIG and a consistent planning has succeeded to move the partnership forward. However, 
the actors in MHS did not add all these ingredients to succeed. Moreover, the structural 
failure to reach out to the LIG and their corresponding housing demand further deepens in 
the city. 
The Kuala Lumpur case for the data analysis has shown measures provided to ensure that 
accomplishment and achievement of the partnership are realized. Unlike Nigeria, the 
participation of market in Malaysia partnership was one to complement, not replacing 
other government LIG housing provisioning. The state, therefore, provides an institutional 
framework for the market participation programme ensuring the implementation and 
monitoring of the participating stakeholders in the partnership in order to realize the 
program objectives as earlier stated above.  The same partnership was supported with 
policy and legal structures for the regulatory authorities and the participating market to 
streamline the procedures and process in the course of implementation, as part of the 
guarantee to realise affordable and decent housing to the LIG are delivered. 
Furthermore, the Kuala Lumpur implementation framework provided was exemplary. It 
demonstrates a policy commitment and political will between the state and market. One 
might not be wrong to argue that the policy was realistic on the account of the supporting 
institutional environment prevailing, producing not only win-win outcome for the 
participating stakeholders, mainly, state, market and society, but above all both 
accountability and transparency seems to thrive in the partnership.  The market 
participation provides the state with cooperation and in the process an understanding 
participatory association between state and market became cultivated. On the other hand, 
the state supported LIG with access and finance, as part of the inclusive outcome in the 
policy outcome. Lastly, such partnership structure has produced a vibrant private sector 
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agents and its contribution to state support has made more housing more accessible for the 
LIG in Kuala Lumpur. 
The key finding of this study is on the MHS housing exclusionary outcome against the city 
LIG, such constitute a lesson learning for a policy that at its conception intends to boost the 
housing of the poor and LIG. The MHS exclusionary outcome is largely mirrored and 
consequences of the structural context in the Nigerian political governance and 
socioeconomic realities. Thus the source of this exclusiveness can be traced from that 
context  and it's very unlikely programmes like MHS to be a success story and earn a 
credibility so long as this socio-economic structural malaise are not addressed. Next, the 
MHS experience suggests that poor implementation of a scheme like MHS can seriously 
aggravate governance failure. Undoubtedly, from Kuala Lumpur JV programme suggest 
necessity to have a firm, transparent and political will and commitment from the state 
institution as the anchor of the programme. Yet, when implementing the programme, from 
the selection of stakeholders, the selections were much dominated by political 
considerations rather than competency and managerial capability. Had it not been 
dominated by political considerations, MHS might have attracted far better and competent 
private developers of long refutations in the country that they currently do. 
Another important lesson to be derived from MHS in Abuja is that policy implementation 
and success is effective governance at all levels of the organisation in the course of 
administering the partnership, particularly at the both levels of state and market. The state 
key performance role is to monitor and manage the partnership inconsistent to the 
framework of institutional and legislated policies drawn. Political will and administrative 
commitment at the state level is indispensable if the programme like MHS is to be well 
managed. This is specifically relevant in an institutional environment like the one in Abuja 
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and Nigeria in general, dominated by inept government and administrators. Perhaps, the 
MHS programme was exploited for personal networks and leverage to political patronage 
and sustenance of cronies and consequently makes it impossible for the state to ensure 
management effectiveness. Given this kind of scenery in the MHS programme in Abuja, 
informed an experience elsewhere that the need for more diligent scrutiny to be devoted to 
how partnership stakeholders are engaged and monitored into the scheme. 
Finally, the MHS context suggests that political will and effective implementation by the 
state institution are equally crucial in determining success. The state‘s failure to manage 
effectively right from the inception of the scheme in 2000 undermined the partnership 
credibility and transparency of the MHS. In 2008, FCTA intervene after the ad hoc 
committee administration in much later in the scheme implementation when actual damage 
had already been done. It is a further question whether the setting up of the DMH under the 
FCDA is an appropriate solution to arrest the institutional failure of MHS and as a measure 
to build an appropriate administrative, financial and governance credibility to the scheme. 
It seems as if this programme is too huge for any single department, and the state is the one 
to consider addressing those structural and contextual realities we earlier mentioned if it 
actually has the political will to address the housing misery of the LIG among Abuja 
residents. The lack of political will from the state to do so will reinforce the housing crisis 
and such multiplies the cost of the failure to a bigger sum in the future than would have 
been the case had it originally intervened. Yet, MHS has not been coordinated with the 
deplorable state of the LIG housing crisis in the city. Had there been such a response, the 
FCTA MHS intervention would have been one of the most unprecedented records of 
housing history even beyond the country, considering the description we have earlier given 
that MHS represent one of the most current largest PPP housing schemes in the world. The 
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gross inadequacies at Abuja MHS are representative state of serious failings of whole 
institutional governance quality in Nigeria. Considering the widening housing deficit and 
ineffective MHS to respond adequately to the deficit, further exposes the state failure 
unfolding in the country as indicated earlier. 
9.4 Summary 
This study, therefore, examined how the paradigm shift in LIHP shared at meeting the 
housing of LIG and why the implementation and its subsequent outcomes differ in the 
countries of the study. In this Chapter, summarise the findings of this study. This study is 
on comparative terms, compared Malaysia and Nigeria processes and strategies under the 
LIHP pursue. In conclusion, the general overview of the Chapter is that beyond the 
classical economics narrowed definition of performance to efficiency, the institutional 
analysis adopted shown that the agency plays a major role in bringing about change. 
Similarly, policy implementation, this study analysis demonstrates that market and LIHP 
are supported and constrained by the pre-existing national structural context  and therefore 
any change or intervention need to be working on the surrounding country context or 
structure. It is on this basis that explains the difference in the LIHP implementation 
outcome trajectories found in Malaysia and Nigeria. In the next Chapter, provides a further 
summary of the findings and conclusion of the study. 
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Chapter 10 
10.0 Summary and conclusion 
―I‘ve always believed the future is going to be better than the past ...‖ 
Jeffrey R. Immelt (CEO, General Electric) quoted in Nadler (2007:25). 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has been directed to compare, review, evaluate and demonstrate the ways in 
which the low-income housing policy for low-income group (LIG) in Malaysia and 
Nigeria were similar and differs and why they differ. This is to identify and apply some of 
the unique features of countries' low-income housing policies as lesson learning. The 
Chapter first begins by giving the summaries of the study. Next, the theoretical and policy 
implications of the study are stated. Finally, the Chapter also contains suggestions for 
future research and limitations of the study. 
10.2 Summaries of key findings from the case studies in Malaysia and 
Nigeria 
In Abuja, beginning of the last decade attempted, as solution, to the deepening housing 
crisis. These were mainly in the form of World Bank tailored neoliberal housing policy 
implemented in the form of PPP, specifically, in partnership with formal housing market. 
From the Nigerian context, in comparison with earlier studies, the remarkable finding of 
this study is that, the greater majority of LIG was unable to acquire housing. The majority 
deems the adoption of new approach has worsened the situation rather than improving. 
Conversely, Malaysian context shows an inclusive trajectory in housing its LIG.  Against 
this background, if the Nigerian government wants to find a lasting solution to its meteoric 
housing deficit, not only in Abuja, it has to learn from the experiences of countries like 
Malaysia.  The recorded success in Malaysia is attributable to the establishment of the 
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workable institutional framework.  Others include building the capability; empowerment of 
LIG and political will to the institutional framework to coordinate, regulate and streamline 
the implementation of the designed policy strategies. 
The findings of this study have shown that, the Abuja case demonstrated the 
compassionate land provision and financing made available to the market. However, this 
does not lead to a significant change to the accessibility and inclusion of LIG in MHS 
participation. To a large extent, the scheme further deepens the exclusion of the LIG and 
by this reflects on the institution norms, criteria and overall quality. The researcher's view 
of the plight of low-income housing policy (LIHP) in Nigeria, when compared with the 
Malaysia, leads to the opinion that the problem centrally lies with the institution. The level 
of success attained in Malaysia towards housing its LIG, was firmly built into the 
institution which regards housing LIG as a crucial factor in the country‘s development. It 
was largely achieved by the operations of the market framework coupled with the firm 
political will and favourable institutional structure fundamentals. It has now achieved a 
zenith that most of the housing supplies for LIG was through the market.  
However, the Nigerian context that tries to achieve this, the market exploits the weak 
institution, even within the context of difficulties arising from unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, the market cannot be expected to operate in socio-
economic environment complexities that constraints the society participation. In recent 
times, the studies on institutions the world over devoted to ascertaining institution's role in 
housing policy has grown rapidly (Sanyal & Mukhija, 2001; World Bank, 2002; Zhu & 
Sim, 2002).  The compelling conclusion has been institution matters, as institutions are 
either enabler or obstacle. 
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The importance and where institution matters on housing policy are on the coordination, 
dynamism and impact for housing delivery. Consequently, the housing policy strategies are 
not only affected by the institution but also by its structural design and quality. The results 
of this study have shown that, to understand the housing policy issues it is necessary to 
know the socio-economic framework within which these issues are dealt with. 
Furthermore, agency behaviour connected with the institutional structure of the society as 
well as the overall long term countries aim. This is necessary to connect the aims with the 
development of such institutional structure evolution and development of such society. 
This means that the institutional policy context matters and set the basis of housing policy 
differences between countries. It is, however, possible to formulate at least the general 
principles which would then be adapted to the conditions of the places concerned. The 
Malaysian context experience is suggested, with a view to improving the Nigeria housing 
policy performance. It is not only that there has been a gross institutional failure in Abuja, 
but the existing strategy  under the state and market in partnership, have been whose gross 
failures in the course of LIG  housing  delivery were very apparent. Therefore, one of the 
contributions was to suggest Malaysian model. The model could be used to improve the 
housing condition of specifically the LIG in Abuja. This is possible by creating an 
effective state institutional framework in the intervention, controls and other policy 
decisions.  
In addition, the perspective of Malaysian context is useful to the conclusion of this study. 
In an attempt to solve Nigerian and similar developing countries LIG housing problem, 
cannot simply be solved by World Bank path dependent housing policy. The reader should 
understand that the social context is unique one in most countries, such uniqueness do not 
easily open to the idea of path dependent imposition. Nevertheless, historically shelter 
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provision occurs from the people, whereby the people explore the immediate opportunity 
and resources around them. There and then meet their basic need of shelter and that should 
be appreciated for what it brings to especially African society, rather than external 
imposition.  
Finally, there is a need to have a perspective into what exactly the housing situation is prior 
to now. Until that happens then housing would continue to be a mirage to many. Thus the 
appearance of path dependent housing policies, whilst nostalgic, may not be the most 
effective method to take Nigeria and Africa to where it needs to go; well at least for right 
now. Path dependent in neoliberal might be in Africa‘s future, until the people are 
empowered, poverty eradicated and state governance capacity built and maintained. So 
only then the driving could be done by neoliberal path and become successful. Malaysia 
development trajectory strongly reinforces the above claim. Hence, this is the relevance of 
Malaysian model to developing countries in general and Nigeria in particular.  
10.3 Conclusion 
10.3.1 Conclusion according to Kuala Lumpur case study 
From the Kuala Lumpur and national context, in response to the successful realisation of 
rapid economic growth, the Malaysian LIHP has demonstrated its reasonable ability in 
responding to these spontaneous and on a large-scale rapid population growth, urbanisation 
and growing affluence, particularly by expanding the housing needs of the LIG in the 
country. The development of the economy and the sustained growth through export led-
industrialisation has been accompanied by rapid employment growth. Reduction of 
poverty, growth of the middle class and general improvement of the living standards is the 
strong fundamentals explaining the extent of the record achieved. The Malaysian housing 
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policy strongly advocates state-market partnership as a means to manifest much of the 
housing needs. The synergy between the government and private developers have 
contributed positively as complement to other sources of LIG housing delivery pursued in 
Kuala Lumpur.  
The key lesson emerging from the Malaysian experience is that with government 
regulations and controls facilitated by a vibrant private sector, the solution of LIG housing 
is not far from sight. The Malaysia‘s changing housing policies shows how it has 
demonstrated learning from experience. They have evolved national realities in their 
implementations. Unlike many other developing countries, Malaysia has never to an 
extreme confined itself to the so-called World Bank consensus or path dependant housing 
policies. Thus, by and large, the policy makers have been meticulous in redefining and 
refocusing the way forward in achieving the housing of the LIG with policy pragmatism. 
This coupled with the political stability; the housing policy's emphasis on the LIG was 
never compromised. Malaysia by developing countries standard has been successful in 
mobilising its private sector in achieving home ownership among its LIG. Thus, the 
Malaysian private sector has become a catalyst in the quest of the nation to realise the 
home owning democracy.  
10.3.2. Conclusion according to Abuja case study 
In contrast to Malaysia, the state of Nigerian of housing sector neglect reflects the typical 
scenario in the country of one of abandonment of all sectors like health, education, 
agriculture, security among others. Indeed, in general, the housing sector is in a worse state 
than those of other sectors of the society, having neglected by successive governments 
since independence and such neglect became a singular conclusion of UN-Habitat (2008). 
Consequently, the emergence of an enablement housing policy created an opportunity for 
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the country. To have a second thought on important aspects of its housing policy strategy, 
by strategising on concrete terms to address the citizen housing malaise to a new agent, 
namely, market. Notwithstanding, the government over exaggerated its expectations of the 
market. This did not make much difference in its contribution to LIG housing. Instead, the 
problem has been transformed into another round of business as usual. The LIG housing 
challenge deepens and the weaknesses in governance and implementation of housing 
policy seemed to have lost the opportunity to make a difference in the country.  
Meanwhile, the informal sector source responded generously to the LIG in the country in 
general.  
Similarly, the MHS enablement housing policy strategy in Abuja has demonstrated that it 
cannot deliver the demand of the majority; LIG. The new agents from the emerging trend 
seem to be not prepared to make provision to these majorities in the city. And in fact, their 
prior attitude to LIG housing before the reform is maintained. Contrary to Malaysia, the 
strategy is proving to be dysfunctional for a dissolute society. Such outcome is the end 
result of the virtues of endemic corruption, fraudulence, treachery, apathy and malpractices 
that is observed in the implementation. The finding of the study shows that it is not tenable 
to posit that the adoption of PPP as a strategy of housing the mass people of Nigeria has 
solved the problems of accessibility and affordability for housing among the LIG. 
Conversely, it can be argued that the strategy of PPP has become a formidable and 
virtually impenetrable barrier to access to the majority of Nigerians, despite government 
support of land and financing. The strategy has succeeded by further marginalising and 
deepening the exclusionist posture of the housing market to majority of Nigerians. As well 
as effectively undermined and stunted the growth and development of the housing sector/ 
home ownership to near incapacitation. The spiral effect of the failure of this scheme has 
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contributed significantly to the further densification of the informal settlements around the 
city. The bottom line of this miserable outcome is mainly in implementation in terms of 
coordination, dynamism and impact. The MHS has not been efficiently implemented for 
the whole period of its inception. During the period of implementation, the LIG has not 
been the focus of delivering. Hence, the MHS has been implemented lacking reasonable 
focus and is characterised with lackadaisical from the responsible authorities. Furthermore, 
the MHS is beleaguered by poor governance and coordination. Thus, from the finding of 
this study it is quite right to conclude that MHS as it has been implemented in Abuja is not 
a panacea and, in fact, it is quite detrimental to the LIG housing.   
The MHS though appears to tackle one of the major constraints to housing supply, mainly 
land availability for developers, the housing delivery to LIG remains as dismal as ever. 
The success of making land available to developers notwithstanding has appeared to 
energize the polarisation and exclusion of LIG in Abuja. Despite this commitment to 
housing for its inhabitants, yet no significant change made so far in the city as per LIG and 
poor housing demand. In the final analysis, it may be argued in the Abuja context that 
housing policy implementation and LIG housing in particular is a product of institutional 
failure. The problem was not deregulation and privatisation, but rather the state institution, 
which did not instil the desired commitment and will to make a difference in the city. 
Concurrently, the market under the partnership appears to be part of, rather than a solution 
to, the housing wrought. Hence, there must be a renewed effort to reinvigorate its 
institutions in all its ramifications with all the necessary incentives to drive the city to 
ameliorate the deepening housing challenge. This appears to be the safe haven for the city 
administration and its constituent‘s city majority inhabitants. 
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The MHS strategy policy formulations resemble with Malaysian. However, the difference 
between the two countries was in the implementation. The implementation as the findings 
of this study indicated, worked without basic infrastructures. Coordination and monitoring, 
inconsistency in implementation plans, insufficient funding and a penchant for misuse of 
available resources are other factors. The concern goes both to the stakeholders of state and 
market. While the state demonstrated a lack of genuine political will and commitment, the 
market had adopted an uncaring and irresponsible attitude to LIG housing. This is apparent 
in the course of the implementation. Additionally, unfortunately, the implementation was 
pursued throughout without adequate and long term planning. Thus, the blatant outcome of 
the policy in Abuja suggests that Nigeria seems not on the way to catching up with 
countries like Malaysia in LIG housing delivery. As such their housing challenge 
deepened.  
Furthermore, this study has provided a number of insights into the institutional failures in 
an attempt to resolve the challenge of housing. The experience shows some of the 
procedures spelt were grossly violated. Therefore, the MHS scheme in Abuja was executed 
without proper procedure, adequate planning and implementation. The scheme also 
suffered from lack of coordination and monitoring from the relevant stakeholder 
departments of the FCDA and the worst originate from the ad hoc committee that first 
administer the scheme. This singular institutional failure brought about the confusion, lack 
of focus, coordination and encouraged non-compliance. It has shown the effects of weak 
institutional framework to successfully coordinate and monitor the progress of this onerous 
task of housing Nigerians. The ultimate goal of the whole exercise has become a mirage to 
the Abuja residents, but in particular to the LIG. The worst outcome from the study shows 
that the scheme is completely disconnected from the overall framework of the country‘s 
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national housing policy, that prioritise to achieve housing for all Nigerians to own or have 
access to decent, safe, and healthy accommodation at an affordable cost through mortgage 
financing. The study reiterates the need to further conduct in-depth reflections on ways to 
address this contentious issue of housing the LIG. What's more, the existing institutional 
framework needs to be overhauled and repositioned on ways best to address this challenge 
to realise the objective of the NHP, 2006 “to ensure that all Nigerians own or have access 
to decent, safe, sanitary housing accommodation at affordable cost”. 
The lesson learning from Malaysia can be read from adequate funding, instituted a policy 
implementation framework in the form of coordination, dynamism and impact. Of course 
there was a committed state institution, namely civil servant implementing the policy. To 
make a difference, just similar to Malaysia, to LIG housing in Nigeria and Abuja in 
particular, there is a need for the policy to be focused. It should determine to be relevant to 
their needs. So, let the Nigeria LIHP be focused on being relevant to the needs of this 
marginalised cohort group. This must be coupled with a state political will of commitment 
and excellence as a guide. Such attainment will guarantee that the difference could be 
achieved and happily realised in LIHP. Malaysia and Nigeria experience is surely 
consistent with the argument that institutions matter in economic performance (North, 
1989b; 1990). 
10.3.3 Overall conclusion according to the comparative contexts of Malaysia 
and Nigeria 
In this study, the researcher uses the case of Malaysia and Nigeria to study the LIHP in 
comparative terms. The LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria are progenies of the British colonial 
era. The common pedigree observed in both countries' housing policies has been singularly 
focused on poor and LIG.  It is thus not surprising that the objectives for the LIHP 
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coincidence with the focus on the poor and LIG. However, sharing common background, 
the housing policies development and strategies since then maintain convergence and 
divergence in the course of attainment of the both countries mentioned singularly policy's 
objective.  The Abuja MHS demonstrates deeper concern of government on housing 
wrought in the city. In particular, MHS became stymied by the entrenched interests of both 
the responsible authority and private developers. The housing policy reform from case 
study context is most dramatic where the state institution is weak. It is more successful in a 
state where the state institution is strong. This study points out that private developers can 
make a positive difference in low-income housing delivery. Their impact in the 
implementation of reform is equally significant. Where they have, there is a significant 
improvement of LIG housing status as this study has demonstrated from Kuala Lumpur 
context.  
There has been much debate on the housing of LIG as well as the associated strategies in 
the literature. Similarly, the paradigm shift in housing policies of developing countries, in 
the form of enablement has generated considerable interest in both policy and academic 
reviews as panacea to house the poor and LIG. In all these, the most recent strategy of 
enablement policy appropriateness as the panacea to the perpetual housing challenges in 
developing countries is questioned and criticised as inappropriate to these country 
contexts.  Most especially when the housing policies in developing countries are going 
through a transformation to market, emerging as the preferred the agent of delivery.  There 
is a key question that still needs to be engaged within the Malaysian and Nigerian context. 
The question is; what role is the state as an institution play in housing the LIG within the 
context of institutional structures and agents' behaviour in the enablement policy. As part 
of an on-going debate, the focus of this research was on state, market and society relations 
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as the actors in LIHP in Malaysia and Nigeria within their different contexts. In both cases, 
it is the state that mobilises other agents for the realisation of the housing policy goals. The 
methods employed are the policy formulation and deployment of the policy strategies of 
implementation (by means of administrative/institutional framework) and provision of 
necessary implementation infrastructure and resources. Finally, the states play a key role 
by enabling the market and society in the participation environment arena. 
The conclusion of this study is thus inescapable that the outcome arena of the LIHP in 
Kuala Lumpur and Abuja are quite significant and notable. They display significant 
differences between the capitals. In Kuala Lumpur, for most of the private sector driven 
housing delivery was state-led. The domineering role of the market in LIG housing 
delivery under strict state control has consolidated the strong hold influence of state over 
time. With state-led, the market has provided decisive impulses for LIG housing since the 
late 1970s when it all began. This was one strong reason that Kuala Lumpur and by 
extension Malaysia performed tremendous progress in housing its LIG population, by co-
opting private sector, as the leading agents in housing delivery. Moreover, the competition 
with informality in the housing delivery is an example of controllable sector in Malaysia. 
Consequently, informal settlements have been rendered insignificant in the country. The 
progress in LIHP due to mixed strategies since independence, firstly laid by government 
provider approach in the 1970s, by enabler approaches since the beginning of the 1980s 
and then by a combination of both onwards. In sum, the government has been able to co-
opt, build and sustain a willing partner, namely the private sector, in the LIG housing 
delivery in Kuala Lumpur.  
In contrast, the state in Abuja has been unwilling to provide the necessary political will to 
mobilise its private sector and to control the process. At independence, up to the late 
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1980s, the housing policy was state led providing minimal impact on the LIG and as it was 
same with formal private developers. At this time, the informality in both of LIG housing 
accessibility and private sector source deepens. Although the emergence enablement 
housing policy in the 1980s and 1990s was hardly palpable to the LIG, the state 
partnership with private sector did not fundamentally restructure the housing delivery of 
LIG, to one of formality. Consequently, LIG housing in Abuja and just like in all of the 
urban centres in the country has been particularly visible outside the state and the 
presumed efficient formal private sector market. 
From the above, the researcher observes the major apparent difference between Malaysia 
and Nigeria, centred on the extent of state presence within the LIHP. In Abuja, despite the 
generous provision of land and finance made available to the private sector developers, the 
state did not progressively transform the partnership with market to achieve an effective 
outcome. The policy implementation shows crosscutting cleavages that arise from the state 
and market partnership stunted the broader support to ameliorate the deepening housing 
difficulties among the LIG in the city. The plethora of developers that emerged did not 
unfortunately come to the rescue of LIG housing in the city. Partly, the clientelist 
partnerships that emerged have only focused more on the less priority area, in the form of 
choice residences to the medium-and high-income groups. The embattled LIG exclusion 
resulted in their absence or limited participation, was mainly due to the absence of little or 
no support from the state. The state and the market, therefore, the historical poor reputation 
of caring for LIG deepen as its consequence under the LIHP.   
Furthermore, at Abuja MHS the sets of actors at the different periods of progress 
demonstrated incapable of executing the duties of implementation to success. Similar at all 
the stages of implementation, the actors‘ vision or administrative efficiency, political will 
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and commitment that strategized to confront the housing challenge were grossly 
inadequate. The MHS objective, therefore, to effectively boost the housing supply, so that 
Abuja acute housing deficit would be brought at par with cities like Kuala Lumpur became 
a mirage. Consistent with the researchers‘ conclusions on Abuja development and 
governance failure, MHS as the city pet project continued along the same path of failure 
and disappointment. The actors in Abuja, most unfortunately did not reflect the structural 
implications of MHS progressing without the participation of the LIG. Instead, the 
authority allowed the continued solely developments in the MHS estates servicing the 
medium-and high-income groups. Under a neo-liberal LIHP pursued, the financial strength 
is the name of the game; the LIG became to be considered as a liability. Nevertheless, such 
thinking has led to Abuja to become into what Adebanwi (2012) called ‗Lagosification‘ 
problems of traffic congestion, homelessness, high rent, exorbitant cost of living, slums 
and squatter problems, crime and insecurity, infrastructural deficiencies, deterioration and 
deprivations etc. The management of MHS as a solution to Lagosification of the city, 
Abuja housing became aggravated deeper into crisis. 
On the contrary, in Kuala Lumpur, the private sector driven delivery under the state 
auspices, demonstrates a greater level of commitment, organisation and coordination than 
in the case of Abuja.  Although such position reached by the private sector should certainly 
be attributed partially to itself, however, much depends on the ability of CHKL to have 
created a competitive environment with sufficient incentives to allow them to extend 
housing delivery to LIG. Additionally, because of the state developmentalist orientation, 
the government has provided a stable economic environment and offers enabling 
opportunities for domestic private investment. The market working under these strong 
fundamentals, the Malaysian private sector generally presents itself as a dependable partner 
405 
 
in the housing delivery against state LIHP. Therefore, the market at all times articulates its 
position towards the integration or meeting the state conditionality‘s of participation in the 
state development framework.  In this context, LIG through market led supply in Kuala 
Lumpur constitutes a dependable source and partner in meeting the cohort housing 
demand.  
Conclusively, LIHP in Nigeria unlike in Malaysia, however, has so far been deficient to 
move forward the LIG housing. An analysis of these contrasting patterns suggests an 
important conclusion that institutional structural and agential factors are important 
determinants of the pace of development. Although the form of LIHP implementation 
shows striking similarities, however, there is quite striking distinctiveness in outcome. This 
comparative study has shown that to understand the trajectories in countries LIHP can only 
be interpreted within their particular institutional context. In this sense, when the country 
contexts are different in key respects, the variation coupled with its quality of institutions 
assumed an important determinant of agent behaviour and consequently the policy 
outcomes as the analysis of this study has shown.  
10.4 Contributions to literature 
10.4.1 Theoretical implications 
The enablement LIHP framework literature dwelt more on the market as the sine qua non 
of success of the policy (Strassmann, 1994). The contribution of the institution is belittled. 
Hence, the implementation of the policy paradigm from Malaysian and Nigerian context, 
practically demonstrated that LIG housing could only be effective if supported by a state 
and a political will capable of administering the discipline integral to its success. 
Accordingly, it is precisely the basic reason why the Nigeria state failed and became 
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incapable to forge a progress despite a contrasting support made available to market in 
contrast to Malaysia context. This reinforces the Jessop (2001) theory that wholesome 
capitalism through market forces without state providing modes of its reproduction, 
regulation, cannot achieve significant economic determination. Hence, Nigeria should 
learn from Malaysian to adequately find a solution to its growing housing deficits. 
Malaysia has demonstrated that a wholesome path dependent World Bank LIHP was not in 
its entirety, the local context strategy of addressing housing challenges matters. On this 
note, it has concurred with what has been professed by Smith (1996), quoted in Gilbert 
(1997) that dependence on such international policy framework constitute a major 
constraint on developing countries urban development. 
Theoretically, the enablement primarily conception and focus in both countries has 
generated participation of both local and international capital.  In the case of Nigeria, 
unlike in Malaysia, it was domesticated to the local capital in housing development. Indeed 
the new paradigm has ambiguous and contradictory implications for LIG and government 
housing policies in general. The market-led LIHP should be read not only in terms of the 
extent of enablement made by the state alone, nevertheless, as a fundamental association 
between the institution and state structure and agency of the countries. To use Jessop 
(2002) the outcomes do not depend on the structure of a state but on agency capacities, 
limits in the policy itself and the subsequent implementation. Additionally, the societal 
patterns of adjustment and response to the strength and weakness of the state and market 
institutions capacities and limitations also matters. The study has shown the critical aspect 
of the distributional impact of the state and market to be either one of inclusion or 
exclusion of the LIG.  In particular, it was precisely this exclusionary outcome – from a 
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government scheme, and market that made a class unity to unite and congregate in the 
periphery of Abuja squatter settlements.  
This study of comparative of LIHP challenges. The findings of this study challenged the 
parochial accounts of developed countries as a model for understanding of a universal 
housing policy experience. The study accounts are regarded as the corrective standard 
bearers for countries in developing countries. On this note, the findings of this study's 
implication on Abuja/Nigeria policy arena are on the urgent need for the state to review 
and focus its market-led LIHP in the light of the Kuala Lumpur/Malaysian experience. 
Malaysia has shown that the outcome would have been different from the market want or 
what would be in the absence of state penetration in the implementation of the partnership. 
The shortcomings of Abuja experiences expose the weakness of networked form of 
governance as a replacement of the hierarchical form as an alternative choice in public 
programme's delivery. 
By emphasising state-market in housing, this study represents the continued academic 
research to deepen the understanding of the impact of the synergy on society in the housing 
sector and issues arising from its context. In these studies, the implications of the housing 
policy paradigm shift are often raised and the findings point to a situation where the 
benefits are distorted and concentrated towards the medium-and high-income groups, 
against the LIG majority (Adegun & Taiwo, 2011; Arku, 2009). Furthermore, these studies 
have also highlighted the issues and problems associated with increasing polarisation 
between the different income groups. The implications of such challenge on long-term city 
morphology and integration are also taken into account. This study has also indicated 
similar issues and the emerging challenges arising from the adoption of market-led 
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delivery strategy in the housing arena. It has noted the success and failures in the two 
countries studied. 
The inequalities, emerging exclusion and focus on the wealthy class in housing 
accessibility widely associated with the onset of neo-liberalism housing policy  and 
market-led model of government housing policy has led to growing interest in 
conceptualising alternative frameworks for housing policy. Notable among these attempts 
have been advocates of a so-called ‗third way‘. This concept has been developed by 
Giddens (1998). Central to Giddens ideas about a third way is the need to rethink the 
nature of equality and inequality and the role of government in tackling both. Active 
attempts to develop a housing policy framework around third way principles have been 
made by a number of researchers in housing policy (Choguill, 2007; Ganapati, 2001; 
Keivani & Werna, 2001a). The experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria lend a strong support 
to this postulation in the housing policy arena. Especially, these two countries displays 
different context, in terms, of socio-economic fundamentals and institutional quality. Thus, 
this study is of value, considering the deepening housing challenges, most especially in 
developing countries with an underdeveloped housing system. It might be useful in the 
fashioning and the formulation of an efficient LIHP, to come to terms with these mounting 
housing challenges in these countries. 
10.4.2 Policy implications 
The NHP adopted in 1991 and 2006 were direct replication to the 1993 World Bank 
housing policy document (World Bank, 1993b). The Nigeria LIHP is made having an 
international conundrum, which ideally should not be so. Additionally, the policy makers 
need to understand that LIHP that does not contain the flexibility to be shaped by the local 
contexts is not likely to live to the expectation of its target objectives (Kumar, 2002). 
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Therefore, there is a need for Nigeria to break its appendage of World Bank wholesome 
concept, which is proving inappropriate and affecting the nation negatively in finding 
lasting solutions to its housing quagmire. Consequently, the NHP 2006 is currently under 
review and forthcoming soon. There is a need for the government to respond to the realities 
of its local context in all its ramifications. This is possible by formulating its autonomous 
policy framework and institution capable enough to make a difference in its housing 
sector. Thus, the once remarked made by Peralosa (1980:692) that “there is ... a need to 
find indigenous answers to indigenous problems” is most relevant here. When this is not 
done, the state incapacity to influence its policy formulation will be exposed. If the policy 
makers continued in Nigeria to adapt the World Bank policy framework, the housing of 
LIG would likely to continue to prove elusive, despite the declared position as its priority. 
Therefore, on the basis of Malaysian context, the Nigerian LIHP has to be locally 
contextualised and evolve based on experience, to be able to transform from its present 
rhetoric to reality. 
The Malaysian case context shows that it is not much the partnership which explains 
successful partnership with the state. Of far greater importance are the implementation 
coordination, dynamism and pragmatic approach adjusting policy to its changing 
circumstances in terms of space and time. The LIHP has had effects in the partnership in 
innovation in Malaysia. Such implementation innovations incorporated include cross 
subsidisation, planning requirement regulation, build-and sale, among others. Undeniably, 
the Abuja case did not manifest any form of such innovations and pragmatism of 
implementation. Conversely, the Kuala Lumpur case it was the policy pragmatism that 
generate distinct outcome when compared to Abuja case. 
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The research findings indicate that the impact of market-led LIHP was minimal at the level 
of LIG in Abuja, than in Kuala Lumpur. The policy reform challenge is in the area of 
inclusionary zoning as well as development control in partnership could help reduce 
―exclusion‖ effects of the LIHP. The inclusionary zoning, however, depends on the quality 
of state governance, by ensuring that it does not differentiate between the participating 
markets. 
There was a wrong presumption in Abuja MHS that because the private partners flocks 
into partnership with the government, the partnership will work. However, the 
implementation did not resolve two important issues, namely, what had to be done for the 
MHS partnership to deliver housing and, what had to be done to engage the vulnerable 
LIG in the city. Until these two are deeply entrenched, the MHS could not achieve 
sustainable and equitable housing delivery in the city. 
For obvious reasons of being profit oriented, market may not always treat LIG equitably 
for housing supply. However, the organisation of partnership between the state-market fills 
a vacuum in market engagement in the LIG housing provision in developing countries. 
Therefore, the priority for policy response is to identify ways in which the state can 
enhance the engagement with more enablement and empowerment environment, 
particularly the ones around the LIG households.  The researcher can cite for instance one 
striking differential basis between Kuala Lumpur and Abuja was financing availability. In 
contrast to Abuja, Kuala Lumpur context indicated that availability of financing was very 
supportive in building the LIG participations. Thus, the policy implication is the need to 
design a framework of ensuring the availability and accessibility to housing finance among 
the LIG. 
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Similarly, in relation to land, the supply of land adopted between Kuala Lumpur and Abuja 
are very different as shown earlier. The physical and location factors combined, 
contributed to what was made available to the market for development. Thus, for example, 
the policy challenge in Kuala Lumpur depends on the desired private developer on greater 
co-operation from the DBKL. In Abuja, where land was not a constraint, the role of FCTA 
and its governance need to have a policy that is strengthened enough to ensure that land 
endowments is exploited to the maximum benefit of common, particularly the 
marginalised LIG cohort. 
10.5 Future research direction 
Future researches on LIHP and enablement paradigm using the institutional analysis 
promises to generate further interesting findings. Meanwhile, comparative experiences in 
enablement and LIHP should continue to be made. Besides, the study of Kuala Lumpur 
and Abuja draws the attention on the need for additional investigation on the most 
effective methods of enablement in the PPP/enablement housing policy. Currently, the 
debate continued on whether the formal market enablement will lead developing countries 
towards having an inclusive housing policy reaching out to the target beneficiaries of LIG.  
The future studies of enablement need to consider the expansion of the range of housing 
policy strategies, beyond the current path dependent one in existence. Undoubtedly, 
housing policy strategies take many forms involving profits, non-profits, community based 
and government organisations. It engages in a wide variety of different relationships with 
the state. Thus, the further research need should be in terms of the variation in these forms 
of the approaches. This study can hope to provide general findings about how the LIHP 
and LIG challenges are contained within a given domain. Equally, the further research 
such as this in comparative terms will articulate the voices of these actors involved. Their 
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strengths in housing the LIG uphold and the streamlining the associated contradictions to 
LIG housing. 
Additionally, the cross-national comparisons undoubtedly miss the crucial aspects of 
change over time in LIG housing delivery. Hence, there is a need for longitudinal 
comparisons to understand the extent of which, over the periods of the policy 
implementation, produces an inclusive or exclusive outcomes, as suggested by Ntema & 
Marais (2012). 
The evidence in this study provides does not yet enable to draw the full conclusions in 
comparing enablement and housing policy paradigm shift, yet, it does yield interesting 
insights that will spawn further theoretical and empirical work. In addition, further research 
on the possibilities of restructuring the enablement to be more state driven. It will have 
greater state support and more reliance on state institutional framework. This would also 
be of great benefit from a research perspective. Further studies of how the enablement 
might be able to earn market support and participation would be of great interest, and then 
could impact favourable on the LIG in the housing market system. Naturally, research on 
how best to govern, specifically partnership (Ball & Maginn, 2005), as enablement strategy 
would be of great importance and value. 
Finally, there is a need for studies to undertake longer-term panel data to show the pattern 
and trend of the impact of market-led LIHP on LIG, not only in these countries under study 
but in other developing country context. Perhaps, developing such broader perspectives 
should create more realistic LIHP, that could build a bridge of societal integration in 
general and specifically through housing policy in these countries. 
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Many such possible further avenues of enablement research are thus available. It is the 
hope of this researcher that this study has made a contribution in moving the LIHP debate 
forward, especially, on how best to realise a pertinent state, market and society partnership 
alternatives. LIHP, indeed, represents to the researcher an intriguing issue, similar to 
earlier expressions made by Peattie (1979) and Ortiz (1996). This is the important concern 
on how to solve a significant portion of Malaysia and Nigeria, and similar developing 
countries housing problems. A possibility very much deserving of further study is one that 
is too promising to ignore. 
10.6 Limitations of the study 
In conducting this study, there were limitations observed and this subsection reports on 
such limitations. Expectedly, the researcher made all efforts necessary to resolve such 
challenges, to ensure that the study is completed. Firstly, the leading challenge was the 
confidentiality of the phenomenon investigated both at the levels of the public and private 
sectors. The controversies associated with the partnership activity, the data associated with 
it, were considered highly confidential. Similar to the experience of Mukhija (2004), 
therefore, the details of the activity data were limited to a level the partnering stakeholders 
were comfortable to release both at document searches and at the time of the interview 
sessions. In other words, crucial documents were not released by the managements of the 
stakeholder partners at both case studies. The socio-political context associated with the 
partnerships implementation was also quite controversial among the stakeholder agencies. 
To tackle this challenge, the researcher made a frantic effort in persuading the concerned 
stakeholders to release the documents needed.  Accordingly, within the limited that has 
been made available, is what the researcher had to work with. 
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The next limitation of this study was the limited number of interviews both in Kuala 
Lumpur and Abuja. Although there were many private developers participating under the 
strategy, part of the reasons mentioned above, many of the private developers declined to 
participate in the study. Similarly it was difficult for the researcher to obtain their 
cooperation to participate in the study. This study planned to interview the respective 
embedded case study housing estate developers in each case study city. However, when it 
was not possible, the researcher extended to other developers participants under the 
strategy.  For all that, in fact, in Kuala Lumpur case, the researcher could only enlist 
cooperation of just one developer, who accepted on condition that to be reported in the 
study as anonymous. Notwithstanding, of their limited participation in the study, this 
challenge has not much affected the depth of the study, since the entire partnership strategy 
content was formally documented and the limited implementation context obtained suffice 
to validate the research puzzles. 
Finally, the current study must duly acknowledge the account that the current market-led 
LIHP is partially limited. Its focus narrowed on the experience of the state partnership with 
formal market. It is indeed, on a limited number of partnering private developers with 
government agencies. However, market-led driven LIHP under partnership strategy 
represents a wider phenomenon. Wherein, the partnering between state and market serve as 
a focus point to understand the LIHP and LIG housing, under the paradigm. The role of 
market in housing delivery is not new, but the degree to which this enabling agency 
became the singular facilitator. The partnership is currently being under thorough 
examination. Thus, this study reported on only one aspect of it. It is hoped that, this study, 
in attempting to gauge the effectiveness of market-led LIHP, has been relatively useful in 
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providing a basis for a broader understanding of the institution. This is towards 
understanding the different types of LIHP practiced in the two countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A-Household questionnaire, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
HOUSEHOLDS STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE IN JOINT VENTURE 
PARTNERSHIP LOW-COST HOUSING PROJECTS 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
Background/ Respondent profile 
House address....................................................................................................... 
1. What is the ethnicity of the respondent? 
a. Malay b. Chinese c. Indian d. Others  (Specify) 
    
 
2. What is the religion of affiliation of the respondent?  
(a) Islam (b) Buddhism (b) Hinduism (d) Christianity (e) Others (Specify) 
     
3. Who is the head of the household? 
(a)Father (b)Mother (c)Father 
passed 
away 
(d)Single 
parent 
(e)Bachelors  (f)Others(Specify) 
      
       4. What is the head of household age range? 
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(a)18- 25 (b) 26- 40 (c) 41- 50 (d) 51- 58 (e) > 58 
     
 
5. What is the size/ number of the household? 
(a) 1- 2 (b) 3-4 (c) 5-6 (d) More than 6 
 
    
 
6. How many of your household members are between the ages of: 
(a) <1- 6 (b) 7-12 (c) 3- 17 (d)18- 25 (e)26- 40 (f)41- 50 (g)51-58 (h)>58 
        
 
7. Is the head of household employed? (a) Yes   (b) No             (If b. go to q.9). 
8. If yes, in which sector is he employed? 
(a) Government (b) Private (c) Self-employed 
   
 
9. Please choose the class that reflects the head of household monthly income range at the 
time you purchase the house? 
(a) <RM750 (b)RM751-1200 (c)RM1201-
2500 
(d)RM2501-
3500 
(e) >RM3500 
     
 
10. Please choose the class that reflects the head of household monthly income range now? 
(a) <RM 750 (b)RM751-1200 (c)RM1201-
2500 
(d)RM2501-
3500 
(e) >RM 3500 
     
 
11. If no, who is supporting the family? 
(a) Parents (b) Siblings (c) Extended 
family/ 
Social 
relations 
(d) Social 
welfare/ 
Government 
(e) Pension (f) Others 
(Specify) 
      
  
(
a) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
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Status of house occupation 
12. For how long have you lived in the house?  
(a) < 1 (b)1-5 (c) 6- 10 (d) >10 
    
   
13. Are you occupying the house as (a) Owner occupier             (b) Tenant       (If a. Go to 
q.15) 
14. If you are a tenant, from whom do you rent the house? 
(a)Government (b)Private 
developer 
(c) Employer (d)Individual 
owner 
(e)Others 
(specify) 
 
     
 
15. If you are an owner occupier, when did you purchase the house (in years)? 
(a) < 1 (b)1-5 (c) 6- 10 (d) >10 
    
      
16. From whom did you purchase the house? (If d. go to q.17). 
(a)Government (b)Private 
developer 
(c) Employer (d)Individual 
owner 
(e)Others 
(specify) 
 
     
 
17. If purchase made from an individual owner, at what price did you buy the house? 
(a)RM25,000-
35,000 
(b)RM36,000-
45,000 
(c)RM46,000-
55,000 
(d)RM56,000- 
75,000 
(e)RM76,000-  
100,000 
     
 
18. To what extent are you satisfied with the house you are occupying? 
(a)Very 
satisfactory 
(b) Satisfactory (c)Neither 
Satisfactory nor 
Unsatisfactory 
(d)Unsatisfactory (e)Very 
Unsatisfactory 
     
 
(
a
)
 
Y
s
 
(
b
)
 
N
o 
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19. To what extent are you satisfied with these common estate facilities provided on the 
estate?  
 (a)Very 
satisfacto
ry 
(b) 
Satisfactor
y 
(c)Neither 
Satisfactory 
nor 
Unsatisfactor
y 
(d)Unsatisfactor
y 
(e)Very 
Unsatisfactor
y 
Religious 
place of 
worship 
     
Children's 
playground 
     
Parking 
space 
     
Shopping/ 
community 
centre 
     
 
20. Do you own a vehicle? (a) Yes                    (b) No             (If b. proceeds to q.22). 
21. If Yes, which of the following? 
(a) Car (b) Lorry (c) Van (d) Motorbike 
    
 
22. Are you satisfied with the location of your house in relation to your place of business/ 
employment?  
(a) Yes                            (b) No    
Source of financing 
23. How did you finance the purchase of your house? (If a or e, proceeds to q.25) 
(a) 
Personal 
saving 
(b) Bank 
Loan 
(c) 
Employees 
Provident 
Fund (EPF) 
 (d) 
Employer 
financing/ 
loan 
(e) Family/ 
relations 
assistance 
(f) 
Government 
loan 
(g) 
Others 
(specify) 
       
  
24. If it is a loan, how are you paying back? 
Monthly salary 
deduction 
Monthly instalment 
payments 
Yearly instalment 
payments 
Others (specify) 
    
 
a
) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
 
 
a
) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
 
a
) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
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25. At what price, did you purchase the house?  
(a)RM25,000-35,000 (b)RM36,000- 45,000 (c)RM46,000-55,000 (d)RM56,000-
75,000 
    
 
26. How much were you required to offer as upfront payment before the purchase of the 
house? 
(a) 1-5 % (b) 6- 10 % (c) 11- 20 % (d)21- 35 %   (e)36- 49 % (f) >50 % 
      
 
27. If it is a loan, on what terms? (Except for respondent of q. 23 a & e). 
(a)Offered a 
collateral 
(b)Offered a 
guarantor 
(c) Employer 
offered as a 
guarantor 
(d)Government 
loan 
(e) Others 
(specify) 
     
 
28. Did you/ are you facing problem with the payment of the loan? (Except for 
respondent of q. 23 a & e).  
(a) Yes                                (b) No       
 
29. Was housing financing available at the time you sought for it?  
(a) Yes                              (b) No       
 
30. Do you enjoy any housing allowances from your employer? 
 (a) Yes                                    (b) No       
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Appendix B- Household questionnaire, Abuja, Nigeria 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
HOUSEHOLDS STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE IN PPP LOW-COST 
HOUSING PROJECTS 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
Background/ Respondent profile 
House address...............................................................................................................  
1. Who is the head of the household? 
(a)Father (b)Mother (c)Father 
passed 
away 
(d)Single 
parent 
(d)Others 
(Specify) 
     
 
          2. What is the head of household age range? 
(a)< 25 (b) 26- 35 (c) 36- 45 (d) 46- 55 (e) 56- 65 (f)> 66 
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3. What is the size/ number of the household? 
(a) 1- 2 (b) 3-4 (c) 5-6 (d) More than 6 
 
    
4. How many of your household members are between the ages of: 
(a) 1- 5 (b) 6-18 (c) 19- 25 (d) 26- 45 (e) 46- 55 (f) >56 
      
 
5. Is the head of household employed? (a) Yes   (b) No            (If No go to q.9). 
6. If yes, in which sector is he employed? 
(a) Government (b) Private (c) Self-employed 
   
 
7. Please choose the class that reflects the head of household annual income range at 
the time you purchase the house? 
(a) <N50,000 (b)N50,001-
75,000 
(c)N75,001-
100,000 
(d)>N100,000 
    
 
8. Please choose the class that reflects the head of household annual income range 
now? 
(a) <N50,000 (b)N50,001-
75,000 
(c)N75,001-
100,000 
(d)>N100,000  
    
 
9. If no, who is supporting the family? 
(a) Parents (b) Siblings (c) Extended 
family/ Social 
relations 
(d) Social 
welfare/ 
Government 
(e) Others 
(Specify) 
     
 
 
 
 
(
a) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
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 Status of house occupation 
10. For how long have you lived in the house?  
(a) < 1 (b)1-5 (c) 6- 10 (d) >10 
    
   
11. Are you occupying the house as (a) Owner occupier             (b) Tenant             (If a. 
go          to q.12) 
12. If you are a tenant, from whom do you rent the house? 
(a)Government (b)Private 
developer 
(c) Employer (d)Individual 
owner 
(e)Others 
(specify) 
 
     
 
13. If you are an owner occupier, when did you purchase the house (in years)? 
(a) < 1 (b)1-5 (c) 6- 10 (d) >10 
    
     
     14. From whom did you purchase the house? (If d. go to q.14). 
(a)Government (b)Private 
developer 
(c) Employer (d)Individual 
owner 
(e)Others 
(specify) 
 
     
 
15. If purchase made from an individual owner, at what price did you buy the house? 
(a)N<2,000,000 (b)N2,000,000-  
       3,499,999 
(c)N3,500,000-
       4,999,999 
(d) N>5,000,000 
    
 
16. To what extent are you satisfied with the house you are occupying? 
(a)Very 
satisfactory 
(b) Satisfactory (c)Neither 
Satisfactory nor 
Unsatisfactory 
(d)Unsatisfactory (e)Very 
Unsatisfactory 
     
 
 
(
a) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
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17. To what extent are you satisfied with these common estate facilities provided on 
the estate?  
 (a)Very 
satisfactory 
(b) 
Satisfactory 
(c)Neither 
Satisfactory 
nor 
Unsatisfactory 
(d)Unsatisfactory (e)Very 
Unsatisfactory 
Religious 
place of 
worship 
     
Children's 
playgroun
d 
     
Parking 
space 
     
Shopping/ 
communit
y centre 
     
 
 
18. Are you satisfied with the location of your house in relation to your place of business/ 
employment?  
(a) Yes                            (b) No    
Source of financing 
19. How did you finance the purchase of your house? (If a,b or c, proceeds to q.19) 
(a) 
Personal 
saving 
(b) Bank 
Loan 
(c) FMBN/ 
Mortgage 
financing 
 (d) Employer 
financing/ 
loan 
(e) Family/ 
relations 
assistance 
(f) Others 
(specify) 
      
  
20. If it is a loan, how are you paying back? 
Monthly salary 
deduction 
Monthly instalment 
payments 
Yearly instalment 
payments 
Others (specify) 
    
 
21. At what price, did you purchase the house?  
(a)N1,500,000-1,999,999 (b) N2,000,000- 2,499,999 (c)>N2,500,000 
   
 
22. How much were you required to offer as upfront payment before the purchase of the 
house? 
(a) 1-5 % (b) 6- 10 % (c) 11- 20 % (d)21- 35 %   (e) 36- 9 % (f) >50 % 
      
a
) 
Y
es 
(b
) 
N
o 
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23. If it is a loan, on what terms?  
(a)Offered a collateral (b)Offered a 
guarantor 
(c) Employer 
offered as a 
guarantor 
(d)Others (specify) 
    
 
24. Did you/ are you facing problem with the payment of the loan?  
(a) Yes                                (b) No       
25. Was housing financing available at the time you sought for it?  
(a) Yes                              (b) No       
 
26. Do you enjoy any housing allowances from your employer? 
 (a) Yes                                    (b) No       
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Appendix C- Public sector questionnaire, CHKL, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Department of Economic Planning & Development Coordination 
1. How is the land for public-private partnerships provided to the private developers? 
2. How do you secure the development land for PPP low-cost housing? 
3. What types of infrastructure provided are to be provided on the housing estate 
(roads, drainage, water, sewerage, and electricity)? 
4. Who is responsible for the provision of the infrastructure on the housing estate?  
5. How do you ensure the standard/ quality of houses produce by the private 
developers? 
6. How are the PPP contract enforced, in the case of any violation of the PPP terms of 
agreements? 
7. On what conditions/ terms the development land is provided to the private 
developers? 
8. Has there been any violation of such terms of the PPP contract agreements? 
9. What are the mechanisms of dispute resolutions in the PPP contracts put in place 
by your organisation? 
10. Is there any legislation on dispute legislation? 
11. How is the minimum guaranteed profit determined? 
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12. How do you determine the percentage of profit to be paid by the private developer 
to your organisation? 
13. Do you have policy guidelines determined the eligibility of the prospective buyers? 
14. Is this department involved in the selling/ allocation of the PPP low-housing units 
to prospective buyers? 
15. What are the benefits derived by your organisation from the PPP projects? 
16. From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP projects in housing 
the low-income households? 
17. What are the steps to take in improving the performance of partnership projects in 
the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Department of Physical Planning (DPP) &Department of Urban Planning (DUP) 
1. What are the policy issues to consider in PPP planning approval procedures? 
2. What are the sources of these issues/ regulations from the planning regulations of 
your organisation? 
3. What are the developments permitted in the form of ―one package development‖ 
allowed to the private developers on the PPP projects? 
4. From what has been approved to the private sector partner, how do you ensure 
compliance? 
5. What types of infrastructure provided are to be provided in the PPP projects (roads, 
drainage, water, sewerage, and electricity)? 
6. Who is responsible for the provision of the infrastructure for the PPP projects?  
7. From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
8. . What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Legal department/ unit 
1. Is your department/ unit responsible for drafting the joint venture (JV) agreement? 
2. Has there been any violation of such terms of the PPP contract agreements? 
3. What are the mechanisms of dispute resolutions in the PPP contracts put in place 
by your organisation? 
4. Is there any legislation on dispute legislation? 
5. From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
6.  What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria in Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to point out the 
mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to which it has 
facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We also like to give 
you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study and be kept 
confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our questions. 
Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
Housing Department 
1. What are the roles of your department in selling/ allocation of PPP low-cost 
housing projects? 
2. Are there policy guidelines in identifying eligible low-cost housing beneficiaries 
formulated by the government or your organisation? Yes/ No 
3. If yes, what are these guidelines set, defining the eligibility of the beneficiaries of 
the PPP low-cost housing? 
4. Do you operate registration process in selling the PPP low-income housing to the 
beneficiaries?  Yes/ No 
5. If yes, how do you operate the registration system? 
6. In your opinion, what do you feel of the registration process operated by your 
organisation? 
7. If no, how do you sell / allocate the PPP low-income housing? 
8. From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
9.  What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Appendix D- Public sector questionnaire, FCTA/FCDA, Abuja, Nigeria 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Economic planning unit/ Joint venture- privatisation unit 
1 How is the land for public-private partnerships provided to the private developers? 
2 How do you secure the development land for PPP low-cost housing? 
3 What types of infrastructure provided are to be provided on the housing estate 
(roads, drainage, water, sewerage, and electricity)? 
4 Who is responsible for the provision of the infrastructure on the housing estate?  
5 How do you ensure the standard/ quality of houses produce by the private 
developers? 
6 How are the PPP contract enforced, in the case of any violation of the PPP terms of 
agreements? 
7 On what conditions/ terms the development land is provided to the private 
developers? 
8 Has there been any violation of such terms of the PPP contract agreements? 
9 What are the mechanisms of dispute resolutions in the PPP contracts put in place 
by your organisation? 
10 Is there any legislation on dispute legislation? 
11 How is the minimum guaranteed profit determined? 
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12 How do you determine the percentage of profit to be paid by the private developer 
to your organisation? 
13 Do you have policy guidelines determined the eligibility of the prospective buyers? 
14 Is this department involved in the selling/ allocation of the PPP low-housing units 
to prospective buyers? 
15 What are the benefits derived by your organisation from the PPP projects? 
16 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP projects in housing 
the low-income households? 
17 What are the steps to take in improving the performance of partnership projects in 
the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Planning department/ unit 
1 What are the policy issues to consider in PPP planning approval procedures? 
2 What are the sources of these issues/ regulations from the planning regulations of 
your organisation? 
3 What are the developments permitted in the form of ―one package development‖ 
allowed to the private developers on the PPP projects? 
4 From what has been approved to the private sector partner, how do you ensure 
compliance? 
5 What types of infrastructure provided are to be provided in the PPP projects (roads, 
drainage, water, sewerage, and electricity)? 
6 Who is responsible for the provision of the infrastructure for the PPP projects?  
7 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
8 . What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare the institutional experiences of Malaysia and 
Nigeria in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to 
point out the mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to 
which it has facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We 
also like to give you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study 
and be kept confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our 
questions. Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this 
regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Legal department/ unit 
1 Is your department/ unit responsible for drafting the joint venture (JV) agreement? 
2 Has there been any violation of such terms of the PPP contract agreements? 
3 What are the mechanisms of dispute resolutions in the PPP contracts put in place 
by your organisation? 
4 Is there any legislation on dispute legislation? 
5 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
6 . What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria in Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to point out the 
mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to which it has 
facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We also like to give 
you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study and be kept 
confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our questions. 
Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this regard. 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
Housing Department 
1 What are the roles of your department in selling/ allocation of PPP low-cost 
housing projects? 
2 Are there policy guidelines in identifying eligible low-cost housing beneficiaries 
formulated by the government or your organisation? Yes/ No 
3 If yes, what are these guidelines set, defining the eligibility of the beneficiaries of 
the PPP low-cost housing? 
4 Do you operate registration process in selling the PPP low-income housing to the 
beneficiaries?  Yes/ No 
5 If yes, how do you operate the registration system? 
6 In your opinion, what do you feel of the registration process operated by your 
organisation? 
7 If no, how do you sell / allocate the PPP low-income housing? 
8 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
9  What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Appendix E- Private sector developer’s questionnaire, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria in Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to point out the 
mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to which it has 
facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We also like to give 
you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study and be kept 
confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our questions. 
Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this regard. 
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS RESPONDENTS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Name of firm....................................................................................................................... 
 Location......................................................................................................................... 
1. Mention the low-cost housing scheme constructed by your firm? 
2. Give the number of low-cost housing flats built by your firm according project(s)? 
3. What are the terms conditions of the PPP contract entered with the government? 
4. How do you source finance for the construction of the estate? 
5. On what terms do you access such construction financing? 
6. What are the planning regulations that your firm must comply before planning 
approval is granted? 
7. What is the unit selling price of the low-cost flat from your firm? 
8. How do you recover the proceeds of sale of the low-cost housing from the 
purchasers? 
9.  Do you pay the government the land value of the land granted to you for the PPP 
project? 
10. What is the nature of minimum guaranteed profit (MGP) payment made to the 
government of the PPP project executed by your firm? 
11. How long does it take your firm to secure approval of the following? 
a. Planning permission 
b. Building plan 
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12. Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically for 
constructing low-cost housing from the local planning authorities? 
a. Yes   b. No (If No, proceeds to question 14) 
     13. If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the local planning 
                   authority? 
 14. Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically for 
        constructing low-cost housing from the electricity authority?  
        a. Yes    b. No (If No, proceeds to question 16) 
15. If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the electricity authority? 
10 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the water authority?   
       a. Yes      b. No (If No, proceeds to question 18) 
11 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the water authority? 
12 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the telephone authority?   
       a. Yes      b. No (If No, proceeds to question 20) 
13 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the telephone authority? 
14 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the other authorities?   
       a. Yes      b. No (If No, proceeds to question 22) 
15 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from these authorities? 
16 Did your firm enjoy incentives / relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from the government on faster plan approval?  
a. Yes    b. No (If No, proceeds to question 24) 
17 If yes, the nature of the faster plan approval granted to your firm? 
18  Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from the government for land acquisition?       
a. Yes     b. No (If No, proceeds to question 26) 
19 If yes, explain the nature of the incentives on land allocation granted to your firm? 
20 Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from government on infrastructure subsidisation?  
a. Yes b. No (If No, proceeds to question 28) 
21 If yes, explain the nature of the infrastructure subsidisation granted to your firm? 
22 Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from government on planning standard?  
a. Yes b. No (If No. proceeds to question 30) 
23 If yes, explain the nature of the planning standard granted to your firm? 
24 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
25 . What are the steps to take in improving the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Appendix F- Private Sector developer’s questionnaire, Abuja, Nigeria 
 
Questionnaire of the study 
Department of Estate Management, 
Faculty of Built Environment, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
MALAYSIA. 
LOW-COST HOUSING POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA 
AND NIGERIA 
PhD Thesis 
Bawa Chafe Abdullahi 
The purpose of this study is to compare experiences of Malaysia and Nigeria in Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) in the low-cost housing strategy. We intend to point out the 
mechanisms, modalities and affordability of the partnership and the extent to which it has 
facilitated in housing the low-income households in the two countries. We also like to give 
you absolute assurance that the responses will strictly use for this study and be kept 
confidential. We are therefore soliciting for your objective responses to our questions. 
Finally, we are highly grateful for your cooperation and assistance in this regard. 
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS RESPONDENTS SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
Name of firm....................................................................................................................... 
 Location......................................................................................................................... 
1 Mention the low-cost housing scheme constructed by your firm? 
2 Give the number of low-cost housing flats built by your firm according project(s)? 
3 What are the terms conditions of the PPP contract entered with the government? 
4 How do you source finance for the construction of the estate? 
5 On what terms do you access such construction financing? 
6 What are the planning regulations that your firm must comply before planning 
approval is granted? 
7 What is the unit selling price of the low-cost flat from your firm? 
8 How do you recover the proceeds of sale of the low-cost housing from the 
purchasers? 
9  Do you pay the government the land value of the land granted to you for the PPP 
project? 
10 What is the nature of minimum guaranteed profit (MGP) payment made to the 
government of the PPP project executed by your firm? 
11 How long does it take your firm to secure approval of the following? 
12 Planning permission 
13 Building plan 
485 
 
14 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically for 
constructing low-cost housing from the local planning authorities? 
            a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 14) 
     13. If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the local planning 
                   authority? 
 14. Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically for 
        constructing low-cost housing from the electricity authority?  
        a. Yes      b. No (If No, proceeds to question 16) 
15. If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the electricity authority? 
16 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the water authority?   
       a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 18) 
17 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the water authority? 
18 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the telephone authority?   
       a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 20) 
19 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from the telephone authority? 
20 Did your firm enjoy concession from fees and financial contribution specifically 
       for constructing low-cost housing from the other authorities?   
       a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 22) 
21 If yes, explain the nature of the concessions enjoyed from these authorities? 
22 Did your firm enjoy incentives / relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from the government on faster plan approval?  
a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 24) 
23 If yes, the nature of the faster plan approval granted to your firm? 
24  Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from the government for land acquisition?       
a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 26) 
25 If yes, explain the nature of the incentives on land allocation granted to your firm? 
26 Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from government on infrastructure subsidisation?  
a. Yes       b. No (If No, proceeds to question 28) 
27 If yes, explain the nature of the infrastructure subsidisation granted to your firm? 
28 Did your firm enjoy incentives/ relaxation as institutional supports on low-cost 
housing development from government on planning standard?  
a. Yes       b. No (If No. proceeds to question 30) 
29 If yes, explain the nature of the planning standard granted to your firm? 
30 From your experience, what are the major challenges of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in housing the low-income households? 
31  What are the steps to take to improve the performance of PPP low-cost housing 
projects in the future? 
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Appendix G- The list of names of all the individuals in stakeholder organisations, as 
well as some information on their background and position at the time of the 
interview 
Area of case study-Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) 
Interviewee Position Organisation Department 
Wan Mohd Ghazali Senior Deputy 
Director 
CHKL/Public sector Economic Planning 
Hj Mohd Yusoff Deputy Director CHKL/Public sector  
En Azrin Planning officer CHKL/Public sector  
Puan Iznah Project Officer CHKL/Public sector  
Zulkifili Ibrahim  Project Director Dwitasik/private sector  
Anonymous   Private sector  
Area of case study-Abuja (Nigeria) 
Engr. Umar G. Jibrin Director FCDA/Public sector Mass Housing 
Engr. Momoh Deputy Director FCDA/Public sector Mass Housing 
Arc. Shehu A.Bammali Assistant Director FCDA/Public sector Mass Housing 
TPL Yahaya Abubakar Assistant Director FCDA/Public sector Urban & Regional 
Planning 
Arc. Bashir  Managing Director APIC/FCTA Parastatal  
Mr Ayo Bello   CITEC/Private  sector  
Engr. Johnson  Project Manager Kabusa Garden/Private 
Sector 
 
Mr Oladapo Popoola Head/Admin. 
Finance 
Yayale Ahmed/private 
Sector 
 
Yakubu Sunday Property Manager  Saraha/private Sector  
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Appendix H- Abuja FCC development phases and the embracing districts 
Phases Embracing Districts 
I Central Business District (CBD) (AO), Maitama (A5&6), Wuse I (A2), 
Wuse II (A7&8), Garki (A1) & II (A3) and Asokoro 
Planned population:230,000 
II Katampe, Mabushi, Utako, Wuye, Durumi, Gudu (B1), Jabi, Kado, 
Jabi, Daki Biyu, Kaura, Duboyi, Gaduwa, Dutse and Kukwaba 
National Park 
Planned population:585,000 
III Bunkoro, Gwarinpa I, Gwarinpa II, Mbora, Industrial Area I, 
Institutions and Research centres, Industrial Area II, Galadimawa, 
Dakwo, Lokogoma, Wumba, Wupa, Dape, Karmo, Pyakesa, Okanje, 
Kabusa and Saraji. 
Planned population: 640,000 
IV Karsana North, Karsana East, Karsana South, Karsana West, Ido 
Gwari, Idu-Sabo, Kado Kafe, Kodo, Wupa, and S. Gida  
Planned population:1,700,000 
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Appendix  I- CHKL conditions of JV partnering with the private developers 
(excerpts from a sample of the JV PA document) 
1. The developer is required to pay 10% of the land value to the CHKL on signing the 
agreement. Thereafter, the developer pays the remaining total land value allocated 
for the project; according to the schedule contained in Table below, extend within 
the period of the development. 
 
Schedule of land value payment to be observed by participating private developer in 
CHKL JV, Kuala Lumpur  
Period  Percentage of payment 
Upon signing agreement 10% 
12 Months 30% 
24 Months 30% 
36 Months 30% 
 
2. Payment of minimum gross profit (MGP) and any additional profit made by the 
developer to CHKL. The dateline for the MGP was set in within one month after the 
issuance of certificate of practical completion. Non-prompt payment of the MGP 
attracts 10% interest beginning from the due date on a daily basis not exceeding six 
months. 
3. Acceptance of substitution of payment of land value, MGP and additional profit (if 
any) in kind to CHKL. These values are converted to the values of equivalent to the 
residential units from the development accompanied with a special discount of 10% of 
the public sale price of such units. 
4. The completion of the development within a period of 36 months. 
5. When it is squatter enclave, the developer is responsible to pay all the quit rents, 
assessment and all other costs and expenses as well as outgoings in respect of the land. 
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Appendix  J- FCTA conditions of partnering with the private developers (excerpts 
from a sample of the MHS LA document) 
1. To complete the specified number of housing units within eighteen months (FCDA) 
or three (3) years (defunct MFCT) from the date of the agreement, on the land 
granted, depending on the scheme. 
2. The housing development should be in conformity with the approved plan and with 
all specifications contained in the Development Control manual of the FCDA. 
3. The private developer is entitled for a six month extension after the expiration of 
the period of completion.  
4. The failure of the private developer to complete the development within the 
specified periods entitled the FCDA to take over the land and improvements made. 
However, the developer is entitled to be given compensation from the 
FCDA/FCTA. 
5. Additionally, there is a broader clause that allows the FCDA/FCTA to take over the 
possession of demised premises upon breaches of any terms of the lease agreement. 
6.  The FCDA/FCTA undertook the responsibility to provide primary and arterial 
infrastructures to the estate, whereas the private developers provide the secondary 
and tertiary. However, where the FCDA/FCTA failed to fulfil its mandate, the 
private developers were at liberty to provide the prerequisite infrastructures to 
make the estate habitable at the firm expense.  
7. The arising disputes between the parties is agreed to be referred to an arbitration 
panel, each nominating one arbitrator and the third appointed by them to preside. 
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Appendix  K- Pre-and post-qualification requirements process for participation in Abuja MHS 
Requirements Specific details 
Pre-qualification 
1. a. Payments  i. An assessment fee of N250,000 
ii. 2.5% of project cost from a recognized bank in Nigeria as 
performance bond. 
b. Legal i.  Duly registered as a corporate body in Nigeria. 
ii. Statutory bodies to produce the statue of creation. 
iii.Free from legal impediments 
iv.Producing certificate of registration; Memorandum and Articles of 
Association and three years evidence tax payments and company 
Audited accounts for three years. 
v. Sworn affidavit on a commitment to develop the land within the 
stipulated time. 
c. Technical Staff i. Must have registered professional staff  in the professions of 
Architecture, Civil/Structural Engineering, Electrical Engineering, 
Planning, Quantity Surveying and Land Surveying.  
ii. The names and their credentials most be given. 
d. Financial  i. Project feasibility reports. 
ii. Project Financial forecast and cash flow projections. 
iii. Sources and evidence of the project finance. 
iv). Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Developer and 
the project Financiers. 
v. Evidence of equity capital  
e. Development 
proposals 
i. Conceptual Layout of proposed development. 
ii. Preliminary Architectural drawings. 
iii. Preliminary engineering drawings  
Post-qualification. 
2. a Payments i. For Land, amounts according to the scale of development as follows at 
the FCC and Satellite Towns 
FCC- Large-     6-10 hectares –N10,000,000 
         Medium- 3-5   hectares- N  6,000,000 
         Small      1-2   hectares–N   3,000,000 
 
Satellite Towns- Large-     11-20 hectares –N5,000,000 
                        Medium-   6-10  hectares- N3,000,000 
                        Small-       2-5   hectares– N2,000,000 
b. Technical  To submit the respective documents for approval under 
i. Planning drawings- site appraisal, topographical maps 
of the plot, general land use plan, density distribution 
plan, detailed site development plan, building 
coverage/block layout plan and environmental impact 
analysis.  
ii. Architectural drawings- building plans, elevations and 
sections, structural designs of building types, services 
design and block models.  
iii. Engineering drawings- road, water supply, 
wastewater, storm water drainage, electrical 
distribution and telecommunication duct networks.  
c. Financial  Project cost estimates by  
i. Cost of building 
ii. Cost of secondary and tertiary engineering 
infrastructure 
iii. Proposed selling prices of the housing units 
iv. Completion period not exceeding 36 months 
Source: FGN (2009:1596-1599) 
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Assigned responsibilities between the FCDA/FCTA and private developers from the 
signed DLA 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
FCDA/FCTA PRIVATE DEVELOPER 
 Land allocation to the selected private 
developers at nominal values. 
 Assessment of improvements on the land 
and subsequent payment of compensation of 
interests in the allocated land by the FCDA. 
 Undertaking to construct primary and 
arterial infrastructure to the housing estates 
subject to availability of financial resources.  
 To provide standards and guarantee 
approvals from Development control, once 
the development documents plans 
appropriately done within one month of 
submission. 
 Coordination, supervision and monitoring 
of the scheme implementation. 
 Issuance of C of O titles to the purchasers of 
the houses sold by the private developers 
once the prerequisites fees and deferred 
charges settled. 
 Submissions of the requisite development 
documents for approval. 
 Carrying out the development in conformity 
with the supplied Abuja Development 
Control Manual. 
 Developing secondary and tertiary 
infrastructure on the estate. 
 At liberty to provide primary and arterial 
infrastructure to provide their housing 
estates accessibility, where the 
FCTA/FCDA fails to provide. 
 Land to be exclusively used for the mass 
housing and not to assign or sublet a whole 
or a part. 
 Payment of compensation to whose interests 
acquired, especially villages to be displaced 
 To produce and supply the list of purchasers 
of the disposed units for the issuance of C 
of O. 
Source: Generated from different records on MHS in Abuja 
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Appendix L- Conditions for obtaining estate development loans by developers from 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) as Estate Development Loan (EDL) 
To qualify for an estate developer‘s loan from the FMBN, an Estate Developer has to meet 
the following conditions: 
 Loan is for residential housing estate development only at an interest rate of 10% 
p.a. (on annuity basis) and for a tenor not exceeding 24 months subject to revision. 
 The bank finances infrastructural facilities up to 70% for private developers only, 
while housing corporations and Government owned development projects are to 
provide 100% infrastructure. 
 The proposed estate must have a good title that can be assigned, leased or sub-
leased to individual allotees/purchasers of the units therein. 
 Housing units under the proposed project must not be more than N15million so that 
they can be affordable to NHF contributors. These units should be in line with type 
plans specified by FMBN. 
 There must have been firm commitments from buyers/allotees of the housing units. 
An accredited Mortgage Loan Originator (e.g. PMI) is to be identified in order to 
facilitate the introduction of the project to prospective buyers/allotters who must be 
contributors to NHF. 
 A financial projection to suit the proposed financial arrangement of the project 
must be provided. The projection must include developers‘ equity participation in 
the project at the present rate of 10%. 
 Estate Development Loans to be secured with the title document (i.e C of O or R of 
O) for the property to be developed and an additional security for a value of the 1
st
 
tranche only. Developers with the lease agreement are to meet the following 
requirements: 
 That it shall be registerable as well as give the developer power to lay out, 
partition, allocate, assign and sublet housing units including apartments, 
flats in blocks, detached and semi-detached bungalow, terraces etc. as well 
as service plots. This must be done in accordance with approved building 
plan/site layout. 
 That the development lease should be stated that the individual titles will be 
submitted directly to FMBN (or financier). 
 That the developer will be able to pledge and mortgage the land 
/development to FMBN or any other financier thereon to raise funds to meet 
the obligation under the development lease agreement. 
 The tenor of the lease should be for a minimum of 5 years with an assurance 
of renewal for a further term of 5 years or more. 
 The financier or FMBN should have first charge over the land /development 
on it. 
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The below listed document should be submitted with the loan application 
package: 
 Certificate of incorporation 
 Photocopy of Article and Memorandum of association of the company 
with true copies of FORM Co2 and Co7. 
 Detailed profile of the company 
 Audited accounts with the signature, seal and certificate stamp of the 
Auditors, for the previous three years. 
 Photocopy of tax clearance certificate for three years. 
 Photocopy of registered title documents on the land for the proposed 
project. 
 Approve building and layout plan by the relevant body/authority. 
 Resolution of the state Executive council as well as a motion of the 
State House of Assembly approving the application for a loan from 
FMBN for State Housing Corporations. 
 The company‘s board resolution to borrow signed by the Chairman and 
Company Secretary. 
Source: http://www.fmbn.gov.ng/vault/edl-faqs.pdf 
 
 
 
